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Chapter “0” 
(Summary & introduction to 1978 Thesis, Brunel University) 
ORIGINAL SUMMARY of WHOLE WORK 
Behaviourists and Logical Positivists commendably set out to purge loose prejud-
iced arguments from science; but where it is obvious that there remains some sort of 
“ghost” in their rational “machine”, it is self-defeating simply to ignore its existence.  
Freud, Piaget, and the ethologists have made some progress in grasping this nettle — 
moving towards a material explanation of the “other-worldly” properties of the 
individual — but their models of the individual remain nebulously structured in their 
basic elements.  Consequently such theories remain disturbingly controversial, and 
circumscribed in their applicability. 
The present work accordingly sets out to bridge this gap by postulating plausible 
functions for the existing micro-structure which could account both for observed 
behavioural phenomena, and for many of the existing vaguer theoretical constructs.  
Part A develops such an explanation for Piagetian constructs, while Part B fills in some 
of the technical details concerning quantitative problems of signal generation, trans-
mission, and selective reception. 
Part C applies these notions to other non-Piagetian descriptions and interpretations 
of psychological phenomena, thereby offering an integration and reconciliation of 
various schools of theory.  (Major areas considered include Ashby’s “homeostat” 
approach, biological self-organization, sleep-modes and dreaming, Freudian theories of 
neuroses, and various theories concerning psychosis).  The basic theory itself is 
meanwhile developed in much greater detail. 
A recurring theme throughout the work is the notion that knowledge-acquisition by 
any independent system depends not only on “external” interaction with the “real” 
world, but also on an active seeking for internal consistency within the resulting 
“internal” model.  This concept is crucial to the study in two ways:-  (i) The operation 
of the brain-systems being considered, and (ii) As a guide to the methodology  <12>of 
the present study itself — in an area where experimental data is uncomfortably sparse, 
and likely to remain so. <13> 
——————————————————————————————————— 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This work constitutes a many-angled attack on some of the age-old questions on what 
important transactions could be taking place inside the structure of the human brain.  This is a tall 
order of course, and time will tell whether the theories proposed are more, or less, correct.  But 
either way, I believe that this work has much to offer in the number of unquestioned (or seldom-
questioned) assumptions which it brings to light.  If my own solutions to the resulting problems 
should happen to be somewhat wide of the mark, this will be comparatively unimportant as long 
as the raising of the questions leads to further investigations and better answers. 
Problems of intuitive thought — as a tool, and as a subject of study 
The following simplistic resumé might perhaps orient the reader to the sort of approach being 
attempted here in relation to the understanding of the mind/brain, and the relation this work has to 
other previous ideas on the subject. 
Let us start by differentiating between two types of thought process:  Intuitive-subjective 
versus logical,  [or Freudian primary versus secondary-process thinking,  or Piaget’s Concrete 
Operations versus Formal Operations;  or “M1L” versus “M2L” in the present work].  We may 
next consider that these two categories of thought, however we choose to define the difference, 
will manifest themselves in two relevant ways:  (i) as an object of study — typically in other 
13
15 
12
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people including patients, but also in “ourselves-at-other-times”, and in non-human animals; 
(ii) as the very process by which we engage in all such consideration.  <15>  
Accordingly, this means that we can think about Logical thought  (a) mystically, in an 
intuitive way, or (b) in a logical way; and similarly we may think about Intuitive thought in (c) an 
intuitive way, or else (d) in a logical way.  Thus:- 
 
  Process by which the study is made  
  intuitive thought 
and feelings 
logical or 
systematic thought 
intuitive 
thought and  
feelings 
  (c) Novelists,  Artists.   (d)    (?Freud) 
ob
je
ct
 o
f s
tu
dy
 
logical or  
systematic 
thought 
  (a) Mystics,  Animists,
   Teleologists. 
  (b) Bertrand Russell; 
   Logical Positivists.
    
 



	





   
   
b
o
th
 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
— though to what extent these various analyses have so far produced helpful results, remains as a 
matter for debate. 
Probably all such studies must start with an intuitive unsystematic approach like those on the 
left, and many problems might indeed forever defy any really systematic approach.  Nevertheless, 
systematization is the aim for scientific treatments like the present work, so the right-hand items 
(b and d) call for further comment here:- 
(b) One great achievement of Western thought has been the comparative rigour of its logical 
formulations.  This has led to the hope that absolute rigour might be achieved, and this hope 
seems to have been the driving force behind logical positivism and other work related to it: 
Whitehead and Russell (1910-1913), Carnap (1928), and arguably also Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus” 
(1921).  In the event, such absolute rigour has turned out to be unattainable, as shown in effect by 
Gödel (1931), and as we may also see fairly easily if we ask ourselves “What is the logical 
justification for our rules of <16> logic?”!  The question then becomes one of finding out how we 
are to achieve good approximations to this ideal — a task tackled in their different ways by 
Popper, Piaget, and the later work of Wittgenstein. 
(d) The equivalent study of intuitive or “non-rational” thought has been very much a 
neglected area, comparatively speaking.  But there are two important reasons why we should try 
to remedy this deficit.  Firstly, however much we may take an elitist view deploring the non-
rational thought in others (Plato: The Republic), it nevertheless abounds all around us and even 
within our own “rational” selves — and there is no realistic prospect of making any significant 
change to this situation, as will be apparent from the works of the psychoanalytical schools, and 
also from the works of Piaget. 
Secondly it follows from the inherent limitation of logical thought, just mentioned above, that 
such “irrational” thought is actually a necessary alternative to fill in the many inevitable “holes” 
in our logic.  (In other cases such intuitive judgement may often be more efficient for the task in 
hand even if a logical solution does exist — as many a practical business-man or politician will 
know from experience).  Accordingly, it seems high time that we knew more about such intuitive 
16
17
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processes so that we could plan a better (logical) utilization for them, as well as giving us more 
understanding to deal with the “irrational” behaviour of others which was mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. 
As things stand, there is some real justification in the claim that “good novelists are streets 
ahead of psychologists” in their portrayal of important issues in social life, (item “(c)” in the 
above table).  Freud has, to be sure, done much to put this study <17> of non-rational thought 
into a rational framework1.  Unfortunately though, in his day there was no adequate knowledge of 
neurophysiology on which he could have helpfully based such an attempt (though he did try), so 
he was forced to “build his house upon the sand” of constructs which were themselves largely 
intuitive in origin; so his system might best be seen as something of a provisional semi-structured 
model.  Now that we know much more about the physical and physiological mechanisms of 
neural systems, we are in a better position to attempt to re-build “the house” (preferably the same 
house if possible) — but “on rock” this time. 
Thus it is that a major purpose of the present project has been to produce some hard-if-
controversial explanations for non-rational processes and their vicissitudes — but in more logical 
and explicit terms than has hitherto been possible.  In short, this work aims to make good the felt-
weakness of “(d)” in the above table. 
In passing, we might notice that the diagonally-opposite entry, item “(a)”, involves an intuit-
ive approach to logical matters!  One conspicuous manifestation of this is the occasional anti-
intellect<18>ual swing against science and logic which becomes fashionable whenever 
sufficiently vocal sections of the community feel justified in claiming that “the experts have got it 
all wrong”.  Sometimes indeed, they may be correct in their basic criticism — but even if they 
are, it does not necessarily follow that a straight regression to intuitive “solutions” will help in the 
slightest.  On the contrary, if actually implemented for complex problems, such a doctrine is 
likely to lead to disaster — to the concentration camp and the gas-chamber, as Bertrand Russell 
remarked in his influential broadcast comments on D.H.Lawrence.  More recently, Professor Max 
Hamilton’s controversial address to the British Psychological Society (1973) also sounded a 
similar warning. 
To abandon ourselves, blindly and totally, to the processes of intuition — without any 
constraints of level-headed logical thought — would be to abandon ourselves to sub-human bar-
barity.  But to go to the other extreme and deny the necessity and existence of intuitive thought, 
would be to throw out the baby with the bathwater; and moreover it would probably provoke an 
eventual reflection from the very same intuitive forces which we were denying.  Intuition then is 
certainly no panacea, but neither can we safely ignore it; and to understand it adequately, it would 
seem that we should at least try to describe its general operation — in the formal and rigorous 
language of “logical” thought.  And this, of course, brings us back to “(d)” and the objectives of 
the present work. 
It might be fair to say that the important contribution of Logical Positivism was to cause a 
general progression out of “(a)” and into “(b)”.  In retrospect it seems that this programme could 
                                                          
1 Other writers also deserve a mention here:-  Wittgenstein’s later work (1953) poses many apposite 
questions illustrating the inadequacy of the conventional “logical” approach (and these questions are 
very interesting to re-read in the light of the current theory), but he himself does not have much to offer 
in answer to his own questions.  Piaget comes nearer to giving an adequate account of sub-rational 
thought in his various discussions and studies of the Sensori-Motor stage — though it has been 
suggested that his account lacks the attention to emotion which any adequate account of social 
behaviour should contain (M. Jahoda, 1972, in answer to a question).  The present work attempts to 
produce explanations which are compatible with both Piagetian and Freudian approaches; though to 
what extent this attempt has been successful is, of course, open to debate.  <18> 
19
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not actually succeed in fulfilling its own perfectionist ideals, and it is now recognized as being 
logically false in this strict sense (Ayer, 1978, last column).  However Ayer adds, with some 
<19> justification, “that it was true in spirit, that the attitude was right”.  It would now seem that 
the missing factor was the recognition of the need for the internal-closure criterion of intuitive 
thought, and the acceptance that this is the only means by which we can “lift ourselves by our 
own bootstraps” out of the state of complete ignorance that our ultimate protoplasmal ancestors 
were faced with.  Once again, this brings us back to “(d)” — and even to the artist’s insights of 
“(c)”, whenever more systematic approaches fail. 
Subtopics and how they are allocated here 
In broad philosophical terms, it should now be reasonably apparent how this present project 
relates to previous work.  But it is a rather more difficult task to locate its detailed arguments 
alongside those pre-existing in the many interdisciplinary fields involved — simply because of 
their number and diversity.  No proper discussion of such relationship to previous ideas will be 
attempted at this introductory stage, but these questions have been explored as they arose.  Of 
these, the most important theoretical backgrounds-to-innovation will be found best summarized 
under the obvious chapter-headings; for example Scientific Method in Chapter C1, and Ashby’s 
“Homeostat” in Chapter C4.  Other less obvious backgrounds to topics within the overall project, 
are given at least a passing reference as follows:-  Classical and operant conditioning, and 
Ethology (Section A1.4); Neurophysiological saltatory conduction (the latter half of Section 
B3.3); Embryological mechanisms (Section C5.3); Infra-red and micro-waves in biology (Chapter 
Bl); and the evolution of intra-organism communication (Chapter B5). 
[By mid-1978, Parts A and B had already been separately published as ‘hard copy’:  
Part A in the two Kybernetes papers (1976 and 1978, vols 5 and 7);    and  
Part B as a 1977/1980 Brunel University monograph (Cyb.#24), which has now recently 
appeared online as  www.ondwelle.com/MolecMemIR.pdf   and as  www.wbabin.net/physics/traill8  —  
(hence its actual text has been omitted here, since the hyperlinks to it seem to suffice). In contrast: 
Part C had hitherto been publicly available only in university libraries.       — RRT, 2006/2007.] 
This leads us to a brief consideration of how the overall project report has been divided up.  
In Part A the discussion has, <20> as much as possible, been kept deliberately abstract — 
considering what formal functional structures would seem to be needed if the system were to be 
capable of behaving according to Piaget’s depiction of dynamic human existence and (psycho-
logical) development.  Having taken this abstract modelling as far as seemed profitable, the study 
turned to Part B in which it was sought to postulate, in some considerable detail, just what 
plausible real-physical-mechanisms could underlie the formal abstractions previously postulated.  
By now this amounted to a promising basic model of the brain and its more straightforward 
processes.  It remained then to elaborate these ideas as much as was feasible, such as to try to 
develop detailed explanations for more-specialized types of behaviour and experience (notably 
sleep, neurosis, and psychosis), as a means toward testing the new postulates, developing others 
relating to fine detail; and meanwhile hoping for practical progress from such innovations.  This 
latter task is dealt with in Part C. 
The balance between Parts A, B, and C — and their interdependence 
The size of the field encompassed by the present project is a compromise between two 
conflicting demands:-  (i) The obvious need to stop somewhere and secure any loose ends as best 
I could, before the whole ensemble of ideas got out of hand; — “to keep it concise” in other 
words.  (ii) On the other hand, given the paucity of direct evidence on the issues raised, it has 
been necessary to extend the ramifications of the theory as widely as is reasonably possible, so as 
20 
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to develop whatever information may be gleaned from interdisciplinary cross-comparison (or 
“internal closure”, to put it into the current theory’s own terminology). 
Part A on its own is not particularly convincing.  Part B is perhaps a little more compelling as 
it clearly contains at least <21> three mutually-corroborating arguments and thus has its own self-
sustaining share of “internal closure in more than two dimensions”.  Nevertheless the new 
proposed model would be bound to look somewhat hollow if it could not offer an enhanced 
understanding of the function and malfunction of the mental system as a whole.  It has thus been 
the task of Part C to attempt this application of the basic postulates to the more general theory, 
and this process needed to be taken far enough either to show up serious weaknesses in the basic 
postulates, or to constitute a persuasive argument that the theory is at least on the right track. 
Ideally other disciplines should have been incorporated as well, in all detail which seemed 
relevant; (e.g.  immunology, biochemistry, pharmacology, and experimental embryology).  It is 
with some regret that such aspects have had to be dealt with superficially, or left out altogether.  
But the line had to be drawn somewhere; and there may even be some advantage in leaving such 
scope for other, less partizan investigators to cross-check the implications within other, so-far 
neglected, fields of study. 
Some 18 interrelated biological insights which seem mutually corroborative 
The most significant direct theoretical insights offered by the project would appear to be the 
following.  (i) Firstly there is the epistemological challenge to the methodological doctrine that 
experimental observations are the only legitimate criterion for advancing theoretical models.  
This clears the way for making progress by other means, depending on the strategy of preferring 
models according to the degree of uncompartmentalized internal consistency which they show; 
though effective use of this strategy depends on the model being based on elementary entities 
which are adequately discrete, valid, and predictable-in-principle.  (ii) Secondly there <22> is the 
complementary insight that it seems to be essentially the same strategy which enables biological 
brains to achieve their extraordinary feats of learning from unsystematic experience (in contrast 
to the comparatively trivial achievements of so-called “electronic brains”). 
This comparison gives rise to (iii) — a general observation that similar complex problems are 
likely to call forth functionally equivalent mechanisms which might or might not be physically 
equivalent; and of which, one such mechanism might or might not incorporate systems belonging 
to the other.  (Such shared systems could then serve different functional roles with respect to the 
two different points of view).  This, in turn, leads to another consideration:  (iv) that a hierarchical 
“recursive” organization might be successfully evolved within some types of brain system; — an 
insight which may be regarded as an extension and generalization of Ashby’s concept of the 
“homeostat”-type of adaptive control, and which thereby offers solutions for his own unsolved 
list of “antinomies”. 
We will turn now to insights as to basic mechanisms:-  
(v) There is the general rule-of-thumb that the explanation for any “mysterious” behaviour in a 
system is often to be found in hitherto unexplored discrete micro-structure within a massed 
population of relatively stable units — which are normally observed as a collective whole, giving 
a misleading appearance of homogeneity and continuous-variation in its properties. 
(This notion should not be considered novel, except in its present field of application.  There 
is, after all, ample precedent for it in:  the emergence of Chemistry following from the modern 
concept of atoms and molecules;  the emergence of sub-atomic physics;  the development of 
Planck’s postulate to explain anomalies of radiation;  Mendel’s abstract concept of the gene — 
and the subsequent elucidation <23> of this notion; the development of the concept of bacteria 
from Semmelweiss’s unstructured statistical correlations into the structured and discrete entities 
22
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of Koch and Pasteur;  the advance in neurophysiology when it became possible to isolate the 
response inside single nerve cells and fibres;  and so on into other microbiological developments.  
It also seems clear that it is our apparent inability to formulate a sufficiently structured view of 
the individual units within social systems, which has left the “social sciences” with a rather 
dubious reputation for any scientific qualities — so that they are often regarded more as “arts” — 
and justifiably so.  The question of whether there is any feasible remedy for this, must be 
regarded as a separate issue — to which we will return shortly). 
Anyhow, in the present context this has led to a critical re-evaluation of various doctrines 
about neurophysiological mechanisms;— doctrines which appear to rest on the dubiously-valid 
criterion of present-day limits to resolution in physiological experiments.  (This evidently follows 
from the self-imposed constraint against seriously considering the existence of mechanisms 
which cannot be fairly-directly observed).  This re-evaluation leads us to further potentially 
valuable insights:- 
(vi) The next is that our phenomenal ability to handle conceptual sequences, in a reliably 
reproducible manner, would be most credibly explained by postulating that the basic encodings of 
memory will be organized in topologically linear “strings” or “tapes” of physical information-
storage; — a formulation which also offers an explanation for the mathematical “sets” and 
“groups” evident in our thought processes.  From there it is but a short step to the plausible 
supposition  (vii) that such linear encodings could be string-like macro-molecules (probably 
DNA, RNA, or protein) similar to those used for genetic encoding.  If this is correct, then the 
above <24> principle (v: population of micro-elements) may be interpreted as suggesting that 
practical memory, as displayed behaviourally, will result from cooperative summations from the 
effects of such micro-elements. 
(viii) The next insight arose unexpectedly during the investigation of an otherwise unhelpful 
theoretical idea.  The surprise discovery was that, despite physiological doctrines to the contrary, 
myelinated nerve fibres are constructed in such a way that they could well be suitable media for 
conducting local infra-red signals through an inhospitable aqueous medium.  Then (ix) the very 
ease with which this infra-red conduction might be aided or blocked by changes at lipid 
boundaries could act as a powerful means for transducing signals.  Furthermore (x) it was seen 
that such co-axial paths might often favour optical dispersion of signals, and that this could 
actually assist the efficient utilization and sorting of signals (contrary to what one might expect 
from engineering-design practice). 
(xi) The next conceptual innovation was to associate this likely availability of infrared-
handling capabilities with the need for such abilities so that there could be proper control of 
emission and absorption spectra associated with the molecular changes presumably entailed in the 
chemical storage of memory — and presumably involving the postulated linear molecules. 
Then, as a by-product of these considerations, there was (xii) the notion that infra-red or 
micro-wave interference patterns would offer a more credible means for controlling 
embryological growth than the more usual suggestion of chemotaxis.  (This point may turn out to 
be rather more relevant than would seem at first sight, because it would seem to be rather more 
testable experimentally than most of the other ideas, and because it might be used to account for 
the production of specific nerve-fibre geometries — as opposed to the <25> functional 
significance of these shapes). 
The idea that the fundamental units of memory, for at least some purposes, were of molecular 
size rather than on the much larger scale of the synaptic junction, opened up a new range of 
possibilities leading to another insight:  (xiii) The vastly greater likely number of such elements 
(and their much greater speed potential) made it plausible to suggest that all-or-most “recording” 
of memories actually depended on a vast system of continuing trial-and-error, and that these 
25
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arbitrary micro-trials stood a reasonable chance of offering a correct interpretation of events — in 
amongst the many incorrect interpretations which would normally be promptly rejected as 
misfits.  Such an interpretation seems to go a long way toward explaining the peculiar strengths 
and weaknesses of biological perception and mentation, as compared with its “counterparts” in 
modern technology. 
(xiv) The next insight is simply a generalization of this concept, to the effect that physically-
based Darwinian trial-and-error seems to be the driving-force behind all substantial biological 
progress;  and that even our apparently transcendental thought-capabilities operate on fundament-
ally the same principle as the natural selection of beetles or bacteria; that they might even use the 
same physical mechanisms (though differently controlled in different organs of the body); and 
that thought processes are simply “evolution writ small”, and involving the same sort of prodig-
ious wastage amongst all but the actual winners. 
On the more psychologically-oriented side of the question, these concepts gave a reasonable 
basis for explaining  (xv) how the brain might handle its representation of “sets” (in the mathe-
matical sense) — in a potentially hierarchical way, and with possible recursion in the organiz-
ation, and even a limited amount of inversion to the hierarchy of control, giving a feedback-loop 
which could upset <26> the brain’s stability if it were abused by too prominent a utilization.  As 
part of this process, the brain was seen as being involved in continually re-grouping its 
mechanisms such as to keep alternative methods at its disposal — enabling it to adapt quickly 
when outside circumstances demand, or when one of the mechanisms fails internally.  The devel-
opment of hierarchical integration was seen as part of this process, and the striving toward the 
construction of “extensively defined sets” (as physical structures) out of the less-accessible 
information of “intensively defined sets” was seen as another aspect. 
The next theoretical innovation was (xvi) to identify the observable sleep-modes as outward 
manifestations of these maintenance and mental-development processes. 
Another insight was (xvii) to explain psychoses as a breakdown of these processes in various ways. 
To complete the list, (xviii) neurosis was accounted for as trapped-states which were explic-
able in terms of the physical operation of the linear-encodings of memory; and this suggested 
ways in which these states might sometimes progress dynamically into a structurally-definable 
psychotic state. 
A concluding remark should be made about the postulated molecular mechanisms.  There is 
no reason to suppose that they in themselves constitute a complete basis for explaining brain 
function, without also implicating the more macro-phenomena at cell and synapse level.  We 
should rather expect that any reasonably-complete explanation will require a consideration of 
both, in much the same way that any adequate understanding of the properties of Radium must 
take account of both its orthodox chemistry, and the sub-atomic characteristics of its nuclei.<27> 
Possible applications in the social sciences and elsewhere 
There are several important applications which might arise from significant progress in this 
field of what we might call “micro-structural psychology”.  There is a clear potential role for such 
knowledge in clinical psychiatry and as a new ingredient to many aspects of philosophy and 
academic psychology; and there are less obvious potential by-products from this work in the 
theoretical domains relating to embryology and other questions of cell-dynamics.  Another non-
obvious potential application is to the broad field of social psychology — the field which we will 
now look at first, before discussing the others on the above list:- 
(1) The psychology of economics and politics.  Rather surprisingly perhaps, it was unsolved 
problems within the social sciences which originally prompted this project, and which seem to 
27
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have attracted the most interest more recently.  The problem which first seems to have come to 
me explicitly, was an unease about the way psychological factors were represented within the 
allegedly quantifiable theories of economics — especially Keynesian economics and the “utility” 
concept of welfare economics.  (These formulations should, for instance, be compared with those 
of Maslow (1954) — a book which gave me some early insight into the complexities of real 
human choice criteria).  Such economic theories have had their critics within economics, especi-
ally since the oil crisis of 1973 (see, for instance: Monthly Review, Sep.  1970, Apr 1974; and 
Politics & Money, Apr-Jun, 1974), but to me it was the psychological naiveté of such 
formulations which seemed most striking. 
The reason for this inadequacy was reasonably obvious:-  
Although one might well be able to criticize the mathematical models by using well-informed 
verbal arguments, there seemed to be no way in which these critical insights could themselves be 
put into any sort of mathematical form, comparable to the existing naive formulae and such that 
any hard-headed practical planner could use them for <28> deciding optimally about complex 
economic systems.  Consequently, any real-life decisions of this nature had to be made either  
(a) using the naive models at face-value, or more likely  (b) tempering the implications of such 
models with sober opinion from men-of-experience, who were able to judge the realities of the 
situation more-or-less accurately — but in a way that they could not fully explain or generalize, 
and using what we are pleased to call “intuition” or “primary process thinking”.  (This non-
communicability also clearly leaves scope for antisocial “fudging” of opinions — whether 
deliberate or not; and this often results in serious distortions of the truth:-   in Accounting 
(Gambling, 1978), and in Politics). 
This difficulty seemed to suggest that the science of psychology might be able to help, either 
by explaining the psychological aspects of market behaviour (of consumer, producer, investor, 
etc.) in adequate detail, or at least by giving us a better understanding of the intuitive processes 
used to correct the naive models. 
Unfortunately psychology itself has hitherto been just about as unsatisfactory in the precision, 
reliability, and generality of its mathematical models, so there seemed to be little it could offer in 
practical terms.  To be sure, there has often been a symbolic gesture towards using quantitative 
psychology in public decision-making, but the evidence rather suggests that this use has been no 
more than a political ploy to support this-or-that decision which has already been taken in 
advance — with the decision-makers then casting around for existing arguments to support their 
case; (Gardner, 1975). 
Statistical evidence on social matters often appears contradictory, equivocal, or simply 
inconclusive or ungeneralizable.  And even if it suffers from none of these defects, it still lacks 
the persuasive <29> power that a structural theory, such as the atomic theory of chemistry, is able 
to exert.  Accordingly it seemed appropriate to seek for a possible solution involving theories 
which offered a structural approach to explaining thought and brain-activity — rather than mere 
correlation and factor analysis.  This led me to work such as that of Jean Piaget and the 
ethologists; and the signs are that this was a significant step in the right direction.  However, as 
they stand, the concepts put forward by these writers do not yet measure up to the structural 
specificity which seemed necessary; so it appeared worthwhile to postulate the type of formal 
“micro-mechanical” structure which could underlie the phenomena of psychology in general, and 
those studied by these writers in particular.  Hence the formal theories set out in Part A, 
elaborated physiologically in Part B, and cybernetico-behaviourally in Part C. 
The original problem then, presented itself as a politico-economic one, but it also seems 
pertinent to other social problems:-  What are the real issues behind censorship of sex or violence 
for different age-groups?   (Correlation studies are costly and inconclusive).  What are the real 
30 
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issues relating to racial equality, intelligence, and ego development?   (Issues hotly debated on the 
basis of orthodox statistical methods).  What is the relation between antisocial behaviour of 
certain social groups, and society’s ambivalent treatment of these groups?   — and what is the 
relation of both of these “variables” to the evolution of ego/superego structures within the 
members of these groups?   Will chronic unemployment lead to violent racialism and/or war as it 
did in the 1930s?   — and is there anything we can do to stop it? 
Some of these problems will indeed reflect back onto economics in the form of questions 
such as:  •“Exactly why is Mr Q prepared to spend large amounts of money or time on — sending 
his children <30> to school Y rather than school Z; expensive cars; a political cause; the 
gambling tables; a mistress; plastic surgery; or whatever?”  •“Are some of these non-subsistence 
buying-tendencies due to an irrational and/or insatiable desire for something else?  •What is the 
something, and is it actually attainable?  Would he be better off not obtaining it?  Is he taking the 
right actions to get this something anyhow?  Is there anything society could or should do to 
influence him in any relevant way, and why?  Is society already creating a problem — for 
instance by allowing misleading advertising, or other vested-interest activity with undesirable 
psychological side-effects?” 
Questions which are more particularly relevant to management are:-  •“When a worker has 
‘job satisfaction’, what is it that is actually happening in his mind, and can we understand this 
process structurally?” Hence  •“Just why is it psychologically important (where possible) to 
consult workers before acting; and how should this be done?” And hence perhaps •“Just why does 
Maoist Chinese society continue to spend large amounts of time and energy on consultative 
meetings of this sort, with apparent enthusiasm, despite the loss of production which this seems to 
entail, at least in the short term?” (From a cybernetic point of view, any system or custom which 
actually survives the test of time — despite apparent “ineconomies” — is likely to have more 
significance to it than would appear from casual inspection; and it is therefore likely to be a 
profitable field for close analysis.  Similarly, systems which are surprisingly unstable will also be 
of practical and theoretical interest).    [Better examples might include:   expensive carnivals,  many religious practices,   and  
irrational gambling — RRT 2006]. 
Other problems, more in the province of the accountant, are:-  •“What do we mean by ‘the 
social cost of unemployment’?   And what positive steps are needed for social stability if we are 
to pursue <31> an overall course of capital-intensive production — making the national labour-
force largely redundant?” Or the introspective type of question:  •“What is the basis for my 
intuitive preference for this statistical figure or that?  And can I formalize this accounting 
procedure in such a way as to free myself from political pressure?” (Sterling, 1975; Gambling, 
1978). 
Unfortunately it is probably too early to properly assess what value my current work might be 
in helping to solve social questions like these, in terms of structured cybernetics.  As they stand, 
these theories about the individual do not, by themselves, have anything much to say on social 
matters without further elaboration — but they may turn out to offer the right sort of framework 
on which a better, and causally-structured, understanding of social processes might be based.  
Anyhow that was the original aim of the project and some slight informal investigations along 
these lines have been initiated elsewhere (Traill, Ref ‘5/77’ [draft only]), even if that part of the task 
has barely begun. 
(2) Psychiatry.         The most obvious field of likely application for the current theories, 
especially as developed in the two final chapters, is in clinical psychiatry and the general area of 
Mental Health.  However this does not mean that the new ideas, even if heuristically or epistem-
ologically valid, will necessarily produce any immediate payoff.  In the longer term though, we 
should at least expect to gain some benefit from improved diagnostic criteria and categories, as 
well as a better understanding or the dynamics of non-static conditions.  In addition, after suitable 
31 
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“research and development”, we might reasonably expect to achieve some helpful progress in the 
pharmacology of mentally-mediated complaints — thus incidentally narrowing the distinction 
between “mental” and “physical” conditions. 
Preventative measures, education and personality development, <32> and socially-mediated 
therapy, might also benefit from such understanding — but of course such matters are intimately 
tied up with the socio-politico-economic systems discussed above as item “(1)”, and worthwhile 
progress in these fields is unlikely if it is tackled in a piecemeal way, or in the spirit of 
overconfident infallibility sometimes found amongst social reformers. 
(3) Philosophical enigmas.  This work also turns out to have a considerable bearing on many 
of the unresolved issues traditionally dealt with by philosophers.  It seems to me that Sloman 
(1976, page 16, col. 2) is correct when he writes “If [experimentally] unrefutable theories are to 
be dubbed ‘metaphysical’, then what I am saying is that even important scientific theories have a 
metaphysical component, ...”.  But then, since the epistemological view promoted here (on a 
Piagetian basis) is that even the most obvious perceptions and experimental observations must 
ultimately rest on assumptions which can never be “properly” tested experimentally, it follows 
that all “physical” knowledge is strictly speaking metaphysical!  The point need not be laboured 
here, but the implications are worth pondering, and they certainly support Sloman’s further 
comment (ibid.): “The development of ... ‘metaphysical’ theories is so intimately bound up with 
the development of science that to insist on a demarcation is to make a trivial semantic point, of 
no theoretical interest.  Moreover, it has bad effects on the training of scientists.” 
Other philosophical issues obviously related to the present work are those relating to the con-
cept of “mind”:-  Body and mind;  Other minds; Personal identity; and Free-will.  The main 
contribution offered here is:  the explaining away of many of the obstacles to identifying mind 
with brain-organization, including questions involving perception, and the “teleological” capabil-
ities of mind. 
Freewill perhaps remains more of an enigma.  The present work <33> at least offers some 
clarification of the likely connection between overt behaviour and the indetermiracy quantum 
effects at the level of sub-molecular physics.  Many would regard this as vindicating the concept 
of freewill because of the commonly accepted view that experimental indeterminacy means that 
the real system itself is inherently fuzzy and undetermined.  Although such a view might be 
misguided, such that in some sense the subatomic structure of the universe might actually be 
predetermined, we can still take some comfort that in practice we will always remain unable to 
divine the full detail of such predestination.  So for all practical purposes we may continue to 
believe in free will. 
In the realm of moral philosophy, it seems likely that any advance in our understanding of the 
nature of human feelings and objectives — and the cybernetics of the dynamic systems 
presumably involved — will give us a better insight into what is entailed in choosing between 
alternative non-ideal solutions.  (This of course is closely related to jurisprudence and to the 
questions of politics and economics mentioned above).  Not that we should expect too much in 
the way of perfect solutions to such imponderable questions, however much progress we might 
make in understanding them.  After all, it may well be that there is no attainable means for 
reconciling the fundamental requirements of all systems competing within the same environment, 
and — try as we might — there may be no alternative to having apparently-avoidable suffering 
occur somewhere or other.  It might even be the case that there is no practical way of avoiding 
some holocaust in which all will suffer “needlessly” due to such constraints as informational 
overload or mental limitation in the face of rapidly moving events; though the better the 
understanding, the better the chance we will have of foreseeing such disasters and of avoiding 
them while there is still time — perhaps entailing some <34> painful decisions about whether the 
33
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ends justify the means, and whether we really know what we are doing with sufficient precision 
to warrant any drastic action we may see as necessary.  How, in other words, can we be 
reasonably sure that we will not ultimately be surprised by the indirect consequences of our 
actions? 
(4) Academic psychology.   The contribution that the current ideas may make to academic 
psychology can be summarized briefly:-   They offer a new point of departure for experimental 
studies such as the work on mother-child interaction.  They also offer a new point-of-view 
regarding methodology, in which cybernetic structural-theories are given a status equal to that of 
experimentation.  Last but not least, they give a tangible basis for psychological theories so that 
students might be saved the unsatisfactory ordeal of trying to cope with essentially unstructured 
concepts, with the attendant danger of falling into gratuitous mysticism;  (see Section A1.1). 
(5) Physiology.   Similar points may be made concerning physiology.  Here it might well be 
worthwhile extending experimental investigations such as to take more account of possible phase-
related infra-red phenomena and their likely interaction with molecular activity (despite 
formidable experimental obstacles due to absorption in water).  Or more simply we might at least 
pay more attention to the possible significance of shape and size of nerve-fibres.  Here too, there 
is scope for a greater use of a structured cybernetic approach instead of an overzealous pursuit of 
experimental purity.  Finally there is a trend to mysticism here too, which should not pass 
unchallenged — even if it should happen to be correct!  Professor Eccles2 might conceivably be 
correct in suggesting that one’s mystical soul resides in some unfathomable way at synaptic 
junctions, but we would be ill-advised<35> to meekly accept this view while there are still any 
prospects for more tangible explanations in detailed cybernetic terms.  Moreover even at a more 
down-to-earth level, physiological explanations are not always as rigorous in their basic structural 
concepts as we might wish, thus leaving the student to accept some detail as an article of faith. 
(6) Embryology and cell-navigation.  One unforeseen by-product of the current theory is the 
potential explanation that it offers for the apparently-purposeful locomotion and growth of cells, 
and especially the embryological development of tissue-structures into their characteristic shapes.  
In particular, the likely existence of certain distributions of coherent infra-red frequencies and their 
presumed interference-patterns could do much to explain why different nerve-fibres tend to develop 
into one or another of several fairly-well-defined types.  Thus it seems possible that a careful 
analysis of such shapes, sizes, and distributions, might ultimately serve as an unsuspected source of 
information about embryological mechanisms — even if they should fail to support the (other) 
hypotheses concerning infra-red signal transmission.  Actually though, we might well find that both 
these topics of interest (embryological development, and functional characteristics) are inextricably 
interrelated, and that it is through rudimentary usage that proper development can take place. 
(7) Demystification within  physics.    Finally, another surprising by-product of the current 
work might turn up within the realm of physics.  The perceptive reader might notice certain 
features of the quantum-explanations which are less specific than we might wish.  Without going 
into detail, we may attribute at least some of this vagueness to the current doctrine in physics that 
mystery is allowable (or even laudable) within the subatomic domain, provided that this structural 
ignorance can be by-passed using mathematical abstractions — thus allowing for short-term <36> 
technological advance, even if at the cost of fundamental understanding.  (This ploy has, after all, 
worked particularly well in applied physics — though it is arguable that the imitators of this 
approach in other applied disciplines have not fared so well). 
                                                          
2 Unfortunately I have only encountered this view at second hand, but I presume it is properly expounded 
in Eccles (1970).  [For my later comments see: Traill (1999, Appendix C): Mind and Micro-
mechanism, Ondwelle: Melbourne: www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF .  —   RRT, 2006] <35> 
36 
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The present project, as well as possibly uncovering the need for a re-examination of such 
principles-of-physics if they are to be applied properly to biology, has also offered an epistemo-
logical justification for breaking away from the straightjacket of measurability as the prime criter-
ion for respectability — and also offered an accompanying methodological approach whereby 
this might be done, within any field of study.  <37> 
PREFACE TO THE 2006 ONLINE EDITION 
What has changed in the intervening 28 years since 1978? — Much in some respects, yet 
little-or-nothing in others.  On the one hand, clinical advances in pharmacology have sometimes 
been quite impressive in dealing with somewhat specialized problems at a practical level;  and 
there have been the notable genome-project findings, with implications raised in “(e)” below. 
On the other hand, regarding comprehensive basic theory,  I am a little surprised that no-one 
seems to have yet offered any systematic rival suggestions to those developed here, (nor taken the 
opportunity to re-invented them independently, given their restricted circulation).  Indeed I am 
not aware of anyone even asking some of the same questions explicitly, let alone trying to answer 
them. (E.g. “How is it that we are so good at rapidly handling sequential lists and texts, when 
the traditional neurosynaptic accounts offer no clue to this ability?”  —   See item (vi), above, on 
“original page 24” as indicated in the margin.) 
Of course, one major problem is the complex interdisciplinary nature of the brain-as-a-system 
— and that must surely mean that any coherent overall explanation of it must also be both (i) very 
interdisciplinary, and (ii) at least moderately complex.  The present account probably answers 
that description, so is hardly surprising if even willing individual readers have trouble assimil-
ating it — and collective understanding presents a further challenge which is often overlooked, 
(see below). 
I am nevertheless encouraged by a series of promising explanatory by-products (“spinoffs”!) 
which have developed out of this study, and these suggest that maybe I am doing something right.  
(I contrast this with theories which are either too vague for them to be extended meaningfully, or 
which simply petered out through insufficient coherence:  like the work of C.L.Hull (1930, etc.).)  
Anyhow these spinoffs include  (a) offering a perhaps-plausible solution to the century-old myst-
ery (Donaldson & Hoke, 1905) of what controls the geometry of nerve-fibre cross-sections 
(Traill, 2000, 2005a);   (b) Belatedly “umpiring” a flawed 1977 debate on long-distance insect 
communication, arguing that the available evidence does actually point to a solution:  modulated-
infrared fluorescence emitted from pheromones (Traill, 2005c). — Hence a supplementary 
conclusion from the given “conflicting” evidence (yet to be further investigated):   (c) that insects 
may be able to receive modulated infrared directly (as such) into their nervous systems, whereas 
visible-light would have to be processed in the ordinary textbook fashion via action-potentials;  
(ibid.).   (d) That single-celled animals plausibly use short-range (≈20μm) infrared signals in lieu 
of a nervous system, and that this range might be a causal factor in determining cell-size. 
Issues less concerned with infrared include:  (e) arguing (Traill, 2005b) that the new discov-
ery (Mattick 2001, 2003, 2004) that about 97% of the human genome did not code for protein, 
left ample scope for some of the ncRNA (“non coding” RNA)  to fulfil the role of Piagetian 
“schemes” — a possibility which Piaget himself had occasionally hinted at hypothetically, and 
which seems to coincide very neatly with the “tape” analogy introduced in Part A, here below.  
Also in connection with that,  (f) it was possible to further reformulate Piaget’s theories in terms 
of perhaps-plausible material mechanisms (instead of just relying on abstract “scheme” concepts 
as is still the norm in Piagetian literature).  — (Traill, 2005b).   
Finally, in social psychology, there is the concept  (g) that society-and-its-science is perhaps 
best seen as a separate learning-being — much more detached from the individuals within it than 
“37a”
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one might suppose — and that it makes sense to interpret much of social dynamics in terms of its 
own separate Sensori-motor and Concrete-operations stages.  (One might ask whether it has ever 
yet achieved a Formal-operations stage!);  (Traill, 1999, Ch.4).  This approach seems promising 
for future investigation of various social dysfunctions — usually involving this society-system’s 
tricky interface with individuals in their various roles, but depending far more on Darwinian trial-
and-error than we might have expected. 
—————— 
Changes in this text itself have been kept to a minimum but in some places (notably sections 
C6.7 and C8.1) prolific insertions of new dark-blue subheadings have been used to assist read-
ability.  Likewise some distracting digressions have been consigned to footnotes to get them out 
of the way.  New text and other amendments (including any visible punctuation, etc.) are nearly 
always identified by being wholly dark-blue.  One exception is for the in-text references in Part A 
where the changes are inevitable-and-obvious since the original text used reference-numbers 
instead.  The other exception is in a small part of section C6.7 (o.pp. 300-303) which has a 
higher-than-usual density of minor amendments.  It thus seemed tidier in some of these cases to 
flag the alteration by no more than a token colour-change in a few key letters only.  (These 
patches arose largely because of an ambiguity in the meaning of signal shape, and it seemed best 
to clarify the situation whilst maintaining the original text as much as possible).  
One new illustration (Fig. C6.7/2a) has been added.  Another illustration (Fig. C8.2/1) has 
been appreciably re-configured — mostly for copyright reasons — but the original may be found 
in the 1940 paper cited there.  For various practical reasons I have retained the original page-
numbers as margin-inserts (in dark yellow) — referring to them as “o.p. 300” etc. 
Finally, my apologies for usages such as “he…his” instead or “she/he…her/him” etc.;  but 
of course that is the way one wrote back in the 1970s, and I resist any temptation to pretend other-
wise. 
 R.R.Traill, 
 Melbourne, May 2006. 
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Chapter A1 
— Part I  of Kybernetes  paper ( published 2 years earlier in vol.5) 
A DISSECTION OF PIAGET'S KEY CONCEPTS — (Part I of the Kybernetes paper, vol.5) 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
Piaget's basic objective is seen as an attempt to explain how the individual and his 
evolutionary forbears can collectively gain practical mental-models of the “real world” 
— starting ultimately from nothing, and without independent assistance. 
This paper firstly sets out to clarify Piaget's rather abstract views on this matter by 
postulating a more detailed mechanistic basis for them, and then interpreting various 
observations in terms of the hypothetical mechanisms.  (This analytical approach is 
thus primarily intended as a heuristic aid; though it is also shown to be prima facie 
compatible with some other, non-Piagetian paradigms.) It is concluded that a useful 
way of summarizing the process is in terms of the combined operations of preference 
for “internal closure” within the brain (Internal Coherence or consistency), and prefer-
ence for “external closure” during interaction with the environment (Pragmatism or 
experimentation). 
In the light of this, Part II briefly discusses the views of Tarski, Popper and the 
Operationalists/Behaviourists concerning the nature of truth and the legitimacy of 
reductionism into unobservable domains. 
A1.1  Introduction: Should we Postulate Specific Mental Mechanisms 
in the Absence of Clearcut Evidence? 
The work of Jean Piaget and his colleagues at Geneva, is best known amongst psychologists 
and educationalists, rather than philosophers — at least in the English-speaking academic world.  
Yet his position is fundamentally philosophical — examining, in considerable depth, various 
questions relating to knowledge and its acquisition.  Moreover, even amongst the educationalists 
and psychologists who rate his work as important, their interest seems concentrated on the 
descriptive results of his observations (such as successive stages of intellectual development in 
children) or his experimental methodology rather than his ideas of the underlying causes — that 
is to say they are concerned with the behaviour of the unknown “black box” rather than the 
speculation about what is inside it (in line with the behaviourist-operationalist tradition of 
contemporary science, which we will look at in Part II). 
The “opaque style” of Piaget’s writing is often blamed for the misunderstandings and ignor-
ance of his work, and there is some substance to the charge.  But perhaps a more compelling 
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explanation can be made in terms of his own theory.  To put it simply — in order to understand 
concepts one must, at some stage, tie its elements down to something concrete which can be 
actually seen and/or handled in various ways; and the relationships between these elements need 
to be such that we can actively manipulate them — at least in our “mind’s eye”, or better still by 
physical manipulation. 
But in the writings of the Geneva school, the concepts propounded are often presented very 
abstractly, without the faintest suggestion as to what the underlying physiological mechanisms 
and entities might be.  Actually such scientific caution in published accounts may well have been 
wise wherever the concepts were necessarily in a state of flux — public acceptance of a primitive 
formulation might well have ossified the ideas into a comparatively sterile dogma, a not-unknown 
occurrence in science. 
On the other hand, the theory has been so extensively developed by now, that failure to 
anchor it into some sort of “visualizable” model seems likely to lead the theory into the realm of 
mysticism rather than science.  For one thing, the rather open-ended (and therefore ill-defined) 
concepts are likely to drift in their meaning from time to time — both in the mind <74:> of the 
reader, and also in the mind of the writer, as evidenced by the ambiguous meanings such as those 
identified by Furth 4(1969). Furthermore it has by now become a Herculean task to plough 
through the extensive literature on the subject, especially as one has to remain alert to shades or 
abstract meaning; and it seems difficult to avoid this effort if one is to gain any sort of deep 
understanding of the subject matter.  Yet if it were possible to anchor these concepts in something 
more concrete, it would almost certainly become possible to condense the theory into a more 
manageable form, as well as rendering it more precise and definable. 
Such a sharpening of precision would inevitably mean an increase in information content, and 
therefore refutability.  In the absence of any further evidence, this information could (according to 
Popper) be supplied by any hypothesis we liked to make, provided we are prepared to scrap our 
hypotheses whenever they are found to produce inferences which do not accord with subsequent 
evidence — or are found to upset the internal coherence in an unacceptable way.  Moreover, in 
practice such a theory3 may still be found useful after falsification, when there is no other theory 
of comparable precision or lucidity to replace it — though it would hopefully be reduced in status 
to that of, say, “a mere heuristic device”.  (E.g. the epicycle planetary model did once have 
quantitative value, even though its detail was structurally false.) 
Thus it is that the main purpose of this part of the paper is to suggest some plausible 
hypotheses about the basic mechanisms of mental activity, and use this hypothetical material 
basis as a medium for re-formulating the principal ideas which the Geneva school have put 
forward on the genetic epistemology of the individual.  But although the discussion will concern 
itself with material events, it will not be necessary nor desirable at this stage to link these directly 
with anatomical structure or physiological events — even where these have guided the nature of 
the hypotheses.  Instead, we may make metaphorical use of orthodox paraphernalia of 
information handling:  computer-tape, reports on desks, and such-like. 
                                                          
3 “Theory” is used here as more-or-less synonymous with the notion of a “concrete model”. The 
justification for this, in the present context, lies in the idea that a formal theory is ultimately anchored 
in the concrete reality of the real world, and our actions on it (see below). 
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A1.2  Popper's Concept of Mental Versus Physical 
Let us start by borrowing some basic terms from Popper (1972, Chs 3 & 4)25:Obj and pruning 
his descrip <:>tions of them to the bare minimum: 
This conceptualization fits in quite conveniently with Piaget’s as we shall see, and it is in some 
ways more convenient in view of the linear-ordinal implications of “1, 2, 3” — it is emphasized 
by both Popper and Piaget that worlds 1 and 3 (as such) can only “intercommunicate” via 
conscious beings (world 2). 
Some other comments are appropriate here.  We will generally assume that there is no 
overlap between these domains, but note that strictly speaking, worlds 2 and 3 are necessarily part 
of the real world (world l) — that is unless we are considering a transcendental being (the 
existence of which I would deny).  For the special case in which we are trying to observe, in 
detail, our own states of consciousness, we can expect to come up against some quite anomalous 
results 10(Landsberg & Evans, 1970); but these need not concern us here.  Of much more 
relevance to real life however, is the fact that at least some of world 3 is quite obviously situated 
in the real world outside our bodies-in the form of libraries, physical models and tools, etc.  It 
would therefore be a matter of interpretation whether someone is using a book (say) as a world 1 
“natural” object, or as a world 3 “symbolic” object. 
There is no reason why we should not subdivide these domains (as Popper himself concedes) 
and it would seem useful to divide world 3 according to whether it is within the brain “world 3i”, 
or outside the brain “world 3e”.  The “e, i” notation here tentatively implies that the two sub-
domains are, in some sense, operating in parallel. 
We may also divide up world 1, and I suggest (using an arbitrary decimal allocation): 
world 1.0  for actual phenomena and objects as they really are, 
world 1.1  for signals which emanate from them, 
world 1.2  for whatever is picked up by the sense organs . . . and so on through the more-or-
less automatic pre-processing which is known to occur 8(Hubel & Wiesel, 1963; 9Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1959), until . . . 
world 1.9  the results are dumped, as “progress reports” (in the form of dynamic display 
summaries rather than written reports) onto the “in-desk(s)” but they rapidly dissolve as further 
information comes <75:> in — except in so far as they attract the attention of “consciousness”. 
The decimal notation here implies a serial processing which obviously has a good claim to 
validity.  However, there may well be some feedback between these stages (not to mention 
possibly large amounts within them), and to this extent our conceptualization will have to be 
considered as approximate only.  This almost certainly applies much more strongly within the 
consciousness-domain (world 2), so I will not attempt any subdivision of this simple sort for that 
part of the system. 
 
WORLD 1 
Physical objects and 
physical states 
 
WORLD 2 
States of consciousness 
 
WORLD 3 
Contents of thought 
and its representation in 
writing, tools, etc. 
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A1.3  Similar Concepts in Piaget 's Work 
We may now start to clothe this skeleton with Piagetian terminology and concepts, plus any 
other artefacts which may help to render the ideas more intelligible.  The main sources here are 
Furth 4(1969) and Piaget and Inhelder 23:MentIm(Piaget & Inhelder, 1966). 
Concerning the world 1, and the associated question of information presentation; I do not 
intend to dwell on the comparatively automatic processes involved in the operation of the senses 
and the re-organization of information which arises from it.  For our immediate purposes it will 
suffice to say:  that distortion will certainly occur (though in a more-or-less predictable manner); 
that such distortion will often be positively helpful (e.g. in selecting the features most likely to be 
useful — as determined by evolution of the species); and that the type of distortion can often be 
varied to some extent according to the whim of the subject (thus selecting what that individual 
has found most likely to be useful, e.g. minimizing the distortion and tending towards objectivity, 
by a judicious re-integration of distorted impressions). 
Let us move on then to the all-important world 2.  This is referred to as thinking or knowing, 
and the key concept is the scheme,4 which we may speculatively think of as being made up of a 
population of identical strips of “computer-tape”, where the replication may be seen as a means 
towards statistical and graded effects-based on an essentially on-or-off mechanism.  Each replica 
may be thought of as encoding two zones:  the first comprising a “label” by which it can be 
identified if encountered, and thus activated; while the second holds an encoding of a sequence of 
actions <:> to be followed.  We may formally use the term “tape” to refer to this hypothetical 
entity, and use “label” and “program”5 for the two zones (partly following computer jargon).  
The mere linear nature of this analogy is quite deliberate, though this does not at all rule out more 
elaborate functional-complexes as we shall see. 
At birth, schemes are prominent in governing reflex behaviours of a fairly stereotyped 
variety.  (There may well be other active schemes, and the uncoordinated movements of the 
infant could plausibly be attributed to them, but they produce no organized manifestations.)  
Later, however, modifications of the existing schemes develop, as also do new superordinate 
schemes which call sequences of the lower-order schemes, like sub-programming in computer 
practice. 
It should be noted though, that the system as here described comprises many “programs” 
operating in parallel, unlike an orthodox digital computer.  This implies the need for some sort of 
stabilizing coordination between those “tapes” actively involved; but such problems have already 
been encountered for some time in connection with biological growth, so this need come as no 
surprise.  [Indeed the “tape” concept has some obvious micro-biological analogues (such as RNA 
or protein molecules), but there is no need for us to claim any identity with them at this stage.] 
                                                          
4 Where scheme is not to be confused with schema (plur. schemata).  But note that English texts prior to 
about 1966-69 have tended to use “schema" for both meanings.  (The schema will be discussed in 
§1.5.)  In addition it will be convenient to introduce the term schemoid to deliberately include both 
senses, non-committally.  
  [Note added 2006:   Although I still stand by these distinctions, I now doubt the wisdom of trying to 
use the “schem...” words alone to represent these shades of meaning (except in localized linguistic 
contexts — such as here perhaps).  As just noted above, the main problem is that different writers and 
translators have had different understandings on the word-meanings, and it is now probably too late to 
reconcile such linguistic divergence.  My 2005 suggestion was to depend instead on suitable adjectives 
to make the necessary distinctions — see Traill (2005b):  www.ondwelle.com/OSM02.pdf  (or .htm) or  
www.wbabin.net/physics/traill2.pdf —— RRT] 
5 Pascual-Leone 15(1970) following von Uexküll, uses “s” and “r” — stimulus and response — for the 
scheme as a whole; whereas here the scheme has been split into many replicated “tapes” . 
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A1.4  Application and Extension 
Having looked at the bare fundamentals of the theory, I now propose to dive straight into 
using it to explain some generally accepted observations of behaviour, introducing further aspects 
and interpretations of the theory as we go.  This seems easier on both reader and writer than the 
alternative elaboration using more-or-less pure abstractions, with perhaps unfamiliar terminology. 
(i) Reflexes. 
 Let us start then with the reflex actions of the new-born, and in particular the “rooting reflex” 
in which the baby moves its mouth (turns its head) in the direction of a touch on the cheek.  We 
may suppose that the mechanism of this scheme works like this:  The stimulus is processed and 
eventually produces a coded internal signal pattern which calls for a particular label or range of 
labels.  This call is equivalent to the paging-system of a large organization such as a hospital; and 
the call-signal itself need <76:> not be completely unambiguous as the specificity could be 
increased by limiting its distribution to the relevant wing of the hospital. 
The call would, in effect, ask all “tapes” with that label to “report to” a particular control 
centre6-or-mode in order to carry out their particular skill (or “program”).  In the simplest case we 
shall assume that this results in the calling of identical tapes (all having the same program, as well 
as the same label) until the “control-centre” is full so that any further late-comers are turned 
away.  Meanwhile, those in the “control-centre” collectively put their program into effect-by 
turning the baby’s head, in this case. 
If the stimulus is withdrawn, we may suppose that the “tapes” are ejected from the “control-
centre-or-mode” — perhaps to be replaced by a scheme-system for an emotional frustration 
reaction.  This emotional scheme may also be describable in terms of “tapes”, but it need not be 
assumed that it will follow the same laws in the same detail. 
If the head-movement brings the nipple (or finger, or whatever) into the mouth, we may 
expect a similar ejection of the tapes from the control-centre.  But this time they will be replaced 
by a similar set of tapes comprising the next scheme in the adaptive sequence — that for cyclical 
sucking-actions.  (Here we may think of each tape as being re-cycled, at an appropriate phase of 
the cycle, until it is eventually ejected due to interruption, frustration, or satiation.) 
For such goal-seeking procedures in two (or more) dimensions it would be inefficient and 
cumbersome to have a completely different scheme for every goal-centred radius on which the 
stimulus might fall; yet clearly a stimulus to the left of the goal would call for a different response 
from one on the right, or above, or below, etc.  It seems likely, therefore, that there will be (say) 
four different schemes corresponding to such cardinal directions, with labels to match; and any 
stimulus on an intermediate radius (say at “4 o’clock direction”) will produce a mixed call 
resulting in both Right-Hand and Below types of label being called to the control-centre, in the 
ratio of (say) 2:1. 
Subsequent execution of this mixed scheme could take one of two forms:  a hybrid action, 
with the musculature of both programs being called into play simultaneously and more-or-less 
proportionately.  Alternatively we might get an alternation, with the <:> more populous scheme 
being activated at the expense of the other — but with re-adjustment of the population within the 
control-centre until the tapes of the first scheme are outvoted by the second, resulting in a switch 
of policy until the original direction-of-imbalance is restored again, and so on.  (It may be 
                                                          
6 Cf. Freud's 3(1917) concept of the preconscious and conscious as rooms (p 249). But in view of K. S. 
Lashley's work on brain-ablations,in the 1920's, and subsequent work, it would be unwise to take 
this “control centre” as being too literally localized; we should think rather in terms of 
communicational proximity . 
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significant that the eye-movements of babies start off with a tendency to move horizontally and 
vertically, rather than obliquely.) In fact, the second alternative is implicit in the first if the 
“more-or-less proportionate” weighting of the two stimuli turns out to be all-or-none (i.e. Bool-
ean); so clearly one might include near-Boolean decisions as well.  This is the sort of thing we 
would expect if the control-centre’s “inner sanctum” would admit one-or-very-few tapes at a 
time. And perhaps the set-up also entails some risk that the encumbent tape will be ejected randomly. 
(ii) Classical Conditioning. 
Next it will be instructive to turn away from Piagetian paradigms to consider the time-
honoured case of Pavlovian classical conditioning 11(Mednick, 1964).  If nothing else, this may 
give us some sort of check on the plausibility of our model. 
As a result of evolutionary processes, some types of stimuli are “inherently” rewarding.7 
Certain tastes in the mouth, for instance.  Now we very quickly and unknowingly learn whatever 
other stimuli usually accompany these rewarding stimuli, and thus tend to respond to the new 
stimuli as if they constituted the original inherent stimulus.  The sight of food is a case in point, or 
any other arbitrary neutral stimulus which happens to coincide with the reward — provided the 
individual can discriminate the stimulus.  In fact the newborn infant cannot discriminate the sight 
of objects in general (as we shall see), but a particular tactile stimulus, or a very simple light or 
sound stimulus would do instead. 
A plausible explanation of this, in terms of our “tape” model would be:  The two stimuli, 
occurring more-or-less simultaneously will both call representative tapes into the control-centre 
together (though not necessarily into the “inner sanctum”).  This physical or communicational 
proximity may then make possible some sort of cross-reference between those particular tapes 
actually “within” the control-centre.  Let us suppose that some of them will swap labels with each 
other, like a genetic chromosome cross-over.  Subsequently then, any presentation of the new 
stimulus will, in some cases, call forth a tape whose “program” part will cause activity 
appropriate <77:> to the original inherent stimulus.  (Whether or not it will also produce similar 
satiation and emotional effects is something which might be considered as a separate issue). 
Anyhow repeated co-presentation of this sort could be expected to increase the effect, 
especially if there were some sort of weeding out of pairings which were not repeated on 
subsequent occasions (“extinction”).  If the repeated learning process were interrupted by a 
distraction, we might say that the tapes would be ejected (in favour of those of the interrupting 
stimulus) and furthermore, that they would become dispersed somewhat from easy access to the 
control-centre, so any resumption of trials would show a drop in effective pairing (“external 
inhibition”). 
If the extinction process (due to a cessation of paired presentation) were considered to take 
place at a control-centre8 then the spontaneous recovery during a long rest in the proceedings 
(“reminiscence”) could be explained as a re-distribution of tape-strips:  those from the general 
population replacing those “near” the control-centre which had been “wiped-out”.  Similarly an 
interruption stimulus during the extinction process (“disinhibition”) would presumably clear the 
encumbent tapes away from the immediate control-centre, so that when they return, they would 
have partly replenished their proportion of “conditioned” tapes from the pool of tapes just outside 
the periphery around the control-centre. 
                                                          
7 Unless temporarily vetoed due to satiation, or suppressed by an “abnormal” sequence of events (such as 
genetic mutation or mental trauma) producing conditions which we would describe as “pathological”. 
8 Presumably the same one, though not necessarily. 
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(iii) Operant Conditioning9 
In this case, instead of two stimuli being presented together and becoming “cross-referenced” 
to each other, it is arranged that a certain element of behaviour (“spontaneously emitted” by the 
subject) is paired with a significant stimulus.  Now from a Piagetian viewpoint, the scheme is the 
basic world 2 representative of any elementary action or any elementary perceptual coding which 
gets that far 4(Furth, 1969, p 138).  Thus the operant conditioning paradigm would appear to be 
little more than a variation on the classical conditioning theme — with a motor-scheme 
substituted for a sensory-scheme. 
(iv) Innate Releasing Mechanisms (IRMs) and Fixed Action Patterns (FAPs). 
These notions of the ethologists look very like congenital schemoids which, in the species 
concerned, are not amenable to modification by learning — though they may perhaps be 
incorporated as parts of more general schemoids.  Thus a particular pattern of visual cues — such 
as the sight of an open beak within the nest-may constitute an IRM (so presumably causing a 
particular “label” to be called) with the consequence that a particular stereo<:>typed sequence of 
behaviour such as a feeding reaction (a “FAP”) will follow.  This FAP is presumably the 
manifestation of a schemoid, 10 and is therefore (according to the current model) coded as a 
“program” on an ensemble of identical or interrelated “tapes”. 
Congenital walking-reflexes (etc.) in mammals may well be of a similar nature, but they are 
generally amenable to subsequent modification.  This may be due to the availability of mechan-
isms capable of effecting changes, rather than the properties inherent in the schemoid, though 
both are possible-perhaps in combination. 
A1.5  Application to Piaget's Theory Itself 
We may return now to Piaget’s own paradigms and consider how it is that an individual 
comes to the hypothesis that there are such things as reasonably permanent three dimensional 
“objects” in his environment.  Or indeed how it is that the impressions which reach him visually 
can be interpreted as vaguely permanent two-dimensional pseudo-objects (also hypothetical from 
his point of view). 
First let us look carefully at the mathematical concept of “mapping” from one domain to 
another (the “co-domain”), and the closely related concept of model-building.  The nature of this 
mapping problem depends rather critically on whether we assume a transcendent role or not.  [For 
the traditional Pure-Mathematician there is comparatively little problem.  His position seems to 
be unashamedly transcendental (with respect to his limited universe of discourse — his detached 
“world 1”), so he can juggle meta-mathematical concepts until he has established whatever 
morphisms his artificial symbolic systems may offer.  The position for the scientist is rather more 
debatable as he has to masquerade, for part of the time, as a transcendental being (possessing 
episteme) without strictly being entitled to do so; a point which we will take up again in Part II.  
As for the contemporary work on artifical intelligence, it is not entirely clear where it should be 
placed.  This rather depends on the type of interaction (if any) the computer has with the “real 
outside world”.  But even purely internal computer exercises, with a static (imitation) world 1, 
can be immensely complex, even though such problems are arguably similar to those of Pure 
Mathematics.] 
                                                          
9 E.g. see 11Mednick (1964) 
10 Despite thc stability displayed, this is probably a scheme (rather than a schema) for reasons to be 
explained (in terms of genetic replacement) in the second paper of this series 27(Traill, 1978a: Chapter 
A3, below). 
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But we are trying to do without transcendent <78:> observers.11  The “conscious” observer 
will, in fact, be confined to world 2 (the co-domain) with no input or knowledge but the distorted, 
incomplete and uninterpreted12 “reports” on his “in desk”-display.  How then is he to set about 
building his model of the outside world (world 1.0)? 
Let us be clear about this.  Following the Geneva view it would seem that something does 
remain of the Kantian a priori knowledge, but this is explicable in evolutionary terms and 
plausibly consists of:  (a) the particular procedures for automatically transforming (i.e. distorting) 
input information, in a way which tends to be adaptive within the natural limits imposed on it.  
(b) Basic input stereotypes corresponding to the end products of the perceptual process (e.g. 
carrying the information that a light/dark boundary is moving across the visual field in a certain 
direction at a certain speed, 8(Hubel & Wiesel, 1963) or ethological IRMs).  These stereotypes, 
alone or in combination, may be considered capable of “calling schemoid labels”.  (c) A complete 
basic set of stereotyped action-elements for controlling the musculature and other effectors; these 
being “callable” by “program elements” within the schemoids.  (d) A limited repertoire of preset 
(but often variable) schemoids serving as the controlling basis for hereditary reflexes.  Possibly 
also (e) various schemoids for purely internal ancillary purposes. 
Finally, (f) there is the very important propensity of the organism to reach conceptual equilib-
rium (a particular case of physiological equilibrium-seeking or “homeostasis”).  This can usefully 
be thought of here as an effect which selectively supports the retention of those mental structures 
which collectively form a coherent whole — a group in the mathematical sense of maintaining 
closure when operated on in a particular manner.  This means that, provided we stick to a 
particular set of “operators” (e.g. rotation by multiples of 90º in the plane), the elements (e.g. unit 
measures directed to North, South, East or West) will not produce new elements outside the set 
when operated upon (i.e. not NE, and not up, etc.).  We may thus think of the structure as being, 
in some way, self-conservative or permanent — provided that increasing <:> degrees of 
“groupness” are rewarded by increasing stability. 
Thus even though the baby initially knows nothing at all about objects as such, nor even that 
such “permanent things” exist, he nevertheless “tries to make sense” of his encounters with 
reality by saving up any apparent replications of apparent closure amongst the schemes existing 
in his world 2.  So if the outside world has any closure/coherence at all, it is likely that some of 
this will be reflected, however imperfectly, in the observer’s world 2; and it is thus open to 
identification with internally produced group-like structures.  Moreover these internal structures 
will, with any luck, have a group-like structure which is at least something like that of the real 
world (world 1).  With further luck, this structure may be improved on subsequently. 
But note that there is no absolute guarantee of success.  Of course the more elements we take 
into account in our mental model simultaneously (capacity and techniques permitting) the more 
likely that only the right solution will really give closure in the model, but we can never be sure 
in an absolute sense.  For instance it seems likely that the child’s first (learned) group-structure 
model of reality is one-dimensional, but models of reality assumed to have this property would 
not show a very good record of consistency.  Similarly two-dimensional models show certain 
                                                          
11 And this implies that we should also forgo the use of meta-linguistic devices 5(Gödel, 1931).  
Of course, in practice, it is convenient to use meta-linguistic concepts, but this implies an artificially 
limited universe of discourse or (equivalently?) an assumption of axioms (i.e. episteme in our present 
context). 
12 Strictly there is some minimal interpretation, e.g. see 7Hubel, (1963).  But whatever interpretation the 
observer may have access to, it can have no more absolute truth-justification than his own hypotheses. 
Such inherited interpretations have arisen through a similar process phylogenetically, by evolution — 
a pragmatic criterion. 
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disconcerting irregularities when a toy disappears behind a cushion (becoming irreversibly 
“absorbed into it” from the infant’s viewpoint, as Piaget has suggested).  But can we be certain 
that a three-dimensional model is sufficient?  The more mathematically inclined physicists would 
claim that there are not only four dimensions, but that they all have the same mathematical status 
(hence the mystical four-dimension concept of interchangeable space-time due to Minkowsky 
12(1908) in 1908, which has kept science-fiction writers busy ever since).  Rather less spectacular 
is the notion that time does constitute a fourth dimension of comparable importance, but that it is 
qualitatively different; anyhow it would seem that the mind divides the dimensions up in this way  
— space first, and then time a good deal later, and by a roundabout method 23:MentIm(Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1966). 
Efforts toward closure/consistency/coherence take place in two directions.  On the one hand 
there is “Formal reflecting abstraction” which takes place within world 2 (though possibly 
drawing on world 3i).  This presumably takes the form of a free exercise of interrelated-scheme 
systems (especially during “REM” sleep,13 and generally with motor-correlates <79:> largely 
suppressed), and it is plausible to suppose that this exercise aids the disintegration or modification 
of those systems which are seriously lacking in closure (at least as compared with other similar 
systems).  In the same way, our number-system has been revised several times to cope with lack 
of closure under such reasonable operations as division and taking square-roots. 
The other effort toward closure involves interaction with world 1 (anywhere between 
world 1.0 and world 1.9).  It is fundamental to Piaget’s position that this process of perception is 
no mere passive taking-in of whatever fate may serve up on the “in-desk” (world 1.9).  Such 
passively accepted “information” has no meaning beyond its possible role as an automatic IRM 
(like a punch-card fed into an ordinary digital computer); and such an activity betokens no 
intelligence in the sense of the organism being able to develop its own internal “mapping” ability. 
Instead, the process will inevitably involve an active exercise of the subject’s own schemoids, 
either in the form of a participatory intervention in the outside world (such as sucking, or 
turning), or tracing an outline by visual fixations, or selecting amongst the “reports” which then 
appear on the “in-desk” (consciously or otherwise).  Or indeed any dynamic combination of such 
interventions. 
Let us suppose that at some stage (before birth) the individual’s world 2 and world 3i, taken 
collectively, contain no structures other than hereditary schemes (and the “tapes” of which they 
are composed).  For some arbitrary reason, a sufficient number of tapes for one of the schemes 
comes to “wander into the control-centre” and become active.  The result — a kick or suchlike.  
This is then likely to become paired with whatever sensory schemes are active at about the same 
time, and these will include sense-schemes which have been activated as a consequence of the 
spontaneous action.  Here we have the makings of an elementary representation of the world 1.0, 
which from the foetal point of view would be something like this (if it could introspect):  
“Something, somewhere, echoes back in response to my thought  — cogito ergo id est (mihi)”!  
[I think, therefore it exists (for me at least)]. 
In other words, the thought/scheme and its associated action precedes any subjective 
awareness of any outside object as such.  This formulation starts to explain how it is feasible to 
set up a “mapping” between the outside world and the thought-domain.  It is no use the subject 
waiting for the outside world to just walk in and present its “map-position” credentials, so to 
speak.  Instead the subject must start off himself with what amounts to a preconceived idea <:> 
(e.g. that no outside world exists), and then see what happens when the idea is applied in practice. 
                                                          
13 “Rapid Eye-Movement” sleep; e.g. see Piaget & Inhelder (1966, page xviii)23:MentIm. 
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So we now have an alternative process of testing for closure — between our own mental 
models and their interaction with the outside world, via senses and actions.  This sounds very like 
Popper’s view (for knowledge at the scientific community level) that one should start with pre-
conceived ideas and then test them with a view to scrapping them if they do not give “closure” in 
the sense just discussed.  We shall come back to this point in Part II, but I shall just mention in 
passing that I think he has overemphasized this closure-with-reality at the expense of the first-
menioned type of closure:  closure within thought.  I would claim that they are about equally 
important — except in the above-mentioned case involving the first item of feedback, when the 
thought domain has (as yet) no artefactual structures to work on, so no basis for closure-seeking 
within itself. 
Before looking at further details relating to the way in which a mental “model” is constructed to 
represent an object, let us first see what is known or conjectured about the nature of such a model, 
once constructed.  The Piagetian term for the special case of a two-dimensional model is “image”.  
This image is not to be confused with any perceptual configuration, so it is quite different from the 
“image” of optics; but it is the means whereby a child can bring back (into thought) a “re-
presentation” of something seen in the past, thus enabling a drawing to be made from memory. 
Actually an image appears to be a particular case of a more general type of entity which 
Piaget and Inhelder choose to call a schema (schèma).  In general then, a schema will be used as a 
repository of any static canonical configurations14 which “look like” being of more-or-less per-
manent value to the individual concerned.  (This is suggestive of the concept of Long Term 
Memory (LTM) which is usually regarded as a separate psychological specialization, e.g. see 
Wickelgren (1970)29). 
Initially such schemata are associated with overt action, as in the case (mentioned by Piaget) 
of a child opening its mouth imitatively as a symbolic preliminary in attempting to open a match-
box.  Gradually however, the overt component (world 3e) often dies away leaving an “internal-
ized” symbol (world 3i).  Just what sort of physical basis such a schema might have is open to 
question.  For the two-dimensional image it would probably suffice to postulate a sort of <80:> 
fossilized scheme — a scheme which had been made immune to modification, but could still be 
“called” in something-like the usual way, including subsidiary calls to other schemoids as 
required (also some calls might have affective or “simili-sensory” 15 affiliations, a possibility 
which may perhaps be denied to ordinary schemes). 
Three-dimensional configurations are, however, less amenable to linear-type based 
mechanism.  On the other hand though, it scarcely seems feasible that any general workable 
Biochemical mechanism could actually be connected into a three-dimensional physical structure 
— yet it is just possible to conceive of a cross-referenced call-system of free linear codings such 
as was postulated above for the schemes themselves.  Furthermore, the lattice-structure implicit in 
such cross-referencing would, in principle, also serve for formal logic systems and presumably 
other abstract entities as well (e.g. see Inhelder & Piaget’s (1959)9 “Early Growth of Logic”, 
p. 273 ff.). 
As for the physical location of such world 3i symbols, they might be located in a separate 
place away from the schemes of world 2; but there seems no pressing reason why they should, 
because their respective “domains” could be specified by code or properties rather than by 
                                                          
14 Two or three-dimensional, or abstract groups of operators, or whatever. 
15 I would prefer the term “provinance” (borrowed from Archaeology), or perhaps “affect-contextual", 
but “simili-sensory” is the Piagetian term. Anyhow, whatever it may be called, we appear to be talking 
about the same phenomenon as that discussed by Penfield (1958, p 31 ff.)16 when he refers to “feelings 
of fear or familiarity” (etc.). 
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position (and it probably would be under such circumstances).  Moreover, a separate location 
might be expected to produce transport and communication problems. 
Thus it looks as though it might be fairly simple to explain the formation process for 
schemata after all.  Given that a system of scheme “tapes” has collectively developed a sufficient 
degree of closure by an “equilibration” process, it seems likely that this success in the closure-test 
will result in a transmutation of the relevant “tapes”, freezing them into their existing configurat-
ions.  Indeed it would seem in keeping with chemical and micro-biological systems if this 
stability of structure were to follow automatically from closure — by some sort of continual 
dynamic exercise for instance (a concept faintly reminiscent of Hebb’s (1949)6 “reverberating 
circuits”, but on a much smaller scale of magnitude than that implied by him, though he was 
careful not to insist on any particular physical basis for his theory). 
It seems likely that once formed, such schemata are seldom re-dissolved.  However with 
disuse, referen<:>ces to such schemata within the schemes of world 2, would tend to be 
eliminated more-or-less exponentially, so that ultimately the unused schemata would become 
very difficult to retrieve.  The evidence for this is rather varied and circumstantial, including the 
psychoanalytical concept of barely-retrievable childhood memories, the work on LTM 
(mentioned above), and Penfield’s (1958, p 31 ff.)16 neurosurgical probes which might sometimes 
be interpreted as generating calls to otherwise inaccessible schemata. 
A1.6  An Orthodox Summary of Piaget 's Stages 
We have now covered those parts of the theory which are most relevant to the arguments in 
Part II.  However, to give some semblance of completion we may look, very sketchily, at the overall 
stages of development.  (There are numerous texts on this macro-descriptive aspect of the topic.) 
Approximately (0–2) years, “sensori-motor”:  Lacking schemata (internal symbols) and so 
lacking a sense of the permanence of objects. 
Approximately (1½ –8) years, “pre-operational”:  Symbols for objects and then also for trans-
formations (creating, transforming or destroying objects), but no coordination between them. 
Approximately (7–11) years, “concrete operations”.  New closure systems involving both objects 
and their transformations.  New schemes for dealing with basic object- and transformation-schemata 
are referred to as “operational”.  But use of these operational schemes requires the objects to be 
present (i.e. “concrete”) and perceivable, perhaps because some symbol-handling capacity is fully 
stretched dealing with operational schemata so that there is none spare for handling object schemata. 
Approximately (11+) years, “Formal Operations”.  The need for perceptual support for object 
representation is overcome, opening the way for the disposable-variables of algebraic systems 
and hypothetical object-relationship systems. 
What underlying physical changes are implied by this progression?  Several factors come to 
mind, though there may well be others.  Firstly there is some degree of recursion as witnessed by 
the progression:   simple scheme — compound scheme — operational scheme.  Then secondly 
there is the fact that at least some of the underlying physiological capacities develop more-or-less 
autonomously (“maturation”).  Progressive myelination of nerves (from the head down) is 
perhaps the best documented, but Pascual-Leone (1970)15 discusses the implications of a likely 
increase in attention-span with age (equivalent to a growth in the size of <81:> the “control-
centre” in the tape-population model discussed above). 
Furth (personal communication) raises another consideration:  the distinction between learn-
ing and non-maturational development.  It seems possible that such development (affecting 
overall outlook in a major way, and occurring in more-or-less discrete steps) is the result of qual-
itative re-organization of internal closure systems — similar to a phase change in a chemical 
system — when the stabilizing influences of the old system are overtaken by the influences 
conducive to stability in the new system. 
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Chapter A2 
TRUTH  AND OPERATIONALISM — (Part II of the Kybernetes paper, vol.5) 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
In the light of the above, Part II briefly discusses the views of Tarski, Popper and 
the Operationalists/Behaviourists concerning the nature of truth and the legitimacy of 
reductionism into unobservable domains. 
 
———————— 
“…toute logistique s’appuie sur des présuppositions intuitives:  à lire les principaux logisticiens, 
comme Russell, v. Wittgenstein, Carnap, etc., on s’aperçoit vite qu’ils se réfèrent tous à certaines 
intuitions tenues par eux comme allant de soi dans la mesure précisément où elles échappent à la 
vérification logistique.”  
 17:Traité(Piaget, 1949, Introduction). 
24Conj(Popper, 1963, Ch. 1), following Plato, goes to some pains to distinguish episteme 
(absolute unknowable true knowledge) from doxa (fallible but attainable human knowledge).  
Subsequently 25Obj(Popper, 1972, early chapters) he develops his “three worlds” concept which 
we have just been using, in which world 1 presumably embodies episteme and world 3 
presumably embodies doxa.  In this he is encouraged apparently by Tarski’s criterion of truth 
(episteme) as corresponding to reality 25Obj(Popper, 1972: Chs. 8 and 9). 
In so far as Tarski’s criterion represents a move away from the operationalist view (that what 
cannot be observed does not exist, so episteme does not exist), then to that extent I share Popper’s 
enthusiasm for the Tarski formulation.  Yet it would seem that Tarski has erred somewhat in the 
opposite direction.  Thus he writes rather disparagingly 26(Tarski, 1972):  “other conceptions and 
theories of truth are also discussed, such as the pragmatic conception and the coherence theory.”  
By contrast I would associate these two with the two types of closure attempted by the developing 
child as discussed in Part I; but note that these had to be used in cooperation.  They would make 
very little sense taken in isolation, and that is presumably Tarski’s (and Popper’s) quarrel with 
them. 
Tarski continues:  “These conceptions seem to be of an exclusively normative character and 
have little connection with the actual usage of the term ‘true’; none of them has been formulated 
so far with any degree of clarity and precision.”  It is to be hoped that the above condensed 
version of Piaget’s theory may serve in some way to answer this latter challenge from Tarski.  
Truth-as-corresponding-to-reality (episteme) forms an essential part of the Piagetian system as 
<:>described here, but there is no absolute guarantee that any mental model which purports to 
represent reality does so faithfully.  This applies to objects,16 and also (it would appear) to logical 
and mathematical systems as well. 
Operationalists in Physics and their Behaviourist counterparts in Psychology, seem to make 
the fundamental theoretical mistake of assuming that there is something which can be absolutely 
relied on.  Thus certain types of observation are taken as infallible because they involve concepts 
like “object” which are so thoroughly ingrained at a very early age that we take them as valid 
a priori17.  Similarly certain types of coherence in a symbolic model are often assumed to be 
a priori valid because they accord with a “logical schema” which was also so thoroughly ingrain-
ed at an early age, that we take it to be an infallible framework on which to hang relationships 
                                                          
16 In so far as there are such things as real objects!  See Popper's discussion 24Conj(1963) of Parmenides; 
not to mention the wave-particle duality of Modern Physics. 
17 Moreover any IRM-"concepts” would be ingrained even earlier:  phylogenetically. 
(73)
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both old and new.  (The same point has, of course, also been made about “self-evident” moral 
laws.) 
I suggest therefore that the operationalist theoretical standpoint is inconsistent — or at best 
rests on an arbitrary division of doxa into “near-enough-to-episteme” and “mere guesswork”.  
If the Piagetian view of knowledge-acquisition is accepted rigorously, then the consistent operat-
ionalist should, it seems, automatically become an agnostic and disclaim any knowledge about 
anything at all. 
But of course, in practice, we must all adopt some sort of criterion of what we are to regard as 
indubitable.  We must impose constraints on ourselves and our thinking or we will get nowhere 
(as Ashby points out) — and imposing constraint is arguably the purpose of closure-formation.  
The mistake is not in drawing such arbitrary distinctions, but in believing inflexibly that we have 
hit on the correct place to draw such a distinction, for such a dogmatic belief amounts to <82:> 
the delusion that we have incontestably acquired some episteme.  The cure would seem to be to 
keep testing closure of both types (empirical and internal coherence) according to some suitable 
strategy.  Just what that strategy should be is open to debate — episteme is denied us here too. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (Chapters A1 & A2) 
I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Sloman and to Prof. Furth and his students at 
Sussex University for useful discussion; and also to Prof. George for his encouragement and 
support. 
82c1
Un
gu
id
ed
 l
ea
rn
in
g:
 I
I.
 —
— 
Ch
ap
te
r 
A2
: 
 T
ru
th
 &
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
al
is
m 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 35  of  207  
Kybernetes, 7, 61-71  © Thales Publications (W.O.) Ltd. — (1978) by R.R.Traill  (1978a/2006b)   
original
page-Nos
↓ 
 
Chapter A3 
ANALYTICAL THEORY OF SENSORI-MOTOR SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT18 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This paper develops more specific details on how natural mental-function might 
evolve within a wholly-material brain system, depending entirely on “self-organizat-
ion” operating within a reasonably consistent environment. 
It is assumed that mental development can, in principle, be explained in detailed 
mechanistic terms.  The attempt is then made to give the outlines of such an explan-
ation, drawing on existing physiological knowledge, and considerations of the practical 
"design" difficulties which such a system would necessarily have to face.  RNA-like 
codeable strings are seen as the basic memory elements (rather than adaptable syn-
apses).   "Concepts" are explained as Piagetian mental models, built up in explained 
stages due to interaction with the real object, and encoded on the linear elements. 
Coordination between these elements is seen as biochemical but with the added 
available intermediary of electrically mediated signals, allowing coordination at a dist-
ance.  The likelihood that subsequent developmental periods may recapitulate the same 
overall strategy is considered. 
A3.1  Introduction 
The general outline of a mechanism to explain Piaget’s theories has been described 23:(Monod 
& Jacob, 1961;  29:M12:Traill, 1975) using basic elements differing substantially from those implied 
by Hebb 10:(1949).  It is now proposed to explore further the details of this system. 
The previous papers postulated processes whereby Piaget’s schemes and schemata could be 
encoded by replicated intercommunicating linear micro-objects.  These are referred to metaphor-
ically simply as “tapes” or “strings” to avoid prejudging the physical details of their structure; 
though it may help exposition to think of them tentatively as short RNA strips or suchlike. 
Such scheme-tapes were envisaged as being generated initially with arbitrary “label” seg-
ments, and with blank, empty, or arbitrary “program” segments which could subsequently be 
altered to something more meaningful.  In addition it was supposed that positive or negative 
segments or tags would be attached to these tapes according to reinforcement contingencies; and 
on the basis of these tags, the tapes would be preferentially replicated, or dissolved. 
 
                                                          
18 This is the second in a series of papers relating to the nature and acquisition of concepts, seen as 
having a material cybernetic embodiment within the brain. The other main papers so-far completed 
[in 1978] are 28:(Traill, 1976:  the above chapters A1-A2 — and 31:1977: “Part B” whose hyperlink 
follows below) respectively. 
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The program part of each tape was thought of as being made up of a sequence of code-units, 
and each of these was supposed capable of generating a specific <> code-signal into a control-
network, or a limited part of a network.  These signals were supposed capable of activating 
specific “sealed units” of stereotyped effector activity, or else capable of activating other schemes 
or schemata — thus making feasible “sub-programming,” “cross-referencing” and other 
departures from strict linear reading of the “list” embodied by a single tape.  Effector activity 
would of course include motor actions, but it also includes internal modification of input, and 
perhaps positive feedback to “hold” the status quo as a mechanism for attention. 
The senses were seen as involving lengthy and complex pre-processing, with comparatively 
unalterable “hardware,” 13:JPhio:(Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Iversen, 1974)18 but with parameters 
controllable by “modifiers” governed by some of the effector code-signals just described.  The 
end result of this preprocessing would be that a new set of externally generated code-signals 
would then find their way into the control-network, or part of it.  These signals were then 
presumed to activate schemes, schemata or effectors in the same way as internally produced 
signals.  Clearly feedback effects such a tracking could be explained on this basis. 
Schemata were seen as scheme-like structures which had somehow acquired an inherent 
stability and were therefore virtually impervious to modification, unlike schemes.  It was 
supposed that they owed this stability to some manifestation of corroboration (i.e. 
selfconsistency, or “internal closure,” — as if implying that the “idea” inherent in the structure 
was likely to have permanent value, and was therefore worthy of <62:> storage in Long Term 
Memory).  However internal-closure was not seen as sufficient; there was also the need for 
“external closure” in the form of predictions of some sort, and some reality-testing of these 
expectations. 
It is sometimes useful to refer to “scheme-like things” without necessarily distinguishing 
between schemes and schemata.  In such cases the term “schemoid” will be employed.  (Note that 
schemoids are taken to be populations of tape-like entities, and are not discrete unique entities as 
such; though they may be able to coordinate their activities such as to produce discrete unique 
action patterns.)  
 
A3.2  The Nature of Hereditary Schemoids 
Table I suggests a number of stimulus patterns which might reasonably “call a label,” and a 
number of likely “sealed unit” effector stereotypes; these are depicted as being already paired-up 
into workable schemoid tapes.  It seems fair to say that each such reflex schemoid starts off as 
being independent of any voluntary control; and furthermore that it has no special affiliation with 
any other schemoid capable of reversing its action, nor a special affiliation with one <> or more 
schemoids capable of achieving the same basic result in a different way.  If this is so, then we will 
need to be able to explain the development of such affiliations in order to account for the later 
acquisition of mental systems with the properties of mathematical “groups.” 
Another noteworthy point is that not all the reflexes are of obvious immediate use to the 
neonate.  Clearly the rooting reflex does make immediate sense, and arguably so does the palmar 
reflex.  It is rather less obvious what immediate use the neonate might find for the stepping reflex, 
though its later use can scarcely be denied.  This comparison raises some delicate problems of 
stability:  If all these congenital reflexes are stable, how do we come to master or eliminate some 
of them?  If they are not stable, but amenable to classical and operant conditioning including 
extinction, then how is it that the stepping reflex comes to survive long enough for the infant to 
learn to walk? 
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As one plausible explanation for this we may attribute the permanence-despite-suppression to 
the supposed inherited nature of these particular schemoids.  Whereas schemata acquire their 
stability and are then difficult to change; these reflex schemoids are seen as infinitely replaceable 
in their original form, from their original genetic source, but readily modi<63:>fiable or 
suppressable individually once they have been produced.  In fact, they would then be just like any 
ordinary scheme tapes in this respect. 
As a working hypothesis then, let us suppose that the heriditary reflexes are pre-coded on the 
actual genetic chromosome as DNA coding, and that RNA strips obtained from these sites would 
either themselves constitute ready-made expendable tapes capable of operating collectively as 
schemes, or else they would be capable of generating such tapes in some other physical form. 
As well as ready-made hereditary schemes, other scheme-tapes would also presumably be 
produced in the same way, but as “blanks” which could not be used as programs until they had 
been modified. 
A3.3  Calling the Labels of Schemoid “Tapes” which are Physically Remote:  
Technical Considerations 
Ultimately any thoroughgoing theory of neural activity has to come to terms with the problem 
of how electri- cal signals and chemical storage of memory interact.19 In the present paper this 
problem does arise, but it is posed in a somewhat different way:  Given that we are considering 
hypotheticai chemical changes, these changes are postulated to be intimately concerned with 
                                                          
19 The evidence for these two phenomena, considered separately, is scarcely to be doubted.  For example, 
see Eccles 6:(1964) or Katz 21:(1966), and Ansell and Bradley 1:(1973), respectively.    
TABLE I 
Examples of congenital schemoids and the stimulus patterns likely to cause their activation.
The body entries of this table give the probable outcome if the particular action occurs in the 
particular context; — each such outcome may then be evaluated for its adaptiveness.  Thus 
evolution would favour the adaptive “main diagonal” and tend to leave other entries as 
“null.” However this could be modified by learning, as in Bruner and Bruner’s experiments 
5:(1968) in which sucking influenced the focus of the image. 
<62>   
CONGENITAL SCHEMOIDS 
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“calling the labels” of other remote chemical systems.  In other words we are really talking about 
chemical interaction across a remote20 distance — “by telephone” so to speak. 
If such a system is to work at all, it is difficult to see how it could operate other than by 
electrical signals ¤21 .  The question then becomes one of explaining how such electrical effects, 
normally having a chemical effect at close range, could be transmitted selectively to relevant 
sites, and how they could be used there to call appropriate chemical systems into play, in the face 
of considerable amounts of random infra-red “noise” within the body.  For <> this purpose, a 
mere “blip” at the receiving end would probably not do; but if it could be analysed into a 
temporal or spatial spectrum beforehand, then this could act very specifically — like a key 
received into a lock.  Such analysis could be achieved if the intervening medium were to act 
“dispersively” (somewhat like a prism). 
Calculations 31:(Traill, 1977: “Part B” below) suggest that these requirements could 
reasonably be met simultaneously by using existing myelinated axon segments as wave-guides, 
with chemical re-activation at the intervening nodes.  Thus the role of the myelin may be more 
than just one of speeding up the conduction of signals, it could also have a more subtle role — 
assisting in the decoding or sorting of jumbled signals. 
If correct, this account might help to explain the comparatively stereotyped behavioural 
repertoire of invertebrates, and other animals including neonates whose axons are lacking in 
myelin.  In such cases it is plausible that only local signals and simple traditional “spikes” will be 
usefully received. 
In short then, the postulate that one schemoid can call others, in a highly adaptable way, need 
not necessarily be left as a metaphysical abstraction.  On the contrary, it seems feasible that the 
process may be amenable to detailed explanation — the outlines of which have been briefly 
suggested. 
A3.4  Schemes, and Piaget's first two Sensori-Motor Stages 
The activity of the first stage is generally deuribed simply as an exercise of reflexes.  Now I 
would at least like to raise the question of just what is meant by “exercise” in this context.  In 
normal usage, “exercise” implies that something is being developed or corrected — though it is 
often not clear exactly what the basic changes are which make up this improvement.  To say that 
the infant is “getting to appreciate the reflex schemes” scarcely does more than re-state the 
problem; so let us try to put more precision into our ideas here. 
With this aim in view, we may look ahead to stage 2 to provide clues as to what has been 
going on clandestinely since birth.  What then are we to make of the overt primary circular 
reactions of stage 2?  Here we have “movements grouped in coherent systems superposed on the 
reflex systems” (Piaget, 1954, p. 211 ff)24:CR:, and “coordination between hand and mouth in 
thumbsucking” just after one month (ibid., p. 106 ff); so what basic mechanisms might underlie 
these phenomena?  And how do they arise?   
                                                          
20 distance >> (wavelengths for the resonance frequencies involved in the chemical changes concerned).  
Such chemically significant wavelengths are likely to be of the order of 1 to 100 microns, i.e. in the 
infra-red range.    
21¤ Moreover, for such frequencies and distances, the signal must evidently use a radiation field rather 
than the simple reverslble induction field which is normally taken for granted in physiological 
discussions dealing with electrical signals. For further discussion see Skilling 27:(1962), Chapter Xl, 
especially pp. 167-168. 
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<64:> Suppose that there is a particular situation “A” (or “Arm-in-striking-position”22) which 
the infant can recognize by some means, and that there is therefore some sort of schemoid 
element “a” which corresponds to this situation.  Suppose also that, provided the situation is 
“Arm-in-position” initially, then a certain overt action “Bang” will in fact normally produce 
situation “Consummation” which happens to be inherently rewarding to the infant.  (And just as a 
is the internal coding for the recognized situation “Arm-in-position”, so is c the coding for some 
positive consummatory effect, and b is the coding for the intervening action “Bang.”) 
Thus if the thought domain were populated by a sufficient number of “tapes” in the form 
“a-b-(c),” then whenever A happened to occur, it would “call” the label a, so that the program b 
would be put into effect.  “(c)” would plausibly have a different status:  as well as any subjective-
effector role it might fulfil (presumably acting ultimately on the hypothalamus) it would also act 
as a positive-affect tag, serving to slow down the decay of the scheme-tapes  “a-b-(c).”  After 
consummation sensation c, the situation may be thought of as happening to relapse to Arm-in-
position (due to gravity perhaps), so that if enough a-b-(c) tapes are still present, the cycle is 
likely to keep repeating — justifying the term “primary circular.”  Insofar as Bang was originally 
some sort of hereditary reflex response in its own right, then Piaget’s description of “superposed 
on the reflex systems” would appear to be appropriate if this means a being superposed on b or 
onto a larger tape containing it.  This description would also seem appropriate even if b had been 
modified from its hereditary form in the interim, by other earlier accommodations “superposed” 
on the original hereditary b’, producing an artefactual b”.  But what about Piaget’s “coordination 
between hand and mouth…,”  or Bruner & Bruner’s (1968)5:  “Eye, Hand and Mind”?  We now 
have parallel activities, and moreover they are coordinated Can such phenomena be explained in 
terms of linear structures?  Well some clues are offered in Monod and Jacob’s 23:(1961) 
conference summary; notably their Model IV in which two separate linear chromosome-
controlled processes are mutually interdependent, due to the products of the first causing 
inactivation of the repressor for the <> second (thus facilitating it) — and similarly the products 
of the second facilitating the first. 
Thus, in our terminology, we may have two types of tape operation in conjunction: 
a(call label) → f1(facilitate other) → p1(proceed if facilitated) → h(hand program) → 
(c)(consummation). 
a(same call) → f2(facilitate other) → p2(proceed if facilitated) → m(mouth program) → 
(c)(same consummation). 
A number of variations on this theme are possible:  notably involving more cross-feed facilitat-
ions, degrees of dependence on such support, and larger numbers of parallel tapes; but this 
example will suffice for our present discussion. 
So then, if the infant does have mental structures like these by stage 2, how did they come to 
be there?  Firstly, we should recognize that some of them may have been there all along.  If they 
did not manifest themselves earlier, this may have been for maturational reasons, explicable in 
terms of our (a-f1-p1-h-(c) and a-f2-p2-m-(c)) model:  There may not have been numerically 
enough of the relevant tapes available for them to adequately facilitate each other, or to reach 
some effector-threshold.  Or perhaps the facilitation pathways were not yet available — maybe 
because of delay in myelination. 
                                                          
22 As a means toward making the following algebraic approach somewhat easier to follow, we may use 
appropriate whole words or phrases as interchangeable algebraic symbols for their own initial letters. 
Thus Arm-in-position º A;    Bang-(spoon) º B; … etc. 
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But assuming we are agreed that some particular behaviour pattern has been learned by 
stage 2, then how do we account for it?  Take the “a-b-(c)” case first.  It was suggested 
29:M12(Traill 1975 and 1976 (A1 above))28:A1 that the process starts with populations of two 
different hereditary scheme-tapes:  (alabel-aprogram) and (blabel-bprogram-(c)) and that approximate 
simultaneity of use brings some of them into physical proximity — allowing for some 
“crossovers” to occur, so that we then obtain some tapes with the configuration:  
(alabel-bprogram-(c)), as required.  Presumably we would also get some (blabel-aprogram); though 
without the “(c)” to protect it or induce its reproduction, this type of tape might not survive for 
very long. 
Some practical variations on this can be achieved without changing the above “algebraic” 
statements.  Thus, for instance, “blabel” might simply be absent, or be represented by a dummy 
mode, according to whatever provisions heredity might have made.  Alternatively, perhaps the 
tape elements are joined in other less neat ways, possibly with some repressor action to quash the 
superseded elements.  This seems rather haphazard and inefficient for a potentially recursive 
biological system, but perhaps we should be careful about dismissing it in view of its possible 
similarity to the original genetic systems. <65:> 
Another more attractive idea is that isolated labels are tailor-made by incoming signals, and 
that they can then augment or replace existing labels on what was a hereditary scheme.  They 
would thus be comparable to episomes23 becoming attached to chromosomes.  Anyhow these 
various suggestions could all be described as “tape transplants” of one sort or another; and 
perhaps we should simply leave it at that for the time being. 
But what about the more complex systems like our (a-f1-p1-h-(c) and a-f2-p2-m-(c))?  There 
would seem to be two possible sources for such non-hereditary new schemes:  They could 
somehow be built up from scratch.  But more plausibly, and more in accord with Piaget, they 
could result from “mutations” of other tapes.  This would be essentially the same then as for the 
above simpler case; but possibly starting from more complex hereditary tapes.  These pre-set 
tapes might in some cases, be retained genetically as blank schemes, specifically “with this 
purpose in mind” — a sort of construction-kit with some scope for coding according to local 
conditions.  If this is the case, then imprinting would seem to supply a particularly striking 
illustration of such last-minute detail-filling. 
When learning is less predetermined, we are left with the problem of how sensible-and-
adaptive schemes can emerge from apparently arbitrary processes.  But this looks very like the 
problem of evolution in miniature (and that should not surprise us if we think of mental activity 
as substltute-evolution:  survival of the fittest amongst expendable models rather than amongst 
the macro beings of the “more real” world — analogously to the industrial use of expendable 
scale models and the like).  A mutant tape might fail to survive because it produces no 
satisfaction, and therefore fails to be labelled with a supportive tag, according to our present 
postulate.  Or the mutant tape and its potential collaborator-tapes may fail to provide the mutually 
necessary facilitation for their joint operation so that they fail for “technical” reasons. 
Under such a general non-specific procedure, there is likely to be considerable wastage of 
potentially useful codings; but if these are on a molecular-population scale then this will be no 
great hardship — especially if their material is re-usable with minimal change.  Also the process 
is likely to go on for some time before there is anything much to show for it.  This then is 
presumably what is happening during the infant’s first month (stage 1), before the overt 
consequences appear at stage 2. 
                                                          
23 which include such things as non-virulent viruses 19:(Jacob & Wollman, 1971). 
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Other species have different ecological requirements <> and limitations so we may expect 
different mixtures of:  predetermined fixed schemoids; largely predetermined but imprintable 
schemes; and open-ended flexible schemes.  Thus a spider’s repertoire of behaviour is highly 
stereotyped, and the human’s repertoire is very much left empty “in anticipation” of appropriate 
filling-in from experience, while a new-born lamb shows conspicuous elements of all three types 
of schemoid:  a well developed hereditary locomotive ability24 on the one hand, plus a reasonably 
flexible intelligence potential, and also a tendency to imprint to its supposed mother. 
A3.5  Taking Liberties with the Rigidity of Mathematical Groups 
The mathematical group is much discussed in connection with Piagetian theories, though 
usually for the periods following sensori-motor.  It implies the following properties, not all of 
them generally acknowledged — cf. Leech and Newman 22:(1969) for example.  In the discussion 
we will use “♦” to represent a generalized operator, including such operators as “+, –, ×, ÷” and 
many others which are not arithmetical. 
Mathematicians accept that A–B ≠ B–A, but in practical group theory it is often not made 
explicit that A and B are expected to both belong to the same set; for instance both taken from the 
unbounded set of real numbers, in which case  A·√B  would not satisfy the requirements. 
Here however, this sort of possibility is considered explicitly in “property (0).” 
(–1) A “substrate” consisting of a recognizable set of states; and also a set of fixed operators 
which may be considered alternatively as a smaller set of n variable-operators whose properties 
may be fixed by a given parameter taken from a set of parameters. 
(0) It is assumed for mathematical purposes that the parameter set is co-extensive with the set 
of states; thus we have (equivalently), n binary-operators applied as follows:  A ♦ P = … [or 
writing it more rigorously:   A ♦ (P) =…], where A and P are both members of the state set 
(though P also acts as a parameter) and “♦(. .)” is one of the n variable-operators; [or to be more 
explicit:  the n variable-operators are ♦k(. .). where  k = 1, 2, ...., n.] 
(1) “Closure” which means that for “A ♦ (P) = C,”  C is always a member of the state-set as 
well as A and P.  That is, the recognized operators cannot cause a break away from the recogniz-
ed set of states; and this <66:> means that the whole universe of discourse has been encapsulated 
within the system, thus giving complete predictability (mathematically). 
(2) An Identity element “I” (producing no change) is associated with each variable-operator, 
thus:   A ♦k (Ak) = A for all member states A, and for each k up to n.  For example, in ordinary 
algebra:   a + (0)  = a  and  a × (1) = a.   [It is also taken to be true that  Ik ♦k (A) = A, where we 
now have A acting as the parameter.] 
(3) Inverse.  For any given variable-operator-cum-parameter, ♦(P), there will also be an 
inverse parameter which will undo whatever change was made originally.  Thus if  A♦(P) = C, 
then C♦(P–1) = A;  where P–1 is the inverse parameter. 
(4) Associativity.  When a variable-operator, ♦, is to be applied twice, to three elements:   
A♦B♦C;  then associativity will hold if and only if  [A♦B]♦C = A♦[B♦C].  This can only 
make sense if condition (0) holds true — at least partially, because B has to act as both a state and 
a parameter if the equation is to be meaningful. 
                                                          
24 I am indebted to Dr. A. Sloman for raising the issue implicit in this example, and for useful discussion 
arising from it.  
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[(5) Commutativity is not required, even for mathematical groups; but as a negative example 
it may help to round off the picture.    Thus in general   A♦(B) = F  while  B♦(A) = G;  where F 
and G need not represent the same state]  A close examination of these properties rather makes 
one wonder whether the supposed properties of a “mental-concept group” are really the same set 
as those specified for mathematical groups.  The Pure Mathematician ignores the worldly implic-
ations of (-1); and he requires (0) whether he says so explicitly or not; while the remaining 
conditions are insisted on uncompromisingly. 
From a practical biological point of view however, such rigid properties can only exist as an 
ideal; to be aspired to perhaps, and approximated on a “pass percentage” basis (see Gasking’s 
8:(1960) “cluster” concept ), or even attained by one part of the mind’s activity, but never actually 
achieved rigorously.  After all as Ashby 3:Intro(1956) has pointed out, such a closed and stable 
system is inert or dead as far as the rest of the world is concerned.  Nevertheless, as we saw 
earlier, strivings after closure in our mental models are likely to form an indispensable part of our 
autonomous mental development.  Thus it would seem sensible to consider the question “How 
can the mental system progress from comparative disorder towards its supposed goal of compar-
atively group-like structure?" 
Initially it would seem that the three sets of entities [exemplified by the three letters in 
A♦(P) = C] are “regarded” as unconnected.  But during developmental <> progression, the three 
sets gradually tend to become co-extensive as required for the mathematical group:  properties 0 
and 1, above;  and arguably this is the most important change to emerge from the developmental 
process at this stage.  Let us therefore talk of “pre-groups” in this context, to refer to those 
systems which have some of the properties of a group and some means whereby sets could be 
delineated in practice (by recognizing tags or properties of the members, “intension;” and/or by 
confinement within a boundary, “extension”). 
A3.6  The Practical Mathematical Achievements  
of Evolution and Heredity 
Clearly the underlying substrate for thinking arises through genetic means, and this presum-
ably provides the material basis for the three sets of “states.”  The internal state-counterparts 
themselves may be considered as genetically-determined stereotypes, operating through highly 
specific pathways such as those in the visual cortex (Hubel & Wiesel 1959, 1962, 1963a, 1965) 
11:13:14:17:.  Moreover, the underlying mechanism might now be reasonably guessed at and 
“designed” 12:(Hubel & Wiesel, 1961;  Julesz, 1975)20:. 
[The details of such pathways, like embryological developments in general, cannot be 
divorced from environmental influences. (Hubel & Wiesel, 1963b, 1963c)15:p994, 16:p1003] 
Nevertheless it may be argued that the environmental influences here are normally sufficient-
ly predictable for hereditary codings to “take them for granted” — just as we may normally make 
many cultural assumptions in our social encounters.  Thus if the experimenter or clinician finds 
major lapses from the developmental norm, this may perhaps be explained as resulting from 
excessive (“unnatural”) departures from the physiological norm 2:Design:(Ashby 1952, 1956)3:Intro.  
We may reasonably use the term “ortho-maturational” for the non-genetic component of a 
phenotype which does depend on the environment being in the “normal” range. 
And another related side-issue:  Hebb (1949)10: and many workers since, have made much of 
synaptic plasticity as the fundamental mechanism for mental functioning.  By contrast, it would 
now seem that such changes might be in the nature of comparatively crude physiological re-
adjustmcnts of overall weightings; and, important though this may be, it would not be directly 
responsible for the main transactions of ongoing thinking, perception, and action.  Even its 
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supposed role in Long Term Memory may be open to question, if only on the grounds of stability 
and economy.] <67:> 
Anyway, a certain amount of perceptual pre-processing is provided as a hereditary legacy.  
Whether this pre-processing ends at the striate cortex with the degree of organization appropriate 
to that region, or at the inferotemporal lobe with its degree of organization, 18:(Iversen, 1974; 
Pribram, 1972)26: or at any other centre, it still makes no difference in principle for our immediate 
purpose.  All we need ask is that it should end somewhere in an array of inherited disparate state-
indicators.  (Of course this is meant to apply to the input channels for all sense modalities, not 
just the “more popular” visual system.)  One important task then for any mentally adaptable 
animal is to set up pragmatically meaningful linkages between these perceptual elements:  both 
within and across sense modalities.  Meanwhile, insofar as such linkages are absent, there will be 
a corresponding degree of compartmentalization with respect to sensory input; indeed 
qualitatively there may be more than a superficial resemblance between this sort of conceptual 
separation, and such phenomena as (i) those experienced by split-brain subjects, or (ii) the 
compartmentalization of beliefs according to the role being played. 
Similarly we may think of genetic or maturational “sealed units” of effector post-processing, 
by which the thought domain can put its “conclusions” into effect:  either as motor action, or by 
internal modifier action — controlling attention, assimilation, and such like.  Again it is not 
vitally important just where such effector channels start to be ready-made, and where they are still 
a direct manifestation of variable scheme action; — we may assume that there will be some of 
each, so both must be explicable within the terms of the model.  Indeed, we might even have to 
contend with a gradual or joint operation transition from one to the other. 
Finally, as we have already seen, some of the variable schemes themselves are likely to be of 
genetic or ortho-maturational origin. 
Now in terms of the mathematical terminology of the previous section:  if we can decide on 
where to draw the !ines between (i) sensory input, (ii) internal variable scheme-thought, and (iii) 
effector output, then we can notionally draw up a matrix similar to Table 1, for any integrated 
thought-centre.  Emphasis is put on “integrated” because it seems appropriate to consider each 
informationally-isolated unit as a separate thought unit until such time as it achieves some sort of 
meaningful dialogue with other units, and thereby loses its autonomy.  Thus it can be seen that 
Table I itself fails to qualify as it stands, because each successive triplet of (row)-(column)-
(diagonal element) forms an isolated unit on its own — so we <> actually have four separate 
integrated units, rather than one as implied. 
Moreover, at birth we may assume that for an exhaustive table of sense-patterns and effector-
patterns, many will lack even this degree of integration.  In general we may think of them as 
“Conditional Stimuli” and “Conditional Responses” which are still “neutral,” so they correspond 
to just an identifiable column, or just an identifiable row, but lacking any entry in the body of the 
table.  [Things might be different at the micro level; for example if each relevantly labelled tape 
has an arbitrary program, so that it is integrated on its own, but not if it is considered as a 
statistical representative of a population.  However not even this complication would arise if the 
program part of each tape were “blank” or simply absent.  Of course for such micro-distinctions, 
any exhaustive table would be of astronomical dimensions! ] 
Anyhow, the ortho-maturational and hereditary achievement may be said to be the “drawing 
up” of such an exhaustive table, but leaving most of the entries empty — though allowing some 
“diagonals.”  Indeed insofar as row and columns represent patterns of input and output, it is an 
open question whether these rows and columns are even all endowed with identifying codings at 
this stage:  these could be added arbitrarily later.  As for size:  if we assume that the basic 
constituents of these input and output patterns are limited by anatomical constraints, and the 
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number of fixed hereditary “sealed unit” combinations of them is also limited, then it is possible 
that an exhaustive table would be no more than huge, rather than “immense” in Elsasser’s sense 
(1961)7: of 10a huge number, as we might otherwise expect. 
A3.7  The Practical Mathematical Achievements of Stage 1 (Manifested at Stage 2) 
The achievements of stage 1 may then be described as a filling-in of some more diagonal 
elements in the table — or perhaps discovering that the particular entry prescribed by heredity-or-
maturation does not work and should be replaced by a different entry.  It is, of course, simply a 
matter of convenience which entries fall in the diagonal position.  The point is that at this stage 
there should tend to be a single preferred response pattern to a given stimulus pattern; and what-
ever this turns out to be, if we can arrange for the relevant entry to be kept on the diagonal, then 
our stimulus patterns and response patterns will turn <68:> out to be listed in corresponding 
order.  We should also bear in mind that any real imposed stimulus-pattern is likely to be 
assimilated as a series of recognizable sub-patterns which include internally generated 
components, so from moment to moment the part of the table “in use” is likely to change 
dramatically; this partly explains how the number of rows and columns might be kept to a 
manageable size — many of the response patterns concluding by “passing the buck,” or simply 
running in parallel. 
Another description of these attainments is to say that the infant has mastered a considerable 
number of (disconnected and probably temporary) one-dimensional abstract spaces at “groupment” 
level, (not “group” because there is no appreciation of a reversal operation as such — even 
though a sort of “zero-resetting” may, in fact, occur by default).  In other words, given a 
recognizable initial situation, the infant may habitually come to produce the right effector action 
pattern to bring about a consummation; but without involving any invidious choices between 
comparable paths, if only because other potential choices will have been forgotten. 
A3.8  Achievements During Stage 2 
Assuming that one-dimensional link-ups do occur in stage 1 as described, then to what extent 
are these made permanent? — and when, and how?  We may suppose that initially such schemes 
are quite ephemeral — though their statistical decay-rate may depend on the extent to which their 
population is tagged as rewarding and therefore worth preserving for the time being — until 
something more pressing drives them out of the infant’s attention.  Where such schemoid formul-
ations do become more permanent we may reasonably identify the resulting stable populations as 
schemata, even if they may have a rather more primitive connotation than is usual in Piagetian 
discussions.   As for when such schemata develop:  they may well be theoretically capable of 
formation right from birth or earlier, but probably do not play a leading role until stage 2. 
Just how this stability is reflected structurally remains to be explained.  Let us take up the 
earlier suggestion that such permanence derives from corroboration of some sort; and in this case 
it is likely to take the form of mutually supportive cross-feed, as in Monod and Jacob’s Model IV, 
discussed above.  But suppose this is true, we have already been attributing this sort of mutual 
support to normal ephemeral schemes — at least in some degree; so where might the difference 
be? <> 
Well it could be essentially just a matter of degree — perhaps involving some sort of 
“critical-mass effect,” in which any exceeding of a critical population density gives a local 
locked-on system.  Another possibility is that the hypothesized electrical intermediaries in the 
cross-feed paths come to be circumvented, thus giving a much more immediate “alliance” capable 
of withstanding disruptive influences.  These two possibilities would seem to be mutually 
compatible; and indeed it would seem necessary to postulate something like the prior local 
68c1
68c2
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 s
en
so
ri
mo
to
r 
sp
ac
e-
se
ns
e 
——
 C
ha
pt
er
 A
3 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 45  of  207  
Kybernetes, 7, 61-71  © Thales Publications (W.O.) Ltd. — (1978) by R.R.Traill  (1978a/2006b)   
original
page-Nos
↓ 
growth of direct mutual support in order to explain how the supposed electrical links could be 
superseded. 
Anyhow, whatever the mechanism, any new promotion of a significant body of ephemeral 
schemes into long-term schemata is likely to have profound effects on mental functioning, and it 
rather looks as though stage 2 produces just such a major milestone comparable to the boundary 
which occurs later between the “Pre-operational” and “Concrete Operations” sub-periods.  
Moreover, the reason is probably similar:  Adequate numbers of schemes for manipulating elem-
ents basic to the particular period25 have just acquired reasonable permanence and salience, thus 
opening the way for more time-consuming explorations of group-like structures.  This means that 
reverse operations, consideration of alternatives, and more advanced waiting-for-response-before-
proceeding become postible within the respective contexts. 
A3.9  Stages 3 and 4 (Approximately) 
Let us consider Table I again.  By now the infant has managed to manufacture a substantial 
number of apparently unique “diagonal” elements, and the infant has also managed to give these 
diagonal action-codings sufficient permanence so that they might now be worthy of attention in 
their own right — as if they were perceptual “sealed units.”  This then opens the way for higher 
order schemes which refer to other schemoids by “name,” without necessarily calling them into 
effect.  Amongst other things, we may suppose that such inward-looking higher schemes would 
be able to “list together” those lower order schemoids which were capable of performing a 
particular consummatory task; (perhaps by first arbitrarily calling such lower schemoids, and then 
“forgetting” them if they fail to produce the arbitrarily pre-set expectation).<69:>  
This would be an important step forward.  It would give a means for forming practical sets of 
one-dimensional linkages; and these presumably offer alternative routes, b1 and b2, to the 
elementary consummation (c) — given a specific starting situation, a.  We therefore now have a 
basis for producing a mental model of an enclosure around a two-dimensional space26. (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1948)25:ChC/Sp.  This in itself is only a beginning:  as it stands, such a link-up does not 
constitute a model of an object — nor even a two-dimensional equivalent of an object — because 
it is restricted in both its starting-point and in the direction in which the boundary may be traced. 
However, other types of higher order scheme should also be attainable.  Suppose for instance 
that there are now two recognized starting points (a1 and a2 ) from which c may be reached 
deliberately; and that the infant comes to discover, by chance, that a2 lies on one of the alternative 
routes which start from a1 — and vice versa.  This then gives a means whereby the reversal pair 
a1a2 and a2a1 can be classified as a special sort of set, whose usefulness in group construction 
then becomes open to discovery.  In order to explain the attainment of a set which included a 
reversal away from the consummation state c, it would seem necessary to change the infant’s 
“drive mode” so that, for the time being, c no longer provides a satisfying goal, but that a2 (say) 
becomes the state to be sought after; — it being assumed that the c and a2 would not lose their 
coded identities during this switch-over.  Furthermore it is likely to be just a matter of exercisc for 
the infant to be able to cope with any recognizable starting-point around the loop (Traill, 1975) 
30:Sensori/LaTr. 
So now our infant has met most of the requirements necessary for the formation of a 
mathematical group — at least for two dimensions:  (–1) Substrate of states and operators, yes, 
(0) Parameter set = state set, generally dubious; (1) Closure, partially yes (on boundaries of two-
                                                          
25 Viz. input  “sealed units” for Sensori-motor; or object schemata for the Operational Period. 
26 “Space” may be understood here as sometimes meaning geometrical space, but also sometimes 
meaning other sorts of topological space. 
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dimensional object-perception loops); (2) Identity, yes (if only by inaction); (3) Inverse, partial 
yes — as for closure; and (4) Associativity remains dubious along with “0” on which it depends.  
This is not perfection, but arguably the most important properties are there to an adequate extent, 
thus giving sufficient capability for the infant to stumble onto reasonably correct models of real 
objects if he “accepts” fulfilment of group-like properties as a “worthwhile goal." 
A related consequence of the higher order schemes is the connecting up, into sets, of those 
schemoids <> for different perceptual modes which happen to display a functional 
correspondence. 
It remains then to probe a little more deeply into how, in mechanistic terms, such sets of 
boundary-tracing schemata (linked by a higher schemoid) come to acquire the extra stability just 
implied in the “goal” concept.  Two general possibilities come to mind:  (i) that these “higher 
order” schemes acquire stability in essentially the same way as for lower order schemoids-indeed 
it would be conveniently economical to suppose that the two types are identical except for the 
sorts of entities which happen to be code-referenced in their respective “lists.”  (ii) It was 
suggested 29:M12(Traill 1975 and 1976 (A1 above))28:A1 that such structures might be “tested” 
more-or-less regularly or continuously for closure.  Presumably some sort of exercise, perhaps 
during one of the sleep modes, and perhaps associated with one or more of the EEG frequencies, 
would attempt to pass control from one element of a set to the next.  If the set did have mutual 
closure, then this “control” would be kept “within the family,” but not otherwise; and stability 
could then derive from this ability to hold control — possibly by replication during such 
exercises. 
These two suggestions appear to be compatible however, and indeed the second could be 
used to help explain the growth in local tape-population density which could then promote the 
first. 
A3.10  Stages 5 and 6 (Approximately) 
It should be borne in mind that Piaget’s “stages” are observational categories.  As such, they 
need not necessarily be a safe guide to underlying unobserved developments.  In the early stages, 
when presumably not too many things are going on simultaneously, the correspondence between 
observed, and non-observed events is likely to be reasonably satisfactory; but at later stages we 
would be wise to exercise greater caution in the interpretation of the observations.  Thus stages 5 
and 6 (the second year) are justifiably considered as the closing stages of sensori-motor 
development, but might they not also be the clandestine starting-phase for the following 
operationol period?   After all, it was supposed above that the initial sensorimotor development 
was also clandestine. 
In particular it seems likely that the experiments with sequential displacements of objects 
should logically be associated with the following operational period, because they take some 
form of object and its internal schema as basic elements.27  Also the same <70:> sort of argument 
applies to observations concerning obstacle removal.  In fact, it rather seems that these are a 
recapitulation of the stage 1 activities, but at a higher level — trying to form coherent patterns of 
operation whereby objects can be moved around, rather than trying to form coherent appreciat-
ions of objects themselves. 
Admittedly the “objects” as perceived in stages 5 and 6 are probably two-dimensional so that 
some incomprehensible anomalies are likely to confront the child in due course, but they 
nevertheless provide a very attractive approximation to reality for an individual who has hitherto 
had to cope with very much less.  Small wonder then if he “goes off half-cocked” into the 
                                                          
27 instead of a constituent object-property and its internal “sealed unit” signal.  
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mysteries of the operational period.  [Nor are adults immune from such incaution, despite the 
proverbial warning that “a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.”  Indeed for phenomena less 
well defined than permanent objects, we may not be able to do better than use our inadequate 
knowledge, however dangerous this may be.  Such is politics for instance.  Moreover, by no 
means all material things can be dealt with neatly as “rigid, permanent objects,” as Green and 
Laxon 9:(1970) admirably illustrate in the title of their article.] 
But to return to the closing stages of the sensorimotor period as such:  Despite any “pre-
mature” excursions into the next period, the child will meanwhile also be building up alternative 
two-dimensional schemata which will turn out to have some interesting common features; and 
ultimately these are likely to be resolved in the formation of schemata which capture the 
properties of three-dimensional groups.  The process is likely to be broadly analogous to that for 
producing two-dimensional schemata, though with some additional complications: 
"Neat” geometrical groups are more difficult to design in three dimensions than in two; thus, 
for instance, 60º rotations about one axis (perpendicular to the plane) generate a perfectly 
satisfactory group (“C6”).  But if we try mixing 60º rotations about two perpendicular axes 
simultaneously then the result is, at best, haphazard (until we invoke formal trigonometry).  
However, a judicious restriction to using mainly 90º rotations can circumvent such embarrass-
ments, and at the same time provide the proper “feel” for the three-dimensional nature of an 
object. 
So better late than never, by the end of his second year the child will probably have sufficient 
grasp of the true three-dimensional nature of objects for him to be able to make good some of the 
perplexities he may have fallen into in the meanwhile.  <> 
A3.11  Subsequent Recapitulation (Recursion) 
It has already been suggested in the above discussion that the operational period will follow 
substantially the same course, but at a different level, using objects and object schemata rather 
than their precursors.  It has also been hinted that the following formal operations period might 
follow the same pattern as well, using something like the entities of set theory or logic, in place of 
objects.  One might even logically postulate a fourth period to include meta-mathematics; and the 
very fact that we talk about algebras (plural) rather suggests this. 
Anyhow, the pattern which at least the first two periods were supposed to follow consisted of 
two phases in each case:  An initial phase in which some basic facts about how one elementary 
state or element (appropriate to the respective period) can be operated on so as to produce another 
particular state or element.  This is then followed by a second phase in which such information is 
classified and systematized into generalized rules or groups, allowing for maximal efficiency in 
problem solving (within the limited understanding of that period), and by the same token 
providing schemata to be used as constant elements for the following period, if any. 
A3.12  Summary and Conclusion 
There is a prima facie case for believing that mental functioning can be explained mechan-
istically, in terms of large populations of linear biochemical codes which are capable, in some 
circumstances, of communicating at a distance.  On this basis, an attempt is made to solve some 
of the problems in “designing” such a system by offering an analytical account of various 
phenomena characteristic of sensori-motor development. 
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
B1.  Introduction: the search for a rigorous structural 
theory of memory 
This chapter poses some basic questions about how the 
phenomena of behavioural psychology could possibly be rigorously 
explained in terms of realistic biological mechanisms — 
in particular questions about selective communication with 
different chemical memory-stores. 
As long as we insist that physiological action-potential is the 
basic indivisible unit of such communication, then any rigorous 
explanation proves to be disturbingly elusive.  However there turn 
out to be some persuasively corroborative arguments that there may 
be an important and rich fine-structure to these and other neural 
phenomena — involving frequencies above 1011 Hz — and this 
would make the explanatory task much more feasible. 
B2.  How could bio-electrical messages be converted 
into meaningful and specific chemical coding — and be 
retrieved ?  
It can now scarcely be doubted that mental activity involves 
both electrical communication and chemical storage.  The prime 
question then is, what connection could there be between these two 
types of phenomenon?  This leads to an evaluation of the role that 
infra-red and sub-picosecond events might play in providing such a 
link. 
However we also need to be able to offer biologically feasible 
mechanisms for both the initial encoding of memories and their 
subsequent selective retrieval.  Thus suggestions are offered to 
explain selective triggering of particular chemical stores, and the 
consequences which are likely to follow — as motor action or 
further internal triggering.  But the most enigmatic feature of all is 
the laying down of memory in the first place; and here it seems 
necessary to postulate a system of trial-and-error at molecular 
level, so that the encodings of both action and perception can be 
judged by their results — in line with Piagetian concepts of mental 
development at the behavioural level.  
 
B3.  Transmission properties for various frequencies of 
electromagnetic signal within nervous tissue, and the 
special case of saltatory conduction 
This chapter provides a corroborative cross-check by making 
an independent analysis of the (saltatory) transmission-
characteristics for myelinated axons presented with all frequencies 
from 1 KHz to beyond 1014 Hz.  Factors considered include:  
breakdown of circuit-theory assumptions for the very high frequen-
cies, free transmission within the myelin dielectric, reflection at the 
co-axial boundaries, limited protection against water’s absorption 
bands, evidence for signal-blockage, and possible artefact results.  
The conclusion is that audio-frequencies and infra-red frequencies 
are both suitable for such transmission, but not the frequencies in 
between. 
 
B4.  The second-lowest mode of transmission in co-axial 
myelin (Hl,0):   optical dispersion of infra-red 
This chapter argues that existing myelinated segments could 
also act as dispersive media, similar to those postulated in chapter 
B2, by using  “higher vibrational modes”  within the myelin.  
 
B5.   Evolution of communication methods: 
suggested extensions to Bishop’s two stages 
This chapter speculates on the evolutionary development of 
communication systems in animals, and suggests that the basic 
elements of infra-red transmission may be very ancient and primit-
ive.  
  
B6.  Other related architecture in brief: 
glia, paranodal regions, and cell-body interior 
It seems likely that infra-red components of a signal will be 
“steered” into their own reception sites, which need not have any 
close connection with synaptic sites.  Instead para-nodal regions 
and glia are likely to be involved.  Transmission of infra-red is 
likely to be limited to distances of about cell-size except when they 
can find a lipid optical path. 
 
TOWARD A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF ELECTRO-CHEMICAL 
INTERACTION IN MEMORY USE:   THE POSTULATED ROLE OF INFRA-RED 
COMPONENTS AND MOLECULAR EVOLUTION 
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“A molecular theory of brain organization, with explanations of 
neurosis, psychosis, and normal functioning”.
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION1 
 
Developing the hypothetical concepts more deeply — 
and applying them to explain a number of poorly 
understood psychological phenomena, including 
dysfunctions of the system which result in  
clinical neurosis or psychosis 
Part C 
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Chapter C1 
A Broader Strategy for Research — seeking coherence amongst well-defined elements 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter serves two purposes, though this may not be immediately apparent.  
The manifest topic is its critical dissection of Scientific Method, seen as a social 
thought process; but the same discussion will later be seen as also being significantly 
relevant as an analogy in an examination of the thought-processes of the individual:  
because both entail Epistemology. 
The case is put that, although modern science may be prepared for progress and 
change in the laws and theories which it directly studies, it is less prepared to question 
its own rules of procedure which take the form of “Scientific Method”.  And yet (it is 
argued), these rules should themselves be open to scientific scrutiny under the rubric of 
Epistemology.  Seen in this light, it may be argued that present methodology places too 
much emphasis on “direct” experimental testability and too little on the development of 
“theory” in the form of internal structural logic; indeed I suggest that it is not strictly 
legitimate to separate these two processes. 
Accordingly, we might expect to accelerate scientific progress if we can properly 
redress this apparent imbalance.  But to do so efficiently we will need non-vague state-
ments concerning whatever we take to be the basic structure of the system concerned. 
C1.1  Observability and experimental testability 
After a very extensive review of the work on schizophrenic thought, Chapman and Chapman 
(1973) suggest, amongst other things, that a tightening-up of experimental method might produce 
some new, more valid, bimodalities — and hence an improved insight into the relevant variables; 
(page 337).  Such statistically based experimental work clearly offers an important second 
dimension to augment the earlier clinically-based conclusions, but it is open to question whether 
statistical experimentation is really adequate for the task — unless it is assisted by yet other 
approaches. 
Even if we look no further than Chapman and Chapman’s proposals, it is clear that a great 
deal of painstaking work would be needed, <137> and that the value of the resulting payoff 
would be uncertain and incomplete.  Moreover Elsasser (1958, 1961) makes the same point in a 
rather more systematic way by extending the physicist’s concept of indeterminacy into the 
biological field.  Thus whereas a physicist must ultimately choose between precision in the 
position of a particle — and precision in measuring its momentum;  a biologist must similarly 
choose how much he is prepared to interfere with (or destroy) the individual subject, in the 
interests of “knowing about” something which no longer exists in that form — or alternatively he 
must choose between the precision of his experimental categories, and the possibility of finding 
exemplars to fit such exacting requirements. 
 The latter (statistical) formulation of the experimental constraints implies that we must 
expect diminishing returns from our efforts to find new insights from statistical surveys — 
however well designed.  This does not preclude progress, but it suggests that sooner or later we 
will simply run out of resources in one way or another.  Of course much can be expected from the 
intensive investigation of individual subjects, but clearly we will then have to cope with the 
“interference/destruction” formulation of the indeterminacy principle, as well as any problems we 
may have in generalizing our results. 
Assuming that such arguments are valid, then should we despair of ever reaching an 
“adequate” understanding of the details of mental functioning, and other complex processes?  
137
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Of course it is true that for some time to come, the psychological sciences will be able to draw on 
the aid of non-psychological techniques in the form of physiological and pharmacological probes;  
(a semi-salvation for which there is no equivalent in particle physics).  But in the end, will we 
still come back to the problem of an insurmountable <138> knowledge-impasse arising from 
indeterminacy considerations?  Well, it would seem that if we accept normal criteria for 
“objective measurements”, then we will indeed reach such an impasse at which our “objective” 
procedures can take us no further. 
[It has, in fact, already been implied (in Chapter A1, above) that we have been too generous 
in our criteria of “objectivity” — that we exceed the bounds of objectivity much earlier than we 
suppose, and that there may indeed be no such thing as objectivity (leading to “episteme”) at all!  
It is not intended, however, to labour this point here; though it may perhaps lend urgency to our 
present considerations.  The main point is simply that sooner or later experimental observations 
will fail to provide all the answers.] 
Pure Behaviourists and many Physicists would have us believe that we should go no further; 
that any dabbling in what is not objectively testable is at best futile, and at worst obscurantist or 
occult — and in all fairness one must admit that such dangers do exist.  In contrast however, two 
points might usefully be made without having to delve too deeply into the philosophical issues 
involved.  Firstly, provided we place any reliance on our deductive processes at all, there is a case 
for indirect testing of postulates — even to the extent of testing by means of remote logical 
implications which may not yet be apparent to us, and which are not likely to become apparent if 
we do not first “take the plunge” and “exercise” the postulates in an apparently untestable state.  
Secondly, even if such postulates were absolutely untestable, they might nevertheless have a 
perfectly legitimate role to play as heuristic devices — methods of condensing an unmanageable 
mass of facts into a more parsimonious and manageable “mental model” (which is arguably the 
defining criterion for “understanding”).  The classical example of such progress is Newton’s 
formulation (via Kepler) of <139> Tycho Brahe’s mass of astronomical observations.  But we 
should not scoff at the very real (if inaccurate) heuristic achievements of the Ptolomaic system as 
an aid to the practitioner in the absence of anything better; its main defect, given the 
circumstances, was that it was treated as absolutely factual. 
Eysenck’s attack on psychoanalysis, (for instance in his chapter “Little Hans or Little Albert”, 
1965), is of some interest in this context.  The very term “Psycho-analysis” implies an attempted 
explanation by means of a ‘model’, the basic elements of which are unobservable (and therefore, 
in some sense, untestable).  Whether or not one agrees with Eysenck that the practice of 
psychoanalysis is a waste of time and money, there does seem to be a good case for conceding 
that hypothetical analytical constructs such as ‘super-ego’ may well be immune from all experim-
ental proof and disproof — by any normally accepted laboratory criterion.  So what value, if any, 
is there in such intangible concepts?  And have they any epistemological justification at all ? 
Well, insofar as such concepts form part of a self-consistent, quantitative, and (perhaps) 
dynamic model, then to that extent we may argue in terms of justification by ‘internal closure’.  In 
this case, such criteria are only vaguely met — but it would be an overstatement to claim that 
they are not met at all.  It is easy to recite the slogan that “they explain everything, and predict 
nothing”; but neither part of the statement is rigourously true, so it would be unwise to entirely 
dismiss such semi-logic.  (Roughly speaking, we may think of such semi-logic as giving tolerably 
usable “conclusions” as long as we do not try to use extended chains of inference.  Related 
concepts include subjective thought, intuition, and primary-process thinking; though these terms 
are usually applied to the individual, and our immediate concern is with collective thought <140> 
within the scientific community, (see Chapter A2, above).  Anyhow the point is that although 
there is some substance to Eysenck’s criticism, nevertheless there may be some formal justificat-
ion for entertaining vague constructs like ‘ego’ and ‘super-ego’.  However the case would be 
139
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much more convincing if a more precise theory (more rigourously testable, by internal closure at 
least) could be formulated.  The question then is, can such a plausible model be devised if we 
ignore the traditional constraint of the need for experimental testability — for the time being at 
least ? 
One apparently valid strategy for improving the internal consistency of a theoretical system is 
to look for new distinctions and variables, or roughly the same type and scale of magnitude as the 
old ones, but with boundaries or definitions revised to accommodate the data more closely.  Thus 
phlogiston, having been shown to be a “negative substance”, was more conveniently replaced by 
the concept of ‘the absence of oxygen’.  Similarly a geo-centric planetary theory can be 
conveniently re-formulated as a heliocentric theory — or a relativistic theory.  In other cases we 
may replace a linear scale by a logarithmic scale (Ellis, 1966), or rotate the axes.  This then is the 
type of theoretical development which one might hope would follow on from any significant 
advances in Chapman and Chapman’s proposed experimental programme, as referred to in the 
start of this Section.  However it is far from clear that this would be likely to produce any 
important departure beyond our present vague concepts of mentation.  Tempting though it is to 
hope for a Copernican or ‘oxygen-versus-phlogiston’ revolution, such hope is ill-founded for the 
complex type of “inhomogeneous” system found in biology (Elsasser, 1958); whereas in physics, 
“the study of homogeneous [or identifiably discrete] systems”, such hope is demonstrably often 
justified — and the situation is also similar for elementary chemistry.  <141> 
C1.2  Induction.  deduction, and internal testability 
But there is at least one other strategy which is also available to us.  Even in Physics, where 
such macro-formulations as Boyle’s law did make significant inroads into the subject, it was still 
found eminently worthwhile to re-interpret these and other phenomena in terms of (unobservable) 
micro-particles — hence the molecular kinetic theory.  So if we managed to dream up a plausible 
micro-structure for mental phenomena, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that a significant 
advance in understanding might accompany this development.  (To be “plausible” in this sense, a 
model would not need to be experimentally testable in the usual direct experimental sense — at 
any rate not initially, and perhaps not at all; but it would need to be able to be compatible with 
reliable evidence from all relevant disciplines — so that it fits in with the ‘internal closure’ of 
theory in general.  This is by no means a ‘soft option’, even if it is somewhat softer than the task 
of “observing the unobservable”; and indeed the more precisely such a micro-model can be 
formulated without violating internal closure on an interdisciplinary basis, the more likely it will 
be that we have stumbled onto the correct solution (episteme), though we can never know for sure 
whether we have actually done so (Popper, 1963/1969; see Part A, above).  Just as the false 
testimony of a murderer (if explicit enough) is unlikely to stand up against logical analysis and 
forensic evidence (if it is thorough enough), so a highly explicit theory is unlikely to survive a 
thorough logical and interdisciplinary examination if it happens to be false.  And this would seem 
to apply even if we consider only the internal closure or ‘equilibration’ based on previous theories 
of a similar status, without necessarily relying on ‘objective experimental testing’; — a dispensat-
ion which is fortunate if there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a genuinely objective exper-
imental test, (Chapter A1, above).  <142> 
It is a matter of some considerable practical importance to clarify what would actually be 
entailed by our “stumbling onto” a suitable micro-theory.  a perfectionist strategy in which 
nothing but ideal solutions are accepted, and no record is kept of failures or partial successes, 
would take such a long time to achieve its goal that we should (if possible!) dismiss it as a 
workable technique.  Ashby (1960) illustrates this point (in Section 11/5) with a simple example 
in which 1000 on/off switches have to be set to a particular combination by random-based 
testing, each test to take one second.  Of the three strategies considered:  ● the perfectionist all-
142
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or-nothing method would be expected to take more than 10301 seconds, (i.e. 21000 seconds, or 
3·5×10291 centuries!);  ● a serial-test of switches, holding on to the partial successes (assuming 
that these are manifest) would take 500 seconds; while  ● a parallel-but-individual testing of all 
switches simultaneously would take only one second.  Unfortunately the third technique will 
often be inoperable, so we will frequently have to be content with a technique similar to the 
second method; but heaven help anyone who tries to solve a complex problem using the first 
technique alone (or as a sizable component in a mixed strategy)! 
For our present problem of developing scientific postulates which are intended to represent 
reality, the situation is naturally somewhat more involved.  For one thing, in Ashby’s example 
both the rules of the game and the nature of the three strategies are presented to the reader ready-
made; and even if he has any difficulty in understanding them, he is not likely to see this 
‘personal’ problem as relevant to the example.  However in science there is ultimately no 
infallible guide as to what the rules or options might be, nor is it even indisputably clear just what 
the objectives are.  Even supposing that the switches do operate in a reliable on/off <143> 
manner (and in a genuine scientific enquiry there is no infallible authority to tell us whether they 
do or not), how are we to know for certain that these (or any) switches are relevant to the 
problem?  They may be mixed in amongst other irrelevant switches — or switches which change 
the rules applying to the others, and so on.  Moreover without “relevant” experience to guide us, 
might we not just as well expect that the recitation of magical formulae, or the divination of 
blemishes and dust-particles on the console (or anywhere else!) would in some way be predictive 
or instrumental in solving the problem.  Of course there are ways of obtaining reasonably 
credible tentative answers to these meta-problems; but the point to be made here is that such 
answers should not merely be taken for granted. 
(The above reference to confusion over the significance of dust-particles and blemishes was 
metaphorical, and referred to the social question of scientific method; but of course such 
confusions are encountered literally in schizophrenic patients, and as we shall see below, this is 
probably no mere coincidence). 
C1.3  Discrete modelling of “continuous” reality 
We also encounter a second complication as we move from Ashby’s example to most cases 
of scientific research, at least in the macro-phenomena which we can “observe” (in the normal 
sense of the term).  As Weiss (1969) puts it:  “Nature presents itself to us primarily as a 
continuum”.  Even though our scientific problems may well amount ultimately to operating 
‘on/off’ mechanisms at some micro or ultramicro level, it will probably be beyond our power to 
treat such mechanisms like normal switches (or perhaps even to prove or disprove their existence 
using normal criteria) so that we may have no option but to use gross statistical manipulations 
and/or measurements in practical transactions.  (Moreover we cannot be certain that the basic 
elements of any system will really be discrete and atom-like, though <144> it seems likely that 
such elements will at least be meta-stable centres of concentration within a continuum). 
Despite such continuous properties manifested by the reality which we set out to study, it 
seems to be the case that most or all “satisfactory” scientific explanation needs to be expressible 
in discrete terms.  Smooth curves, for instance, are “most satisfactory” when expressible in terms 
of finite series of polynomial, trigonometric, or other standard functions.  Fortunately however, 
natural phenomena are generally “well behaved” in this respect — exhibiting properties which 
can, in principle, be simulated extensively at the observable level by an appropriate choice of 
discrete elements at the micro-level in the model, whether or not these correspond to the actual 
micro-structure of “the real system”. 
144
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Alchemy was a mystic art which, as it developed into Chemistry, acquired some semi-satisfy-
ing explanations when its regularities at the observable level were summarized approximately by 
Mendeleev’s periodic table; but adequate “understanding” had to wait for the atomic theory — to 
provide a micro-structural basis.  As a surprising contrast, the explanation of gravity has rested at 
the observable-scale of formulation (despite Newton’s own misgivings!), presumably because the 
inverse-square formula is so reliable here that we become conditioned not to press too hard for a 
“proper” explanation.  And the same applies even more startlingly to that extraordinary formulat-
ion of our own century:  the wave-particle dualism concept which is expressed in strange abstract 
formulae.  This formulation has produced spectacular results like atomic energy, to be sure, but 
no satisfactory “explanation” in the sense of fundamental “understanding”.  (Popper, 1963). 
It would probably be fair to say that the alchemists were slow to produce proper understand-
ing because they lacked <145>  
 (i) an adequately systematic methodological approach, and  
 (ii) an adequate feel for the underlying micro-structure which might conceivably exist  
  within their chemicals;  
and the same might be said of Medicine before Pasteur and Koch.  In both cases, this shortcoming 
may be seen as a failure to conceptualize adequately in discrete terms — indeed we may suspect 
that such a rudderless groping for structure is a nearly-inevitable precursor in any new field of 
enquiry.  In such an environment, superstition is likely to surround the particular area of ignor-
ance — perhaps despite general enlightenment on other topics.  That is to say some sort of ad hoc 
structure is likely to creep into unstated assumptions, as a means towards papering over the 
nagging cognitive dissonance.  While such ad hoc structures remain unrecognized as being only 
provisional, they are likely to form a serious obstacle to the elucidation of truth however valuable 
they may otherwise be as “stop-gap” theories. 
But note that this danger of ‘getting stuck with’ a misleading model of reality (without realiz-
ing what has happened), is not confined to the models we construct of chemicals or neural elem-
ents; the danger also applies to the methodological rules which we use to constrain ourselves 
from using hopeless strategies like Ashby’s first example.  But these methodological rules are not 
infallible, and they too can serve as superstitious obstructions to truth-seeking — even if they 
simultaneously prevent us from setting up other obstructions lower down the hierarchy.  In fact it 
seems likely that the “methodological superstitions” would be the more insidious in that they are 
less likely to be noticed for what they are.  If this is the case, then we would do well to spend 
some effort to re-check the status and credentials of our rules for Scientific Method from time to 
time, or perhaps even relax them occasionally in the spirit of (controlled and monitored) 
adventure. <146> It might even be fair to say that this is the chief value of responsible clinical 
evidence, leading to such fresh insights as those of Freud, Laing, Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz, 
and the ‘diary’-observations of Jean Piaget; so those who have criticised such work on the basis 
of ‘laboratory criteria’ have not necessarily helped the cause of science as much as they might 
suppose. 
This of course brings us back to the point (raised in the middle of Section C1.1) that the 
current doctrine favouring direct-testability is open to criticism.  To elaborate a little on the earlier 
comments:  it seems that, in practice, this doctrine means that only those novel theories which can 
be ‘fully developed’ within the space of one paper (or perhaps one book) are likely to be taken 
seriously; (where ‘fully developed’ means concluded to the point that decisive experimental tests 
are feasible).  Not only does this tend to exclude useful heuristic developments, but it also tends 
to rule out those theories which cannot be ‘fully developed’ within the arbitrary limits imposed by 
the single paper (or book) format, no matter how well the theory fits the alternative criterion of 
internal consistency (Traill, 1976c).  This may therefore be taken as an argument in favour of 
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altering the rule so as to include the internal consistency criterion — and for keeping such rules 
under surveillance generally. 
C1.4  Apparently-continuous modelling of apparently-continuous reality:  
“Scientific Impressionism” 
Let us first consider the implications of apparent-continuity in the “reality” under study.  One 
approach is to adopt the Newtonian technique of discrete-symbolism-for-continuous-phenomena 
and hope that reality does match the models provided by integral and differential calculus.  Any 
success here will automatically provide empirical predictive power; but it is open to question 
whether this really contributes to our fundamental understanding.  <147> 
Alternatively we may do our modelling stochastically, using a large population of micro 
elements or events, such that a statistical simulation of macro-reality may be hoped for, whether 
or not we wish to claim any validity or homomorphism for these micro-aspects of our model.  For 
instance, suppose that we had no clear concept for a circle or how to reproduce one; how then 
could we approach the problem of communicating the concept between us?  Well, we could say:   
“it’s a bit like a square (in all its orientations), a bit like a pentagon, …”.  If we were then to 
superimpose line-drawings of all these approximations, this would ultimately result in a tolerably 
identifiable impression of a circle. 
It is here suggested that our concepts of ego, superego, schizophrenia, and indeed most of the 
concepts used in the psychological sciences, are of this impressionistic type.  Similarly we might 
perhaps say that the various alternative theories of psychoanalysis, used pluralistically by 
clinicians, are analogous to the square and pentagon (etc.) of our above example.  Thus none of 
them would be strictly correct, yet a judicious choice might result in the clinical use of a 
particular approximation which is optimally suited to the particular patient at a particular time.  
And a suitably mixed “superposition” of these theories might sometimes give a good overall 
“feel” for the real phenomenon as a whole. 
We do ourselves less than justice if we decry the value of such “unscientific” techniques 
(which are significantly similar to ‘primary-process thinking’), but neither should we be content 
to rest on our laurels.  If there is any prospect of building a model which is sharper than our 
present impressionistic one, a model capable of incorporating the various “straight-line figure” 
approximations into one improved “circle” formulation, then it would seem prudent to try.  
(Planck’s reconciliation of Wien’s law and the Rayleigh-Jeans law is perhaps <148> a more 
pertinent example, (Slater, 1955, Chapter 3)).  If such a formulation cannot at present be 
supported by evidence or immediately forseeable experimentation, then this is unfortunate — but 
not catastrophic so long as we do not forget its tentative status, and so long as it shows ‘internal 
closure’ within its interdisciplinary implications (like its close cousin ‘secondary process 
thinking’). 
It was to this end that an unobserved ultra-micro structure was postulated for the Piagetian 
impressionistic concepts of “scheme” and “schema” (Part A, above); and also further postulates 
were introduced to improve the interdisciplinary internal-closure by removing some more 
“somehow”s from the general formulation, (Part B, above; and Traill, 1976b).  It is now proposed 
to apply these concepts to more general activities of the human brain, both in the hope that the 
results will find practical application, and as an effort towards a further extension of interdiscip-
linary internal closure.   <149> 
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Chapter C2 
A Brief Review of the Neo-Piagetian Linear-Molecule Theory of Brain-Function 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter serves mainly to draw together the main ideas put forward in the 
present work so far, in preparation for their impending use in postulating the more 
elaborate structures and processes which are presumed to give rise to behavioural 
phenomena. 
We start by reviewing the essential points of the “linear micro-element” basis 
postulated for memory, which differs from the pure neuron-synaptic view in the much 
greater information content which it permits, and in its ready-made organization into 
linear sequences — and yet offers a new basis both for precision and for flexibility.  
We also recall the notions of how each individual may reconstruct reasonably faithful 
models of basic reality by seeking grouplike properties amongst his elementary sensori-
motor concepts — seen as physical encodings.  This leads to the question of elementary 
“symbolic” thought (without full external action), and a likely role for sleep. 
In addition the question of “levels” of mental organization is brought up again, and 
formalized a little more by the introduction of the “mnl” notation. 
C2.1  The fundamental physical basis 
The essential point is that synaptic changes are no longer seen as all-important elements for 
memory or for hereditary reflexes, but are augmented or even replaced by supposed coding 
activity at the molecular level.  Molecular coding is thought of as a linear sequence of coded sites 
— as in DNA, RNA, or linear protein — which are set up in such a way that they can be rapidly 
“read out”, thus activating other such molecules or triggering specific items of motor activity.  
Individual molecules would probably not be capable of producing manifest observable activity on 
their own; but could only be effective if and when they found “agreement” from a sufficient 
population of similar molecules, with which they would also have to have some sort of coordin-
ation mechanism —<150> probably along the lines of Monod and Jacob’s biochemical coordin-
ation model, “Model IV” (1961).   (Traill, 1975b, 1976d). 
Sites along the molecular strings were seen as falling into two main types and a subsidiary 
type.  The label type would await appropriately coded signals from outside the molecule before 
they would do anything, and in general they would probably also need to have been primed by an 
internal signal within the molecule before they would start to “listen” for the external messages; 
so they would normally serve as ‘and’-gates thus:  “Have I recently received a nudge from my 
neighbouring site, and have I the specific go-ahead from outside?  If so, then I must nudge my 
other neighbour to set him going in a similar way.” Phonon or exciton transmission seemed to 
offer a sufficiently rapid method for relaying the “nudges”, and the external messages were seen 
as emission-and absorption radiation, which implies infra-red for macromolecules of the type 
envisaged.  (See Chapter B2, above). 
Whereas the first main type of site served as a tuned28 receiver for specific external signals, 
the second was seen as a transmitter of such signals (along with the sense-organs, via their 
proximal representatives).  The second type would also normally pass on the “nudge” without 
question.  The transmitted signals were seen as having various functions:  motor, controlling 
                                                          
28  It should not be imagined that this is a simple tuning in the sense of a fixed-frequency sensitivity like 
a radio morse-receiver.  It will instead, almost certainly depend on patterns of signal input which will 
be more like ordinary (complex) speech waves, highly dependent on sequence (like a combination 
lock), and rather less definable in terms of sinusoidal functions.  (See Chapter B2 above, and again 
later on in Section C6.7).  <151> 
150 
151 
Li
ne
ar
-m
ol
ec
ul
e 
th
eo
ry
 —
— 
C2
.1
  
Fu
nd
am
en
ta
l 
ph
ys
ic
s-
ba
si
s 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 58  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  58  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
internal activities such as sense-organ parameters and aspects of attention, “subprogramming” 
calls to other relevant types of molecular coding, and <151> synchronization of the population of 
similar molecular codings.  (Whether or not this account is correct, it does at least bring into the 
open the question of explaining just how chemical memory-traces and electrical signals might 
conceivably interact in detail). 
The concept of infra-red signals being transmitted across appreciable distances leads to some 
troublesome problems due to the formidable absorption characteristics for water in this region of 
the spectrum.  One conceivable solution would be for the infra-red coding to become “translated” 
into and out of orthodox action-potential coding, though it is by no means clear how this might be 
achieved on the basis of conventional theory, and it seems inevitable that huge losses of 
information would be entailed by such a procedure.  An alternative suggestion (Traill, 1975b, 
1976b; also Chapters A3 and B3, above) arises out of a close analysis of the physics-theory of 
saltatory conduction of electromagnetic signals along myelinated nerve-fibre segments.  It 
emerges from this study that such dielectric pathways would be eminently suitable for conducting 
infra-red along the distances envisaged, provided that a moderate amount of protection from the 
absorption effects of water is available.  It would seem that there are several plausible ways in 
which this moderate protection could be provided, and moreover the idea can plausibly be 
reconciled with action-potential phenomena by considering the latter as massed effects in which 
infrared-scale pulses or waves are an important component.  The infra-red hypothesis may 
therefore be provisionally accepted on the basis of its internal consistency (see Chapter C1), 
pending external evidence more convincing than the fragments currently available. 
C2.2  Learning and the sensori-motor period 
As for the learning process, it is remotely conceivable that experience is “recorded” on such 
linear molecules in the manner of <152> a tape-recording.  But until some plausible mechanism 
is suggested, we would do better to take Piaget’s concept of action first, then learning to its 
logical conclusion and suppose that all learning must first await spontaneous elaboration or 
“genetic crossover” at the molecular level — on a trial-and-error evolutionary mutation basis; 
(Traill 1976b; also Parts a and B, above).  Any such embryonic idea which appears to be adaptive 
will then be “reinforced”, while others will be re-dissolved or mutated further.  Just how such 
reinforcement might take place is a matter of some importance, and two possible mechanisms 
have been offered, though so far even the internal-closure support for them (in the public-
knowledge domain) leaves much to be desired.  Provisionally however, we may accept them both 
as working hypotheses. 
The first mechanism is seen as a rather abstractly described seeking-after-internal-consist-
ency, or a trend toward “mathematical groups”; (Traill, 1975b; and Chapter A3, above).  This 
means a striving towards ‘internal closure’,  so its successes-or-failures appear to entail their own 
“pleasure-or-pain” in what is usually taken as a metaphorical sense, but is here taken rather more 
literally. 
The second mechanism involves normal concepts of pleasure and pain; and thus, in the main, 
serves the cause of ‘external closure’ — i.e.  keeping the mental models more consistent with the 
reality outside.  For this, we suppose that there is a supplementary type of molecular site which 
can become (reversibly?) appended to the molecule according to the ‘satisfaction state’ of the 
organism at about the time that the particular molecule was last ‘read’.  Those molecules with a 
‘positive’ tag would tend to be immune from attack and/or be eligible for replication, while a 
‘negative’ tag would amount to an “outlaw”-label; (Traill, 1975b).  These tags might also be 
involved in subjective feelings of pleasure or pain — <153> or alternatively there might be other 
similar tags for this purpose, which would normally operate in parallel, but could fall out of line 
under some circumstances thus producing anomalous effects. 
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Linear codings of this sort are seen as accumulating sufficiently for them to produce 
observable behavioural effects, in which case they would appear to coincide, collectively, with 
Piaget’s concept of a “scheme” — either hereditary or learned.  They may also be closely related 
to the concept of Short Term Memory, though that is of less immediate relevance.  With 
continuing use, such an ensemble appears to acquire stability and permanence for reasons which 
are not entirely clear, though increasing localization and the concentrations of mutually-
supportive cross-feed (from similar elements within a closely-knit population) do offer one likely 
explanation; (see Section A3.8, above).  Anyhow, such a stabilized and quasi-permanent scheme 
is referred to as a “schema” (plural “schemata”) following Piaget’s terminology, even though his 
usage is confined to what we shall regard as a similar consolidation during the following 
“Operational Period” (Furth, 1969).  Here we shall use the same term for both periods, and also 
for the two sub-periods within each, for reasons which should soon become apparent.  (For both 
these periods, and others, it is tempting to relate the schema concept to the notion of  Long Term 
Memory; but as before, there is no need to labour the analogy here). 
Mental development of the first type (the one seeking internal group-structure) depends on 
some degree of lawfulness or consistency in the external environment which it is trying to model.  
Similarly we might expect that any “introspectively directed” attempts to classify or control one’s 
own thought-elements would be doomed to failure until such time as these thought elements 
showed some potentially-discernible pattern.  With the consolidation of a <154> sufficient 
number of the primitive schemata (such as:  “Given situation-perception a, and desire-state (c), 
then the thing to do seems to be action b”), then it becomes feasible to classify such schemata into 
sets — and ultimately into mathematical groups  (Traill, 1975a; and Chapter A3, above). 
C2.3  Internal reference ‘by name’:  sleep, mathematical sets, and the “mnl” hierarchy;    
implications for decision-making behaviour 
Given a substantial repertoire of pre-coded patterns of activity, including integration 
arrangements between them similar to ‘subprogramming’, then it would only take some minor 
modification to the key ‘call-sign’ coding (which would normally activate the ensemble) to 
suspend the actual execution of the action implicit in the ensemble.  Such a modification serves to 
convert the ‘call-sign’ into a detached ‘name’ which is then available for use as an abstract 
symbol for the action which has now been deferred; and this is accordingly a likely material basis 
for a primitive mental ‘concept’. 
It is of some importance to consider the nature and implications of such suspensions of 
execution.  Presumably they must often be convertible so that ‘at the flick of a switch’ certain 
abstract thoughts can be converted into the real action to which they correspond; but if so, then 
we would do well to have some idea about how such ‘switches’ might be controlled.  Without 
going too deeply into this question, we might list several possibilities:-  a comparatively minor 
modification to the call-sign might distinguish the ‘symbolic’ from the ‘real’, (and such a mod-
ification might be analogous to a grammatical change of vowel as an indicator of tense).  
Alternatively ‘tags’ might well be involved in the modification of the actual encodings (as oppos-
ed to the call-signs which are presumed to activate them). 
Then again sleep would almost certainly be involved in some way, <155> possibly by 
changing the overall criterion as to what is to be executed and what is to remain symbolic and 
abstract.  This raises some intriguing and complex possibilities relating to the different modes of 
sleep — and perhaps also various drug-induced states.  Consider for instance:  (a) the suppression 
of general muscle tonus during REM sleep, (b) the increased incidence of REM sleep with 
position in the phylogenetic scale, and (c) its dominance (to the exclusion of “orthodox” sleep) 
for neonate mammals, (Jouvet, 1967).  We will come back to some of these issues in Section 
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C6.4, and again subsequently as part of the discussion of the psychotic symptoms arising from 
sleep deprivation, (Section C8.4). 
Anyhow, the development of name-codings29 for stable primitive action patterns now makes 
it feasible for ‘higher-order’ scheme-elements to evolve.  These may be thought of as linear lists 
containing ‘name-codings’ for lower-order schemata (and hereditary schemes). 
This new development constitutes the first step up an extended hierarchical ladder, so it 
would be well to introduce a naming-system for the various levels.  What seems here (rather 
naively as we shall see) to be the basic level containing the elementary schemes of sensori-motor 
development — will be referred to as the “m0l” level.  (The terminology here is intended to be 
roughly compatible with that of mathematico-logic/linguistics, in which L represents the basic 
“language”, ML represents the “meta-language” within which L may be discussed, MML stands 
for the “meta-meta-language”, and so on.  In fact though, this traditional notation will be seen to 
correspond a little more closely to the somewhat <156> broader categories inherent in the “MnL” 
notation, which will be introduced below in Section C3.2).  The new type of scheme-element 
which we have just introduced as “lists” for the basic elements will be referred to as being at the 
“m½l” (sub)-level, where the fraction conveniently implies a qualitative difference from both m0l 
and m1l (which roughly corresponds to the traditional “ML”); and of course the fraction also 
implies the postulated position for m½l as being between m0l and m1l. 
The setting up of such m½l lists or mathematical sets might plausibly take place by a process 
such as the following30.  Firstly we need some mechanism for producing a “blank note-pad” on 
which the acquired lists can be “written”; where we may assume that these “note-pads” are linear 
scheme-elements similar in principle to those of m0l, but containing internally-directed references 
to the m0l schemata or hereditary schemes rather than to externally-directed actions.   Such blank 
scheme-elements might be provided ready-made as part of the hereditary legacy, or they might be 
the result of arbitrary accretions combined with a selection process, and/or they might be 
produced by converting some of the m0l elements either by ‘inactivating’ their references into 
‘names’ — or by some sort of (gradual?) replacement of sites along the linear string. 
So suppose that, by some such means or other, we now have blank or “inadequately coded” 
m½l linear elements available in sufficient numbers; how could these be developed into usable 
mathematical-set concepts such as “the set of all schemata which seem to lead to my hunger 
being alleviated (given initial conditions ‘so-and-so’)”?  In view of the postulated mechanism for 
the m0l scheme elements, it seems likely that the m½l elements will similarly <157> contain some 
sort of coded expectation about the properties of its listed ‘members’; and such an expectation 
would amount to an intensive31 definition of the set.  Conceivably this expectation might simply 
be implicit in the existing list, at any given instant, as some sort of consensus property.  But 
pending a satisfactory explanation of how such a system might work in detail, we may consider 
the alternative that the m½l elements contain an explicit coding of expectation — albeit arbitrary.  
(This might result, for instance, from the ‘promotion’ of m0l elements — as these will presum-
ably already contain a coding for consummatory expectation, even if this is not qualitatively 
appropriate as it stands).  It is not clear just how many members there could reasonably be on a 
                                                          
29  These should not be thought of as being linguistic names in any literal sense; indeed we have so far 
been discussing pre-linguistic infants, in their first year <156> 
30  More detailed explanations will be given in Section C5.2 and in Section C8.1, but this present 
generalized account will suffice for our immediate purposes.  <157> 
31  In Piagetian usage, an intensive definition is a description of set members against which any potential 
member can be assessed to determine whether it is actually allowable as a member or not; whereas an 
extensive definition amounts to saying “all objects within this boundary” (or “all phenomena within 
this time-interval”) etc.  <158> 
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given list element, though it is tempting to see a connection with the concepts of ‘chunking’ and 
‘the magic number 7 ± 2’ (Miller, 1956a, 1956b); but the effective list at behavioural level might 
gain extra scope using a population of less complete elementary lists, used redundantly. 
But given that these m½l elements have some coded “expectation” concerning any members 
to be listed on it; how could it come about that the members are in fact of the type “expected”?  
(I.e., how is it that the “extensive definitions” happen to coincide with the “intensive definit-
ions”?).  At first sight, one might expect the list to “search” (somehow) for suitable members 
whose ‘names’ might then be added onto itself; but this is another case of an anthropomorphic 
model which we would do well to set aside until a detailed explanation of it, in mechanistic 
terms, should happen to be forthcoming.  <158> 
Meanwhile let us suppose that ‘names’ of members are added to the list more-or-less at 
random, and that it is then the job of ‘the system’ to correct the resulting errors-of-commission.  
It would not be too difficult then, to imagine some sort of automatic rehearsal procedure (perhaps 
during one of the sleep-modes) in which the coded “expectation” for the list was to be compared 
with the relevant properties of the named members.  Whenever there was a mis-match we might 
suppose that the whole list might be liquidated, or else all ‘names’ could be erased from the 
encoding, or perhaps only the name of the offending member would be erased; (these alternatives 
being in order of ascending efficiency).  Once again it is worth commenting that the huge redund-
ancy possibilities which result from the present molecule-based model, make it feasible to con-
template such apparently inefficient mechanisms and to use them as an alternative to anthropo-
morphic or teleological “ghosts in the machine”. 
One consequence of this development of set-constructing ability is likely to be the capacity 
for using elementary strategies for problem solving.  Consider the general situation (Siegel et al., 
1964; Wetherick, 1977) in which the individual must choose (repeatedly) between two altern-
atives which we will call A and B.  If A happens to be the appropriate choice in, say, 75% of 
choices (while B is correct for the remaining 25%), then the “rational” strategy would be for the 
Subject always to choose A — that is once he has had enough experience of the situation to 
appreciate the nature of the random factors involved.  However this “rationality” requires a com-
paratively sophisticated mental organization,  so some animals are unable to operate at this level; 
and those that can, such as humans, will not necessarily do so under the given circumstances — 
for one reason or another. 
In the absence of this rational strategy, the individual seems <159> to use the less efficient 
technique of frequency-matching; that is to say he ends up selecting A for about 75% of his 
choices, distributed in an approximately-random fashion — thus matching the frequency inherent 
in the phenomenon itself.  In terms of our present molecular model, this can be explained in terms 
of the degrees of reinforcement for the two types of action and their respective molecular 
encodings.  Those coded elements instrumental in the choice of a will receive more support, and 
will consequently come to be represented by a larger population of molecular encodings, while 
the pro-B elements will also receive modest amounts of support and will thus build up their own 
relatively-modest population.  In any actual choice then, the two populations will presumably 
compete to provide the effective program for action; and it will literally be “the luck of the draw” 
as to which one will succeed in any given instance.  But note the important point:  no special set-
organization appears to be necessary for this process. 
Fish apparently operate at this primitive level, but rats are capable of evolving toward the 
“rational” strategy of always choosing that single alternative which has the best average payoff 
(Wetherick 1977, citing Bitterman), and this superior capability seems likely to be due to an 
ability “to envisage something that is not present in the immediate perceptual environment”.  But 
for the rat to be able to realize on this inherent ability, it needs to be “allowed to approach the 
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correct discriminandum even if it chose the wrong one initially”  — and it would seem that some 
sort of set-organizing mechanism must be required if these two exploratory probes are to have 
their information integrated into one usable scheme, this being some sort of an appreciation of the 
selection situation as a whole rather than the mere blind impulse that a certain response should be 
made.  Anyhow it would seem likely that Wetherick’s <160> second level corresponds to the m½l 
level proposed here, and indeed his third level which “involves ability to identify differences and 
similarities between present states of the environment and past states ...  [and hence relates to] 
language” seems to be identifiable with the m1l level and its presumed power to manipulate the 
m0l and m½l elements (as discussed below). 
Note that even human subjects may be caught out using the primitive frequency-matching 
strategy which we have just considered (Siegel et al., 1964), though here the result is bound to be 
more difficult to interpret because of the confounding influence of the third level (m1l), and 
probably other levels as well — as we shall see.  However one plausible explanation for Siegel’s 
results is that the subjects used the primitive strategy because something in the experimenter’s 
instructions, or the cultural expectations implicit in the situation, led them to believe that this was 
what was required of them.  Thus possibly they operated under active (m1l ?) schemata, which 
served to suppress any relevant m½l activity, so that the primitive m0l-based “lottery”-approach 
was left as the one which actually operated on the problem. 
The notion of a negative instance raises some complex issues which we will not go into fully 
here, but we should bear in mind that a concept and its specific negation actually have much in 
common (Freud, 1900).  This suggests the need for a set-like structure to link them both, and 
probably an extensively defined set-structure at that — though perhaps this would take time to 
evolve itself.  Similar things might also be said about conjunctive concepts (Bruner, Goodnow, 
and Austin, 1956), and it is likely that their reported increased difficulty with disjunctive concepts 
arises due to a need to call on further organization higher up the mnl scale. 
Anyhow provided that extensively defined mathematical sets <161> (or “lists”) can be 
established for any conceivable common-criterion (intensive definition), then it becomes feasible 
to explain a possible mechanism for the mental development and retention of “mathematical 
groups”, or more normally — group-like concept-structures.  We may now turn to this topic and 
elaborate on the ideas expounded in Chapter A3 (above), and illustrated in Traill (1975b). 
C2.4  Trend toward mathematical groups in the later sensori-motor period 
This turns out to be a matter of formidable complexity if we try to trace the probable course 
of real-life developments in any detail.  For our immediate purpose it will suffice if we look only 
at a few simplified or idealized cases; but it should be born in mind that a real brain system must 
cope with the complexity as it actually occurs, thus making heavy demands on its structural 
capabilities and redundancy reserves.  Anyone attempting to build a computer model to simulate 
such activities would also do well to ponder the “hardware”-implications quantitatively before 
becoming too involved. 
The most convenient example, already discussed in some detail (Chapter A3, above; Traill, 
1975b), is the geometrical-spatial task of learning how to find one’s way around a (topological) 
square in which the “corners” correspond to recognizable and distinguishable events or 
phenomena, and at least one of these is inherently rewarding — and so worth trying to attain.  
Voluntary reversibility was seen as arising as a consequence of a change of the individual’s 
“drive state” (e.g.  from hunger to thirst) in such a way that a different corner of the square 
became attractive.  In this way, all the appropriate m0l schemata could develop, thus enabling the 
m½l “lists” (relevant to transactions with the square) to achieve exhaustive completeness — or 
something like it. 
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But there are many ways of conceptualizing a Euclidean square, and likewise there are many 
ways of viewing other similar “topological <162> quadrilaterals”, both literal and metaphorical; 
and the same argument applies in principle to the learning task for each of them.  Even if we look 
no further than the “corners”, it will be of practical value to distinguish different subsets taken 
from the complete set of possible moves between one corner and another.  We may usefully keep 
a list of schemata for “diagonal moves” (only), or for “clockwise moves”, or for “routes towards 
corner x”, etc.32. 
Yet there is still another, less obvious, complication.  Our view of an observed square as 
having group properties is partly conventional33.  Consider what happens when we have to scan 
the “corners” consecutively and we also judge each corner as having an absolute time-based 
property, then we can never return to precisely the same corner again (though we might be 
prepared to accept “an approximation”, more-or-less consciously).  Thus, depending on our 
criteria, a conventional group-like thing will not always be perceived as a group.  <163> 
So it would seem that even the “ideal” group-like nature of rigid geometrical bodies is, to 
some extent, just a construct of the mind — made for the sake of pragmatic convenience.  But in 
any case, for other more “fuzzy” macro-manifestations of structure such as Mr X’s personality, it 
becomes quite obvious that any group properties which we might attribute to such “things” will 
always fall short of perfection; (and this will apply to our social “scientific knowledge” models, 
as well as to our concepts as individuals).  In fact this presumed strategy of “aiming at groupness, 
but being prepared to settle for the best available approximation” seems to work very well on the 
whole.  Errors will often be irrelevant for practical purposes (even if their existence comes to be 
recognized), or they may simply be corrected as the occasion demands.  There may however be 
problems when one such partially-correct grouplike model becomes enmeshed in another, and 
when the resulting structure has become instrumental in maintaining the stability of the individual 
or the society.  Thus trivially-inappropriate associations may give rise to neuroses or (socially) a 
Galileo may have trouble correcting a mistaken cosmology when it becomes enmeshed with 
religious doctrine due to historical and political reasons rather than “rational” reasons.   <164> 
                                                          
32  Moreover we will probably need a list of these lists if the individual is to keep track of the fact that the 
subset lists are fundamentally related to each other —  unless this could be done in some other way 
such as overlapping memberships see Section C8.1.  Then there may be some value in associating 
these schemata with those for the concepts of “rectilinearity” and/or “perpendicularity” — almost 
certainly more difficult and sophisticated than would appear at first glance.  Next there might be 
concepts for “midpoint of side” or “middle of square”, and so on —  though not indefinitely.  Thus, for 
instance, there would normally be little point in developing a (non-numerical) schema for a concept 
which amounted to “17.87% of the way along a side”. 
33  Such a view is based on pragmatic grounds which are suggestive of the truth, but do not absolutely 
prove it.  (This is a “hair-splitting” distinction in the present example, but in general it will not be).  
<163> 
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Chapter C3 
Abstractions, or Thoughts about Thought-Constructs:   Is the Process Recursive ? 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
Within the discussion of mind-brain organization, this chapter introduces the 
mathematical concept of recursion, i.e. the re-using of the same basic organizational 
procedure repeatedly (but at different levels), so as to build up a hierarchical organizat-
ional structure while also allowing simplicity of design and standardization of basic 
resource units.  This is seen as a possible explanation for Piaget’s stages, and it also 
seems to fit in with Ashby’s ideas of double-or-multiple feedback loops. 
C3.1  The concept of mathematical recursion, and some variations on this theme 
As an explanation of the recursion concept, consider the mathematical function “factorial n” 
(written as  “n!”), where 
 [ 0!   =  1 ], 
 1!   =  1, 
 2!   =  2 × 1, 
 3!   =  3 × 2 × 1, 
 4!   =  4 ×.3 × 2 × 1, 
  .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
 n!   =  n × (n-1) × (n-2) ×  …   × 2 × l. 
 
A function such as this can readily be specified by a recursive algorithm, which in this case 
would be:-  
 (A) Take the value of n and ‘write it down’ in some accessible place called ‘memory’ (specific to 
this particular entry into the algorithm, see below).  
 (B) Make sure that n is neither negative nor fractional; otherwise give up and signal that an error 
has occurred.  
 (C) ‘Write’ “1” into another position called ‘answer’ (which must also be specific to this 
particular recursive “level”). 
 (D) Test whether ‘memory’ now contains “0”, and hence choose <165> whether to do E or F:-  
 (E) If n, the number in ‘memory’, has a value of 1 or more, then multiply the ‘answer’ by this 
number, and also by (n-1)! — which will entail a recursive repetition of the whole procedure “at a 
different level of operation” (with a new value for n), and there will ultimately be many such 
levels whenever there are high values of the original n.  When this task has been done, the next 
task is determined by ‘exiting’ back to wherever the immediate request for a factorial evaluation 
came from — whether within the same recursive series or not.  
 (F) If the n-value in ‘memory’ is zero, then accept ‘answer’ in its present form (= 1) as being the 
result for this recursive level, and pass this result back to wherever the immediate request for a 
factorial evaluation came from (either the “abstract” previous level of recursion, or the original 
“real-life” problem), and also return to this same place to find the next instruction.   
Equivalently, this algorithm may be written in ALGOL:- 
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integer procedure factorial(n); value n; integer n; 
begin 
 integer answer;   comment The “integer n” sets up a new memory-location for each 
successive recursive entry into this subroutine, and stores the nominated value in it ready 
for use.  The answer location is also set aside, but with no reliable pre-set value; 
 if n<0 then goto ERROR;  comment n has already been made an integer; 
 if n=0 then goto F; 
 E: answer:= n * factorial(n-1);  comment recursive call; 
  factorial:=answer; 
  goto EXIT; 
 F: factorial:=l;   comment Basic simple case, no (further) recursion; 
  goto EXIT; 
 EXIT: 
end  of factorial subroutine (this time round);  <166> 
 
The details of this particular example are not important here, and indeed their relevance is 
somewhat limited; but there are nevertheless several useful concepts to be drawn from the 
example, or from others like it (Barron, 1968).  (a) Firstly the method may be seen as a “trick” 
whereby a complex operation, of unpredictable magnitude, can be carried out by a compact 
repertoire of not-very sophisticated actions:  simple multiplication, subtract 1, identify 0 and error 
conditions, keep basic records, transfer results, and the ability to “pass the buck recursively”.  It 
has been suggested above (in Section A3.11) that a similar sort of recursion between levels may 
be operating in connection with Piaget’s stages of development; though here the limited 
repertoire of available actions would include those involved in set and group construction, and 
also the ability to “handle” such constructs — or at least those produced at lower mnl levels.  It is 
not suggested that the brain can necessarily cope with a denumerably infinite number of levels, as 
seems to be the case with the factorial-function example.  In both cases there will necessarily be a 
practical limit to recursive processes; though in the case of the brain it is not yet clear how such 
limitations would be likely to operate.  It will perhaps be evident from the system proposed above 
in Section C2 that an important difference between it and the “factorial” algorithm lies in the 
method of “passing the buck” to the next level.  In the brain-model, the lower level is “at a loss” 
and is only rescued if-and-when the upper mnl “interferes” arbitrarily in the right way. 
(b) In both cases there is an indispensable “ground-floor” level which comes closest to being 
in contact with the “real world outside” — on an actual transactional basis.  In the factorial-
algorithm, this level is the one which actually performs the final stage of the calculation and 
passes the result back for the benefit <167> of the computer program in which it is embedded — 
this being its “outside world”.  In the case of the brain-model, as we have seen in Chapter C2, the 
lowest level was postulated as being m0l — the basic part of the sensori-motor double level.  
(Later on, in Section C5.4, it will be suggested that the basic level is actually lower than this — at 
an  “m–1l” or “M–1L” level). 
(c) In both cases there is also, in some sense, an upper level.  Obviously some degree of 
flexibility is called for here, so it may not always be clear where to locate this “top floor” when 
the system is diffuse — as envisaged in the brain model.  In the “factorial” case, the “top” will 
always consist of a mere allocation of the answer “1” (in response to the problem:  “evaluate 0!”); 
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but in view of the postulated downward direction of initiative-taking for the biological brain, the 
significance of the current top level will presumably be radically different for the two cases.  In 
fact it has been tentatively suggested (Traill, 1976d) that the top level may be intimately involved 
in the phenomenon of consciousness for the case of the brain model; and after all, the “top” is 
seen as a unique source of initiatives which exert decisive control over some activities of the 
other levels. 
(d) a purely recursive process may be thought of as re-using the same material mechanisms 
for each successive level of its “calculation”, as is clearly implied in the above ALGOL example.  
However it would be perfectly possible to re-write such a subroutine such that different 
mechanisms are used for different levels.  For instance it would not be unreasonable to treat 0!, 
1!, 2!, 3!, and 4! (say) as special cases in which it is, on the whole, easier to simply “remember” 
the answer ready-made (as being 1, 1, 2, 6, and 24, respectively).  The calculation for higher 
values would then terminate with the “evaluation” of 4! as being at the top of the <168> hierarchy 
instead of that for 0! as was used above in the pure case.  This sort of change in methodological 
procedure according to hierarchical position or complexity is fairly common in a non-computer 
daily context, and may perhaps be illustrated below by the second way of writing out the 
following formula for an infinite series:- 
   l   l   l   1   1   1  
 e = — + — + — + — + — + —  + … 
   0!  1!  2!  3!  4!  5! 
 
        l   1   1   1  
 e = 1 + 1 + — + — + — + —  + … 
        2  3!  4!  5! 
And moreover it should be recognized that there are practical advantages in such a corruption 
of the purity of the formula; — though there are disadvantages as well.  Ultimately the “efficacy” 
of such a mixed methodology must be judged according to the context of its likely use. 
In the brain-model as described so far, we have considered two supposedly separate levels 
(active within the sensori-motor period):  m0l and m½l — the first dealing with internal codings 
for direct primitive interactions with the outside world, and the second dealing with sets and 
groups of the former.  It would not be unduly surprising lf these two levels of activity were to find 
their physical embodiments in linear elements which were strictly allocated to the one or the 
other, and not freely available to both — in the short term at least.  Nevertheless, it would seem 
likely that these two types of coding should be spatially close together for easy communication 
and control; and being populations of elements, this would presumably mean that the two types 
of element would be intermixed within whatever regions of the brain happen to be involved. 
C3.2  Estimating the likely scope and nature of recursion in the brain 
It was suggested previously (in Chapter A3) that consecutive recursive levels correspond to 
the sensori-motor, concrete operations, <169> and formal operations periods respectively.  It 
was also suggested that each of these levels has a two-tier subdivision; so that in each case, the 
lower tier was concerned with the relevant type of “primitive” element (as for the m0l level) while 
the upper tier was engaged in forming sets and groups (as for the m½l level).  Logically then, 
there would seem to be at least six such sublevels in use in adults:  m0l-and-m½l (sensori-motor); 
m1l-and-m1½l (“concrete operational” in the wider sense, comprising “pre-operational” and the 
narrower sense of “concrete operations”, respectively); then m2l and m2½l (for formal operations). 
169
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This postulated hierarchical series raises several questions as to whether recursion is really 
involved, and if so, then in what form.  There is no immediately available means for supplying a 
confident answer to such questions, either from experimental data, or from ‘internal closure’.  But 
if our general approach is correct then it will become a matter of considerable interest and import-
ance to clarify such matters; mainly because many malfunctions are likely to be selective as to the 
physical mechanisms which they will affect, so that any mechanism which is shared by two or 
more levels is likely to cause multiple symptoms whenever it fails to work correctly. 
For the sake of having some definite ideas to criticise, the following suggestions are offered 
as tentative working hypotheses.  Any evidence for these postulates is no more than impression-
istic; but the exercise should at least help us to a clearer concrete view of the problem, and it 
could plausibly lead us fortuitously into a model which turns out to offer unsuspected internal 
closure. 
Let us first take the three double-levels as units and consider the relationships between 
neighbours.  Now, according to our earlier tentative postulate, the m0l and m½l combined-level 
will collectively be the one most directly concerned with interactions with the outside <170> 
world (whereas the others are supposed to confine their control activities to internal entities).  
Also it is tempting to locate the m0l/m½l elements within the phylogenetically older parts of the 
brain, and the higher double-level elements within the neocortex (which, roughly speaking, starts 
to appear in animals which are capable of transcending sensori-motor limitations (Diamond and 
Hall, 1969).  Anyhow on the basis of such impressionistic leads, let us postulate that (i) the 
m1l/m1½l double-level (i.e.  M1L)34 shares a common material substrate with the m2l/m2½1 (or 
M2L) double-level, but that (ii) the more basic and primitive m0l/m½l (or M0L) double-level has 
its own separate substrate, thus disturbing the “purity” of the supposed recursive activity.  
However even if the substrate is different, this does not of itself mean that the basic mechanisms 
of the different substrates will necessarily be different though of course that is a possibility; and 
in any case, drugs and other disturbing agents might well affect these substrates differently. 
But this picture may well be too simple.  Bearing in mind that we are dealing with a “parallel 
processor” (unlike the strictly sequential activities of a digital computer), and considering too that 
the initiative is supposed to come from the “top”, it is quite plausible to suppose that there may be 
several alternative substrates for any given level.  We need not go into the ramifications of this 
here, but we should not lose sight of the possibility and its implications for potentially 
antagonistic mechanisms. 
Neither should we assume that organization within any given level will be straightforward.  
Indeed we probably need look no further than the problem of developing the schemata for “three-
dimensional <171> solid object” on the basis of previously acquired schemata for two-
dimensional figures (Section A3.10, above), to see the need for some sort of recursive-like 
procedure within the m½l level.  Moreover the above remarks about parallel processing would 
seem to be just as apposite here. 
As for consciousness, any suggestions can be little more than intelligently speculative at this 
stage.  However it seems likely that, as a presumed source of “initiative”, it will have something 
to do with the “top level” whatever that is, (Traill, 1976d).  This might reside in whichever level 
is currently developing, though anyone who has tried to carry on office-work whilst the business 
is gradually moving premises might be inclined to doubt the wisdom of such an activity.  Instead, 
for the sake of the present discussion, let us postulate that:  (iii) There will be a comparatively 
                                                          
34  At this stage it is advisable to introduce extra terminology:  
“M0L” as a collective name for the m0l/m½l double-level  
“M1L” as the collective name for m1l/m1½l;   and  
“M2L” for m2l/m2½l.<171> 
171
172
Th
ou
gh
ts
 a
bo
ut
 T
ho
ug
ht
s 
——
 C
3.
2 
 s
co
pe
 o
f 
br
ai
n-
re
cu
rs
io
n 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 68  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  68  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
stable top level, whose workings will not normally be accessible to the other abovementioned 
levels; but it will itself behave, in some sense, as controller over them as the occasion demands 
presumably the “source of initiative” which was considered above.  One might perhaps think of 
this postulated controller as being a sort of M∞L level35 a sort of local approximation to an “all-
seeing” transcendental being.  If such a “centre” does exist, then perhaps the reticular formation 
would be a promising candidate for the post. 
Pure recursion, in the sense of re-using the same basic “hardware”, may well not extend 
throughout the whole MnL scale; but provided that it does exist at the higher levels, this will have 
important consequences for the nature of abstract thought.  It would <172> seem to make 
possible, in principle, a boundless series of levels of abstraction beyond mere “Formal 
Operations” — as implied in Section A3.11, above.  Just how far this could be taken in practice is 
a moot point however.  “In principle” one might well be “able to build a card-house up to the 
ceiling”, but to actually do so is quite another matter.  The importance of “effort” and “ideal 
conditions” becomes increasingly intrusive the further one goes.  Even in computer-run 
mathematical recursion one first encounters economic constraints, and ultimately technological 
constraints on the practical size of a recursion process; while in “biological recursion” one must 
expect much greater problems in view of the less formal and redundant organization inherent in 
such systems.  <173> 
                                                          
35  Concerning “M∞L”, this issue is discussed in more detail in Section C6.4 (paragraphs 4 and 5), and is 
also raised again in Section C8.2 (paragraph 36).  Meanwhile we should not take the numerical 
implications of the “∞” too literally —  but only its topological implications.  Indeed, to avoid 
misunderstanding, I propose in future to use “MtopL” in place of the “M∞L”.  <172> 
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Chapter C4 
Ashby’s Adaptive Brainlike Mechanisms — but with added Self-organization 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter provides a summary and discussion of Ashby’s successive brain-
simulation models, of increasing sophistication:-  
 (i) a simple non-learning but reactive system;  
 (ii) an “ultra-stable” system, with an extra feedback loop to allow it to randomly alter 
its response strategy if it has not achieved its goal by a certain time; and  
 (iii) the “accumulator of adaptions” whose “gating mechanism” allows it to store its 
earlier strategies — in case the original situations should re-occur.  This latter develop-
ment seems to provide a third feedback loop, and is somewhat suggestive of a recursive 
process. 
However it seems possible to envisage a more-complete ensemble of self-organiz-
ing procedures for such systems — a capability which seems essential within the real 
biological world, and which is developed in further detail in the next chapter. 
C4.1  Evolutionary pressure toward self-organizing systems 
Biological systems would seem to have, as a vital distinguishing characteristic, the ability to 
“actively” counteract a moderate range of exogenous disturbance-or-attack on their integrity as 
physical entities.  By definition, such an ability will have survival value, so it must be expected 
that Darwinian natural-selection will promote the evolution of increasingly sophisticated systems 
of this type. 
Ashby’s “homeostat” or “ultrastable system” (1960) is a promising paradigm for understand-
ing such mechanisms, but his account still depends partly on “ready-made” components (as he 
himself points out in his Sections 17/10 and 17/11).  Let us therefore work carefully through his 
standard cases, starting with the simplest, in an attempt to postulate an unaided sequence of 
development in plausible biological terms rather than using the short-cuts of a computer-program-
mer aided by his “god-like” insight.   
C4.2 The trivial cases of unstable and metastable systems 
In the extreme case of an arbitrarily assigned set of entities with no coherence at all, then the 
set scarcely even qualifies for <174> the title of “system”.  If disintegration does go on without 
interruption but is somewhat delayed by a modicum of cohesion, then we may talk of an unstable 
system; while temporary freedom from disintegration, pending some set of triggering stimuli, will 
characterize the metastable system. 
In all these cases, the ensemble is likely to go into irreversible liquidation if left on its own 
without outside maintenance, so their interest to the biologist will be somewhat limited.  
Nevertheless two points should be made about them:-  Firstly they may be viewed as a first easy 
rung up the evolutionary ladder; and secondly these concepts may be useful for describing 
subsystems which form part of a larger system capable of providing the necessary maintenance or 
restoration — especially if it can aid its own overall stability in some way by so doing.   
C4.3  Inanimate stability and stereotyped “responses” to “stimuli” 
Any isolated (or “closed”) ensemble will eventually end up in a stable static state, or in a 
regularly recurring cycle (Ashby, 1956/1964) — except in the freak borderline case of “neutral 
equilibrium” in which all feasible alternative configurations have the same energy state.  But 
meanwhile, even for non-isolated (or “open”) sub-ensembles, there will also often be a 
spontaneous formation of locally stable subsystems — coagulations within the erstwhile 
174
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homogeneous or randomized substrate.  Crystals or droplets will tend to form and disrupt the 
homogeneity of the medium — though this will depend on the overall conditions within the syst-
em:  temperature, pressure, and relative concentrations, (Goel et al., 1970;  Goel and Leith, 1970). 
The important point here is that these subsystems do not need to be designed; they will occur 
spontaneously given certain commonplace conditions, and they will tend to survive moderate 
fluctuations of <175> the environmental conditions also, without any deliberate maintenance 
from outside.  Any would-be creator does perhaps need to design a suitable substrate (unless such 
a substrate is fortuitously provided, ready made), but after that he may just let things happen in 
their own way. 
In its most basic form, such stability will manifest itself in ways 
similar to those described in the equilibrium-paradigms of elementary 
physics:  a temporary displacement will fail to upset the system per-
manently, and it will return to its equilibrium state spontaneously.  
(In the present context of naturally occurring systems, it would be 
better to look at distortions to the shape of dew-drops or the energy-
state of an atom — rather than the usually cited examples of 
pendulum or cube-on-a-level-surface; but the stability principle is 
essentially the same).  The essential point is that such systems will 
react to specific “stimuli” by giving a specific response — perhaps 
allowing for statistical variation if necessary; they thus correspond to 
Ashby’s (1960) non-learning but reacting systems, depicted in Figure 
C4.3/1. <176> 
One point which does not seem to have been made clear in 
Ashby’s treatment until six chapters later, is that the “response” will 
not necessarily appear straight away, nor will it necessarily emanate 
from the stimulated part of the system; nor indeed will it necessarily 
show any preconceived temporal or spatial distribution — given that 
the system itself will be somewhat extended, and so capable of a 
multi-faceted response.  a system (such as an atom) may simply fend 
off the stimulus (as when an atom causes an incident alpha-particle to 
“bounce off”), but it may alternatively bide its time (before re-emitting the same particle — or 
some other, if we choose to accept that it will still be the “same” system afterwards); and of 
course the disturbance may travel through the “body” of the system and eventually produce one-
or-more responses at remote parts of the system.  In short then, the “stimulus-signal” is likely to 
be subject to spatial and temporal dispersion (Ashby, 1960, Section 13/14 ff) whenever the 
system is polystable in Ashby’s sense (Section 13/2) of its having richly intercommunicating 
parts with many equilibrium positions. 
If the system has a more meagre claim to polystability, by having a definite-but-more-limited 
intercommunication path and a more modest repertoire of equilibrium positions, then the effect 
may be less extreme — but it may be more useful and orderly.  It may well be that this is one of 
the advantages which would favour the survival of linear molecules such as RNA if they were to 
be generated spontaneously.  Anyhow, a mechanism of this sort has been suggested, in a more 
biological context, as a basis for the reproducible precise gross behaviour of animals, (Traill, 
1976e). 
C4.4  Systems able to switch to alternative response patterns 
Unlike Ashby (1960, Section 7/20 ff), let us confine ourselves for the moment to systems 
which might reasonably be expected to form <177> spontaneously within a realistic evolutionary 
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Fig C4.3/1  
Ashby’s Fig 7/2/1 depicting 
a reacting but non-learning system. 
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time-scale — and using only elementary trial-and-error techniques.  Orderly limited-dispersion 
molecules (such as RNA) would appear to answer this description and also serve as a suitable 
medium for the initial development of the adaptable-response mechanisms which we are about to 
discuss.  In general we will be talking about collective systems comprising ensembles of linear 
strips which maintain communication linkage between them, yet representing distinct formulae 
for action or response.  It is not important at this stage to speculate seriously about whether they 
are physically connected or not, though it seems convenient to think of them as joined end-to-end 
in the nature of chromosomal strips — even if this is less likely from an evolutionary viewpoint. 
There would seem to be two ways in which adaptability could be built into such collective 
systems.  Firstly we might expect to find sites along individual strips which were capable of 
taking on several different functional states — as “reversible mutations”.  In most cases these 
would doubtless be no more than on/off “switches”, determining whether that strip would be 
available for participation in any ongoing activity; and of course this is likely to be of vital 
importance, even if it is only a beginning.  It is also possible that some such sites might serve as 
multi-purpose switches or gearsticks, with their functional role changing according to the 
“switch-position”; but it should be recognized that the chances of structural economy occurring 
spontaneously would be comparatively remote as if an object selected for its knife-like properties, 
from amongst randomly fabricated metal shapes, were to be found useful for its comb-like 
properties as well.  Anyhow, to the extent that this type of mechanism is adequate, there would be 
little need for the strips to form into ensembles involving higher mnl levels.  <178>  
<179> 
The second source of adaptability would be the choice between whole alternative strips 
within the ensemble.  The actual selection between these alternatives is likely to depend rather 
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Fig C4.4/1.         Ashby’s concept of the “ultra-stable” system, 
capable of adapting its functioning response-pattern  (usually 
reversible)  according to changes in the environmental pattern. 
(Diagram adapted from Ashby’s Fig 7/5/1, 1960). 
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critically on subtle nuances in the overall signal pattern, probably involving optical interference 
phenomena (Chapter B2, above; and Section C8.1, below).  Such context-dependent mechanisms 
are of course thought to operate within the genetic code:  if the developmental stage is right (so 
that it is emitting an appropriate pattern of signals) and if the cell is appropriately placed within 
the signal-pattern, then the cell’s DNA will have its “liver-cell-development” strips switched on 
— or whatever is appropriate, if anything. 
We may now turn to Ashby’s “ultra-stable” system, and look at it in the light of the above 
considerations.  To start with, we should notice that there is a degree of complexity creeping into 
the system which is now arguably beyond what we can expect to be created spontaneously with 
any sort of reasonable frequency; Fig C4.4/1. <179>  Accordingly we should expect that some 
sort of self-replication mechanism would need to be one of the “actions” to evolve in the 
repertoire of such systems, at about this stage of development though perhaps slightly later.  This 
would make it possible to store partial successes in the learning of survival-technique, in the 
manner of Ashby’s cases 2 and 3 (1960, Section 11/5), already described in the present work 
(Section C1.2).  Anyhow, such replication (together with mutation) would help to explain the 
postulated existence of ensembles of limited-dispersion molecules within a totally indifferent or 
hostile environment which contributes no guidance for the creation of the system — other than a 
stiff dose of fortuitous reality. 
There would seem to be no great problem in postulating an RNA-like basis for such ultra-
stable systems; see Fig C4.4/2.<Fig.C4.4/2>  <180> 
180
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Specific 
Receptor 
for E1,i 
 
E1 RA
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Responder B  
Specific 
Receptor 
for E1,i 
 
E1 RB
Test for 
noxious E2 
 
E2 
Delay 
unit 
If so, switch 
off active elements 
and excite others 
Is E2 still 
noxious? 
Fig C4.4/2.      Schematic diagram to suggest a plausible ensemble of linear elements capable of functioning 
collectively as an “ultra-stable” system (as in Fig C4.4/1).   Three types of linear element are shown here 
(and in practice each of these is likely to represent a whole population of coordinated similar elements).   
Those on the right correspond to the primitive paradigm discussed in Chapter B2 (above), but with switching-
gates as part of their labels.   The other element is also formally similar, but serves to re-set the switches; and 
this will occur in accordance with the pattern in a different category of inputs — the “evaluative stimuli” E2.   
The “program” part of each element is heavily outlined, while the other parts, to the left, constitute the “labels”. 
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C4.5  Purposeful switching to alternative response patterns 
The system depicted above in Figures C4.4/1 and C4.4/2 operated on the principle of “let’s 
do anything in an attempt to alleviate the present discomfort” — much as you or I might do in a 
panic situation where our existing knowledge-and-experience seemed to be invalid.  But given 
some sort of patently appropriate body of knowledge such as we could normally expect for 
human subjects, we would expect something more systematic than a mere random change of 
parameter-settings.  As Ashby puts it, at the end of his Section 10/2 (1960):  “If the reader feels 
the ultrastable systems as described so far, to be extremely low in efficiency, this is because it is 
as yet quite unspecialized; and the reader is evidently unconsciously pitting it against a set of 
environments that he has restricted in some way not yet stated explicitly …”.  Note that if the 
environment is totally capricious, unpredictable and unconstrained, then one might just as well go 
right on and panic — as in Figures C4.4/1 and C4.4/2 — there being no basis for anything more 
logical!  Indeed there would not even be any basis for deciding what was a “suitable delay” 
before trying some other panic measure.  Nor, come to that, would our genetic repertoire of panic 
measures (fight, flight, freeze, etc ) necessarily help at all!  The very fact that such repertoires are 
fairly standard, reflects some degree of consistency in the “laws of nature” in the environment; 
and it also reflects the ability of surviving species to acquire a genetic “knowledge” about general 
approaches to coping with such situations in practice. 
One important constraint commonly found in natural environments, is the tendency for events 
to present themselves in consistent patterns:  “the recurrent situation” (Ashby, 1960, Sections 
10/4 to 10/7).  In these circumstances there is some point in acquiring the ability to transcend 
mere random panic reactions to noxious stimulus <181> E2, so that now it becomes sensible to 
respond systematically with a specific “switching” action — corresponding to whatever has been 
successful in the past.  In Fig C4.4/2 there are only two alternative courses of action indicated, so 
it represents the trivial case in which there can be no choice once one sets out to change the 
switch-setting.  But in general there will be many possible actions which one might take if 
“Switch A” is currently on and due to be changed; and one can imagine that initially there will be 
many linear codings for all the different competing actions which might be taken to try to escape 
from this situation.  It then becomes easy to see that we will get the right sort of adaptive learning 
process if we postulate a Darwinian selection of the “fittest” amongst these coded linear elements; 
and moreover the explanation will then be fundamentally similar for both learning within the 
brain of an individual animal and for phylogenetic learning of hereditary traits within the species.  
(Cf.  Chapters A2 and C1, above). 
Another constraint likely to be found in the environment is the distribution of times for such 
patterns of stimuli-and-consequences to manifest themselves.  If we imagine that the initial set of 
codings also varied as to the number of “delay elements” along their length (or some other 
equivalent “clock” mechanism), then we can see a way in which the organism-or-species might 
learn some “idea” of how long it should persevere with one line of endeavour before abandoning 
it as unpromising; (cf. Ashby, 1960, Section 17/10).  Once again the process may be interpreted 
as Darwinian. 
However such constraints are not so straightforward as would first appear.  Such recurrent 
situations will often not recur immediately, and in the mean time other unrelated situations will 
frequently intervene.  Thus the constraints in the environment will not usually present themselves 
as one ever-repeating pattern of events, <182> with all the essential elements discernibly similar; 
they will instead appear as a variety of sub-environments with such properties.  So the constraints 
will be there alright, but if the organism is to take advantage of these constraints then it must be 
capable of adapting to the prevailing sub-environments.  This means, firstly, that it must be 
capable of storing enough of what it has learned so that it can turn back to it later on — without 
having it “over-written” by any unrelated learning which has occurred in the interim.  Such is the 
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problem considered by Ashby in the remainder of his Chapter 10 (1960) under the sub-heading of 
“the accumulator of adaptations”, and he depicts the solution as shown here in Fig C4.5/1. The 
various sub-environments are represented as P1, P2, and P3, while the corresponding alternative 
sets of storable response-determined experience are represented by S1, S2, and S3. <183> 
Ashby’s account gives rather scant attention to the nature of the “gating mechanism” which 
selects which Si should be used by the organism; nor does he elaborate greatly when he returns to 
the topic in Chapter 16.  However it seems that we can make the system rather more mechanically 
plausible, without violating Ashby’s conceptualization, by re-drawing the diagram as in Figure 
C4.5/2.  <Fig.C4.5/2> Here the gating mechanism is depicted as operating under the influence of 
a third sub-set of the general input from the environment, E3, (instead of Ashby’s arrangement — 
which arguably amounts to the same thing — of using “a part of ” E1).   When seen in this way, it 
becomes easier <184> to envisage the mechanism as being a “higher level” recapitulation of the 
same basic linear micro-element mechanism postulated in Fig C4.4/1 and discussed further in the 
next chapter (Chapter C5).  It also suggests the possibility of further recursion into even “higher” 
levels provided further distinctions (E4, E5, ...  etc.) can be made between different aspects of the 
input.  This question also incidentally highlights the problem of just how these subdivisions of the 
input are to be made — a point which we will take up in Chapter C6.<185> 
 
185
184 
 E1 
Fig C4.5/1.         The “accumulator of adaptations” to various different      <183> 
“sub-environments” (P1, P2, P3), as depicted in Ashby’s Figure 10/9/1, (1960). 
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<Fig.C4.5/2>..<184>.. 
 E1 (minor) 
Fig C4.5/2.  
A variation of the diagram of Fig C4.5/1 to emphasize the potentially recursive 
implications of Ashby’s “gating mechanism”, and to suggest approaches to 
explaining its operation.   When there is a mismatch between P and S, then the 
S will be altered (randomly or purposefully) by the gating-mechanism loop.   
However this concept is developed further, starting at Section C5.1(3), so we 
should regard this E3 loop as provisional only. 
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Chapter C5 
Toward Fully Self-Organizing Versions of Ashby’s Systems, 
Using Populations of ‘Linear Micro-Elements’ 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter sets out to reconcile Ashby’s model with the molecular or ‘linear 
micro-element’ theory of memory which has been our main concern so far.  In general 
this means introducing largish populations of structures capable of acting collectively in 
a manner similar to those outlined in Traill (1975b, 1976d).  As it stands, Ashby’s 
model is still too “computerish” and not biological enough (as he himself implies in his 
sections 17/10 and 17/11 when he lists five unexplained features as lacking provision 
for self-adjustment).  The linear micro-element theory offers an explanation in essent-
ially Darwinian terms, because the molecules (the presumed micro-elements) would be 
profuse enough for extensive trial-and-error procedures to work economically. 
C5.1  Some acknowledged defects in Ashby’s exposition 
Like most working models, Ashby’s model is presented ready-made with many of the import-
ant problems of existence already built into the system before “testing” begins.  It is not easy to 
refrain from imposing one’s observations of gross structure onto a model, and there are some 
advantages in taking such a short cut:-  Displaying some limited-but-important principles (as 
here);  Short term prediction;  and/or  Making-do when there is no guide to possible substructure.  
Indeed most model-builders (Dutton and Starbuck, 1971) impose even more structure onto their 
models — these being mathematical stereotypes which are then fitted, as best they can, by meas-
uring the “relevant parameters” and inserting them into the model.  In such cases the basic struct-
ure of the model itself is not regarded as being subject to continuing amendment (let alone evolut-
ion), though it may be seen as being “on trial” in an absolute pass/fail sense. 
However it would seem that, for biological systems, their very structure must be largely self-
constructed — with no explicit <186> guidance, though with some implicit shaping from an 
indifferent or hostile environment.  (One might quibble on the detail of this proposition — after 
all education is explicit guidance in some sense, or so it would seem — but self-organization 
nevertheless seems to be the more important factor, especially embryological development of 
physiological structure which presumably lays the basis for feedback-loops like those in Ashby’s 
diagrams.  In any case, one can probably answer the “education” argument insofar as it is 
applicable — by regarding education as communication within the species, and asserting that it is 
this wider system which is self-constructing in the long run — even if this is not quite true for 
individual members of the species). 
Ashby's first two self-criticisms — problems potentially solved in the above discussion 
Ashby is more-than-usually aware of the desirability of incorporating such self-organizing 
principles into models which purport to depict biological reality.  Indeed he himself lists five 
ways in which his model falls short of this total objective (1960, Sections 17/10 and 17/11):-    
(1) The duration of a trial, before abandoning it as “a failure”, was set by him in the light of 
experience — and not by the system itself.  However it has been suggested above (Section C4.5, 
paragraph 3) that it is feasible for systems of this broad type to adjust such timing-parameters, at 
least in the case of a ‘linear micro-element population’ realization of Ashby’s general concept. 
(2) Ashby decided for the systems:   which ranges of the “essential variables” (E2) were to be 
considered “good” thus entailing a non-action “response”, and which were to be considered “bad” 
so that they lead to attempts to change the input by altering the configuration in its own 
parameters.  To simply identify such mechanisms with biological pleasure/pain activation is an 
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appropriate start, but it still leaves the problem:  “How did the body come to decide that a <187> 
burn should be ‘painful’, while replenishing a physiological deficiency should be ‘pleasurable’?”.  
Indeed the problem is heightened when one considers pathological cases in which this formula 
fails to hold.  Of course at a relatively trivial level one can learn that object A is pleasurable or 
object B is painful.  this is the familiar paradigm of classical conditioning which has been 
interpreted in terms of the linear micro-element model by invoking the concept of genetic “cross-
overs” between segments of the linear-elements (Chapter A1; Traill, 1976b).  Similarly one can 
learn the same sort of differential between one’s own actions; this being the case of “operant con-
ditioning” which may be explained in the same general way (ibid.), in what amounts to a Darwin-
ian explanation entailing the competition for survival amongst the linear elements.  It is possible, 
for instance, that those producing “painful” consequences fail to acquire the tag (or switch 
setting) that would enable them to be replicated; or they might be tagged “for demolition”; or they 
might simply fail to become incorporated into a self-supporting “schema” of mutually intercom-
municating elements as an “internal closure” systems (Chapter A3; Traill, 1976e).  However it 
would seem that the ultimate sense of pleasure/pain, from which the above phenomena derive, 
must be arbitrarily inbuilt into individuals in the first place.  When such settings help survival, the 
setting is likely to survive along with the individual and be transmitted genetically; whereas a 
“wrongly-connected” individual will probably not survive; — Darwin again. 
Ashby's third self-criticism — What generates the “gating mechanisms”? 
(3)36 Ashby points out that he has not made any suggestion as to how the organism might 
acquire its gating mechanism, shown here in Figure C4.5/1.  However, if we re-interpret this 
concept as a “metasystem” (E3 in Figure C4.5/2), making recursive use of the same <188> basic 
type of mechanism as in E2 and E1, then it begins to look as though a plausible explanation for 
this aspect of the self-organization might be forthcoming. 
Some details, of how such a system might work, have been given in Traill (1976d).  But first 
we should re-examine Figure C4.4/2, the base level mechanism, and re-interpret the role of such a 
subsystem when acting “on a higher plane”.  For the base-level case, the routine interactions with 
“the outside” are R (the set of responses) and E1 (the set of “non-evaluative” stimuli) — both 
implying contact with the environment outside the organism itself.  Let us now consider another 
such system in which the E1 and R interact with a different domain.  Instead of interacting with 
the outside environment, we shall suppose that this new system will interact with a “pseudo-
external” domain consisting of the stable elements of the original system.  (Thus it would become 
capable of interfering in the activity of the original base-level system — as a god-like “meta-
system”).  What form, then, should such interference take? 
Figures C4.5/1 and C4.5/2 portray this “gating-mechanism” interference as controlling the 
activity of the switch-setters (S1, S2, S3, ...) by some means which is not clearly specified, though 
it seems likely that it might involve changing the sensitivity of the environment-oriented system 
to the evaluation-signals (E2) — presumably by blocking off communication pathways on the left 
side of Figure C4.4/2.  This could make sense in the light of Ashby’s discussion, in his Section 
11/5, concerning the tremendous practical benefit to be gained from holding onto partial 
solutions while other unsolved parts of the problem are explored further.  Thus if we had a large 
population of environment-oriented sub-systems of many different types — corresponding to 
many possible transactions with the environment — then it would be sensible to be able to 
exercise <189> some sort of control over the incoming “criticism” via E2.  Otherwise the 
criticism is likely to be received at inappropriate points, with destructive results. 
                                                          
36  We will not get to items (4) and (5) until Section C5.5.  <188> 
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Not-yet-resolved aspects of the problem which now require deeper investigation 
This still does not explain how the organism comes to know which base-level sub-systems 
are to be left open to the prevailing E2 from the environment.  To some extent this will doubtless 
be trivially genetic or structural, and not readily open to modification.  Thus emergency responses 
such as pain or visual reflexes will often have a private, genetically-determined pathway; and 
such an arrangement is not really open to orthodox re-education, though it may well be overruled 
or else functionally isolated in some way, in some cases.  Rather more subtly, it has been 
suggested that such stability may be partly due to the closing of a communicational loop (or a 
“more complete” topological enclosure than a mere loop) — in the form, perhaps, of elements 
such as those on the right of Figure C4.4/2 giving off responses which included a component 
which could activate other members of the group; (see Chapter A3; and Traill, 1976e).  Such 
groups were then envisaged as being capable of acting collectively as new complex elements on 
which higher systems of organization could be based.  This is a point to which we will return 
shortly, early in the next section. 
But leaving aside these more automatic cases, we are left with the previously-mentioned situ-
ation in which one “higher” subsystem interferes with the parameters of a “base-level” subsyst-
em; (or more correctly, one parallel set interferes with a lower parallel set).  How then does it 
“know” which type(s) of base-level subsystem it “should” interfere with, and in what direction?  
Indeed how does it “know” that it should interfere in anything, or take any action at all?  The 
answer, according to this model, is that it generally does not know any of these things a priori; 
(or if it does, then the knowledge <190> was gained genetically — by orthodox natural selection 
amongst its ancestors).  It is postulated instead that, as in the case of the base-level codings 
themselves, the higher subsystems develop from a large number of more-or-less arbitrarily coded 
elements which then have to compete against each other for survival under the prevailing 
conditions.  It is rather less clear what form this evaluative feedback (higher-level E2) should 
take, but we may tentatively suppose that it is governed by essentially genetic-based mechanisms, 
as for the lower level.  The main difficulty would seem to be how to distinguish adequately 
between various painful evaluative verdicts, where these are “appropriate” to only one of the two 
respective levels.  How then could we tell which of these two levels should be amended for each 
of the various painful feedbacks?  Once again this is likely to be ultimately explicable in terms of 
trial-and-error among competing units — genetic and/or learning elements.  In particular, 
acceptable trial-times are likely to be very different for the two cases; (Ashby, 1960, Section 
17/8; see also Sections 3/15 and 8/15). 
The problem of distinguishing between different levels of evaluation will be discussed in 
Chapter C6.  Other points relating to Ashby’s list will be continued in Section C5.5, after two 
longish digressions:-  
 
C5.2 Exploring details of linear micro-element versions of such mechanisms 
It seems desirable, at this stage, to take the time to reconcile the picture presented in Figure 
C4.4/2 with that portrayed earlier (Chapter A3; and Traill, 1976e), in which the development of 
representations of sets and groups was explicitly emphasized.  For both versions, the basic elem-
ent is the “RNA-like linear microelement”, envisaged as being approximately as shown in Figure 
C5.2/1:-  <191> 
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It will be evident that the three sub-parts in Figure C4.4/2 conform to this general pattern — 
though with some doubt concerning the roles of “switches” and “affect tags”.  Also it is not 
immediately clear that these functional units in Figure C4.4/2 are actually envisaged as compris-
ing physical populations of linear micro-elements (of a slightly more complex type involving 
synchronizing signals) as depicted in Figure C5.2/2. 
a  f1 
(recognize 
“call”) 
(facilitate 
other) 
(proceed if 
facilitated) 
p1 
a  f2 
(recognize 
“call”) 
(facilitate 
other) 
(proceed if 
facilitated) 
p2 
Σ 
b 
 
 
 
b 
(c)
(satisfaction) 
Fig C5.2/2.    Illustration of how the individually-insignificant micro-elements may collectively 
cooperate, under favourable circumstances, to produce significant behaviour.    
Only two elements are depicted here, but the concept should be thought of as applying to a 
somewhat larger number — probably involving a threshold concept, in that only when there 
is a sufficient active population with sufficient unanimity and synchronization, will the 
behaviour actually take place.   The diagram is taken from Traill(1976d), but alternativie 
versions may be found in Traill (1975b and 1976b), and in Section A3.4 (above).        <193> 
LABEL SEGMENT 
PROGRAM SEGMENT 
(OPTIONAL) 
AFFECT TAG(S) 
(Not necessarily situated 
in this position)
Sensitive to a 
particular signal-
pattern which will 
“call” the element 
into action 
The constituent units initiate 
similar “calls” to other 
scheme-elements, and to 
efferent motor fibres 
This tag is seen as 
determining the 
likelihood of 
 (i) replication,  or
 (ii) dissolution; 
as well as having 
subjective affect 
manifestations 
Fig C5.2/1.    Supposed “anatomy” of an RNA-like linear micro-element (of the simple type, 
lacking any “AND-gates” within the program segment).   This is offered as the physical 
counterpart of the functionally defined “scheme-element” (Part A, above).  
This diagram is taken from Traill (1975b), with slight modifications to accord with 
developments in Part B, above.     <192> 
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Synchronization and specificity of elements 
This question of cooperative activity amongst the postulated elements is arguably another 
situation for which categorization of elements into sets would turn out to be essential.  It would 
seem to be invariably necessary to involve largish numbers of such elements, and often it would 
seem to be important to orchestrate various different types in one collective complex action; but 
clearly it will be crucial to be highly selective and orderly in the involvement of these various 
elements — in higher animals at least.  If such specific selection is to take place, then there must 
<192> inevitably be some effective mechanism whereby the elements are allocated to sets:  either 
by intensive definition (relying on shared common labels, tags, or other distinguishing features on 
the elements themselves); or by extensive definition (using externally imposed boundaries or 
other physical constraints on the physical elements); — or by using some combination of both 
methods. 
For instance, in the straightforward case depicted in Figure C5.2/2, the two-or-more parallel 
elements would presumably both be called into action when they both “recognize” the same 
signal at about the same instant; here the possession of the correct “recognizer” or “label” serves 
as an intensive definition of the relevant set — and if the signal has only a restricted distribution 
confined to a local area, then there is also an extensively defined criterion to delimit the (sub)set 
which is to be activated.  (Further details on this postulated process of recognition are given in 
Sections B2.3 <193> [above] and C6.7, and in Traill (1976b); but briefly, the label segment is 
seen as a series of sites receptive individually to specific pulse-or-wave configurations — and to 
the prior excitation of the previous site, if any; so that the chain of sites will only collectively 
accept signals with the “correct” temporally extended pattern, probably in the infra-red region of 
frequency components). 
Another example is afforded by the postulated activity of “affect tags” (see Figure C5.2/1, 
above).  Generally speaking, these are thought of as auxiliary labels which intensively define their 
respective elements as “good, bad, or indifferent”:  thereby influencing the likelihood that these 
scheme-elements (or the schemes of which they are part) will be called into action.  Alternatively 
or additionally they may also influence the chance that such elements will be annihilated as 
unwanted cellular rubbish.  However we may also suppose that such tags will often be context-
dependent in their significance.  Thus if an animal is angry, or fearful, or sexy, then quite differ-
ent sets of scheme-elements will be “switched on” or at least made more sensitive to the prevail-
ing signal traffic, while other sets of elements will be inactivated for the time being.  In this way 
then, it will be possible for the important and far-reaching sets of “good” and “bad” (or “approp-
riate” and “inappropriate”) to be superimposed reversibly, briefly, and flexibly, right across any 
other existing set-memberships of the elements — and without necessarily altering those other 
membership categories in any direct way.  Such tag-activation would presumably be performed 
overall by endocrine hormones; or more selectively by means of the Autonomic Nervous System 
— implying a location-based extensive component to the definition for sets of elements in this 
case.  [Indeed, broadly speaking, the transmitter-release from normal synaptic activity of the 
Central Nervous System might also be seen in this comparatively <194> lowly role, while the 
detailed information could all be coded within the postulated infra-red signals!] 
Stability of element-ensembles 
Yet another instance of the usefulness of this conceptualization of sets has been the proposed 
explanation of the nature of Piaget’s schema, and how it comes to be formed; (Part A, above; 
Traill, 1975b, 1976d).  To quote from Chapter A3:- 
“Schemata were seen as scheme-like structures which had somehow acquired an inherent stabil-
ity and were therefore virtually impervious to modification, unlike schemes.  It was supposed 
that they owed this stability to some manifestation of corroboration (i.e. self-consistency …) …”. 
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One supposed mechanism producing stability of this sort was sketched, in outline, in the third-last 
paragraph of the previous section (Section C5.1).  This concept brings together a number of ideas; 
notably the notion of “seeking out” of “internal closure”37 as a collective property for related 
scheme-elements — and this is closely identifiable with the well-known concept of Gestalt 
(English and English, 1958).  Essentially this entails building models which will tend to have a 
mathematical group type of structure; — a strategy which is likely to pay off because many 
phenomena in our environment do seem to have such a structure, especially for solid objects and 
discrete phenomena.  [It may well be that we are less well equipped to deal with concepts 
involving continuity — at least until we devise some discrete way of symbolizing them.  Thus 
Bridgman (1927) wrote “The mind seems essentially incapable of dealing with continuity except 
in negative terms.” (page 94); while Ashby (1960, Section 17/9) writes “But when the whole syst-
em is not so divisible it remains merely a fearfully complex whole, not capable of reduction, …”.] 
Other ideas inherent in the notion of group-structure modelling of this sort are concerned with 
the likely mechanics of such model-<195>building and maintenance.  a useful guiding biological 
“intuition” for this is the principle that physiological structures tend to develop appropriately by 
virtue of the stress laid upon them.38 In the present context this encourages the notion that the 
survival of individual scheme elements may be promoted if they happen to be part of a commun-
icational network which is continually “exercising” its collective self by echoing lowish-intensity 
signals around its network.  (Such activation might, for instance, ensure that the elements did not 
fall into a state of particularly low energy — perhaps centred at a particular site such as a “tag” — 
in which state it might be vulnerable to dissolution as “rubbish”). 
The formation of meaningful ensembles 
Here we have been talking about the maintenance of group-structured schemata, but we need 
to go into the matter a little more deeply to explain their formation.  In fact these structures are 
seen as being comparatively sophisticated types of schemata, so we should now give some 
attention to the rather more elementary structures which have the properties of sets (i.e. lists), 
defined extensively in their essentials, but which have not (yet) achieved group-status.  (It is 
supposed that the group structures must, in fact, progress through this mere-set stage during their 
development.  After all, to the mathematician, a group is simply a specialized <196> type of set). 
The problem for the organism is to gather together, into some readily controllable centre, the 
access to those scheme-elements which are all characterized by some common property.  Or, in 
other words, the task is to translate intensive definitions into extensive definitions — except 
perhaps for the trivial case in which the formal label-segment constitutes the intensive definition 
(in which case there is arguably no need for an extensive definition since the members are already 
“on tap”, as in the first example following Figure C5.2/2, above).  Anyhow, this process of 
translation of other distinguishing features into physical structures representing extensive definit-
ions is explained, as in Traill (1976d), using Darwinian and genetic concepts as follows:- 
                                                          
37 Here “closure” is effectively synonymous with “coherence”, as discussed later in Traill (2005c) — 
www.ondwelle.com/OSM03.pdf  — and in philosophy-orientated works generally; [RRT 2006]. 
38  There is an obvious advantage in such a biological strategy in that the animal is taught by the 
environment which is actually present rather than some out-dated formulation of what the environment 
should be; and moreover it makes for tremendous savings in the amount of information needed to be 
transmitted genetically.  Galbraith (1977) makes a similar point when he compares the regulation-
bound Spanish colonial administration with the pragmatic approach of the British administration in 
India.  And returning to biology, Ashby (1960, Sec. 18/4) writes:  “it is the mouse which teaches the 
kitten the finer points of how to catch mice.” <196>  
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First we need to consider how any sort of arbitrary list could find physical representation in 
terms of the linear micro-element model.  It scarcely seems likely that in such circumstances the 
elements should become physically enclosed within vesicles containing representatives of the 
set’s members, but some functional-equivalent to this is required.  Perhaps such elements could 
somehow become “moored” along a master linear element which would form a “spine”, like the 
side-chains along an aliphatic carbon-chain?  Unfortunately it is difficult to see how such a struct-
ure could replicate effectively — unless the side-chains were quite short — and replication is 
probably an essential means for “amplifying” successful combinations of this sort.  In any case, if 
the listed elements were of any appreciable length (and some of them might well be), then it 
would be wise to do what sophisticated computer “sort” programs do:   i.e. deal only with the 
“names” (label codings) of such elements — not the elements themselves, as these can be 
accessed subsequently by using the label-coding if necessary.  <197> 
Thus we may start by thinking of the list as a master linear element, with its own separate 
label segment “α”, followed by a series of names (β1, β2, β3, etc.); and this is the arrangement as 
portrayed in Traill (1976d).  However there is a possible difficulty with this too if we are thinking 
in terms of adding and removing names from the list, because it is hard to see how this could be 
done without breaking the chain.  For the moment then we will have to contemplate a comprom-
ise, which seems to mean short side-chains (for the names only) short enough to be encompassed 
in the replication process as side chains, or else able to undergo a conformational change such 
that they “slip into line” for replication purposes.  Of course if we are prepared to accept these 
master elements as having a substantially fixed membership once they are formed, on a Darwin-
ian trial-and-error basis, then the name-codings can be considered to be entirely linearly arranged 
without any need for side-chains at all. 
Next we should consider how such sets come to have relevant and helpful entries in their 
name-lists.  According to Traill (1976d) there is “an arbitrarily set expectation (intensive definit-
ion) as to what the membership criterion should be for the particular list; (embodied, perhaps, in 
the properties of the first member?)”.  Candidates are then tentatively accepted (or perhaps 
merely considered) pending acceptance or rejection on the basis of the arbitrary criterion; while 
the survival of the list itself, as a whole, depends on the relevance of the arbitrary criterion to the 
apparent needs of the organism.  (Such possibilities are re-evaluated below in Section C8.l(a), but 
the above account will serve for the present discussion). 
Several practical problems arise out of this suggestion, and they will need a more thorough 
investigation in the hope of finding a more rigourous yet plausible mechanistic explanation.  The 
first <198> problem is how the arbitrary “membership criterion” is to be encoded; and this leads 
into the second problem of how candidate members are to be selected on such a basis.  Another 
associated question is to consider what communicational and spatial connections there might be 
between the “list-of-symbols” on the one hand — and the actual items represented by those 
symbols, on the other hand. 
It was suggested in the earlier work (Traill, 1976d), that possibly the first-named item on the 
list might also serve as the paradigm criterion by which all subsequent candidate members might 
be judged.  At first sight it is difficult to see how this could conveniently be executed if the list 
contained only a “name” for the paradigm concerned; it would seem to be too cumbersome to be 
constantly invoking this name to access fully-fledged exemplars at relatively remote sites 
whenever a new candidate member was being assessed.  Rather it would seem probable that any 
such criterion would need to be physically attached to the list — in full relevant detail, and not by 
“name”; (though it is possible that such attachment could be intermittent and reversible — 
depending on how the list was being used or replicated at that time, and this would possibly be 
related to the various sleep modes). 
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Figure C5.2/3 sketches the general idea of how a “higher order” linear element might 
constitute a list;  but it gives no clear answer to the problem of criterion-specification, so we 
should now attempt to remedy this deficiency. 
. 
 
 
α 
 
(label) 
β1 
 
(name1) 
β2 
 
(name2) 
β3 
 
(name3) 
β4 
 
(name4) 
c 
c 
!!
referencing: 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
c 
c c X !!
p1 
f1 
b
f2 
p2 
  b B
p3
f3
?
f5 
f5 
b 
!! 
b b
p6
f6
?  acceptable according 
to the arbitrary 
criterion 
?  eliminated as 
“not belonging” 
     Fig C5.2/3.   <200> 
Slightly modified version of a diagram from Traill (1976d) depicting the postulated “higher level” linear 
element (α−β1−β2−…) serving to construct, physically, an extensively defined set or list.   This set is shown 
as consisting, momentarily, of six linear elements.   Three of the element-names (β4, β5, and β6) “should not 
be there” because the codings of their corresponding elements do not accord with the arbitrarily preset 
intensively definied criterion for the set, so these member-names are seen as about-to-be-ejected.  
The detail of this arrangement is criticized in the text, and a subset of simpler structures proposed instead. 
(200)
→ Full Self-organization —— C5.2  Details of linear-micro 
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Practical procedures for establishing ensemble-“lists” — each with its consistent criterion 
Suppose then, that such a criterion segment (γ) were to be fitted somewhere into the higher-
level linear element in Figure C5.2/3.  How then could this effectively influence the membership 
of the (extensive) list?  For the moment we may also suppose that such an element will contain 
only one member-name, β1, (any other names being held by other similar elements in a population 
all having <199> the same label, α).   Thus, if α is activated, the β1 will also be activated in turn, 
sending off a “call” to labels of the type a1.  As a consequence of this, at least some of the “base-
level” elements will be activated — either with overt behaviour, or perhaps asynchronously or 
subliminally so that there is no overt effect.  Anyhow, it may be supposed that such activation 
will produce some sort of reproducible and locally-recognisable signal activity capable of being 
monitored at the “criterion” segment (γ) of the “higher level” element, enabling this element to be 
tagged according to whether or not it is consistent between its intensive component (γ), <200> 
and its extensive component  (β1 → a1 …, etc.)  which provides the feedback on which the 
comparison can be made with γ;  see Figure C5.2/4. [  <201>] 
Special (sleep)-modes of operation might be involved here in several ways.  In particular, the 
suppression of overt behaviour is one likely result.  Also the monitoring and tagging procedures 
might well be impossible during the normal “noisy” activity of the awake state, so this might 
supply the reason for any such suppression. 
In the version of the theory just described, in which each “higher element” of the set held 
only one name (βi), our extensive <201> definitions have lost the ordering of the names in that 
list — as compared with Figure C5.2/3 where they are clearly ordered.  So does this matter?  In 
fact this loss will arguably make our model more realistic in several ways:-  To start with, it is 
more credible to imagine the spontaneous mutation of linear elements into usable re-codings of 
the type α–β–γ, rather than the more unlikely longer sequences of the type α–β1–β2–β3– …–γ.  
Secondly, we arguably do not usually start our concepts of sets-of-objects by thinking of them in 
terms of ordering; and indeed such ordering concepts take some degree of experiential 
sophistication before they develop, (Inhelder and Piaget, 1964, Chapter 9, p 247).  Mind you, this 
might be explained as an initial random ordering of the βi units among the different elements 
making up the relevant higher-order population of elements (α … βi … γ), though one might 
expect a speedy selection process in such circumstances. 
Then obviously, it is difficult to see how the “γ” could effectively monitor the simultaneous 
synchronized feedback from all the  βi…ai   connections within the set; whereas with a separate 
physical label (α) for each βi, there is at least a chance of moderately-asynchronous-but-adequate 
feedback — especially if other activity is reduced by using a “sleep” mode.  Finally if the βis 
were to be added and subtracted as implied in Figure C5.2/3, then there are further difficulties 
such as how to stop the whole physical sequence from breaking inappropriately and losing the γ 
segment, along with the distal βis.  (This assumes that the γ is at the far end away from the α — 
as it probably would be in view of its post hoc role and the supposed transmission of the internal 
signal along the element away from the α). 
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Note that these considerations do not conclusively rule out the possibility of two or more βis 
in series, as depicted in Figure<202> C5.2/3.  It is conceivable that the membership criterion 
codings might be located remotely in a detached β1, either initially or as a later sophistication, and 
that other linearly-ordered members might then be added; though it remains to be explained how 
the detailed operation of such a system could take place, and until then we should regard it as 
suspect.  (One of the attractions of such an arrangement would be the ready explanation it would 
offer for temporally-ordered sequences of behaviour if these are deemed to be important at this 
α-d i rected s ignal  
α
β2
γ
α 
β3 
γ
α 
β1 
γ 
a1 
c 
p3 
f3 
b 
3a1
c 
p2
f2
b
2a1 
c 
p1 
f1 
b 
Fig C5.2/4.      A variation on the theme of Figure C5.2/3.
Here each βi is held by a separate “master” element which nevertheless acts in unusually close 
cooperation with its fellows; — a well-controlled intensive linkage (rather than a genuine 
“tethered extension”).    Only one subsidiary element (ai – fi – …) is shown for each βi, though in 
general there would probably be many available and the reference would presumably not 
distinguish between those with the same “i” value.  <Fig.C5.2/4>  <201> 
203 
(201)
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higher level.  But even if they are important, they could be explained alternatively in terms of 
differential time delays or by chain-reactions between such elements, or by parallel lower-level 
linear-elements — though admittedly such explanations would themselves seem to be rather 
cumbersome).  However, until we are pressed to look again at such possibilities by unexplained 
inconsistencies, it would seem best to opt provisionally for the simpler basic mechanism outlined 
in the previous four paragraphs — on the “Occam’s razor” principle. 
(Actually neither of these two proposed techniques seems to be entirely satisfactory if it is to 
be the method of organizing sets.  Accordingly we will later be looking at yet another suggested 
technique, which will be depicted in Figure C8.1/4, below; and there may well be other possible 
arrangements of a similar nature.  Moreover it is quite conceivable that some or all of these 
alternative methods might be used concurrently as a collective pluralistic system). 
A likely topic-segregation role for cell-membranes (and other brain subdivisions) 
Extensive definition can, and does, take another form; (arguably co-existing with the one we 
have just discussed, and quite possibly also collaborating with it).  An extensive definition of a 
set is most commonly seen as the drawing of a physical boundary around the relevant members, 
thus isolating them from non-members; so what could be more natural than enclosing supposedly 
similar molecular members <203> within a restricting cell-membrane.  For much of the brain 
(other than the “association areas”) there is ample evidence that function is localized in a 
systematic way (e.g.  Hubel and Wiesel, 1962; Thompson, 1967, Chapter 11); but it has not been 
clear in detail just how such specialized cells operate, and it has been even less clear how they 
come to be in such methodical positions with such systematic functions.  Of these, the question of 
operation might be explicable if we invoke the above molecular theories; and the question of 
construction clearly raises problems of embryology and development.  It is quite possible, 
however, that such molecular theories are applicable to embryology, and that embryological 
considerations are pertinent to theories of molecular encoding; so it might well be profitable to be 
on the look-out for unifying principles here.   
C5.3 Embryological considerations, and their relation to the extensive definition  
of linear micro-element sets 
This is not the place to embark on a full discussion of the likely mechanisms of embryolog-
ical development; but it does seem appropriate to sketch in certain ideas which would seem to 
have some immediate bearing on our present problem.  Trinkaus (1969) explains, with some 
understandable misgivings, the commonly accepted notion of how the cells of a developing 
organism may be guided into position by the supposed process of chemotaxis — extreme 
sensitivity to gradients of chemical concentration, which are presumed to be somehow set up and 
maintained in just the right way at the right time in a reasonably robust way.  I have yet to see a 
reasonably detailed working through of just how such a mechanism might operate; but, in any 
case, it has seemed to me for some time that a much more likely explanation might be found in 
terms of one of the war-time navigational aids — code-named “Gee”, (Crowther and 
Whiddington, 1947, pp 53-56).  <204> 
This system (“invented by Mr. R. J. Dippy and developed by his team at Tele-commun-
ications Research Establishment”)39 involves the emission of a signal from one centre A, which 
then stimulates the emission of secondary signals from two other “slave” centres B and C.  
Provided that the time taken for each path remains consistent, and provided that a suitable 
periodicity is maintained by A, then the pattern of crossing secondary signals forms a grid 
network on which meaningful navigational moves can be made.  One could, for instance, follow 
                                                          
39 and eventually developed into our present-day Global Positioning System (“GPS”) — [RRT 2006] 
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one set of wave fronts with axons from one set of neurons, and the other wave fronts with other 
neurons — thus forming such extraordinary structures as the optic chiasma, whose criss-crossed 
architecture is so baffling to explain in terms of chemotaxis.  In “Gee”, the network lines were 
hyperbolic; but it is not too difficult to envisage the formation of other shapes by using larger 
numbers of slave centres — possibly using distinguishable call-signs, and possibly partly depend-
ing on chemotaxis or other influences.  (Come to think of it, there is a formal similarity between 
such ideas and the notions of Huygens — developed later by Young and by Fresnel; (Bell, 1947; 
Jenkins and White, 1950)). 
Moreover, in view of the circumstantial evidence from other theoretical fields40 that infra-red 
local radiation is likely to be an important biological phenomenon; it would seem that there are 
now reasonable grounds for taking seriously the idea that the “Gee” principle might be crucial for 
embryological and developmental processes41. 
An interesting set of cases is provided by the work on regeneration of the optic nerve in 
amphibians (Sperry, 1943; Sperry and Hibberd, 1968).  It is difficult to see how the cut optic 
fibres could re-connect more-or-less as they had been originally — <205> despite physical 
obstruction or rotation of the target optic-stump unless some system of call-signs (intensive 
definitions) were in operation.  The subsequent re-connection would then constitute a re-
establishment of the equivalent extensively defined associations, thus emphasizing a particular 
form of informational redundancy and interchangeability, and therefore robustness in the face of 
perturbation. 
Why then is there no regeneration for a cut mammalian optic nerve?  Could it be that once the 
initial connections have been made, the call-sign system changes role from carrying hereditary 
information (which is now left to the extensive definitions inherent in the connections) and now 
takes on the task of encoding the results of learning processes?  After all, Sperry’s amphibia were 
unable to learn to correct for the rotated eye, whereas human subjects can learn to correct for 
“mirror-vision” spectacles in a way reminiscent of Ashby’s homeostats.  Such a role-change 
would also seem to be consistent with the observation that neurons cease dividing mitotically42 at 
about the same time as they (presumably) become functional, suggesting that the genetic 
equipment (DNA etc.), having fulfilled its initial role in producing “extensive” structures, is now 
free to be used for a different type of intensively-defined coding — arguably the scheme-elements 
or “tapes” of the “Linear Micro-element Theory”. 
In this light, it seems likely that any tendency to use “higher order” linear elements (to tether 
or list the basic elements) might constitute a new alternative method for forming extensive defin-
itions which does happen to be compatible with the newer non-genetic intensive codings.  We 
might well consider that this constitutes a first step up the hierarchical ladder (the “mnl” scale of 
                                                          
40 Cope (1973) on ATP metabolism — and later refences “45-51” cited in Traill (1988 — Speculations in 
Sci.&Tech., 11(3), 173-181) on photon-emission from nerve-fibres. — Also see Part B, above,  
[ www.wbabin.net/physics/traill8.pdf   or   www.ondwelle.com/MolecMemIR.pdf ]  concerning 
saltatory conduction and molecular spectra (ibid., Table 2.2/I). 
41 — a view supported more recently by theory-and-evidence regarding the control of myelin-growth, 
(e.g. Traill, 2005a — www.ondwelle.com/OSM01.pdf  or at  www.wbabin.net/physics/traill4.pdf ). 
42 By now (2006), it is known that this adult mitosis-suppression is not always true, though the 
exceptions are fairly rare and specialized so the argument still seems supportable in general.     See:  
• Nottebohm, F. (2002 Feb 1) “Why are some neurons replaced in adult brain?” 
J.Neuroscience, 22(3), 624-628. http://psych.colorado.edu/~munakata/csh/nottebohm.pdf   
• Gould, E., & C.G.Gross (2002 Feb 1) “Neurogenesis in adult mammals:  Some progress and 
problems”. J.Neuroscience, 22(3), 619-623.  www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/22/3/619  —  
• Traill (2005b, sec.(15)):  www.ondwelle.com/OSM02.pdf   or   www.wbabin.net/physics/traill2.pdf  
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Chapter C2, above), with some formal similarities between the two <206> levels, but using 
discernibly different mechanisms.  If so, then clearly any recursive process we may envisage will 
not be a totally “pure” one; (see Chapter C3, above). 
C5.4 Concept-structure types within each level: 
another digression in preparation for clarifying Ashby’s difficulties 
When we digressed at the start of Section C5.2, we had just been in the middle of discussing 
the third item on Ashby’s list of unexplained features:  namely, that he had offered no suggested 
process whereby his “gating mechanism” could be established without deliberate outside inter-
vention. 
His difficulty in giving a detailed account of better-than-random tinkering, by the system, 
with its own parameters may be partly ascribed to his emphasis on actions — neglecting 
consideration of more sophisticated symbolic representations of the real world outside.  The main 
symbolic structures are likely to be:  verb-like concepts which represent actions (but without 
executing them), and noun-like concepts representing objects (or mental schemata, in the case of 
abstractions without any tangible external embodiment). 
“Verb” concepts may be taken to be made up of linear elements of the straightforward action-
type, but with some sort of inhibitory switch which prevents them from actually initiating any 
action under normal circumstances.  (“Abnormal” circumstances may be determined by hormon-
al, reticular, or Autonomic Nervous System influences — selectively setting such switches on, 
and plausibly leading to such phenomena as dreams, “acting out”, and vestigial or subliminal 
action.  On the other hand, “abnormality” might well consist of an unusually high propensity to 
use such inhibition:-  conscious “suppression” of otherwise spontaneous tendencies, or unconsc-
ious “repression” of them — leading to neurosis in some cases). 
“Noun” concepts may be identified with the rather more complex <207> “sets” or lists of 
other elements — often having mathematical “group”-properties — described above in Section 
C2.4, and also in Chapter A3, and Traill (1975b, 1975c, and 1976d). 
The Neo-Piagetian approach to Ashby’s third problem 
These Action, Verb, and Noun concepts should now be fitted into the context of the supposed 
hierarchical control-structure discussed in Chapter A3 and in Section C2.3, above.  Let us start by 
considering just one level insofar as that is possible; and for this purpose, let us choose the level 
predominating in an infant of about one year old — half way through the sensori-motor period.  
Here “action” concepts refer to such hereditary reflex actions as sucking, grasping, kicking, 
smiling, and crying — and also learned modifications to these schemes (Section A3.7, above).  
But it should be noted that none of these action-patterns is a straightforward simple action of a 
single muscle; in each case there is already a considerable degree of organization, including 
temporal and sequential considerations.  Clearly then, we should not delude ourselves that these 
actions of the sensori-motor stage lie on the bottom level of the hierarchical-pyramid; but rather 
there must be at least one other level below them, with its own (genetically determined) set of 
structural devices.  Nevertheless, as adults we tend to take both these levels for granted in our 
daily life — if we ever notice them at all.  From that “common-sense” point of view then, it 
seems reasonably in accord with everyday thinking to rate them as being of order “0 and –1” 
respectively; and this fits in with the nomenclature used in Section C2.3 where the simpler 
phenomena of the sensori-motor period were said to be at the “m0l” level.  Presumably then, we 
might reasonably talk of individual-muscle activity as being at the “m–1l” level — or at least 
within the broader category of an “M–1L” level. 
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From a formal point of view then, the assignment of the zero (to n) for the “mnl” scale has 
been done arbitrarily — serving, if nothing <208> else, to emphasize the existence of some 
misconceptions built into our culture:  comparable to talking about the Sun as “rising and 
setting”.  But in any case we would be wise to be cautious in our interpretation of mnl values:-  
Even assuming the present basic theory on hierarchical organization is correct, there is no 
guarantee that we have identified all the relevant stages and their true interrelations.  There may 
be at least one extra full (“double”) level between what we have happened to call “M0L” and 
“M1L” (in Chapters C2 and C3); and the hierarchical organization may not be as simple and 
linear as we would like to believe.  After all, family relationships do not always observe neat 
proprieties of generation-separation — so that aunt-nephew or father-daughter matings are 
possible, even if they are not regarded as proper; and who is to say that our supposed hierarchy 
will not break these or other rules?  It may do so to some extent under normal conditions — 
especially if it is physically split up into poorly connected regions; and it may do so even more in 
pathological cases, as we shall see.  It is possible that these irregularities, if they exist, may be 
connected in an intelligible way with EEG (electro-encephalogram) tracings, bearing in mind that 
effective trial-times are likely to increase appreciably for the more sophisticated control-loops in 
Ashby’s system (as mentioned at the close of Section C5.1) so the slow waves of the EEG might 
have a particular association with the higher MnL levels. 
Anyhow, we were considering the action-codings within that level of organization which has 
now been labelled as “M0L”, and for this level we should be clear that we are talking about 
“actions” as calls to M–1L structures which then activate the actual muscles.  Next it will be well 
to recall some of the details as postulated previously, (Sections A1.3 to A1.5, and Sections A3.1 
and A3.2, above).  <209>  Isolated linear elements or “tapes” were seen as essentially unstable or 
at least vulnerable in a competitive environment.  Survival for such codings was seen as taking 
one of several forms:  either they were hereditary and so readily replaceable from genetic sources, 
or they attained a collective stability through joint participation with other such elements, or else 
they acquired a “tag” of approval which afforded them some measure of protection from 
dissolution and/or enabled them to replicate.  Following Piaget’s terminology, the collective 
effect of the more ephemeral elements (including the replaceable hereditary elements) were 
termed “schemes”, while the collective effects of the stabilized elements were referred to as 
“schemata”.  The non-commital term “schemoids” was used to include both cases, and its use is 
convenient to evade some confusion as to whether the stable patterns of behaviour in a reflex 
should be considered as schemes or schemata; (Section A3.2, above).  In the light of our current 
discussion, we may now reasonably suggest that they are schemes from the M0L viewpoint, 
though we might well consider them as schemata at the M–1L level — if we accept the legitimacy 
of this terminology for such a primitive level. 
On fitting the Ashby and Neo-Piagetian models together 
It remains now to identify the dominant “verb” and “noun” types of entity for this stage of 
development, given this postulated collection of linear elements.  In the third paragraph of this 
section we have already taken the “verb” entities as being reversibly inhibited action entities, and 
clearly it will make sense for us to stipulate that these should be M0L action entities; however no 
mention was made there about stabilizing-influences in such cases, and this is something which 
we should now consider briefly.  The predominantly symbolic role of such structures would seem 
to militate against direct strengthening-through-use, thus arguably weakening the case for both 
the tag reinforcement method and the passing-of-a-signal-<210>around-a-closed-circuit method.  
However, as has already been suggested, such active roles may be intermittently restored in some 
sense during certain sleep modes — for the very purpose of promoting such selective 
stabilization. 
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We have already identified “noun” entities as being list-structures of some sort, presumably 
defined predominantly by extensive means, and preferably having a substantial degree of internal 
closure within themselves so that they have some claim to being embodiments of mathematical 
groups.  It is envisaged that the constituent members of such lists will be inactivated action 
codings, and we would expect these to be of the M0L type, (though it is not clear whether these 
members would already be intermittently-inactivated “verb” entities before they become listed, or 
whether it is the listing process which inactivates them.  On balance, we might favour the former 
alternative as representing a stepwise imposition of control; but then this could be construed as an 
unnecessarily time-wasting strategy (Ashby, 1960, Chapter 11).  In fact there seems to be no 
particular reason why both types of entity should not be eligible for membership on such lists, so 
let us provisionally accept this to be the case). 
[This is a case of what we may choose to call “the pluralistic principle”:  that when there are 
several ways in which a biological mechanism might work, and they appear to have comparable 
probabilities, then there is a good chance that all of them are actually operating in parallel — or 
operating alternately, according to fluctuations of circumstance.  Indeed the concept might 
profitably be extended beyond biology to complex mechanisms in general — including the case 
of chemical resonance.  Even when one of the alternatives is rather improbable, it is probably fair 
to imagine that sooner or later such improbable methods will be “tried”, whatever the 
consequences might turn out to be.  a similar principle may also be stated for cases <211> where 
the function of a structure (such as the urethra in male mammals) seems to have more than one 
possible use.  Often it will be profitable to postulate that it does have multiple functions — thus 
increasing the chance of side-effects if we try to alter any single one of these functions.  These 
two different variations on the general theme might suitably be distinguished by separate titles:  
the “redundant mechanism” principle, and the “multiple function” principle, respectively]. 
Anyhow, because such list-structures must necessarily await the appearance of the “verb” 
and/or “action” elements before they can build up and appear as “noun” entities, there is some 
logic in dividing the control level of the hierarchy up into two parts:  lower and upper — m0l and 
m½l.  This also seems to tally with Piaget’s division of his Sensori-motor and Operational periods 
up into “A” and “B” subperiods; (and this would hardly be surprising, because it was in fact the 
Piagetian notion which first suggested the m0l/m½l type of double-stage mechanism — repeatable 
at higher levels). 
Adding a third component —  
the coexisting “Textbook Synapse-and-Action-potential” account 
We may now turn to the M–1L level to consider what mechanisms may be involved there, and 
the nature of their interface both with the M0L level and with the outside world.  Whereas the 
basic action elements of M0L were seen as sending off their sequential orders in an “intensively 
defined” form (using specific callsigns to select their targets), the M–1L action elements must 
presumably come down to earth and send their orders down efferent nerve fibres (each defining 
an “extension”) — and presumably using straightforward Hodgkin-Huxley (1952a, b, c) action 
potentials, more-or-less in accordance with the accepted view:  (Eccles, 1964; Katz, 1967).  It 
seems then that the output side of M–1L will entail an explanation of how the postulated intensive 
calls of the linear micro-element theory could become transformed into (amplified) extensive 
signals <212> destined to bring about muscular changes. 
No detailed explanation will be attempted here, but some general ideas will be outlined.  
Firstly, initiation or modification of motor signals by “intensively defined” calls must presumably 
arise through some sort of chemically-induced action at non-myelinated locations:-  cell-bodies, 
dendrites, unmyelinated axons, or Nodes of Ranvier.  (Hence all such sites are feasible locations 
for M0L processes, especially when the neuron concerned happens to be an interneuron).  
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Secondly, since we are dealing with highly stereotyped actions, there seems to be no pressing 
need for the driving “chemical” activity to be located in a central brain; — local reflex centres 
should be adequate.  Much of the neural activity of invertebrates would seem to be of this sort, 
and what little learning there is may plausibly be explained in terms of locally situated (Horridge, 
1962) M0L linear action elements, together with the mutations and “crossovers” amongst them; 
(Traill, 1976b; and Section A3.4, above). 
Thirdly, it should be borne in mind that the Hodgkin-Huxley propagation along unmyelinated 
neural membranes has some obvious chemical aspects.  These appear to be predominantly 
governed by trans-membrane electrostatic potentials, but it is possible that these may be at least 
modified by information emanating from M0L action elements:  for instance by altering the 
postulated infra-red components of the Hodgkin-Huxley action-potentials (Traill, 1975b, 1976b; 
and Part B, above), or simply by altering thresholds.  This may be what is happening during the 
disruption (“blocking”) of the resting-state alpha-rhythm EEG tracings, when “thinking” activity 
begins.  After all, it would not be difficult to imagine that such “calls” from collective micro-
elements might be in a position to control the release of energy from mitochondria, thus 
functioning like the grid in a triode valve to produce amplified effects; and <213> no doubt there 
may be other feasible methods which could be used for such amplification.  Incidentally, it is 
worth bearing in mind that EEG rhythms, as measured, have been located as coming from apical 
dendrites, (Gray-Walter, speaking at Brunel University, 1976). 
Fourthly and finally; as far as I know, there has not yet been any adequate explanation as to 
what precisely causes the vesicles of Acetyl Choline (or whatever) to rupture and spill their 
chemical message into synaptic clefts.  (One might perhaps be forgiven for supposing that some 
workers in this field are content merely to name this process as “exocytosis”, and accept this as a 
substitute for explanation!  But actually, of course, they are presumably just awaiting some 
“hard” evidence before attempting such an explanation; however such evidence is very slow to 
appear — as is so often the case in this ultra-micro field of investigation).  Anyhow, it seems 
likely that this exocytosis may be set off by specific types of (coherent infra-red?) “calls” from 
linear micro-element sources — or else set off by some other agency with at least some features 
in common with these “action elements”. 
But the M–1L level will also have a traffic in input sensory signals, and not just the output 
actions which we have been discussing.  Hubel and Wiesel (1959, 1961, 1962, 1963a, 1963b, and 
1965) have done much to elucidate the more-or-less automatic stepwise processing performed on 
a visual image during the passage of its effects from the retinae, through the lateral geniculate 
body, to the striate cortex and beyond.  Such accounts naturally tend to focus on those effects 
which are observable in the laboratory situation, so we would do well to be awake to the 
possibility of other ramifications of this process; and we might profitably also give some thought 
to how such a system might develop its structural detail under the joint influence of genetic 
coding, and interaction with the environment — <214> or lack of it (Hubel and Wiesel, 1963a, 
1963b).  Nevertheless, we shall leave aside such details here, and consider more generally what it 
is that this whole string of processes amounts to:- 
There seems to be a somewhat arbitrary distinction drawn between the gross layout of the 
overall picture and the fine textual detail.  The gross layout is “mapped” onto the new regions 
more-or-less intact — maintaining its extensive properties; however the textual detail (including 
dynamic aspects) is “analysed” or “interpreted” into a different type of extensive definition — 
with specific screen-display patterns43 being “identified” and turning up as action-potentials in 
                                                          
43  many elements of which might justly be described as intensive in nature —  so the interpretive process 
seems to be translating in the wrong direction.  However, if we consider that the intensive properties 
(such as physical colour patterns) are external to the individual and probably in an unusable intensive 
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specific neuron cells (and thus being sorted into positional “slots” ) .  If this input process is to be 
the reverse of the postulated output process, then we would expect this processed set of extensive 
codings to be subject to still further processing until it ended up in an internally usable intensive 
form. 
Extending Piaget’s ideas into the more elementary domain 
 — (pre-sensorimotor: M–1L) 
According to the Piagetian view, perception is no mere passive acceptance of whatever 
manifests itself at the sense-organs, but rather a consequence of active internal manipulation of 
such material (based on the original physical manipulation of relevant parts of the environment).  
This concept is of fundamental importance — though even today it has not been widely 
understood.  In fact, we <215> might perhaps sum up Piaget’s main contribution as an 
application of this concept to phenomena which we, as adults, tend to take for granted as “basic” 
— discrete objects, phonemes, the concept of “mother” or even “original sin”!  Re-examination 
from a Piagetian point of view suggests that many of these supposedly basic units are not 
necessarily basic at all, but built up experientially at an early age (or in one’s ancestors) as 
described in the postulated detail of how an object concept develops (Traill, 1975b; and Chapter 
A3, above). 
But this breakthrough was at the M0L level, and we have now turned to a discussion of the 
M–1L level; so does the same principle apply here too?  Perception of edges and bars etc., with 
specific motion and orientations, would appear to be the basic units of M–1L; so do we come to an 
appreciation of their potential value through association with some action which we ourselves 
initiate?  Well, while it is possible that something of this sort might take place here 44 , it 
nevertheless seems that there must be a stop to this <216> subdivision process eventually.  
Sooner or later we must “hit rock bottom” in that our sense-organs will simply be unable to 
discriminate any further remotely meaningful detail among the signals from the world outside; 
indeed it might be argued that the outside world will itself eventually reach a bottom limit of 
structural detail.  Whether such basic units of mental concepts are to be found here in the M–1L 
level (or any lower level) is thus open to question.  However as the outcome of any such 
discussion is unlikely to have any crucial bearing on the issues of this present work, we may leave 
the question open — but meanwhile provisionally assume that M–1L is the lowest level, in which 
case concepts such as specific edge motion-and-orientation will be basic.  In any case, it is 
difficult to see what would be gained by extra flexibility at this stage because configurations like 
this would seem to be adequately ubiquitous and basic. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
form, then it makes better sense to think of such visual impressions as being translated first into a more 
manageable extensive form —  and then, if necessary, re-translated into a different (internal ) intensive 
form.  After all, such procedures are commonplace in computer practice, and in the use of coordinate 
systems .<215>  
44  At some stage, development is likely to be governed by what I have elsewhere referred to as “ortho-
maturational” processes.  These might be regarded as being half way between straight genetic 
development and learning-process development.  Whereas true learning can explore a number of 
unforeseen possibilities in an open ended and reversible way, ortho-maturational development is 
essentially genetic but with the implicit “assumption” in its coding that the environment will provide 
certain recognizable cues at appropriate times.  Imprinting is one apparent example, and the develop-
ment (and maintenance?) of optical pathways into fully functional systems may well be another.  
   In a trivial sense, of course, all genetic development must be ortho-maturational to some extent.  
For instance, it will nearly always “assume” that the environment will never manifest a temperature of 
100ºC in the organism’s own immediate location.  <216> 
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Anyhow, whichever one is the fundamental basic level, its “noun/verb/action”-content will be 
rather different from the other levels.  As far as the Central Nervous System is concerned, signals 
enter and leave carrying codings which have meaning only by virtue of (i) the fibre in which they 
are travelling (extensive definition), (ii) the pattern of action-potential pulses along the fibre, and 
perhaps (iii) interaction effects between different fibres; — at least that is the accepted view, and 
there does not seem to be any pressing need to challenge it as the means for sensory and motor 
peripheral communication (though the present work obviously contains different proposals, 
involving infra-red, for the mechanisms appropriate for higher mental processes — including 
such lowly activities as channelling reflex emergency responses).  Thus it would seem that any 
structure in the coding of the entities of this lowest level will have been imposed from elsewhere, 
so the entities themselves will apparently lack structure of the “linear micro-element” type, 
<217> which means that the noun/verb/action distinction loses significance.  This seems to mean 
that there is no room here for the abstract difference between such a signal and the “thought” of 
it.  It will operate or not operate, as the case may be, but there is no symbolic contemplation of 
that particular signal by the animal or person concerned. 
Other thoughts about mental hierarchies 
It will now be left to the reader to consider whether bacteria, plants, or computers (as usually 
programmed) could be said to operate at this level of “thought”.  I suspect that this exercise might 
not be as frivolous as it appears at first, and that it might shed some light on the historical 
development of thinking, as well as giving some further insight on what constitutes the “lowest 
level” (if indeed this concept is valid) and related questions on “how to emerge from a recursive 
process”.  However, it seems that a full development of these questions here would take us too far 
from our main topic which is more concerned with the “higher” levels of thought. 
We have been discussing the processing of information of a textural/edge-detection/colour 
type — information which can be attributed to a small local area on the retina (or corresponding 
local areas in other sensory or motor systems).  But as we have seen, these “points” will often 
form a gross topological pattern which will be transmitted more-or-less intact right across the 
brain, and despite the considerable amount of processing which has meanwhile been happening to 
the “textural” information.  I would suggest that it is, in fact, beyond the competence of the M–1L 
mechanisms to deal with information of this sort — with its almost astronomical variety of 
potentially meaningful configurations (unlike the limited “textural” repertoire whose information 
it will also use).  a different approach is required in such circumstances, and this is provided by 
the Piagetian paradigm of:  “arbitrary action first, and then see if the <218> outcome seems to 
tend towards meaningfulness” — as already described for M0L, the level which will presumably 
be required here. 
Simpler animals will probably make do without such gross holistic analysis.  Ashby’s 
remarks (1960), that it is fallacious to believe that a brain must be richly interconnected, would 
seem to be particularly applicable here.  Indeed one might say that the only justification for 
interconnection within parts of the brain is the need to handle situations in which the meaningful 
cues are of at least this complexity; and arguably this handling can only be done by using M0L 
mechanisms, or higher.  In this context, it is interesting to speculate on the significance of various 
anatomical sites in the brain, and why new structures of various sorts have appeared at particular 
stages of evolutionary processes.  Plausibly M0L would initially be absent, or present only locally 
at isolated sites without any need for a centralized “brain”; and later it might achieve such 
centralization in the “old brain” in such structures as the optic tectum.  Presumably these old 
structures were incapable of being modified to cater for new higher levels such as M1L and M2L, 
and so they became something of a historical curiosity (with some vestigial powers) when there 
arose, fortuitously, a new structure which did have such capability, and clearly the 
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disproportionate size of the neocortex in mammals makes it look very like the sort of structure we 
would have in mind. 
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As for recursion (discussed above in Chapter C3); it would now seem likely that M–1L and 
M0L will use different mechanisms from each other, and indeed there may well be at least two 
different types of mechanism in use for M0L (corresponding to the supposed alternative sites in 
the archecortex and neocortex).  It is possible however that M1L and higher levels may all use the 
same basic linear microelement pool, and that the distinction between the different levels <219> 
will be maintained autonomously and adaptively using internal devices (such as “tagging”) 
inherent within the system itself.  Moreover the “neocortex type” of M0L might well also be a 
party to the same sort of method, which would seem to give us the option of a complete recursive 
arrangement for all but the basic M–1L level.  (This option need not necessarily be used for all 
purposes, as in cases where the archecortex is still significant).  It should be noted that such an 
elaborate recursive system, with potentially flexible roles for the constituent elements, is more 
vulnerable to malfunction than a less sophisticated inflexible system; and we will return to this 
issue in Chapters C6 to C8. 
Table C5.4/I summarizes some of these hierarchical MnL concepts which we have been 
discussing.  In particular it shows how the postulated fundamental linear action-elements of each 
level (n≥0) are supposed to depend on the Noun and/or Verb structures of the next-lower level to 
provide them with meaningfully stable referents.  In their turn, these Noun or Verb structures are 
presumed to refer, directly or indirectly, to the linear action-elements of their own level.  The 
Table also implies the question of whether any recursive build-up can continue beyond M2L; and 
if so, then how far?  In other words, can we form an abstraction of an abstraction — of an 
abstraction …  (and so on), without losing track of what we are doing, and without delegating our 
task to some essentially mechanical outside aid? 
Of course we must expect that the real brain system will be rather more “untidy” than the 
comparatively neat arrangement here.  Not only are we likely to have such things as old and new 
types of M0L system, but it would seem likely that there will be other duplications of (e.g.) the 
visual gross field into areas “I and II” (Thompson, 1967, p 316  — after Woolsey, 1958) within 
the new <220> processing lobes.  Moreover, there will almost certainly be irregularities and 
exceptions in any such arrangement, so we would be well advised to bear this possibility in mind. 
C5.5  Completing the review of defects in Ashby’s exposition (as listed by him)   <E2 etc now not u/lined!> 
At this stage it should now be possible to give a reasonable explanation of Ashby’s “third 
conundrum” (if we may call it that):  how a natural biological system could establish its own 
“gating mechanism”.  Let us first remind ourselves of the elementary situation shown in Figure 
C4.4/1, in which the organism responded to an unsatisfactory response-pattern by a random 
change into some other arbitrary response-pattern, and (so to speak) hoped for the best!  While 
we may accept this sort of change as occurring in principle, it will now be necessary to take issue 
with it concerning matters of detail in the mechanism:-  Ashby is clearly thinking mainly in terms 
of gross “nuts and bolts” models, as described in his Chapter 8 (1960), whereas our concern here 
has become one of populations of cooperating and competing micro-elements — for which it will 
not quite do simply to say of gross behaviour-patterns that they are “switched” on or off; so 
further elaboration is needed. 
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Applying the above discussion to Ashby’s third problem  
— on explaining gating-mechanisms 
In terms of the linear micro-element theory, we may suppose that the “Responder” in Figure 
C4.4/1 consists mainly of linear elements with a specific hereditary action coding45, though there 
will also be minorities of mutants, thus implying possible alternatives, but whose existence or 
growth will not be encouraged while the organism remains in a “comfortable” state.  Plausibly the 
most <222> prevalent type of coding (sensitive to this E1) will be the one which will actually lead 
to action; and in some sense we may say that it is holding the organism’s “attention” (Without 
necessarily implying that this attention will be conscious).  If attention, in this sense, means that 
its programme of action is the one which forms the response R; and if it also “gets the blame” 
whenever E2 detects that the outcome is unacceptable; then we can see how the response-pattern 
may become “switched”.  Thus “getting the blame” will entail a dissolution of at least some of 
those elements which are “under attention” — either directly, or via unfavourable tagging.  This 
will tend to allow some rival coding to increase its relative numbers and eventually capture 
attention from the original coding. 
[Without actually using the term “attention”, this concept has already been discussed above 
(in the early paragraphs of Section A1.4).  There, the linear elements were described 
metaphorically as being called (by an E1-type stimulus) “to report to a particular control centre”; 
though it was pointed out in the footnote that the “control centre” should be interpreted in terms 
of “communicational proximity” rather than the spatial proximity implied by the terminology.  
However there was no clear indication given as to what form such “communicational proximity” 
might entail; so let us now specify something more definite.  It is conceivable that this could be 
attributed to gene-like switches on the linear-elements (with “on” signifying “attended to”), 
perhaps dependent on sleep-or-mood state as postulated above for the formation of “verb” 
elements; but we may be inclined to think that such a mechanism would be too passive, sluggish, 
and unwieldy as an explanation for “attention”.  Alternatively we might consider excited quantum 
states (rather than chemical changes) as a somewhat more credible switch mechanism for 
constituting the attention-state.  This would seem to be more clearly reversible, <223> especially 
under competition, and more readily established under suitable circumstances.  Various degrees 
of stability might be obtained, depending on potential barriers or on a possible propensity for 
some states to trap any further hyperactivating transmissions which might be available — a form 
of positive feedback]. 
So, looking again at Figure C4.4/1, we would apparently do better to think of the “responder” 
as a sort of consensus ballot-box, activated by a multitude of “micro-responders” — each with its 
own (micro) switching system of one sort or another, and in danger of liquidation if its 
performance in office is not up to scratch, for whatever reason!  This would be more accurately 
represented in Figure C4.4/1 if the “responder” and “switch mechanism” boxes were combined, 
though this would still not quite do justice to the supposed infrastructure.  Anyhow, we may 
presumably identify this combined subsystem with the M0L level which we were discussing 
earlier — and moreover this will mainly entail use of the action entities of M0L. 
Coming back now to Ashby’s “gating mechanism” as depicted in Figures C4.5/1 and C4.5/2, 
we may recall that its purpose was to select a switching-mechanism (Si) appropriate to the 
current situation or “sub-environment” (Pi).  In terms of the present version of the theory, this 
would seem to mean selecting the appropriate subset of micro-elements (from those sensitive to 
the E1 in question) and allowing only this subset to respond overtly to the stimulus pattern E1; 
                                                          
45  Here we are considering only those elements which are susceptible to the particular input stimulus E1.  
There would presumably be many others which would remain passive here, but would be roused by 
other types of E1.<222> 
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though if the general “situation” had been different, then some other subset of micro-elements 
would have been chosen.  Such a process may be likened to the selection of a sport-team 
specifically to suit the prevailing conditions of weather (etc.) on that particular day.  It is 
incumbent on the selectors of such a team to “have in mind” alternative subsets of criteria, and to 
use the right subset for that set of conditions.  <224> 
It may be that the appropriate criterion is very simple and straightforward.  Perhaps the same 
pool of potential players is to provide a basket-ball team on Monday, and a team of rowers for 
Thursday; and conceivably the over-riding criteria for the two cases would be:  height for basket-
ball, and weight for rowing.  Simple criteria like these can readily be expressed by intensive 
specifications:-  “Tall men over here please, whoever you are!”; (and this seems to be very much 
the same thing as applying an “objective test”).  But such decisions will normally be more subtle 
or “subjective”, and depend heavily on experience; and this “experience” can be interpreted as a 
pragmatic evolutionary selection amongst arbitrarily established sets — defined extensively. 
Whatever the physical mechanism is that holds such successful subsets of M0L elements 
together, it will evidently be taking on the role of an M0L “noun” element — acting as a link to 
M1L action-elements, as depicted in Table C5.4/I.  We may recall that the mechanism for 
forming a physical extensive set could be:  
 (i) enclosure by a physical envelope such as a cell membrane,  
 (ii) the somewhat improbable direct tethering to the M1L linear element itself, and/or 
 (iii) symbolic tethering by having “names” of the member elements attached to the M1L element 
— and depending partly on intensive definition to give the “names” a meaning.  See Sections 
C5.2 and C8.1.  
While the enclosure method (i) would doubtless suit admirably for more-or-less permanent 
subsets like those envisaged  for M–1L, any potentially evolving system of subsets would seem to 
need a more flexible-yet-controllable arrangement such as symbolic tethering (iii). 
Anyhow, this provision for control by the M1L structure now leads us to identify this control-
path as the “gating mechanism” postulated by Ashby.  From there, it is a comparatively simple 
matter to use the <225> above expositions to answer his conundrum as to how such gating-
mechanisms might arise.  We may suppose that the potential M1L linear elements arise 
arbitrarily, in largish numbers, by some process of mutation.  These will have inbuilt sensitivities 
to various situations, using input codings of a type which will turn out, in successful cases, to be 
different from those input patterns (E1 in Figure C4.5/2) which are used for activating M0L 
systems.  The new type will be identifiable as E3 in the diagram, but in any live situation it may 
well be a matter of some considerable subtlety to distinguish which input cues are to be 
considered as E1, and which are E3 as we shall see in Section C6.5.  And then the situation is 
further complicated by the need to consider evaluative feedback-input:  E2 for the M0L case, to 
which we may now add E4 for the M1L case — thus introducing another feedback loop into the 
configuration of Figure C4.5/2. 
In addition to their specific sensitivities to incoming signals, these elements will also have 
definite inbuilt codings for “actions” of various types.  But in the successful M1L elements, these 
“actions” will apply internally to the structures of the M0L level, and not to the motor-effectors as 
would be the case for M0L actions. 
So the answer to Ashby’s third conundrum would seem to be:  that the gating mechanism 
consists of a population of M1L linear micro-elements, and these evolve into effective systems in 
an essentially Darwinian trial-and-error way.  Provided that we can sort out the tangle of feedback 
loops satisfactorily, this process can be seen as being a learning procedure within the life of each 
individual concerned — and essentially operating on the same principles as the basic learning 
process used to improve the M0L repertoires of responses.  The crucial difference will be the 
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destination of the action signals, and the nature of subsequent derivatives which will presumably 
arise from the “inactivation” <226> of such codings; but we may also expect other incidental 
differences such as a new pattern of sources for the input signals. 
Before we move on, however, there is a rather important further point which should be 
remarked upon — albeit with unseemly brevity.  If we can have a “gating-mechanism” system to 
bring orderly “purposeful” operation at the M0L level, instead of the random re-settings used in 
Ashby’s simpler “Homeostat” models; then why not have a higher level gating system to bring a 
methodical approach to the original one at M1L?  Why not indeed?  Provided (once again) that 
we can cope with the extra complications of further feedback loops, we may well assign such 
control to an M2L level; and then why not continue recursively to higher and higher levels (until 
lack of coherent structure in the organization of the outside world renders it unrewarding to put 
further structure into our modelling system)?  It is tempting to suggest that, in principle, that is 
very much what happens in the human brain; and that it is this very recursive ability which gives 
to man his superior place on the scale of intelligence.  Like most elaborate mechanisms, however, 
this arrangement lends itself to a new set of possible misfunctions; and this will be our chief 
concern in most of the remainder of this current work. 
At last then, we have disposed of Ashby’s third conundrum.  Let us now move on and look at 
his fourth:- 
Ashby’s fourth problem — maintaining a balance between parts of the system 
(4) Ashby was concerned that he had not explained how the body might maintain a reason-
able proportional balance between those “parts” of the system which were in equilibrium at any 
given time, and those parts which were undergoing a change at that time — thus determining the 
pattern of changes in the next “instant”.  This would seem to be a much simpler question than his 
previous one.  Presumably, like many well-known physiological devices for maintaining one 
variable or another within appropriate bounds, the process may be explained in <227> 
comparatively straightforward servo-mechanism terms. 
Our present theoretical context does rather complicate the issue however.  To start with, 
Ashby was clearly thinking of his system’s “parts” as being whole neurons (1960, Section 13/12); 
and while he might well be right as far as M–1L processes are concerned, we should now keep in 
mind the idea that for many other processes we are likely to be dealing with excitation-states at 
more-or-less discrete sites along linear molecules.  Secondly, the hierarchical structure proposed 
above puts a rather new slant on his concept of local stabilities, as discussed in his Chapter 13; — 
not that this invalidates his argument here, indeed it could well be claimed that the revised 
interpretation adds weight to it, but it does alter the implications somewhat. 
There is a third complication which amounts to a generalization of some points which Ashby 
himself mentions in passing.  Signals cannot be counted on to add up neatly in any given way:  
arithmetical, algebraic (taking inhibition into account), Boolean logic, or whatever; (Ashby, 1960, 
Section 13/12; cf.  McCulloch and Pitts, 1943).  This has become increasingly obvious for real 
extended neurons in which the important signal components are presumed to depend principally 
on action-potentials (including refractory-period phenomena), exocytotic rupture of vesicles of 
transmitter chemicals into synaptic clefts, and other such mathematically “untidy” phenomena.  
The quantitative situation for linear micro-elements has scarcely been discussed yet, but there is 
little reason to suppose that the “addition” of signals would obey absolutely neat mathematical 
rules here either — though almost certainly there will be addition of some sort, if only in the form 
of mutual facilitation as in Figure C5.2/2, above.  The situation could be particularly complicated 
if “optical” interference patterns between signals should play an important <228> role (Pribram, 
1971), possibly involving the coherent infra-red sources postulated for the micro-element theory 
(Traill, 1976b; and Part B, above). 
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Despite all this untidiness concerning detail, there does not seem to be any great problem here 
regarding general principles (unlike the fundamental issues raised in Ashby’s third conundrum, 
above).  At a practical physiological level, we may reasonably assume that such control 
mechanisms either depend on some natural self-limiting process around which evolution has 
“designed” the rest of the system, or else some system parameters are set genetically on a trial-
and-error basis.  (One component may be unmodifiably hereditary, but other aspects might be 
subject to learning in the manner previously described using the concept of mutation-within-the-
nervous-system).  Moreover, at a basic ultra-micro level of resolution, we might reasonably 
expect to find ultimately that the mathematical untidiness would disappear — though we would 
then be left with the same sort of untidiness as soon as we attempted to “put the parts back 
together again”.  This might then be best dealt with on a statistical basis — perhaps even using 
statistical mechanics techniques borrowed from physics. 
There seems to be no pressing need to develop these ideas here in a generalized way; instead 
it will suffice to develop specific cases if-and-when they become important.  However we may 
usefully draw attention to some places in which these concepts have already arisen:-  There was 
the stability of mental schemata arising from their supposed “mathematical-group” closure-
properties (Traill, 1975b; and the last two paragraphs of Section A1.5, above).  There was also the 
phenomenon of positive reinforcement, the mechanism of which could be of the type sketchily 
described in terms of “tagging” (Traill, 1976b, Figure (v)b;  Traill, 1976d, Section B).  However 
<229> any limit needed here will presumably be supplied by some obvious natural limitation; 
whereas Ashby’s problem was to explain why only a sensible number of “parts” were active at 
any instant — neither too many nor too few.  Of course, it may well be that there is a natural 
limitation here also; and conceivably this could take the form of a breakdown in effective 
coordinating communications whenever too many “parts” are trying to function simultaneously 
creating too much “noise” for each other’s coherent infra-red signals, or whatever.  And 
incidentally, a similar type of “jamming” phenomenon might be behind the “displacement” 
behaviour described by ethologists, in which the animal is “torn with indecision” between two 
mutually incompatible instincts — so he “ignores” both alternatives, and does some other (less 
pressing) activity!  (Tinbergen, 1951). 
This half-answer will suffice for our present purposes, so we may now turn to Ashby’s fifth 
and final conundrum (1960, Section 17/11). 
Ashby’s fifth problem — Which MnL level should receive which input? 
— A topic for Chapt.C6 
(5) Under the heading “Distribution of feedback”, Ashby poses the problem of how any given 
disturbing change in the environment will be “steered through” the appropriate Ei – Ri path, 
where Ei is the appropriate “essential variable” and Ri is the corresponding appropriate response.  
In terms of the linear micro-element theory, part of the answer will now be quite straightforward:-   
At any given level in the hierarchy which involves learning, the “paths” will be name-call-
specified, with considerable precision, in advance; but many such specifications will be found to 
be non-adaptive, and will be eliminated in a Darwinian evolutionary process.  However there is 
another part of the answer which remains anything but clear:-  How does such a living system 
choose which hierarchical level to incorporate new information into?  In other words, should a 
given input pattern be associated with E1, E3, or E5, ...  ; or as an evaluative feedback E2, E4, etc.?  
This is a major concern of Chapter C6, to which we will now turn.  <230> 
230
→ 
Fu
ll
 S
el
f-
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
 —
— 
C5
.5
  
Re
vi
ew
 o
f 
As
hb
y-
de
fe
ct
s 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 101  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  101  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
Chapter C6 
THE SYSTEM LOOKED AT AS A WHOLE, 
AND SOME INHERENT WEAKNESSES TO BE EXPECTED 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter concerns itself, in a broader and less-specific way, with those 
“emergent” properties which are likely to arise in a large integrated system, or which 
are actually observable and need to be accounted for.  In particular, likely non-adaptive 
by-products of sophisticated developments are suggested, on theoretical grounds, as a 
prelude to the systematic discussions of neurosis and psychosis in Chapters C7 and C8 
respectively. 
C6.1  When should it be feasible to mount a frontal reductionist attack on the perennial 
problems of psychology? — including such intangibles as Attention, “Mental Energy”, 
Ego, and Morale 
It will be important here to clarify what is meant by “reductionist” and “frontal attack”, in this 
particular context.  The reduction contemplated here entails a chain of causal functional explanat-
ions — stretching from behavioural phenomena down to the supposed functional elements from 
which the system appears to be constructed.  Ideally these elements will be identifiable physio-
logical or biochemical structures; but it will be held to be sufficient here if they can be narrowed 
down to sets of a manageable size, such as “linear molecules like RNA”, or “signals involving 
coherent infra-red emission”.  The main point is that their functional role should be definable with 
sufficient precision for us to be able to make definite predictions about the operation or macro-
characteristics of the system as a whole (Popper, 1934/1959, 1963/1969).  [But note that the 
testing of such predictions need not just be by traditional experimental methods; we should also 
seek validation of the macro-model by means of “internal closure”]. 
Another requirement for a reductionist system — as conceptualized in this work at least  — is 
that the basic elements should be self-<231>organizing rather than having to be ultimately 
created by some transcendental “programmer”; (see Part A, above; and Traill, 1976e, Chapter 
VII).  Hyland’s analysis (1977a, 1977b) is also of interest in this context.  He divides hypothetical 
constructs of psychology into three categories: Mentalistic, Mechanistic, and Physiological — 
and suggests that these cannot legitimately be mixed within any one explanation, though one may 
be used to interpret or explain another.  It looks as though his Mentalistic category deals with 
entities like “ego” which, as they stand, (in Freudian theory), do not have enough precision to 
build up any extended theory in detail — though it seems reasonable to claim that a modest 
amount of closure can emerge from ad hoc psychoanalytic situations, when the conditions are 
sufficiently favourable.  (It should be noted that this is no mean feat, even if we may hope to do 
better some day.  Major advances in our knowledge will usually have to come in stages — and 
dearly bought at that!) 
To the best of my knowledge, all computer-like models of mental functioning have always 
been Mechanistic 46  in Hyland’s sense, and I take this to mean that they are never fully 
conceptualized as being self-organizing.  In fact it is now easy to see that Chapter C5 was an 
attempt to convert Ashby’s “Mechanistic” model into a “Physiological” one in Hyland’s sense 
— which I take to mean “radically reductionist” (to the extent that one continues reducing, in 
                                                          
46 My own use of the term “mechanistic” has been somewhat broader — including the physiological type 
of mechanism as well; (but then I have gone in for a further reduction below the usual concepts of 
physiology).<232> 
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principle, until the elements or substrate seem to have become irreducibly simple — whatever we 
take this to mean). 
When we base a model system on elements which are hazily defined (e.g. Mentalistic) or on 
elements lacking recognizable provision for <232> self-organization (i.e. “Mechanistic” in the 
above sense), then in both cases our model will only be a qualitative approximation to the real 
natural system which it purports to represent.  [We are here assuming that such natural systems 
do have these properties of ultimate discrete structure and self-organization, at least to a 
substantial degree].  Such approximations are very often the only way in which animals 
(including ourselves) can cope with the initial mysteries of the environment — so we should 
accept the necessity and importance of such “primary process” thinking in our patients and 
experimental subjects, and also in ourselves, whenever the occasion is appropriate.  The 
existence of alternatives — Mentalistic or Mechanistic — is also potentially very useful; as it 
offers a means for a pragmatic switching from one to the other, as in Ashby’s homeostat.  
However it will generally be best to at least have the option of using a more precise model, and 
we will take it that this must be one of the “Physiological” sort.  The question then becomes one 
of whether we can translate all the important features of our approximation-models into the new 
reductionist framework, at least in principle.  If we can, then we have the makings of a “frontal 
attack” on the problem in question.  If not, then we may have to persevere with re-formulations of 
the approximation-models and perhaps also conduct research into any proposed new basic 
substrate — until such a cross-interpretation does become possible.  (The Hegelian concepts of 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis might profitably be discussed in the same terms also). 
It is perhaps necessary here to refer again briefly to the supposed inadmissibility of trying to 
validate a theory by testing the internal consistency of its consequences rather than concentrating 
on its “observable” predictions; (Traill, 1976e; also Chapters A2 and C1, above).   It is often said 
that J. B.  Watson (1919, 1928, <233> 1931; Watson and McDougall, 1928) was the father of this 
traditional behaviourist view; and his pronouncements certainly constitute a strong advocacy of 
this position.  Thus (1928, page 7):- 
“Behaviorism’s challenge to introspective psychology was: ‘You say there is such a thing as 
consciousness, that consciousness goes on in you — then prove it [experimentally].  You say that 
you have sensations, perceptions, and images — then demonstrate them as other sciences 
demonstrate their facts’.” 
Or, on page 3 of the same work:- 
“Behaviorism thus leaves out speculations.  You'll find in it no references to the intangibles — 
the unknown and the unknowable ‘psychic entities’.” 
However a careful reading of his discussion suggests that his main complaint against Freudian 
and introspective psychology was that they seemed to him to be using a thinly-disguised form of 
Cartesian dualism, involving a non-scientific spiritual “soul”, (ibid., pp 93-97): a “Mentalistic” 
concept in Hyland’s sense, which might after all turn out to be compatible with a scientific 
“Physiological” formulation, if the ideas of the present work happen to be reasonably correct. 
Anyhow, if this point could be cleared up, the remainder of his case in support of publicly 
observable experiments might arguably be re-interpreted as a support for whatever could be used 
with most precision — so as to minimize the intrusion of ill-structured concepts into the current 
corpus of scientific belief.  In the 1914-1930 period there was a good case for identifying this 
criterion with a support for a sober experimental approach, but it is conceivable that the present-
day preoccupations with obscure statistical interpretations of experiments now show little 
advance in concept-precision in any meaningful sense, while structural theories based on the 
fairly precise elements of physiology, biochemistry, ultra-micro anatomy, and physics, can now 
claim to hold the initiative in the precision-game.  However it would seem to be unprofitable to 
233
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indulge in a controversy<234> over the relative merits of these two approaches.  Both are 
apparently necessary, and each will have its successes or otherwise, according to the current 
overall problem. 
What then can either approach do to solve such perennial imponderables as: consciousness, 
attention, “mental energy”, personal identity, morale, or the poorly structured concepts of 
Freudian theory such as ego and superego?  To Watson (1928) such questions about supposedly-
supernatural abstractions could be nothing but meaningless: “If the behaviorists are right … then 
there can be no such thing as consciousness or its substratum, the unconscious.” There is some 
suggestion that at one time he may have taken a more moderate view, though he himself claimed 
to have tempered his views in the interests of expediency in the early days; anyhow McDougall 
(1923/1931)47 cites him as saying:- 
“What has been called experience or consciousness may occur or exist for all I know or care.  
But I am not interested in it.  I am concerned only to understand human behaviour.  I know all 
behaviour is mechanistically determined by reflex processes; let me get on with the study of 
‘conditioned reflexes’.” 
Ashby (1960) also disclaims any insights or involvement on such issues.  So should we be 
content to leave these concepts as vague impressions or permanent metaphysical intangibles?  Of 
course, perhaps in the end some of them will defeat us — maybe even permanently.  However, 
whenever a new way of looking at the mind/brain should happen to arise, then it would seem 
sensible to ask whether it will<235> shed any light on the old imponderables.  The present theory 
does seem to offer a new perspective of this sort, so we may reasonably feel that any attempt to 
apply it to concepts like morale or consciousness will at least be instructive and thought-
provoking, even if it is not correct in itself.  But any actual success should have immediate 
application in explaining psycho-pathology. 
C6.2  Consolidating the functional principles of the current model — constraints and 
hierarchies 
Broadly speaking, the task of the brain is to obtain and maintain an organized and readily-
accessible model of the more important features of the organism’s environment.  The whole 
purpose of any utilitarian model seems to be that it can be consulted rapidly, repeatedly, and with 
minimal effort or disruption during use; and this rather implies that appropriate parts of the model 
should be robust in the face of “interrogation” — and that the “referencing system” should be 
reasonably efficient, with an emphasis on building up “extensive” methods of set-formation 
rather than exclusive reliance on implicit sets using “intensive” methods alone.  (Similarly, if a 
largish company is to be able to act promptly, its records should be filed and re-filed; and not just 
left in one large box even though each record might be clearly labelled.  Moreover, these records 
should not easily fall to bits in the normal course of the retrieval of their information). 
One might ask the innocent-looking question: “Why confine ourselves only to the modelling 
of the more important features of reality?  — Why not aspire to ever-greater precision, and 
ultimately complete precision?”  The latter extreme case of complete precision can be promptly 
dismissed due to the impossibility of rigourously modelling oneself, or of rigourously excluding 
oneself from any system of practical interest; (Landsberg and Evans, 1970).  Other answers<236> 
of more immediate relevance will however also entail practical problems:-   how to obtain 
detailed information about the environment without destroying it in the process; and how to 
                                                          
47 McDougall alleges that this is from Watson (1919), but I have been unable to trace it there; nor have I 
found it in the third edition.  Moreover I have not found so tolerant a statement in Watson’s other 
principal works on the subject (1928, 1931), nor in the debate between these two writers (Watson and 
McDougall, 1928).  So perhaps it comes from one of Watson’s earlier writings, of about 1912.  <235> 
236 
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actually build and operate any nearly-all-embracing model — given that we must only use 
material media for the purpose.  These outline arguments, or the latter ones at least, look 
suspiciously like re-formulations of the “indeterminacy principle” of physics and its counterpart 
in biology, (Elsasser, 1958, 1961); but here the trade-off is between rigour of the detail portrayed, 
and robustness in the model — e.g. the real system itself is naturally correct in every detail, but 
maximally vulnerable or unyielding to interrogation, and so a poor “model” of itself in our 
present sense, unless it is naturally robust. 
For the environment, robustness may be interpreted as being constraint in the number of 
conceivable configurations or “laws”; and as Ashby (1956) points out, we can usually take 
advantage of any such constraint.  Elsasser too makes much the same point when he describes 
physics as the study of systems with many identical and expendable members, and indicates the 
relative simplicity of elucidating the properties of such systems.  Anyhow, we do not have to look 
very far to find considerable amounts of constraint in the environment — notably among material 
solid objects, but also for plastic, breakable, and liquid configurations; and then also for the 
behaviour of our fellow human-beings, even if their constraints are more loose and capricious 
than those of the “physical” phenomena. 
As long as the perceptual environment shows any tendency towards permanent distinctions or 
boundaries, then we will have the basic essentials for an adaptive responder; but actual environ-
ments are particularly likely to produce some quite sharp distinctions ready for exploitation — 
even if they are only boundaries between solids, liquids, or gases; (at “biological” temperatures, 
at least).  Such<237> toeholds on reality can offer a basis for the evolution of primitive creatures 
with only an initial M–1L reflex capability, possibly restricted to “unsharp” discrimination of 
chemotactic gradients or concentrations.  But note that the very existence of such evolved reflex-
patterns constitutes a simple model of the properties of the environment, a model which would 
have evolved differently if the properties of the environment had been different.  Moreover such a 
model would presumably be the prototype for subsequent modelling of pleasure/pain distinctions 
— a basic M–1L attribute on which all subsequent model-building will eventually be predicated. 
It seems reasonable to assume that, other things being equal, the most efficient type of model 
will be one which most faithfully reflects the same structural constraints as the outside reality 
which it purports to represent.  After all, any departure from this will represent a departure from 
truth; and on the whole this will usually mean a loss in adaptability — though it may work well as 
long as the environment does not actually show its full repertoire of potential phenomena but 
continues to display an (ultimately spurious) appearance of surplus constraint.  Anyhow, insofar 
as the model is likely to reflect outside structure, it will be instructive to look carefully at the 
constraints and regularities inherent in the observable environment (including the environment of 
ideas and culture, where humans are involved).  Hopefully this will shed some light on the type of 
structure likely to develop in our mental models, and hence help to explain important aspects of 
our mental processing. 
Rather than continuing to develop the theme of analysing the manifest properties of physical 
systems (started three paragraphs ago) and unfolding the hierarchical nature of these constraints, 
as already done above in Chapter A3, it would instead be more assimilable to the adult point of 
view to start at the other end of the process and<238> work backwards from the abstractions of 
which adults are consciously aware.  In fact abstract concepts seem to fall naturally into two 
broad categories which we will look at separately.  There is the logical, mathematical, hard-
science tradition; but there is also the rather more nebulous worldly-wise area of business, 
politics, the novel, and subtle interpersonal relationships — involving phenomena which are (as 
yet) too complex or lacking in discernible regularity for us to be able to cope unless we use gross 
approximations in our models, with all the dangers of mutual incompatibility and departures from 
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truth which this entails.  (One might also argue in favour of yet other categories of abstract 
concepts, such as mystical “inner experience”; however these will not be discussed here). 
Western culture seems to endow formal mathematical systems, including logic, with some 
sort of mystical transcendental power — a privileged gateway to at least some of the ultimate 
undoubted truths (episteme) of nature.  While there is some basis to such a claim, it cannot stand 
up in any absolute sense; and this work will treat all these mathematical systems as being, 
epistemologically speaking, no more than particularly successful types of mental model which are 
culturally transmittable with minimal difficulty because of the robustness of the basic schemata.  
This robustness and their general usefulness arises directly from the policy of selecting and 
refining such systems on the basis of how well they display internal closure among their basic 
operations.  (In this sense then, there is nothing mystical about their properties — they have been 
inbuilt in much the same sort of way as survival-techniques are built into evolving living 
organisms).  The practical value of such systems arises whenever they can be matched to physical 
phenomena — thus demonstrating the internal closure of our ideas about the latter, and so tending 
to validate them in this internal sense.  <239> 
However, thanks to the work of Inhelder, Piaget, and their colleagues, it has by now become 
apparent that there is also an important pragmatic (external) basis to these abstract concepts.  In 
practice, natural physical phenomena are constrained to certain types of behaviour, and these 
constraints48 are seized upon for the development of mental models.  We have seen above that 
gross textural/chemotactic/etc. features may become reflected at the crude genetic M–1L level; 
and the concepts involved in solid geometrical objects were explained as evolving from experi-
ence with reality, resulting in the M0L level; (Part A, above; Traill, 1975b).  By now the organ-
ism will be dealing with internal representations presumably, and this process may continue on 
from this less-obvious abstraction into the patently abstract.  Thus during the Concrete Operations 
period, there will develop a mental model of the constraints inherent in the physical manipulation 
of the solid physical objects (such as rules of multiplication and set-closure), giving us our M1L 
level.  In so far as these rules for different individual operations (as represented in internal 
intensive coding) can become generalized (sorted into extensively defined sets), then we will 
have various separate types of algebra, including logic — and hence we will have reached the 
M2L level.  Similarly, any further generalization into an algebra of algebras will presumably give 
us an M3L level. 
Here we have been covering old ground.  But the new point to be made here is to emphasize 
that our ability to build up such a hierarchy of abstractions is largely though not entirely governed 
by the real hierarchies of constraints which happen to be present in our<240> external physical 
environment; and consequently that our adult mental model will presumably tend to reflect the 
same “logical” structure as the environment which it purports to represent.  A corollary of this is 
that if we happened to have been brought up in a world with different-but-structured physical 
laws, then we would stand a good chance of adapting to them also — though this might well 
depend on the sizes of the logical leaps between one set of regularities and the next, more 
generalized, set of regularities.  This thought leads us directly to the problems of the more 
nebulous “worldly-wise” type of learning task:- 
One of the most distinctive features about the arts and humanities is the important position 
they give to egocentric and ethnocentric considerations.   
                                                          
48 These notably include mathematical-group properties.  I suspect that we might well be able to interpret 
these much further by a cybernetic analysis using a deeper reductionist interpretation; but that is a 
matter for discussion in the context of physics, and we will not go into it here.  <240> 
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(By contrast, the hard sciences go out of their way to decentre their concepts.  This has its 
admirable side, leading to such concepts as the heliocentric solar system, and relativity; but this 
does seem to encourage the risky idea that one’s subjects or patients or acquaintances “should” 
constantly be objective and detached on all or most matters.  More importantly in the present 
context, it encourages us to forget or overlook the egocentric origins of our supposedly transcend-
ental ideas on mathematics and the physical world;  and this is sometimes suggested by the scant 
attention given to source-references in such disciplines.  The danger in this forgetting of origins is 
that we will remain unaware of any corners that may have been cut in the past, to answer specific 
questions, but which cannot be legitimately cut for new questions which arise later on.  I would 
suggest then that much49 of our claim to objectivity in the hard sciences is, strictly speaking, 
spurious — though excusable for the<241> “trivial cases” studied in the hard sciences;  but if we 
are to progress significantly into the “soft sciences” in any formalized way, then we must 
inevitably go through the tedious task of uncovering the short-cuts and the untidy aspects of 
epistemology which these short-cuts have served to circumvent). 
In discussing any egocentric activity, some view must be taken of the organism’s self-
concept; for as soon as it gets as far as conceptualizing objects as such, its own body will figure 
prominently among the objects considered.  But even before that, at the Sensori-Motor stage, 
there will be developing sets of distinctions between “what can or cannot be influenced by my 
actions”, and between what is subject to sensation and what is not; and here it is not necessary to 
conceptualize actual objects in any coherent sense.  From this self-concept or ego, we may expect 
the differentiation of “those objects which are close to me, but are not fully me, and are rather less 
controllable” — giving the imago concepts of parents and other closely associated persons, who 
may ultimately come to embody societal values thus providing a basis for superego concepts. 
[Many of the issues raised here were later discussed in greater depth (Traill, 2000, Part I), 
now available online as   www.ondwelle.com/BK1_V28.PDF  or in print as “Physics and Philos-
ophy of the Mind”, Ondwelle Publications: Melbourne.   — RRT, 2006] 
C6.3  On modelling Attention, Ego, Consciousness, and Superego 
Let us deal with these various concepts in turn, in chronological order this time.  We may 
start by considering the nature of attention.  Following Freud, this can be thought of as a room 
into which only a limited number of mental-preoccupations can fit at any one time (Section A1.4, 
above); but as a physiological model this is not really very credible, and we might do better to 
postulate a competitive energizing process such as has been demonstrated in the mutual inhibition 
in the retina (Teitelbaum, 1967; after Barlow, Fitzhugh, and Kuffler, 1957).  This would involve a 
negative cross-feed of some sort — conceivably a primitive competition for scarce resources, 
though it is also possible that inhibition signal-targets could be<242> specific, and perhaps even 
learned.  (The ethological concept of displacement activity as a substitute for both of two 
mutually incompatible potential activities, seems to suggest specific inhibitions — though this 
could be attributed, somewhat improbably, to local scarcity of resources).  Anyhow we shall 
tentatively assume that the phenomenon is largely one of emission of specific inhibiting signals 
which may be more, or less, generally effective — depending on the distribution of “labels” 
sensitive to such signals.  (The potential usefulness of this postulated mechanism for explaining 
the Freudian concept of “repression” will perhaps be apparent at this stage). 
Next we must look more closely at the likely methods for building up the self-concept.  To 
this end, it seems helpful to consider the nature of motivation in general — leading up to the issue 
of what it is that provides the motivation for an individual to go to the trouble of forming a self-
                                                          
49 In fact physicists seem to have partially escaped from this trap by recognizing the inevitable disturbing 
role of the active observer, and the principle of indeterminacy.  <241> 
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concept.  The usual laboratory type of positive or negative reinforcement tends to be of the simple 
physiologically-obvious type: shock or food-reward, “stick or carrot”; and the effect of these 
unconditioned stimuli is initially to produce genetically-determined responses which are likely to 
protect or maintain the individual or his kin.  The setting up of such genetic stereotypes, by 
orthodox natural selection, may be regarded as a sort of trivial “motivation” of trial-and-error 
survival; and we may also identify it with the M–1L level, not requiring any sort of brain, and just 
as much a characteristic of a plant as of an animal.  By contrast, the simple “stick or carrot” 
learning will occur within the one continuing individual — though the present theory maintains 
that there will be a captive natural-selection process going on within some form of nervous 
system, and probably using fundamentally similar genetic-type mutation processes.  Anyhow, we 
shall identify this type<243> of activity as being “Sensori-Motor” and as taking place at the M0L 
level. 
By now we have got past the mere issue of survival (a sort of “pleasure or pain” for the 
species), so we have reached the normal “literal” meaning of pain and “erotic” pleasure (in the 
Freudian sense of bodily sensation).  It seems reasonable to suppose that it is those scheme-
elements which are being attended to (and hence in communication with some signal pathway) 
that become associated with any feelings of pleasure or pain at about that time.  This association, 
by “tagging” or by some other means of discrimination, would provide a ready explanation for 
approach or avoidance tendencies and hence for “motivation” in the formal sense.  However, this 
in itself does not explain actual feelings (as opposed perhaps, to the outward “emotional” 
behaviour of a neonate or sensori-motor animal).  It seems difficult to imagine feelings without 
consciousness; and for the want of any better guidance, it will be assumed here that consciousness 
must await some sort of self-concept, the very phenomenon which we are currently leading up to 
— as a somewhat later development. 
Now we may recall from Chapter C5 that such elements were supposed to become “listed” in 
extensive sets of apparently related part-images of the outside world (perhaps because they gave 
similar parallax “responses” to a move of the head, or because of some other intensive property 
which they all happened to have in common).  Furthermore, it was supposed that there was a 
propensity for the individual to selectively save those versions or ensembles of such lists which 
had “mathematical-group” properties or a tendency towards them — indicating a degree of 
internal closure in addition to the pragmatic pleasure/pain external closure encountered earlier.  
In this way, it was suggested, the individual re-constructs by himself a potentially realistic mental 
model for each important distinguishable object in his environment.<244>  At this stage, (if we 
may use one of Piaget’s examples), he probably cannot tell slug A from slug B, or understand the 
concept of slugs in general, (Baldwin, 1967, p 238);  but this will apparently not invalidate our 
next two points, and the deficiency will, in any case, be made good in the following Concrete 
Operations period — see Table C5.4/1, and also Gambling and Traill (1977). 
The first thing to notice in this is the postulated preference for internal closure.  Another way 
of interpreting such a phenomenon would be to say that:-  the formation of internal-closure gives 
“pleasure” to the individual and its disruption gives “pain”.  Clearly this is a new type of 
pleasure/pain, which might not be felt so consciously (by those having consciousness), but it 
might nevertheless be just as real.  Presumably its origin would also be hereditary, though 
possibly in a trivial orthomaturational way, since we might reasonably expect any structurable 
dynamic medium to generate some stable configurations with group properties, under some 
conditions at least, (e.g.  Goel et al., 1970; Goel and Leith, 1970; Leith and Goel, 1971).  Indeed, 
as we saw at the end of the previous section, this is the ultimate justification for such a propens-
ity:-  there is an excellent chance that the outside environment will ultimately have similar prop-
erties, in one form or another.  If inside and outside both tend to share the same basic property, 
then the self-organized modelling process appears feasible;  otherwise it is difficult to see how 
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life could exist with any substantial degree of complexity — or even, perhaps, how it could exist 
at all! 
The second point, also introduced in the previous section, is that we can now start to explain 
the self-concept as a special augmented type of object-concept.  From a sensory point of view, 
our vantage point of our own bodies is certainly unique, not only regarding vision and the various 
tactile senses, but also in<245> audition and olfaction.  Perhaps even more important though, it is 
open for us to discover that hands, feet, and mouths are much more likely to move more-or-less in 
accordance with our wishes — while the behaviour, if any, of other objects in our environment 
will generally be much more capricious.  True, the mother-figure in our environment might be 
over-responsive to our whim, possibly leading to a rather over-broad concept of where our self-
boundary should be placed; but even then there will be a readily discernible difference in time-
lag, reliability, and scope for misinterpretation — though of course the neurotic’s perceptual 
process may “choose” to overlook such differences. 
So, without needing to labour the point, it seems reasonable to suppose that initially one’s 
self-concept is just another object-concept, derived in the usual way; but that its unique associat-
ions and properties ensure that it very rapidly comes to dominate the mental-object scene — 
especially in view of its inescapable omnipresence.  (We may notice, in passing, that this is 
another example of ortho-maturation:-  a development implicit or “expected” by the genetic code, 
but not actually coded into it).  Thus then we appear to have the makings of a personal identity or 
ego, and we may provisionally take these terms as synonymous with self-concept, though we 
might wish later to endow the former terms with properties arising from further development. 
At what stage then does the ego arise?  Judging by the postulated evolution of other object 
concepts, we might say that during the sensori-motor (or oral) stage, it becomes built up as a non-
integrated ensemble of ego-parts: “my hand”, “my mouth”, and so on.  In the normal course of 
events we would expect such parts to become integrated as sets and groups, early in the following 
Concrete Operations50 period —<246> a development which may readily be associated with the 
wilful acts of autonomy over environmental influences attributed to the anal stage in 
development (according to the Freudian formulation).  In view of the presumed pre-eminence of 
this ego schema and its antecedents, we might expect this particular set-and-group formation to 
be the first substantial sign of the emergence of group-formation in general.  So while we might 
describe such a development as a Concrete Operations (or M1L) activity, we need not be 
surprised if it actually occurs in what is still a predominantly Sensori-Motor period.  Such 
overlaps for different aspects of development are, after all, part of the Piagetian description. 
So now we may turn to the thorny issue of consciousness.  We can at least start by postulating 
two pre-conditions for consciousness:-  attention, and self-concept.  If we stop attending to 
something, then it slips from consciousness;  and partial attention implies partial consciousness of 
the thing concerned.  If we are unconscious, then we are not attending to anything.  If we are 
dreaming, then we may be “unconscious” in behaviourist terms, but we are actually attending to 
internal schemata, and we ourselves are conscious in this sense. 
But it might well be argued that a normal computer can and does “attend” very closely to its 
“senses” and to its motor activities; and it might even be said to switch its attention from one task 
to another when it is operating in a time-sharing mode (as is usual for large computers these 
days).  Yet one would scarcely claim that such attention, on its own, would constitute conscious-
ness;  and the particular shortcoming which we will deal with here, is its lack of any flexible self-
concept of the type we have been considering. 
                                                          
50 in the wider sense which includes the “Pre-operations” sub-period.  <246> 
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These two conditions may well be necessary for consciousness to occur, but are they likely to 
be sufficient?  After all, the concept of consciousness is closely bound up with age-old concepts 
of sentience<247> and soul 51 ; and at first sight the proposed physiological/mechanistic 
organizations for attention and self-concept are not immediately obvious as the likely bearers of 
sentience, nor of soul.  It may indeed be the case that other pre-requisites will become obvious at 
a later date; but meanwhile it will at least set the stage if we look for potential makings of 
sentience and/or soul within such a mechanistic-physiological organization as the present one. 
If we look more closely at sentience, it does seem to have a lot to do with pleasure/pain at a 
symbolic level — which, in the present context, may be interpreted as pleasure/pain relating to 
states of internal closure at the M1L level.  (In later development, the M2L level might also 
become involved; but if consciousness can occur here before it arises, then clearly the M2L 
phenomena cannot be essential ingredients).  Perhaps all such symbolic pleasure/pain will involve 
the state of closure of the self-concept in some way; anyhow we may at least expect this to be true 
of the more powerful instances — in which sentience is most in evidence.  Take, for instance, 
those “very human” traits of sentimental attachment to an object of some sort.  It seems reason-
able to assume that the internal schema associated with such an object is bound up in some way 
within the group-like structure which constitutes the person’s ego.  Consequently any loss of such 
an object (if it then results in a change in the internal schema) will be likely to upset the stability 
of the person’s self-concept or ego;  and, on the other hand, any refusal to accept the objective 
change by clinging to the old schema, will result in a mental drift away from reality.  Of course 
Freud makes very much the same point in his “Mourning and Melancholia”, and his term<248> 
“cathexis” may be interpreted here as meaning “included within the group-like structure of the 
ego”. 
Thus there is a prima facie case for agreeing to the proposition that the necessary and suffici-
ent conditions for sentience (and presumably soul and consciousness as well) are simply those 
suggested above:-  Attention and Self-concept52.  Provisionally then, we may accept this as a 
working hypothesis until some contrary argument or evidence leads us to re-consider the situat-
ion.  We should bear in mind however, that any explanation of consciousness will probably 
appear at its least credible when one tries to apply it to one’s own consciousness:-  
“Cogito ergo sum” — “I think [= ‘I am conscious’?], therefore I am”.  “Perhaps your conscious-
ness is explicable mechanistically, but surely mine is somehow special and transcendental — and 
probably eternal also!  After all, I am quite unique and special in a remarkable way.  Surely my 
life at least has a supernatural basis?”  
(On the other hand though, these very thoughts help to suggest the important egocentric role of 
the self-concept as a hopefully stable point of reference in group structures at the M1L level). 
The remaining task for this section is to be rather more specific about the concept of 
superego, than in its previous mentions in Section C6.2 and in Traill (1975c).  In the latter paper, 
superego was seen as “one-or-more schema (imago) embodying the perceived properties of 
another ‘person’.” To which the comment was added that this structure might provisionally be 
thought of as occurring at the M2L level rather than the M1L level of the ego; (though the 
terminology used was a little different).  On second thoughts though, it seems more likely that 
superego constructs will be on the same level as the ego (i.e.  M1L) — and not in the M2L realm 
of Formal Operations and<249> Secondary Process Thinking.  (Of course it might later be 
appropriate to consider whether there might not be another level in between these two, especially 
                                                          
51 Lest there should be any doubt, I am not supporting any type of dualism here.  Any “soul” will be 
supposed to have an ultimate physical embodiment — like that envisaged for any other mental 
phenomenon.  <248> 
52 provided it is based on pleasure/pain motivation toward internal closure, as described above.  <249> 
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if this would resolve some subsequent paradox.  But for the moment, we will assume that this is 
not the case).  The essence of the “debate” is this:-  On the one hand we have several reasons for 
expecting the superego to make its appearance after the self-concept type of ego which we have 
been considering — which suggests the possibility of its being characteristic of a later stage, but 
by no means establishes this convincingly.  Then there is the apparent ability of the superego to 
control the ego, and this seems to imply a higher echelon within the MnL hierarchical 
organization; though against this, it will shortly be argued that this sort of control does not always 
operate in a downward direction within the MnL hierarchy — and that the control must some-
times be upward or sideways!53 
On the other hand though, if one’s self-concept is essentially an object-concept, and if the 
superego is also based on object-concepts (“perceived properties of another ‘person’ ”), then it is 
difficult to see either of them as belonging initially to any level higher than M1L (which entails 
power over objects);  and indeed we might expect the basic “objectness” of self and parent-figure 
to lie in the M0L level — in both cases.  Moreover it seems unlikely that either structure has any 
strong affiliation with M2L constructs, because in neither case are they directly and reliably 
amenable to the rational logic of the M2L level of Formal Operations.  Then again, if the super-
ego differentiates from the ego in a gradual way without any discrete qualitative jumps, then it 
seems likely that it will still be found within the same functional medium as the ego.  Anyhow 
this is the view which will be taken here, and maintained until a better contrary argument crops 
up. 
But how is it that these parental imagos are supposed to modify<250> the ego’s activity?  — 
What are the likely mechanisms?  Well, at least it makes reasonable sense if we use the object-
building conceptualization, and consider that the individual will usually be faced with apparent 
rival claims on his internal-closure tendencies.  Of these, self-concept is undoubtedly the most 
important; but it is rivalled by other closely related configurations:-  self-plus-other-people-
closely-involved-with-me, mother, father, mother-father, animate things, and other such 
permutations.  Different sets of haphazard experience or context will favour some such world-
views for the moment, and discourage others — until the external situation changes yet again.  
But on the whole this will tend to yield a reasonably balanced view of reality for that individual, 
in the long run.  Of course the important lesson to be learned here is that society (in one 
personified form or another) is a vital part of reality, of comparable importance to the self; and 
that flouting of society’s norms is likely to be painful to either one’s sense-receptors, or to one’s 
ego-support through M0L or M1L retribution — “painfully” attacking one’s internal closure at 
these levels. 
In the longer term then, these superego/social group-like structures will presumably tend to 
shape their ego counterparts, and vice versa — each providing some internal constraints on the 
stability of the closure-patterns of the other.  We may nevertheless accept the Freudian idea that 
the two start off as the same structure set, and that it is only in the light of further experience with 
the world that alternative closure-structured hypotheses evolve in favour of a differentiation of 
this sort.  Such differentiation will presumably run counter to the preference for maximum 
closure — apparently expressed by the Eastern ideal of “Nirvana”, a universal oneness which 
incorporates the self in a strifeless eternity — but such a world-view does not accord very well 
with the realities of an Earthly<251> mortal world, so countervailing support for differentiation 
will build up as the infant becomes increasingly confronted with the evidence that “Mummy is 
not just part of me“!  Paradoxically, some of this evidence may be seen in retrospect to be 
                                                          
53 See also the later discussion and diagram of “Democratic pseudo-hierarchies” in Traill (1999, §8.3(5), 
p64) — now available online as   www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF  and in print as “Mind and 
Micro-Mechanism”, Ondwelle Publications: Melbourne.   — RRT, 2006]. 
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logically spurious (just as many scientific ideas or inventions had their initiative in concepts 
which were not in themselves correct); thus it has been suggested that the main incentive for the 
differentiation of “other” from “self” is the difficulty in accepting “bad” and “painful” into the 
concept of self — so some other scapegoat entity must be found, and this criterion of goodness-
or-badness is therefore the original pseudo-definition for self-versus-other; (Fenichel, 1946). 
[In passing, we may note that this trend toward self/other distinction can, in a sense, be 
induced to take a useful step back into reverse by the unfolding of genetic developments.  The 
significant emergence of any new erogenous zone or mode will inevitably throw a new M–1L (id) 
factor into the situation; and in particular, the advent of genital sexual arousal will predispose the 
individual toward a selective re-extension of ego as an amalgam with the concept of the loved 
one, into a more generalized group-like structure.  Indeed such a psychological accompaniment to 
procreation would seem to be essential in humans if the resulting children are to encounter the 
ego-forming environment which the genetic code takes for granted — as an orthomaturational 
extra]. 
There are other useful ways of conceptualizing such schisms in mental structures.  One 
notable approach is the theory of “Cognitive Dissonance” promoted by Leon Festinger and others 
(see the anthology edited by Fishbein, 1967); and criticized, on purist-experimentalist lines, by 
Chapanis and Chapanis (1964).  The essential point here is that three propositions (A, B, and C) 
are each considered in relation to the other two.  To put it briefly (and in the terminology of 
our<252> present discussion), there must be mutual consistency, i.e. internal closure right round 
the triangular path — or else there will be a strong motivation to change one or other of the 
propositions; or to escape the “dissonance” in some other way. 
The theory predicts, quite reasonably, that a “neg-
ative attitude” such as we might expect C to be in 
Figure C6.3/1, will induce a similar negative attitude 
in either A (differentiating self from mother, in this 
case) or in B (dissociating pain from both, and pre-
sumably projecting it onto some other conceptual 
object).  Both these solutions imply a schism of one 
would-be group structure into two separate structures.  
Such differentiations are necessary if we are to devel-
op an adaptive model of reality — and they depend on 
there being a detectable amount of differentiation in 
our perceivable environment; otherwise our picture of 
reality would remain as one undifferentiated mass — 
a trivial situation in which the chosen solution is to 
make C into a “positive attitude”, thus embracing pain!  
(This solution is probably not feasible in this case, 
unless the genetic M–1L nature of pain changes, or the 
“pain” is itself due to some other lack of closure, or 
else a higher MnL level intervenes and so constitutes a 
case of masochism (Fenichel, 1946, pp 73-74)). 
One trouble with this simple model is that real situations will usually involve more than three 
elements, so that the web of affiliations<253> between them will be much more complex, and 
indeed the simple triangle-based rules used above will not serve us any more until they have been 
extended.  Such extension is best conceptualized by some sort of matrix-table of connections, and 
one such formulation is given by Abelson and Rosenberg (1958;— in Fishbein, 1967), a 
formulation which appears to work for the data which these authors provide — though we may 
doubt its general applicability in the form given by them:-  a specific algorithm which amounts to 
A 
C B 
MeMummy
Pain 
Fig C6.3/1. 
Example of 
Cognitive Dissonance; 
see text. 
<253> 
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a cluster-analysis technique and which gives non-believable results in some apparently applicable 
hypothetical examples.  Of course, in a sense, the whole purpose of such biological attempts at 
meaningful differentiation is to perform cluster-analysis; but this is scarcely a matter for 
algorithms in the normal computer-oriented sense, and it should moreover be viewed as a 
potentially continuing process — open to feedback and new evidence, as well as being probably 
performed by some self-organizing process which will also be sensitive to feedback.  By contrast, 
the “Repertory Grid” measurement techniques devised by George Kelly (1955) would appear to 
do better justice to gauging what the important elements are (in the mind of the individual 
concerned), and how they should be clustered.  To a considerable extent, these analyses can 
detect blockages in the formation of adaptive differentiations, and these may lead to solutions;  
but their proper use depends on feeding the relevant tentative findings back to the individual 
himself, (presumably at the M2L level!) 
The more biologically sensitive aspects of such modelling would seem to be quite compatible 
with the micro-element theory and its concepts of internal closure which we have been dis-
cussing.  The major difference of emphasis is obviously in the fineness-of-resolution and the 
concomitant difference in measurability.  In practice we will also expect the clinical/behavioural 
conceptualizations to recognize<254> a degree of “fuzziness” in the subject’s mental constructs 
especially in his attitudes and associations, though also in his mental models of objects.  (On the 
other hand, in the realm of the perhaps-unobservable, we can envisage a fairly precise discrete 
structure for elements at the molecular level, with the fuzziness arising as statistical consequences 
of populations of these discrete phenomena).  Rather more significantly however, I am less 
certain that any actually-existing MnL structure will necessarily come to be reflected in any 
cluster-analysis technique as currently administered, though I fancy that the Repertory Grid 
technique is flexible enough to do so if it is administered by someone who is sensitive to the 
possible importance of non-standard entities intruding into the “normal” domain of experimental 
study, from M–1L or M2L levels.  Indeed perhaps the method has already picked up such 
phenomena.  Moreover, some types of hierarchical or lattice structure may not necessarily lend 
themselves readily to expression and analysis via orthodox cluster-analysis matrices.  If this is the 
case, then the main need is to become aware of the previously unsuspected structural complic-
ations of the subject’s thought-affiliations. 
But let us return to our specific case of concept-differentiation:-  the nature of the superego, 
and its distinction from the ego.  We have already identified the ego as being the individual’s self-
concept, or at least those aspects of it which are pertinent to consciousness or to the control of 
one’s activities.  Similarly superego is usually regarded as being a parent-figure personification of 
some aspect of society’s demands on the individual — as seen by him; and subsidiary “parasite 
superegos” of hypnosis or war-neurosis serve much the same role, though in a more ephemeral 
way (Fenichel, 1946, p 125).  But by what mechanical-or-physiological means could such struct-
ures exercise their influence over the ego — bearing in mind that in some<255> cases this control 
seems to become dictatorial in its strength? 
In natural conditions, surviving primate infants will always have considerable contact with 
one or more parent figures who will, to a greater or lesser degree, generate schemata with 
sufficient resemblance to their own characteristics for them to be able to “graft” these conceptual-
izations onto their own fragmentary self-image scheme-like structures — hopefully resulting 
eventually in a reasonably coherent whole which may now be identified as the self-image or ego.  
Even at the basic object-level (M0L) this is probably indispensable for any orthomaturational 
development of a self-concept; and the mechanism might fairly be explained as generating 
potentially-useful (though unstable) scheme-like structures as images of the examples presented 
— structures which are thus available for incorporation into the “jigsaw” process of building up a 
credible group-like stable structure to represent the self.  It may reasonably be supposed that 
255
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without a good supply of such part-formed pieces as “hints” available for introjection, the task of 
satisfactorily building up the “jigsaw” pattern of self would be virtually impossible.  (Such a 
mirror-like function of Mother-Child interaction shows clearly in work such as that done in 
Edinburgh: Trevarthen (1974, 1975), and Maratos (1973, 1974)). 
One consequence of this procedure is that the infant presumably “builds his house out of local 
materials”;  that is, his self-structure will contain components whose composition is influenced by 
any local peculiarities in the environment which he has happened to have experienced.  If we 
confine our attention to the more object-centred experiences of the M0L level, such variations are 
not likely to be very extensive — after all, geometrical and physical properties do not vary vastly 
from one place to another, even if there are some significant differences for such things as facial 
configurations. <256> However as soon as we advance into the complexities of social 
environments, there will clearly be very great local differences.  Consequently the crucial M1L 
aspect of the self-concepts might well be very considerably affected by the nature of the scheme-
like fragments which become incorporated into the structure of the ego at this stage.  This then is 
almost certainly a vital feature in personality formation (presumably in combination with genetic 
raw-materials and “tools”); and it is undoubtedly significant that this coincides with Freud’s 
“Anal Stage” with the infant’s exercise of his powers of choosing to give — or choosing to 
withhold. 
But how does this explain the superego’s apparent tendency to control the ego?  Surely there 
must be more to it than a mere sharing of common scheme-like fragments?  Well, it would seem 
likely that these fragments will often maintain viable connections with more than one schema-
structure, and this will presumably mean that we must face the problem of trying to attain closure 
simultaneously in two separate-but-communicating sets.  (Essentially this is the same problem as 
the case of Cognitive Dissonance problems in which there are more than the simple triangle of 
three entities; and in fact no full solution may be possible).  If simultaneous closure of the two 
sets is possible despite their need to “cooperate”, then well and good; but otherwise we must 
expect to see one set achieving closure at the expense of the other — or perhaps there will be 
deadlock, or oscillation between the two possibilities (suggestive of a manic-depressive condition 
perhaps?), or some other type of compartmentalization. 
This discussion has been referring to the more macro ensembles such as schemata, and these 
are to be seen as being composed of coordinated populations of elements which we have taken to 
be linear molecules (such as RNA).  At this stage it seems helpful to consider more closely just 
what might be happening at the molecular level —<257> this being basic to any physiological-
mechaniatic understanding of the underlying processes.  Let us start by considering the stabilizing 
 (a).  Simple loop (b).  Figure-of-eight  (b).  Polyhedron 
Figure C6.3/2.       Group-like corroboration around the topological loops  inherent within the 
supposed intensive-reference patterns between members of a developing physical set.   
Looking from left to right, the configurations show increasing degrees of mutual support, 
presumably adding to the stability of the topology. 
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influences on a simple “set” configuration (see Sections C2.3 and C2.4, above).  Initially our 
extensive set is presumed to have been formed on the basis of some arbitrary intensive criterion.  
As such, it will only be “on probation” — with some sort of precarious metastability until such 
time as it might gain extra stability from elsewhere; otherwise it will simply be dissolved as a 
“Darwinian failure”.  One way of achieving this extra stability was seen as being the acquisition 
of group-like properties:  simple closure around a “loop” in its own membership-references — or 
better still, by additional mutual corroboration with the loops of other sets; see Figure C6.3/2. 
It is not clear precisely how this would be likely to work out.  Indeed it would not be 
altogether surprising if the actual details were “messy and pluralistic” from the viewpoint of an 
observer who was looking for the sort of order he would find in a crystal lattice.  It should, of 
course, be recalled that we are considering communicational networks, and that these are not 
necessarily the same as geometrical-physical considerations, despite anything that Figure C6.3/2 
might suggest to the contrary.  But must the different loops arise from<258> different sets (which 
then form an amalgam), or could they arise ab initio within the same original set?  And are the 
entities, represented by dots in Figure C6.3/2, definite and distinguishable — or are they simply 
interchangeable exemplars, indistinguishable and diffusely distributed?  There seems to be no 
compelling reason why these various possibilities could not all have some element of truth — in a 
“messy and pluralistic” way, and indeed the actual mix might well depend on the complexity of 
the structure to be depicted — simple structures evolving successfully by trial-and-error within 
the solitary set (and perhaps its exact replicas), while more complex structures would presumably 
require a more piecemeal approach (with or without the aid of higher MnL levels).   
(There are some interesting parallels here in the structure of various chemical substances in 
bulk — though it would be dangerous to read too much into such analogies.  Ionic solutions, 
benzene derivatives with their conjugated double-bonds, and liquid crystals are cases in point). 
Anyhow, the points which are important for our discussion arise here when we consider what 
is likely to follow if this sort of arrangement applies to the M1L structures including ego and 
superego.  For one thing, one’s parent-figure basis for the superego will certainly be too well 
established and corroborated for it just to dissolve away if it does not happen to fit at all into a 
coherent whole with the self-concept.  It is even less conceivable that one’s self-concept could 
dissolve away under such circumstances — especially if we see it as the “gateway” to conscious-
ness.  Accordingly, if there is a serious incompatibility between the two, then one of the follow-
ing courses would seem to be inevitable:-  ▪ One might suppress the other (and this probably 
means “repress” in Freudian terms), either obstructing its external communication, or by using 
some sort of superior magnification of its own influence — probably by outnumbering the other 
in terms<259> of elemental units, or by incorporating into its schema some elements which are 
inherently more attention-promoting.  There is some difficulty in seeing how this could work 
effectively en masse over a diffuse extended region, but it might well have some local import-
ance. 
▪ Another possible course is for one or both of the structures to accomodate its overall 
structure to the peculiarities of the other.  Such structural changes are probably occurring 
arbitrarily in the elements all the time anyhow — as chance mutations.  In these circumstances, 
there will be an encouragement for some mutations to proliferate so as to improve the overall 
closure (even at the expense of a more restricted type of closure), and this will ipso facto tend to 
reconcile the “demands” of ego and superego. 
[▪ A third possibility might be “to do nothing” and to keep the self-concept apart from 
superego/social concepts.  In so far as this is possible, it would probably amount to a dominance 
of the ego, denying the existence or relevance of social imagery.  As such, it would appear to be a 
special case of the first possibility listed here;  but it is perhaps worth noting that this seems very 
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close to Laing’s (1960) suggestion concerning the development of at least some types of 
schizophrenia.  Briefly the scenario runs something like this:  “I deny the impossible and stupid 
demands which society makes on my ego, so I will re-draw my concept of reality, narrowing it down to 
schemata which are closer to my inner real self.  But now I find that my ego is becoming atrophied through 
lack of external closure.  I shall blame the outside world again, and draw my concept of reality yet closer so 
as to protect the purity of my real self. …”  — and so on, perhaps into catatonia]. 
Such concepts as closure and differentiation can probably only have a precise meaning when 
applied to small localized ensembles of discrete elements such as molecules; and even then we 
would probably<260> have to postulate that they exist in an artificially strict isolation.  For such 
macro-oriented concepts as ego and superego, this limitation to structural definability will be 
even more applicable;  and whether we like it or not, we will presumably just have to put up with 
it.  Clearly such terms do make sense at the macro-level, and it seems likely from the above 
discussion that their discrete underpinnings at the micro-level can be plausibly postulated, if 
nothing else.  Such limitations are by no means new.  Any discipline concerned with large 
populations of discrete elements runs into the same problem:  Physics and chemistry of fluid 
systems, and (arguably) the concept of socioeconomic classes, are cases in point.  Of course we 
can find ways of handling such population concepts — appropriate to specific problems at least, 
even if we cannot arrive at an ideal generalized approach.  (As examples of such ad hoc 
modelling we might cite Ashby’s concentration on specially chosen configurations (1960), or the 
use of statistical mechanics for populations of particles or gas molecules in physics).  There is no 
obvious reason why similar techniques should not be useful, in at least some contexts, for brain-
systems if they can be adequately specified statistically and/or paradigmatically in this way; but 
in order to achieve sensible results in this approach, it will be more than usually necessary to be 
clear about what we are doing, and why we are doing it.  (In such matters, other things being 
equal, it is probably more profitable to be specific — at the risk of being wrong — and then be on 
the look-out for evidence that might shed light on any errors implicit in the theoretical 
assumptions). 
Anyhow, what can we now say about the ego and superego structures, and the nature of any 
dictatorial tendencies of one over the other?  For one thing, we can start by casting doubt on the 
propriety of the “dictatorial”-power concept:-  Joan of Arc may well have hallucinated<261> 
voices which commanded her to crown the Dauphin, but it is also possible that these 
hallucinations and their content arose as secondary consequences of her pre-existing world-view 
on social matters — probably involving parental imagos within her superego, but not necessarily 
originating as a capricious command from such a source.  In the context of the present theory, it 
is more informative to think of superego “commands” as particular socially-oriented sets which 
are somewhat lacking in closure and yet, for historical reasons, they are also important 
constituents in the closure-pattern of the ego.  Or, to put it another way, the attempts at closure 
(for a specific aspect of self-concept) runs into a conflict between (i) the more obvious aspects of 
self and their self-consistency, and (ii) self as a social being within the context of what one sees 
as facts and also the closure-requirements within one’s immediate society. 
Emphasis on (i), the non-social self, would seem to be characteristic of the man who will 
expend great efforts to make exhaustive coherent sense of his own self or his ideas, (Leonardo da 
Vinci, perhaps?); while emphasis on (ii), the social being, looks rather more like Dixon’s (1976) 
authoritarian military commanders whose self-image largely rests on the continued favourable 
opinion of “father figures”, and who will tend to put themselves and their armies in suicidal 
situations in an unconscious attempt to maintain this favourable opinion.  However I see no 
inevitable reason why we should expect people to be consistent on such matters.  Such emphasis, 
one way or another, could well be situation-specific or (more precisely) specific to the particular 
aspect of the self-image which is involved.  In practice though, if one is brought up in an 
environment in which one aspect of one’s self-concept is learned as being predominantly a matter 
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of social-approval, then there will probably be a similar learning-situation for other aspects of self 
as well.  But this is<262> not inevitable, and we might well be aware of the possibility for 
exceptions such as might arise from a home/school dichotomy — or situation-specific attitudes 
exhibited by the parents.   (Inconsistent behaviour by parents within a specific situation 
constitutes a rather different phenomenon, and will be discussed in Chapter C8 as being a 
probable schizogenic factor). 
Another influence likely to enhance the consistency of a person’s view across different 
aspects of self-concept will presumably arise at the M2L level.  Here the person is likely to 
realize, intellectually, that he is acting inconsistently;  whereupon he may or may not feel strongly 
enough about it to try to remedy the situation.  He might seek out situations which promote one 
attitude or the other, (this could be done unconsciously and perhaps entail Freudian repressions); 
or he might consciously seek enlightenment or other help.  There is however no guarantee that 
such endeavours will succeed. 
We may summarize the situation of the superego by suggesting ▪ that it consists of those 
aspects of ego-closure which depend for their stability on schemata relating to the parent-figures 
(as archetypal representatives of society);  ▪ that “demands” are primarily felt-needs for closure; 
and  ▪ that it is probably misleading to think of the superego as some separate self-contained 
structure which competes or cooperates with the ego, or with the id, in a rather mysterious and 
autonomous way. 
C6.4  More about the likely hierarchical organization of concepts: 
parallel systems, inversions of control, and consciousness again 
In Chapter C3 we considered the likelihood that the various levels on the postulated MnL 
hierarchical scale might be using the same basic substrate.  The tentative opinion resulting from 
this was that the levels M1L, M2L, and any higher than these, would all share the same substrate 
— quite likely within the neocortex; while<263> the M0L level would occupy a separate 
substrate, presumably in the older parts of the brain, though possibly elsewhere as well (see 
Section C5.4).  The M–1L level was not mentioned in Chapter C3, but it is fairly obvious that it 
would involve yet another separate substrate.  It is, after all, defined in terms of peripheral 
nervous activity (early in Section C5.4).  Whether or not such levels share the same substrate is 
likely to have a significant bearing on the properties of the physical-set elements (or “lists”) in the 
levels concerned.  List-structure, as depicted in Figure C5.2/3, entails actual-or-potential “calls” 
to other elements which are generally assumed to belong to a population which is lower in the 
MnL hierarchy.  But perhaps there is no compelling reason why this should always be the case — 
especially if the higher levels have no fundamental distinction between them to hamper such 
flexibility. 
Bertrand Russell and his mathematically-minded contemporaries were much concerned to 
clarify the paradoxes which arose from an “inadmissible” use of sets, such as “the set of all sets 
including this set itself”.  But the biological world is no respecter of man-made restrictions, so 
there is no reason in principle why mental lists of the sort we have been looking at should not 
include themselves if any useful purpose could be served by doing so.  Rather more to the point, 
they should be able to include references to other lists within their own MnL level, perhaps 
reciprocally, and even to include references to lists higher on the MnL scale! 54  Same-level 
linkages might possibly be invoked as a means of effectively extending the practical length of 
lists; but here we will concentrate on some interesting implications arising from the latter 
suggestion that “membership“-references might extend upwards to higher MnL levels. 
                                                          
54 See original-page 250 above, and its new footnote53.     — [RRT, 2006] 
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Given the hierarchical MnL structure, there is something of a dilemma as to where ego and 
consciousness could be fitted into it. <264> In Traill (1975b), the ego was placed at the M1L 
level (there referred to as “L2”); while it was suggested that “Consciousness may be explicable in 
terms of a highest order schema” ...  selected from those levels currently available to that 
individual.  Subsequent accounts have left the ego at M1L, but some further thoughts have 
emerged concerning the placing of consciousness.  In Traill (1976d, Section E1), the new 
suggestion emerges that consciousness may be: “some sort of communications-device-or-centre, 
separate from the pyramid-structure itself, and having a more-or-less stable and unchanging 
status throughout the development process.” 
Section C3.2 of the present work, ends up by provisionally accepting what amounts to the 
latter concept: “as a sort of M∞L level — a sort of local approximation to an ‘all-seeing’ 
transcendental being.” And yet in Section C6.3, ego (with attention) was seen as a precondition 
for consciousness — strongly suggesting that consciousness should be closely associated with 
M1L, the presumed level for the ego.  How could these two implications be compatible?  
In topological terms, the solution turns out to be simple once one drops the assumption of strict 
hierarchical ordering:-  One could have a loop structure for the communicational connections; 
and that is precisely the sort of innovation which would be made possible if sets could reference 
higher-order elements. 
We may suppose that the “consciousness structure” (whatever it is in physical terms) is 
indeed closely associated with the ego (self-concept) and likewise at the M1L level with it; and 
yet it will still be able to “call” or refer to schemata at the M2L level, or possibly any levels 
beyond that, by means of this “inverted referencing”.  In this sense it could still effectively fulfil 
the role of a M∞L, no matter how many levels of abstraction were added to the MnL hierarchy; 
and yet it could still retain some connections with its<265> presumed original place at M1L.  Just 
what balance should be kept between these two types of affiliation is another matter, and it will 
be worthwhile for us to look briefly at what this is likely to entail:- 
It is well known that introducing a communicational or control-path loop into a system is 
likely to cause problems of instability — or overstability.  One form of run-down system 
discussed by Ashby (1956) arises when the state-determined path of its transitions happens to 
bring it back to a state which is identical to one it has already passed through;  so from then on, it 
will repeat itself ad infinitum unless outside agents intervene such as to give an adequate change-
of-course to this dynamic process.  Such a tendency to get stuck in a rut, pending a sufficient 
shake-up, constitutes a type of stability.  If it occurs in a living organism, it will presumably 
manifest itself as some sort of paralysis — possibly damaging the organism’s chances of survival, 
though there may be circumstances when it might aid survival instead; this will depend on 
ecological balances.  Negative feedback, as understood by electricians and economists, will have 
a similar stabilizing effect (for good or ill); while positive feedback will magnify effects (for good 
or ill) — possibly leading to system breakdown, depending on the details and parameters of the 
system. 
If consciousness does reside at the M1L level, then it is difficult to see how we could control 
our abstract or concrete thoughts without control links (from M1L) to M2L and M1L respectively.  
Perhaps we could still acquire the relevant concepts fortuitously, as seems to be the case for 
sensori-motor development of M0L, but apparently we could neither direct our learning activities, 
nor consciously use the concepts once we had acquired them!  Thus the anomalous “upwards” 
and “sideways” referencing would seem to have an important role in the mental life of primates.  
But apparently there is a price to be<266> paid for this privilege, and this could turn out to be the 
risk of having one’s ego “de-stabilized” by interference from our own consciousnesses — either 
directly, or via the abstract thought of M2L; (and it might be argued that herein lies one danger in 
attempting to psychoanalyse oneself).  We shall not pursue the matter further in this chapter, but it 
265
266
267M
ac
ro
 v
ie
w 
of
 m
ol
ec
ul
e-
br
ai
n 
sy
st
em
 —
— 
C6
.4
  
Mo
re
 o
n 
Co
nc
ep
t-
Hi
er
ar
ch
ie
s 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 118  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  118  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
is worth bearing in mind when considering the detailed nature of neuroses and psychoses, and the 
likely useful roles played by the Freudian defense-mechanisms. 
Before leaving this section, it will be appropriate to elaborate slightly on the points made at 
the close of Section C5.4, concerning parallel processing.  It was suggested there, that there 
might well be at least two different M0L levels for mammals:  one primitive and archetypal, 
while the other would be “purpose built” for the neocortex and (presumably) the basis for higher 
levels of the MnL organization.  Each would probably develop more-or-less independently, with 
little or no direct communication between them — in accordance with Ashby’s comments (also 
cited in Section C5.4) on the undesirability of excessive interconnection.  Similarly there was 
mention of the better documented paralleling of visual and auditory receptive areas of the brain.  
Then again, it has long been realized that ablation experiments point to a considerable ability of 
the brain to use alternative (parallel) pathways or mechanisms.  And of course, at the much 
smaller molecular level, it has been a crucial part of the current theory that there will be quite 
large parallel redundancies amongst synchronizable micro-elements. 
For any system like this, we should beware of asking naive questions of the type: “Does the 
brain process its information by method X, or by method Y?” — inducing us to set up an 
experiment aimed at a decisive X-or-Y answer.  In fact though, it is quite likely that the system as 
a whole will be quite able to operate either way<267> if both methods are reasonably feasible; 
and even if we can isolate small parts of the system, we might find that the configuration will 
fluctuate with time (as in chemical resonance).  This makes for considerable experimental 
complication, though perhaps there might be ways for detecting the current state without unduly 
disrupting it by the very process of measurement itself.  (For instance, the various frequencies and 
patterns found in Electro-Encephalogram (EEG) traces might turn out to be useful indicators of 
which specific subsystems or modes were currently being used by the brain). 
The natural advantages of such a pluralistic system should be obvious.  The greater the 
redundancy and (suitably organized) variety, the better prepared the system will be to face the 
surprises and buffetings of a capricious environment.  Of course if the system finds itself in what 
seems to be a stable and reliable ecological niche, then there will be a case for specializing — 
dropping some of the cumbersome provisions for “the invasion which never comes” — and 
perhaps producing great efficiency within the context of the niche, outrivalling its slower all-
purpose competitors; and yet the “day of wrath” may still come when the security of the 
comfortable niche will disappear.  But then nature as a whole is also pluralistic.  The specialized 
dinosaurs may go, but there are many other pluralistic cards in nature’s hand, and the overall 
system of life will tend to continue in many other forms. 
And yet there may be still more to be gained from organizing such variety to the best 
advantage.  It will be recalled that each Mi+1L level has been depicted as serving to form useful 
sets amongst the members of the MiL level below it, and this is indeed interpretable as a trial-
and-error attempt to organize the existing variety to the best advantage, while still remaining 
pluralistic itself.  Ashby is surely correct in pointing to the dangers of intercommunication 
within<268> the brain (at least at the same MnL level), and the hazards of loops in general has 
just been looked at;  but insofar as the coordination can be managed “from above” without 
disturbing the states of the elements, then we can lay some claim to having the best of both 
worlds.  Thus perhaps we can say that one interpretation of the importance of higher levels of 
intelligence is that it gives us the potential for specialization without necessarily abandoning our 
flexibility.  It would be comforting if we could be confident that Homo Sapiens, as a race, is 
capable of realizing this potential through all eventualities! 
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C6.5  Distinguishing inputs and acquiring a conceptual hierarchy; 
success, failure, and the shadow of psychosis 
At this stage we should return to the Ashby-type model developed in Chapter C4, and look 
critically at the practical details implicit in Figure C4.5/2.  In particular, we should note that there 
are at least three different types of input (E1, E2, E3) — each manifestly serving a different 
function which should not really be confused with the others — and yet we have so far said 
nothing definite about how such distinctions are to be made.  To quote from Section C5.5 
(paragraph 8), where the matter was mentioned in passing:- 
“...  in any live situation it may well be a matter of some considerable subtlety to distinguish 
which input cues are to be considered as E1, and which are E3 ...  And then the situation is further 
complicated by the need to consider evaluative feedback-input: E2 for the M0L case, to which 
we may now add E4 for the M1L case — thus introducing another feedback loop into the 
configuration of Figure C4.5/2.” 
[In this context, Ashby’s “Ei” nomenclature is beginning to become less helpful because it 
obscures the supposed relationship with specific MnL levels, and the distinction between 
“straight” information (E1, E3, E5, ...) as against the evaluative feedbacks (E2, E4, E6, ...).  
Although this issue will not arise again in the present work, after<269> this present section, it 
might nevertheless help to clarify the situation if we consider an alternative notation which would 
correspond to the MnL notation (in which each MiL level was subdivided into a lower sub-level 
of elements “mil”, and an upper sub-level involving sets and groups “mi+½l”).  Thus we might 
now use a notation something like IPi to represent the In-Puts to the respective levels MiL; and 
differentiating this further into IPri and IPei — as variants to specify raw data or evaluation, 
respectively.  Thus IP0 would consist of IPr0 (=E1),  and IPe0 (=E2) — with these relating 
respectively to m0l and m½l (which collectively constitute the sensori-motor level, M0L).  And 
similarly for the other double-levels.] 
As adults, we are inclined to take such distinctions between the different types of input for 
granted — until we hear stories of typists mistaking the typing-instructions for the text itself, or 
until our computer mixes up the different levels of its data when we fail to spell out every 
distinction according to the rules;  or indeed until a psychotic patient appears incapable of reliably 
making distinctions of this sort.  Moreover, children seem to be much amused by (comprehended) 
jokes which play at violating such distinctions — arguably because they thereby demonstrate to 
themselves, and to others, that they have mastered some vital part of this aspect of everyday 
reality; (internal closure again).  Thus:- 
First child: “Say something!”;  Second child:  “Something!”. 
But then it seems plausible that many adult joking-practices may serve a similar function in 
relation to levels within the social context.  Here the purpose of “ribbing” a non-group-member 
may be seen as demonstrating that he does not have the necessary “in”-knowledge to distinguish 
fact from a dead-pan delivery of fiction;  or at least the teller does establish his own position even 
if the “victim” can wend his way between the<270> more concrete facts and the more abstract 
joke-component.  In fact, such mutual negotiation of the distinctions is actually likely to be more 
satisfactory all round, and contribute to social cohesion (Fenichel, 1946) — unless there are other 
reasons for wishing to exclude the outsider, in which case there will presumably be dissonance at 
the turn of events, and some measure of resentment within the joke-teller. 
But let us return to more clear-cut cases, and try to establish a measure of detail as to how we 
ever achieve the ability to make such distinctions within the mass of information which is 
presented to us.  This should then shed some light on why the psychotic, and the computer, have 
difficulties in these matters. 
270
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First we may deal with the evaluative feedbacks: Ei (where i is even), or equivalently IPek 
(where k is an integer).  As far as the hereditary or “hardware” M–1L level is concerned, there will 
presumably be no such feedback for the individual, though clearly there will be for the species via 
natural selection between individuals.  So, for our present purpose, we may disregard any 
question of “E0 or IPe–1”  as potential modifiers of the M–1L level.  Looking next at the sensori-
motor stage and the M0L level, it is clearly closely related to physical pleasure/pain, of the 
traditional straightforward “reinforcement” type; and such feedback was seen as tending to 
stabilize existing constructs by “tags” of approval for those “under attention” when the reward 
occurred.  Similarly, any negative reinforcement would tend to de-stabilize by means of negative 
tags, and presumably directed by attention in the same sort of way.  (The “decision” as to what 
will be classified as pleasurable or painful has already been taken in the evolution of the species, 
and is incorporated in the M–1L-level structure). 
And yet there was more to the sensori-motor period than just the physical aspects of the 
pleasure principle, though this is perhaps<271> not apparent at first.  If the individual concerned 
is making any significant headway towards the construction of object concepts (in the sense of 
modelling the objects’ group-like properties, and not simply acquiring rules-of-thumb for 
handling them), then it is difficult to see how this could possibly be done without using internal-
closure criteria.  (Of course it might be argued successfully that some animals, while starting into 
the sensori-motor period, never get to the stage of developing internal closure.  Such possibilities 
should be borne in mind, and if they turn out to be valid then we might reasonably consider such 
modifications as re-defining the developmental periods in a more optimal way).  Anyhow, the 
supposed internal reward derived from such internal closure does constitute a type of feedback, 
even if it is not strictly an “input” in the usual body-boundary sense; so it will not necessarily 
cause the same problems of disentanglement as those inherent in the various Einteger inputs of 
Figure C4.5/2.  Nevertheless it might be useful to formally label it as IPi0, with the understanding 
that it does originate internally — hence the subscript i for “internal”, (not to be confused with “i” 
as a disposable integer in the earlier discussion). 
So far there do not seem to have been any awkward decisions to be made about how to use 
the input.  Hereditary structures and inbuilt random-generating features have presumably directed 
attention to this or that sensory phenomenon, so that a certain distribution of sensory (and motor) 
hereditary scheme-elements have been subject to a potential learning-process; but this has 
presumably affected the M0L level alone, since the higher levels have not yet materialized, and 
we assume the M–1L level to be uninfluenced by learning.  Once the M0L level has developed 
stable schemata for objects or other group-like structures, these will provide the elements for the 
M1L development to begin — and here there will presumably be a new need for evaluative 
feedback<272> as a means for choosing among this new crop of elements.  How then is the 
evaluative input correctly allocated between the two levels? 
Considered in absolute terms, there probably is no such clear-cut allocation, and the same 
evaluative signals will initially descend equally on the attended-to elements of both M0L and 
M1L, so that each is likely to share “praise or blame” along with the other — however unjust this 
may seem to be, and however retrogressive its effect.  Moreover it seems likely that the M2L 
level will receive the same indiscriminate treatment when it appears on the scene later on.  
(Indeed the same arbitrary distribution will occur to some extent within each level, because there 
is no guarantee that the phenomena attended to are actually related to the reward-or-punishment.  
However such situations are fairly rapidly corrected using versions of the “homeostat” principle 
discussed in Chapter C4 above, with behavioural consequences familiar to users of the Skinner-
box experimental technique).  NB:Thorndike (1911) had been early in noticing an apparent asym-
metry between positive and negative reinforcement: the “pain” case giving less predictable results 
— arguably because it is not always easy to predict the level (or the schemata within a level) 
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which will switch-over in an “attempt” to avoid the noxious stimulus;  and there are similar 
ambiguous implications for punishment in education!  Experimental design, for the standard 
laboratory paradigm of the controlled experiment, appears to solve this problem: the Subject’s 
attention is deliberately constrained into the desired channels, by such devices as saliency or 
training, so it is more-or-less known which level will be influenced most significantly.  Of course 
this is fine as far as it goes, though it does rather seem to trivialize the Subject as an otherwise 
interesting system-to-be-investigated.  It is this inherent limitation which has been so usefully 
transcended by some of the “less respectable” work, such as ethology.  <273> 
But looking again at evaluative feedback, it would seem that we actually do eventually 
manage to deal with many of our pleasure/pain sensations by responding at the correct MnL level.  
True we may panic or act impulsively in response to stimuli which would be more appropriately 
handled by a “thoughtful” approach (using the higher MnL levels);  or we may make the opposite 
mistake when it would have been better to act on impulse — “Wise men and grocers: they weigh 
everything!” (“Zorba the Greek”).  However that may be, our various levels (if we accept their 
existence) do seem to develop along correct lines, in some of us at least; and this must 
presumably be due to the steering influence of evaluative feedback — directed, on average, to the 
appropriate levels.  So let us consider what particular influences might tend to perform such 
steering correctly. 
Probably the most important factor here will be selective attention of various sorts.  To start 
with, it rather looks as though the significance of Freudian erogenous zones is precisely that their 
sequential pattern of ascendancy does direct the individual’s attention to specialized types of 
phenomena which are likely to be the most important ones for that particular stage of develop-
ment.  After all, the Sensori-Motor (M0L) stage does involve oral/manual/visual/auditory experi-
ences as a basis for object-concepts; whereas the crucial task for the M1L development of the 
following period is the acquisition of an adequate self-concept, and here the “anal” activities of 
autonomous giving-or-withholding deserve close attention — along with the mysteries of “When 
does a part of me cease to be part of me?” Clearly it is likely that such vital-at-the-time matters 
will be promptly attended to if the individual is granted the bonus of erotic pleasure by so doing. 
[Development in this way would constitute another example of orthomaturation.  The “pre-
programmed” unfolding of erogenous zones, <274>in a strict sequential schedule, pre-supposes 
that the appropriate environmentally-determined experiences will be available at these times.  If 
these experiences do not occur, or if they bid for attention at the wrong time when erotic-attention 
is directed elsewhere, then it is probable that the “wrong” lessons will be learned.  Moreover it 
seems likely that the secret of a successful society or culture lies it its particular knack of institut-
ionalizing such “wrong” lessons such that they turn out individuals who are actually “right” for 
that society, as a stable ongoing system — even if the lessons were sub-optimal from the point of 
view of the individual, considered as a potential member of some other culture.  (Margaret Mead, 
1928/1954, 1935/1950).] 
Another means for usefully directing attention would probably be provided by the tendency 
for the mind to remain concentrated on the same area of thought, for some time at least.  The 
usefulness of this “mental set” depends on a tendency for phenomena in the environment to retain 
a similar logical connection for more-or-less extended periods of time (in addition to the tendency 
for them to have structural features in common with our postulated MnL hierarchy); thus if one 
has just been actively involved with concepts of food, then one will tend to retain this outlook for 
any new phenomena — and, on the average, such a bias will turn out to be well-founded.  But 
such selection is presumably occurring within a particular MnL level;  so would the same apply 
between the levels?  In fact it seems that we do maintain such level-specific attention:-  If I am 
concentrating on abstract matters, I will tend to continue to do so for a while; (though 
interestingly enough, I may also be able to maintain some degree of separate attention to some 
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other task at another MnL level — such as driving a car!  Yet it seems that there will be times at 
which I must concentrate my “full” attention on one or the<275> other; quite likely because the 
particular problem has come to require the active involvement of other MnL levels — as when I 
must think logically about the route I must take, or when the gearstick jams). 
Once the ego has appeared, we must expect that it also will play a major part in directing 
attention;  and in accordance with the arguments of Section C6.4, we may suppose that this could 
occur for any MnL level — though it is by no means obvious that we actually do or can attend to 
M0L or M–1L levels, perhaps due to lack of loop-pathways which might provide needed negative 
feedback.  Often such attention-biases will be “unconscious” but clearly they may alternatively be 
directed consciously.  For the want of any better suggestion, we might reasonably suppose that 
the mechanism which does the actual directing of attention is itself the subject of attention at that 
moment.  [How it is possible for the ego-ensemble to monitor and control what is apparently 
another part of itself, is a matter which we will not discuss in detail here:-  Perhaps it operates on 
two levels (M1L and M0L), and it might thus operate as a miniature replica of the Ashby type of 
system which we discussed in Chapters C4 and C5].  Anyhow, as well as promoting attention, we 
may take it that there will also be “suppression” (conscious) and “repression” (unconscious) — as 
we shall see. 
Ego-control is presumably one form of learned selection of attention, but there are likely to 
be other learned focussing methods which do not depend on the ego-schema to organize them.  
All that is needed, in principle, is pre-existing attention to a relevant set/list which contains a call 
or reference to the “focal” item, and perhaps some suitable stimulus to activate the set-schema — 
though the fact that it is already under attention would arguably suffice.  Thus, instead of using 
the ego-complex with its relatively ubiquitous “M∞L” control-connections, we would seem to be 
using a<276> comparable-but-restricted schema from the MnL level which is one step higher 
than the focal item.  One might also argue a similar case for “associations” within the same level, 
though it seems likely that such mechanisms would often turn out to require the participation of 
the tethered-sets to provide the extensive definition of linkages; (of course these would not be 
required if a satisfactory method for establishing direct, intensively-defined linkages could be 
adequately explained;  or if there were a plausible case for hereditary or mutant connections on 
common chromosome-like micro-elements). 
We have been considering possible mechanisms whereby evaluative feedback might be 
channelled in the direction of the most appropriate MnL level — the one most likely to be praise-
or-blame worthy.  All the suggestions so far have involved attention, either directed onto the 
coding concerned, or persevering inertially in the absence of any stimulus to change further.  But 
there is a further possibility which might also be classed as attention (though such categorisation 
is not crucial here), and this is the case of a structure which is more-than-usually susceptible to 
the effects of evaluative input stimuli — due to its own endogenous structural instability 
properties when these are also related causally to the evaluative feedback obtained. 
To be more specific, consider the case of a set of elements in which there is some measure of 
internal closure, but which fail to form properly into an adequately self-consistent “group-like” 
structure.  Thus, like many scientific theories, it will be stable enough to withstand the 
(postulated) normal processes of enzymic “garbage disposal”, and yet it will not really have made 
the grade as a fully complete and stable structure according to the prevailing criteria.  Its “loose 
ends” may therefore be thought of as being “extra reactive”  — somewhat analogous to a sodium 
atom “looking for”<277> a halogen atom so that their collective orbital pattern will be reasonably 
stable and complete.  Such persistent dissonance seems likely to attract attention, and also thereby 
to become involved in the initiation of behaviour and its consequent evaluative feedback; though 
the outcome from this is likely to fall short of the ideal:-  If the feedback is negative, then the 
imperfect schema itself is likely to be repressed (tagged as “unsavoury” and therefore not to be 
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admitted into attention if possible, or actively interfered with to prevent its future expression, but 
not usually annihilated because its residual stability is too great for that).  If, on the contrary, the 
feedback is favourable, then those other schemata involved in bringing the shortcomings of the 
dubious structure into attention will be likely to suffer some degree of repression instead.  In 
neither case will the problem really be solved; instead it will just have been swept under the 
carpet — though in real life it often turns out that this is the sort of thing which we must just 
make do with, at least in the short term.  After all, what practical man will bother unduly about 
finding a perfect generalization, as long as he can cope satisfactorily in the real world by using ad 
hoc hypotheses in conjunction with a manageable set of identifiable limitations and exceptions?  
Such conceptualizations even enjoy a degree of scientific respectability — at least temporarily; 
Cartesian dualism is a case in point, and so is the wave-particle dualism of physics. 
However we are beginning to encroach on the complementary topic of non-evaluative feed-
back, the structures evolved to make use of it, and how it is that there will actually be distinguish-
able MnL levels — whether the evaluative feedbacks can be correctly attributed to them or not.  
Let us therefore turn now to consider the E1, E3, E5, ...  (or  IPr0, IPr1, IPr2, ...) input paths, and 
how they might be<278> differentiated. 
Let us start by reminding ourselves concerning the type of construct which we expect to be 
developed in each of the respective levels; (see Table C5.4/I).  Sensori-motor development entails 
the building up of object concepts using hereditary sense and action stereotypes as basic elem-
ents.  Next (for M1L) we have Concrete Operations development involving interactions among 
objects, including other people, and one’s own self — describable perhaps as the piecemeal laws 
of physical nature and the “laws” of particular social interactions.  (Note the apparent beginn-
ings of a dichotomy here, a point which we will come back to from time to time).  Next there will 
be Formal Operations dealing with “abstractions”, which seems to mean an internal involvement 
with sets of piecemeal laws.  And so on perhaps, to yet higher levels. 
There is nothing particularly profound in suggesting that such a hierarchical structure has 
evolved because, and only because, the real outside world can best be modelled in this way — 
and that the real world does, by-and-large, actually have that sort of structure.  However it would 
perhaps be more significant to suggest that much of this mental structure is re-created anew in 
each individual — as a result of his interaction with the environment which has this structure.  
Clearly there will be some important hereditary guidelines such as pre-determined M–1L elements 
(encapsulating many generations’ experience in using elementary bases for object-modelling), 
and the pre-programmed sequence of emergence for the erogenous zones, discussed above.   
Moreover it seems likely that for the more primitive animals, and the more primitive parts of our 
own brains, the nature of M0L structures will also be hereditarily determined.  But there is also 
clearly much scope in primates for the development of individual differences, despite a similar-
or-identical genetic legacy. <279> In fact, the higher levels of the MnL hierarchy probably 
depend for their structure almost entirely on experience gained through interaction with reality, 
and only minimally on hereditary encodings.  This independence from genetic influence will be 
particularly true if the various higher levels all share the same substrate, and have to arrange their 
own differentiation between levels.  Nor will it make much difference to this independence if we 
suppose that different parts of the brain evolve their own separate hierarchical structures more-or-
less independently — with each developing along similar lines, under similar influences. 
It is interesting to consider the above-mentioned dichotomy (physical-object-logic versus 
social) in this light.  Solid objects and the related “hard sciences” have a more discernible and 
regular manifest structure than we can find in the “social sciences”, so it is no accident that exam-
ples to illustrate the postulated hierarchical structure have generally been “hard-science” oriented.  
Accordingly, it should surprise no-one if any MnL representation of social phenomena were 
much more diffuse and lacking in the upper levels of abstraction.  Indeed it would probably 
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constitute a prime example of the use of sets-of-exceptions and special cases alluded to four para-
graphs ago; and it would doubtless entail extensive compartmentalization and “logical inconsist-
encies” both within itself, and vis a vis the supposedly monolithic “hard science” structure (or 
structures!).  Emotional guidance and tagging would presumably come into its own here, and so 
too would the emergence of the later erogenous zones:  anal and phallic/genital. 
This is not to say that social phenomena are inherently devoid of precise hierarchical struct-
ure.  Indeed one of the main purposes of the present work is to demonstrate that it makes sense to 
envisage the existence of such structure, even though it may be beyond our<280> powers to 
demonstrate it clearly.  (If this basic structure is accepted as a premise, then this would mean that 
we could notionally replace a mentalistic view of social matters by a “physiological”/ mechanistic 
one; see Section C6.1, above).  But even given that basic hard structure does exist for social 
phenomena, this structure is certainly not manifest nor easily construed.  And rather more 
important:-   Even if we did have very comprehensive structural models, this would not, it itself, 
guarantee that we could reap practical advantages from this knowledge; and probably we would 
then have to re-organize it into some new simplified model which hopefully would give us a 
better insight into how to control the environment to our best advantage.  Indeed we would quite 
likely generate a series of such approximate models, to be produced under varying circumstances 
as if they were “exceptions” derived in an ad hoc way!  Possibly this principle will be illustrated 
usefully in the following pages when attempts are made to explain neurotic or psychotic 
aberrations.  Anyhow, this takes us conveniently into a consideration of the failure of the normal 
hierarchical organization:- 
It is instructive to turn to the early pages of Chapman and Chapman’s book (1973) and 
consider their overview of the symptoms of schizophrenia in the light of the above discussions.  
Let us look at some relevant fragments:-  (page 4) “[the patient’s] intonation and gestures seemed 
to indicate that he felt he was giving a meaningful reply” — which raises the question:  “What are 
the principles by which this discourse is organized?”.  Then, his answer may be described as a 
“fragmentary description of several vaguely similar scenes, and he skips quickly from one to the 
other.”  In the context of our present theory, this looks rather like a case of a breakdown in the 
ability to use extensive definition (which would perhaps entail attending to a particular M2L set, 
and using it to direct one’s<281> selection of lower level elements, thus “keeping to the point”).  
Such a failure might plausibly leave the patient to fall back on less-organized intensive definitions 
or other comparatively nebulous forms of “association”. 
Then, on page 5, it seems that the patient is “trying to talk about several themes” and that he 
“can handle only one idea at a time” — also potentially attributable to the failure of some 
expected set-organization to marshal its relevant components simultaneously, for whatever 
reason.  As another example, it seems that “the question is too abstract for him” — suggesting a 
similar interpretation, and perhaps also specifically implicating the M2L level due to the apparent 
deficit in Formal Operations.  Similarly, where there are some of the features of a regression 
towards infancy, this may reasonably be attributed to a breakdown or partial malfunction of the 
higher MnL levels, which would be absent in infancy anyhow;  (the “inability to assume the point 
of view of his listener” would seem to be closely related to this issue because, as Piaget has dem-
onstrated, such egocentric conceptualization and perception are characteristically present during 
the Concrete Operations period — at least in the wider sense of the term).  However (page 7): 
“few, if any, schizophrenics consistently behave in a ‘schizophrenic manner’ ”, so it would be 
rash to assume a total breakdown of any MnL level.  Finally, “intrusion of his feelings ...” might 
be put down to a weakness of M2L “resolve”. 
Unfortunately there are other aspects of clinical schizophrenia which are less amenable to 
such explanations.  These involve an apparent wilful negativism, which is difficult to explain in 
terms of MnL deficiency because the patients give the impression of being all too competent in 
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set-handling with the deliberate intention of being difficult!  Thus (page 8, quoting from 
Kraepelin):  <282> “they deliberately turn away their attention …” and yet “in the end … a kind 
of irresistible attraction of the attention to casual external impressions” may draw them round — 
which suggests that MnL deficiency may also exist alongside the negativism, and probably with 
some sort of causal interrelationship.  Further instances (page 9) are cited from Bleuler, involving 
“evasion or paralogia” — such as the apparently deliberate adding of one to all numerical 
answers.  Laing’s (1960) account of the nature of schizophrenia as being a rejection of the 
apparently-hostile outside world, also sounds very similar — though seen from a different angle.  
This (perhaps justified) paranoid view of the world, is portrayed by Laing as leading to the 
seemingly rational choice of trying to escape from the world into one’s own hermit-like ego, in 
order to protect that ego.  But the tactic actually backfires (arguably due to the consequent lack of 
external closure, and hence the non-maintenance of important schemata) thus leading to a 
psychotic state. 
Seen in this light, paranoia seems to be an interesting special case;  (see Section C7.7, below).  
Even if the essence of paranoia is structurally quite different55 from “psychosis proper”, it may 
nevertheless be seen as one of the likely routes into the structural deficiency which does produce 
the attention disorders of clinical schizophrenia.  If it does facilitate the onset of psychosis in this 
way, then it is easier to see why the two types of symptom tend to co-exist:-  the paranoia would 
tend to cause the psychosis-proper;  and this in its turn could well reinforce the paranoid feelings 
— thus producing a vicious circle of causality).<283> 
We will return to questions of psychosis in Chapter C8, when a more systematic consider-
ation of the clinical and experimental evidence will be embarked upon. 
C6.6  Dreaming, sleep, and sleep-modes  
Our task in this section will be to draw together several disparate viewpoints concerning 
sleep, its nature, the purpose it might serve, and some thoughts on how it might be brought about.  
In particular, it would be helpful if we could reconcile Freudian dream-theory with the more 
recent distinction between different modes of sleep, and reconcile both with the current theory 
including the role proposed for sleep (in Section C2.3, above).  By and large, evolution sees to it 
that there will usually be a reason or functional significance for any surviving structural or 
behavioural quirks of nature — even if no-one has yet found the relevant explanation;  so it 
would not be surprising if all the details of sleep had their own particular significances.  (Freud 
himself made very much the same sort of point56, though expressed rather more weakly in terms 
of intuitive appeal, and referring to dreams alone rather than sleep as a whole).   
The explanation which Freud57 offers is that “A dream is the<284> fulfilment of a wish”; 
(1900/1953, page 91 and Chapter III).  We may or may not agree that this has served well as a 
working hypothesis; but there are at least two aspects of this formulation which deserve ultimate 
                                                          
55 This need not be the case.  The basic structure could be similar to that for psychosis “proper” (which 
involves objects, logic, and attention as tangible signs) — but differ by being primarily involved with 
social objects and affiliation-networks.  <283> 
56 “It need not necessarily be possible to infer a function of dreaming ...  from the theory.  Nevertheless, 
since we have a habit of looking for teleological explanations, we shall be more ready to accept 
theories which are bound up with the attribution of function to dreaming”.  (Freud, 1900/1953, page 
75).  One might perhaps add that until such an explanation is found, our theory will be disturbingly 
lacking in internal closure.  Incidentally, Freud’s heretical playing-down of vain hunting after the 
observable, in favour of closure, seems to have been partly prompted by Scherner (1861) via Volkelt 
(1875);  (Freud, 1900/1953, pages 84-87).  <284a> 
57 After Griesinger (1845/1861) and Radestock (1879).  <284b> 
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clarification — before it is endorsed as well-supported by closure, or modified to that end, or 
abandoned altogether.  The two points requiring clarification seem to be (i) the meaning of 
“wish”, and (ii) explaining how unpleasant nightmare phenomena can be examples of “wish-
fulfilment”. 
In much of his work, Freud was attempting the very difficult task of postulating a structure, 
as explicitly as possible, despite the lack of any helpful neurophysiological clues which might 
have helped him to bridge the knowledge-gap between the mental and the “hard sciences”; 
(Traill, 1976b).  He was, in fact, quite well aware of the existing shortcomings of physiology and 
looked toward a time when the situation might be remedied; but he was nevertheless prepared to 
proceed despite these deficiencies.  Thus, for instance, “There is no possibility of explaining 
dreams as a psychical process, since to explain a thing means to trace it back to something 
already known, and there is at the present time no established psychological knowledge under 
which we could subsume ...” (etc.); (1900/1953, page 511).  Accordingly it was scarcely feasible 
for him to enquire too deeply concerning the meaning of words like “wish” ((i) above); and 
although he did manage to explain the nightmare (ii) in terms of wish-fulfilment — as a sort of 
masochistic trade-off (1900/1953, page 557) — his account can nevertheless benefit from some 
structural tightening-up.  Whether or not the current theory is correct, it can at least offer such a 
structural basis for attempting this sort of further development. 
Let us try to interpret the idea of “wish-fulfilment” in terms of linear micro-elements and 
MnL hierarchies.  In fact there is no<285> great difficulty in visualizing an ego-schema in which 
there is a painful lack of closure reflecting some powerlessness to cope autonomously with a 
disobliging real world; nor should we be surprised if the individual should experiment mentally 
with ways of resolving this dissonance which threatens the very basis of his self-concept as an 
efficacious being.  A primitive attempt at solution would be an all-out “Death-or-glory” 
confrontation with reality, with no pause for consideration.  While such a ploy might occasionally 
work, it would generally turn out to be a poor gamble; so some sort of “experimentation” within 
the safety of one’s own mental model system would usually be preferable as a start — leading 
perhaps to a subsequent judicious testing of any promising putative solutions.  This scarcely 
needs to be said of problems which manifest themselves clearly at the logical M2L level.  
Dreaming is not usually acknowledged as necessary for the solution of problems in “hard 
science” (though Kekulé’s celebrated dream, leading to the notional discovery of the hexagonal 
benzene ring, is a notable exception; (Read, 1947, page 341)).  Such problems are apparently so 
well structured that it is possible and preferable to use formal (even doctrinaire) techniques for 
making the best use of the available information — and to do so in an awake state.  And yet even 
problems of this sort often have fringe aspects which are less amenable to formal treatment, so 
that it may well pay us to pause and “sleep on it”. 
Suppose we generalize the Freudian formulation somewhat, and suggest that the function of 
dreaming (as we know it) is to juggle the elements of our M1L conceptual level in an “attempt” to 
find better solutions to the incompatibilities between the schemata of this level.  This would entail 
actions and relations amongst objects, including “social objects”.  Now as “self” is the salient 
object in anyone’s world-view, and as one’s concepts of action and relationships<286> 
apparently based on egocentric elements of action, it would seem to follow that all or most 
“thought experiments” at this level would entail the self-concept in one way or another.  Thus the 
new formulation given here would seem to subsume Freud’s wish-fulfilment as a special case or 
even, it might be argued, be co-extensive with it. 
Armed with this more structural explanation for dreaming, we are now in a position to 
attempt a more credible interpretation of “masochistic” nightmare-dreaming; but it will be helpful 
to start with the phenomenon of masochism itself.  The Freudian conceptualization, as outlined 
by Fenichel (1946/1971, pp 73-74), depicts masochism as a package deal entailing a net gain in 
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satisfaction, despite a very significant element of pain, which is seen as “a necessary evil ...  
unfortunate but unavoidable”.  Such sub-optimal solutions would seem to be just the sort of 
situation which we were considering for the more complex types of cognitive dissonance, in 
Section C6.3.  The problem barely arose in the simple tripartite case considered in Figure C6.3/1, 
but for the more involved cases it became clear that cluster-analysis techniques, or similar 
imperfect-solution-finders, were the sort of mechanism which we must expect.  Even so if, in 
principle, a much better solution could be found by formal means, the system must meanwhile be 
capable of carrying on and progressing in a less neat, but more robust, fashion.  Masochism then, 
is presumably a particular more-or-less stable solution reached using such a technique — and the 
same can doubtless be said of all the other neuroses as well as many or all the indispensable 
features of our M1L levels.  By contrast, dreaming seems to be the main process in which a “re-
shuffle” of the existing M1L “clusters” can take place. 
In one sense, dreaming may be thought of as a temporary state of insurrection!  — or perhaps 
as a stop to hold elections in the<287> light of events which have occurred since the previous 
poll.  Anyhow the result is a “capacity and inclination for carrying out special psychical activities 
of which it is largely or totally incapable in waking life.” (Freud, 1900/53, page 82).  We may 
suppose that, during waking life, the M1L status quo is controlled (or contrived) from exogenous 
centres; but during dreaming it seems that these controls are removed 58 , and “local” 
configurations are left comparatively free to find their own equilibrium in their own way.  Thus 
distressing ideas may all become switched to pleasant ones — “a palpable ‘wish-fulfilment’ …”; 
(Freud, 1900/53, page 556).  Or alternatively, “An unconscious and repressed wish [from the “id” 
at M–1L or M0L ?], whose fulfilment the dreamer’s ego could not fail to experience as something 
distressing, has seized the opportunity …” — offered by comparative freedom and a new local 
configuration arising from “the day’s residues” — to present itself as a new potentially acceptable 
picture of reality.  (Ibid., pages 557 and 573). 
Of course there is no guarantee that the picture of reality offered will necessarily be correct, 
and there is even less chance that it will be found acceptable even if it is correct; however the 
effort will have been made, and such reviews of the current model would seem to be just as 
necessary here as in any business enterprise which would hope to survive in a changing world. 
On awakening, the new configurations are rudely subjected to what almost amounts to an 
alien culture.  In many cases they will simply not make any recognizable sense in consciousness, 
nor offer any new stability in any available broader context, so they will presumably just disint-
egrate without any permanent trace.  In other<288> cases they would become assimilated into the 
mould of the existing schemata, so that “the dream loses its appearance of absurdity ..” as seen in 
the light of M2L rational thought; (ibid., page 490).  Such a secondary revision looks very like the 
sort of transformation which happens to a story or picture when it is reproduced by persons from 
a different culture who are unfamiliar with the nuances of meaning implicit within the original 
setting; (Bartlett, 1932).  Probably there is no mere coincidence in this similarity; in both cases 
there is presumably an attempt being made to recover closure internally — among elements 
which arise separately from different sources, and so show little initial promise of having 
collective group-like properties.  Of course, once in a while, a new superior closure will be found 
— surpassing the preceding structure in “mathematical elegance”.  This is presumably where real 
progress will take place, ultimately justifying the whole roundabout procedure. 
Until after World War II, there was probably not much point in distinguishing between sleep 
and dreaming in any theorizing on the function of dreams.  However it is now common 
knowledge that there are at least two modes of sleep with markedly differing characteristics: Slow 
                                                          
58 “Self-consciousness is suspended or at least retarded, ...  ”  
(Spitta, 1882, p 199; quoted by Freud, 1900/53, page 90).  <288> 
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wave or “Orthodox” sleep, and “Paradoxical” or REM (Rapid Eye Movement) sleep.  Moreover it 
has been established that dreaming, as we know it, is associated with the brief periods of REM 
sleep, and not with the Slow Wave variety which accounts for about 80% of sleep in adult 
humans.  (Jouvet, 1967; Kleitman, 1963; Oswald, 1964, 1966, 1970). 
Thus it would appear that the above discussion about the function of dreams has offered an 
explanation of REM sleep only.  So what sense can we make of the residual Slow Wave sleep?  
While there is no decisive lead as to what the answer might be, it is worth remarking that dreams 
(as we know them) seem to deal mainly or<289> exclusively with M1L matters, while any re-
shuffling of ideas during waking-hours will mainly concern M2L concepts; so what about the 
other levels?  We may of course dismiss the M–1L level as being immutable within the individual, 
and this leaves M0L as a plausible area of concern for Slow Wave sleep — assuming it has any 
function at all.  If that is the case, then it would seem that there is another sort of “dream” going 
on during slow-wave sleep, and that this deals in re-shuffles of Sensori-Motor sets and semi-
groups.  Unlike REM-sleep, this M0L activity would presumably have no direct concern with the 
activities and status of the ego (though it will probably be concerned with its bare object-like 
basis), so we might expect that its relevance to Freudian theory would be somewhat 
circumscribed.  In any case it is unlikely that much if any of this activity would ever be retained 
in consciousness in view of this remoteness from ego-interest, though I understand that there is 
some slight evidence in favour of simple realistic memories emanating from this non-REM sleep 
activity; (Pound, 1977; after Rechstaffen et al., 1963). 
Taking this allocation of roles as a postulate, there are several predictions which we might 
reasonably make about the two modes of sleep and the proportion of time spent on each.  One 
might, for instance, expect different types of stress to produce different patterns.  However here 
we will only consider cross-species and cross-agegroup differences.  Firstly we would expect that 
animals which exhibit no M1L (Concrete Operations) capabilities would also have REM-free 
sleep — with corresponding compromise characteristics for intermediate cases.  This does indeed 
seem to be the case (Jouvet, 1967):-  The tortoise shows no REM-sleep while the hen shows very 
little, and the largely stereotyped behaviour repertoires of such non-mammals would appear to be 
almost entirely sub-M1L in their nature, with learning limited to certain circumscribed M0L 
constructions<290> — of which the most spectacular is the phenomenon of “imprinting”.  
Mammals, on the other hand, are generally more concerned with learning anew the relationships 
between objects, involving M1L Concrete Operations — and their proportion of REM-sleep is 
also correspondingly higher.  Moreover sheep are arguably “less bright” than the other mammals 
considered here (rat, cat, and man), corresponding to their somewhat lower percentage of REM-
sleep; and it is reported (Pound, 1977) that those lowliest mammals, the echidnas, exhibit an 
absence of REM-sleep similar to that of non-mammals. 
Across age-groups, we might expect that the older an animal becomes (up to maturity) the 
more it will become pre-occupied with activities involving the higher MnL levels.  Accordingly 
we would predict that adult animals would show more REM-sleep than the neonates of the same 
species.  In general, however, this is not the case at all; indeed quite the reverse seems to hold for 
mammals — though on the sparse evidence supplied here it could well be true within the non-
mammal category.  There seems little point at this stage in offering any detailed speculation as to 
why this should be so, though clearly this is a matter which deserves attention in the future.  
Suffice it here to suggest that there may well be extra complications in the more advanced 
mammals — complications which we have not yet formulated, or perhaps not even envisaged.  
Anyhow, this suggests that, even if we are on the right track, we still have a great deal to explain.  
In the circumstances, this should not really surprise us. 
Before concluding this section on sleep, we should perhaps consider briefly what sort of 
mechanism or mechanisms might control which mode of sleeping-or-waking will be operative 
291
292Ma
cr
o 
vi
ew
 o
f 
mo
le
cu
le
-b
ra
in
 s
ys
te
m 
——
 C
6.
6 
 R
ol
e 
of
 D
re
am
in
g 
& 
Sl
ee
p 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 129  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  129  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
within the individual animal at any given time.  It is all too easy to adopt what amounts to an 
authoritarian view of the system and claim that<291> “the orders” come from such-and-such a 
centre; but of course this merely shifts the problem (even if the assertion is correct) because then 
we should properly ask how this “centre” decides the mode it will support.  It seems likely that 
the most fundamental form of regulation will consist of competing attempts (mutually inhibiting) 
by various subsystems to stop other ongoing activity while they clear up their own state of 
comparative disarray — comparable to stocktaking, or sorting and filing accumulated 
correspondence.  One might perhaps think in terms of such subsystems becoming increasingly 
inefficient due to unadjusted configurations, until the worst-affected reaches some sort of 
threshold and bids to shut itself off from the others, for the time being.  (We might provisionally 
think of these subsystems as being: consciousness, M1L, and M0L — corresponding to 
wakefulness, REM-sleep, and Slow-Wave sleep, respectively).  Of course, in so far as overall 
coordination is required here, some sort of “semi-authoritarian centre” will be needed; but this 
should be seen as a consensus-device rather than as an all-powerful feudal lord.  In time, we 
might expect habit schemata to play a part in ordering sleep modes — in conjunction with 
periodical influences both outside and internally; but the fundamental instigator would probably 
be the consensus balance. 
In this connection, it is perhaps appropriate to mention the model proposed by Kilmer, 
McCulloch, and Blum (1969).  This is a computer model in which it is sought to simulate the 
supposed activity of the Reticular Formation in selecting modes of behaviour — using a 
consensus approach.  It will thus be useful to bear this model in mind in any attempt to elaborate 
this issue further; its formal cybernetic features stand a good chance of being correct, even if we 
are less sure concerning the details. 
Finally, we would do well to consider how such mutual inhibitions<292> might be physically 
put into effect.  It is generally assumed that specific nerve-fibre contacts would be used — in 
effect constituting a bounded-extensive definition of the addressees.  Leaving aside the question 
of how signals are to be directed into these channels in the first place, such an explanation would 
scarcely be adequate for ensembles in which the active elements are of molecular dimensions 
(rather than cellular).  A tethered-extensive definition would also tend to be totally unwieldy, and 
probably impossible to set up.  By elimination then, it looks as though such inhibitions may have 
to be addressed intensively, to specific sites on each element concerned in the process. 
C6.7  Bio-energetics and Pharmacology:  Freudian “Mental Energy” 
If linear molecules really are vital, what signal-mechanisms could they offer? 
It seems to be obvious that any discussion on matters relating to neuropharmacology should 
start with the chemical preparations themselves, or with the clinical effects which they produce.  
However now that we are armed with some sort of structural idea about what may be the details 
and purpose of molecular activity in the nervous system, there is some point in attempting an 
alternative approach:-  Let us elaborate the likely details a little more explicitly, and then consider 
in what ways this system might be open to chemical interference or modification, and the likely 
clinical effects which might plausibly follow.  It will then be comparatively less important to 
concern ourselves with detailed matters of chemistry; and this aspect could then be dealt with 
subsequently, in the light of particular theoretical requirements.  Of course any such further 
elaboration is also likely to facilitate other external tests of validity, as well as such internal tests 
as the construction of properly self-organizing computer models. 
For obvious reasons, traditional neuropharmacology has concentrated on the synapse.  In 
view of the present theories, we should now<293> also be examining possible mechanisms (and 
vulnerabilities) of:-  {a} How elements might specifically address and call each other (“naming” 
293
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or “intensively defining”);  {b} How cue-signals might traverse along an element;  and {c} How 
logic elements such as “And-Gates” might operate at this level.  These questions, especially 
“{a}”, will involve us in some rather specialized theoretical matters concerning ultra-micro 
energy transfer. 59   Of these, the more speculative and heretical suggestions, concerning 
unobservable structure, may well turn out to be superfluous or wrong.  However it seems 
worthwhile to introduce them as being sufficiently plausible to merit tolerant consideration, 
because if they should happen to be right, we would have great difficulty in trying to arrive at 
them systematically via orthodox approaches which emphasize impartial observation. 
Now let us postpone “{a}”, the problem of address-labels, and deal first with:- 
{b} Internal signals within molecules — what form could they take? 
Let us begin by taking a closer look at the linear microelement, as depicted in Figure C5.2/1, 
and the likely behaviour of the string of sites along it.  It has been supposed that some sort of 
discrete signal will, in favourable circumstances, travel along this string of sites — thus 
potentially triggering the release of other free signals as chemically-induced molecular-photon 
emissions (probably in the infra-red range, and phase-related to those from other sources if they 
are to carry any effective message across any appreciable distance).   
[If the linear micro-element in question happened to have a consistent series of 
conjugated double bonds, or some other electrically conducting pathway, then we might well 
suspect that the postulated captive signal would consist of an electron traversing this path.  
However it seems rather unlikely that these conditions could be adequately met in any 
realistic system; and<294> there might also be some difficulty in explaining how the 
electrons could be re-cycled after their transit.] 
 Accordingly, if there is such a signalling process at all, it seems more likely that we should be 
considering a captive energy-quantum, and referring to it by an accepted term such as “phonon” (more 
properly used for relatively homogeneous systems such as crystals), or “exciton” (Burnett, North, and 
Sherwood, 1974). 
Unfortunately, like much of psychology, this individual within-molecule aspect of chemistry 
is inadequately observable, so it is very difficult to ascertain in any descriptive detail just how the 
exciton is likely to interact with its string of molecular sites.  As in psychology, much work has 
gone into formulating the manifest behaviour in formal mathematical-statistical terms; and the 
success of this ploy for technological60 applications has tended to blind us to our fundamental 
ignorance about what might feasibly be going on in the unobservable domain.  It is, after all, very 
tempting to hide behind our elegant mathematics and the behaviourist/operationalist premise that 
the “unobservable” does not exist.  Anyhow, it seems extraordinarily difficult to find an expert in 
this field who is prepared to step beyond what is safely established statistically, and consider 
hypothetically the detailed nature and behaviour of excitons in such ultra-micro situations.  But 
the present work has frequently encountered this need to postulate a substructure within one 
“black box” or another, so there seems to be no new reason why the same approach should not be 
used on the mysteries of fundamental physics and chemistry wherever this seems likely to 
produce conceptual progress.  Meanwhile however, we may happily<295> continue to use the 
accepted statistical-behavioural concepts whenever they seem adequate for our immediate needs. 
                                                          
59 Some of these issues have already been discussed in Chapter B2, above; though from a rather different 
viewpoint.  <294> 
60 See the distinction drawn (e.g.) by Bannister (1968) between the needs of Science, and those of 
Technology:  (page 230, column 2).  <295> 
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A modified analogy to macro waveguides? 
Let us suppose then, that the linear molecule will have the same sort of general properties as a 
more macro wave-guide (such as a non-uniform lumpy guitar string), but with possible additional 
constraints due to quantum effects.  (Quantum theory is part of the cybernetically-unsatisfactory 
mathematical mystery, as it stands; but we may often let it pass without elaboration as a gener-
ally-accepted and useful descriptive formulation).  Non-uniformity in a wave-guide will make a 
considerable difference to its performance — as any dedicated Hi-Fi enthusiast will know.  When 
the wave-guide is uniform, as shown in Figure C6.7/1, then any established disturbance will 
propagate at constant velocity 61 along the wave-guide — for ever if the wave-guide should 
happen to be undamped and endlessly long (or looped without violating effective uniformity).  
Any discontinuity62 in such a pathway will tend to cause a reflection of the signal back 
towards the source; and if this reverse-travelling disturbance meets with another discontinuity, 
then it will tend to bounce back again — resulting in a standing wave in between the two 
discontinuities:  see Figure C6.7/2.  Thus it is possible to semi-trap the energy of this disturbance 
between two sites along the linear wave-guide, as well as confining it to the wave-guide itself 
(a constraint which, in fact, depends on the same sort of discontinuity principle). 
                                                          
61 If the medium is “dispersive”, then each frequency has a separate constant velocity.  <296 – (297=figs)> 
62 Also see Karbowiak (1965, Chapter 3), Benade (1960), Kinsler and Frey (1962), and Nederveen 
(1969).  <298> 
A.  Laterally plucked guitar-string 
rarefaction 
compression 
B.  Acoustic speaking-tube. or 
woodwind musical instrument 
Fig C6·7/1.    Examples of uniform wave-guides 
<296> 
C.  Electrical 
co-axial cable 
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At any point along a wave-guide, and most obviously at any discontinuity, the propagated 
signal must so-to-speak “decide” whether it will continue on in its present direction, or reverse its 
direction, or take some other sideways path, or indeed to dissipate itself resistively as heat; or 
even to suspend itself in storage as if in a wound spring.  Moreover different parts of the total 
signal energy may well be allocated simultaneously to any combination of these possibilities, 
which may leave us wondering which proportions of the energy will become distributed into each 
alternative.  It is not the purpose of this present work to give a quantitative discourse on the finer 
points of acoustics; but there are some important qualitative details which do deserve clarific-
ation, and these relate to the actual micro-mechanisms of the alternatives we have just considered. 
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Fig C6·7/2.    Examples of non-uniform wave-guides. 
               = site of reflection or partial reflection, (changes of impedance). 
Bridge 
“leakage” Sound-board 
Nut 
A.  The Guitar 
B.  One type of speaking-tube (or woodwind) configuration 
closed 
end 
branch and reservoir 
open 
end 
side 
hole 
poor 
join 
C.  Unmatched electrical impedances 
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wires 
co-axial cable 
cut 
end 
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For instance, let us look at the concept of resistance.  Here we have “dissipation” of energy 
into “waste” heat;  but what does this really mean?  In fact it means a loss of our orderly real-or-
conceptual control over the energy of the signal — that is, a loss of negentropy or information.  
It would seem that such a phenomenon<298> might make sense only when viewed from a 
comparatively macro viewpoint — and that, by contrast, individual quanta of energy would not 
be able to be frittered away like this in a gradual run-down of energy.  Resistance then, would 
appear to be a statistical “behavioural” manifestation of massed discrete quantum phenomena 
which are individually precise (and possibly even deterministic in a sense — though not 
experimentally determinable). 
Similar considerations will apply to the conduction of excitons of energy along linear mole-
cules.  Here “energy dissipation”  would only have meaning in the more macro context of parallel 
molecular waveguides which normally operate in a phase-related way.  If the signal traversing the 
different pathways were delayed by arbitrarily differing amounts, then the phase relationship 
would be destroyed, and the collective more-macro signal would become misdirected into some 
irrelevant direction — and probably stripped of any message as well.63   
{a} If molecular exciton-signals reach specific targets, what “labels” could they use? 
Of the problems raised at the start of this section, the most crucial explanatory task before us 
is evidently Problem “{a}”: accounting for the postulated specific addressing-code, directed 
at<299> specific types of element or reception site.64   
It is scarcely to be believed that a simple allocation of “broadcasting frequencies” would offer 
sufficient code-variety on its own;  so we must look for something which is a bit more sophistic-
ated, and this will presumably entail keylike patterns of signal components — probably distribut-
ed appreciably in space or time (though not inevitably so as we shall see).  In Chapter B2, 
above65, it was assumed that a time-distribution would be operating, but let us now re-argue the 
issues more comprehensively and distinguish three conceivable bases for patterns of signal-
distribution suitable for an exciton-molecular system:- 
(1) The spatially-extended keylike signal may be received as a space-distributed complex 
(which would then presumably have to be translated into internal exciton-mediated activity).  
                                                          
63 This could occur as a result of the failure of cross-feed coordination depicted in Figure C5.2/2, as it is 
unlikely that such dubiously-identical parallel elements could maintain proper synchrony without such 
help  —  unlike laser-crystals.    [In fact it would seem that the criterion for a good optical or acoustical 
extended signal-conducting medium, is that it should display a statistically reliable delay between its 
absorption of an incident quantum of a given frequency, and its “decision” to eject another such 
quantum; that this delay value should apply at all such sites throughout the medium; and that these 
sites should be homogeneously spaced.  Thus reliable phase relationships will be maintained.  (Also 
see Stumpf, 1973, Chapter 1).] 
64 Two types of analogy  may serve as imperfect illustrations:  (i) Telephone numbers (and especially 
cell-phone numbers)  show the power of using a precisely formulated label-code to home in on a 
specific target — though that will be a single unique target rather than the here-envisaged diffuse 
population target of unanimous schema-encodings, of which all-or-many would presumably respond 
to the same “phone number”.  Anyhow note that these use a serial time-base, like spoken speech.   
(ii) Traditional Lock-and-key mechanisms use matching spatial codes to achieve their specificity — 
and note that immunological recognition uses the same trick using “lumpy” protein key-patterns.  
Such coding is obviously in 3D space rather than time.    —  [RRT  2006] 
65 As noted earlier, this is now actually in a separate online document:  
www.ondwelle.com/MolecMemIR.pdf    — See especially Fig [B]2.3/2 for two plausible mechanisms. 
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Receptors A and B, perhaps placed a significant distance apart, could each be activated simultan-
eously by their respective frequencies or other parallel stimuli.  Consequently they would then 
each pass on an internal exciton toward an and-gate within their common molecular structure, 
such that if-and-when the two excitons reached the and-gate together, a further internal signal 
would be passed down the effector or “program” segment — and the reception process would 
have been completed.  Unfortunately however, given the likely frequencies (with wavelengths > 
1 µm), it is difficult to see how A and B could be a “significant distance apart” (compared to the 
1 µm) and yet still be sufficiently in touch via intra-molecular communication-channels.  Such a 
model could still be of some service though, if we drop the requirement for A and B to be so far 
apart, and instead use it as one possible device for solving case (3), below. 
(2) The signal may be treated as a time-distributed complex of discrete quanta forming an 
identifiable time pattern66.  Here we can envisage an initial stimulation of receptor A which sets 
up an internal exciton-signal.  Further progress will then presumably depend on the more-or-less 
precisely-<300>timed arrival of a correctly-tuned signal at receptor B, and another at C, and so 
on; (Traill, 1976b; and Chapter B2 above65 (alias Traill, 1977)).  There seems to be no obvious 
objection to a system such as this, and moreover it is easy to see how the appropriate time-pattern 
of signals could arise — through the optical dispersion of the various Fourier components of an 
initially integrated pulse or other disturbance having a quite specific shape.  Such dispersion 
could be particularly pronounced in myelin wave-guides, (Chapter B4, above — ibid.). 
(3) The specificity of the signal might lie in its “shape-as-such” as a composite irregular 
pulse or  wave-packet67 on arrival at the receptor, where this implies a signal time-span compar-
able to the period of component frequencies.   
This pulse-shape modification rather presupposes populations of supposedly-unison photons, 
and hence a move toward the macro-effects of everyday life.  (After all, the wave pattern within 
an individual photon cannot be “bent” in this way!).   The FM or AM coding of radio signals 
would serve as a close analogy, but we have to be careful not to import such notions into isolated  
ultramicro quantum situations. 
Optical dispersion — its constant modification of signal shape-and-timing 
In view of the likely prevalence of dispersion, it is doubtful whether any emitted pulse or 
disturbance could maintain its shape 68 until it reached a site which was realistically remote.  
However it should be noted that there is no requirement that it should be the same shape as when 
it started; it is merely necessary that it should have a characteristic shape by the time it is received 
— and possibly different characteristic shapes for different receptors (where the same signal is 
likely to be used at different sites).                 […69]   
                                                          
66  (e.g. a coordinated volley of well-separated quanta;  i.e. with each pair having a time-span between 
them which is appreciably greater than the period of individual component frequencies, as illustrated 
by the last sketch in the New Figure C6.7/2a  below).   The original 1978 sentence (black text) here 
singled out this special “well-separated” case.  However that was being overselective:   Overlapping or 
even simultaneous quanta can also be included here — as long as they are not truly interacting before 
they reach their target.  (That is the unlikely “(3)” case, which we will briefly consider next).   [2006] 
67 odd shapes like the (omitted) sum-curves for first three sketches in  New Figure C6.7/2a — see below.      
68 Here we take the wider interpretation of  “shape” — including time intervals between logically-related 
photons (“case (2)”) — as well as the more obvious but sometimes-questionable shaped-pulses of 
“case (3)” 
69 [Sentence deleted as irrelevant and confusing. :    On the other hand though, this will not help much if dispersion has actually “dismembered” 
the signal into its component frequencies, as required for “(2)” above; and it seems quite likely that this is what will normally happen.  — RRT,  2006] 
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Nature has a way of capitalizing on odd effects like this.  One possibility here is that this 
constant reproducible-and-predictable “translation” of signals as they travel along their optical 
path will make it easier for some receptor, somewhere along the path, to establish meaningful 
communication — partly by Darwinian trial-and-error.  We will return to this idea below in the 
subsection “Fixed-range signals” below (o.p.304), and in New Figure C6.7/2a. 
Meaningful signal-combination from two sources simultaneously  
But there is yet another twist to this question of remote shaped-patterns, and that is that they 
might arise in a barely-predictable way from the interaction of signals in the presence of a 
receptor competent to “capture” an ephemeral pattern — a pattern which would normally 
disintegrate without trace. 
A simple way of detecting coinciding signals like this would be  • just to receive each one 
individually, at closely situated receptors such as those suggested at the close of “(1)” above, 
and<301> then let the separate resulting intra-molecular signals interact via some suitable and-
gate arrangement.  The question of external interaction of the signals themselves would therefore 
not even arise in this case, and indeed the arrangement turns out to be very similar to that of “case 
(2)” — differing mainly from the Fig.B2.3/2 versions in its apparent lack of internal “delay 
units”, so that it would appear to be merely a special case of the latter.   
If we are looking for a fundamentally different alternative mechanism, then we must 
apparently grasp the nettle of  • selective interaction at the receptor itself, and contemplate such 
questions as:  how it might simultaneously cope with two incident quanta; what (unobservable) 
structural changes might be involved internally; and just how strictly simultaneous, and geometr-
ically-arranged the coincidence of the quanta would need to be.  For instance it is conceivable 
that the polarization of the two quanta should be more-or-less perpendicular, the trajectories 
should perhaps be at about 70º, and maybe the peak amplitude of one of them should arrive at 
about 5 picoseconds before the peak of the other (± 2 p.sec.).70   
Suggestion for deeper investigation of exciton interaction 
No further attempt will be made here to explore the feasibility of these mainly-external types 
of interaction, but perhaps some remarks about how to approach the problem would be 
appropriate.  Probably the main need is to analyse, in as much structural detail as possible, the 
intricacies of the process of ordinary  single-quantum  absorption into atomic and molecular 
orbitals.  Even though no hard experimental evidence will be available for establishing the nature 
of the dynamic sub-structure, this should not be allowed to halt the programme while there is still 
plausible progress to be made using internal-closure principles for investigation — on the 
reasonable assump<302>tion that the real system must have group-like properties if it is to 
sustain itself cybernetically.  (Of course such model-building should take full account of accepted 
formulae and formulations of physics, though without necessarily accepting their implicit 
assumptions on such matters as causality).  Depending on the degree of success with such a 
programme, it might then be comparatively easy to extrapolate — more or less convincingly — to 
cases involving transient phenomena and  multiple incident photons.  One might even come to 
some (partially) testable hypotheses leading perhaps to a (partial) justification by traditional 
criteria.  This amounts, of course, to advocating a reductionist programme in physics along the 
lines that the present work is attempting to apply to psychology. 
                                                          
70 Fortunately, we can probably ignore the totally heretical idea that the two quanta might coalesce just 
before reception: the case of pure interaction! 
302
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Other applications for signal-combination?  
Before leaving the inconclusive “case (3)” concerning the shape of signal pulses, let us look 
briefly at what implications would be likely to follow on from such mixing of signals from 
different sources.  To start with, it would not be much use on its own for the type of specific 
name-calling envisaged in the theory of sets and groups developed in connection with the 
postulated MnL hierarchy.  It might however, conceivably play a useful auxiliary role by 
governing which elements out of the many would be available “on call”, and which should 
instead remain dormant for the time being.  Perhaps this might express particular moods or sleep 
modes, or ensure a balanced “randomized” access amongst the roughly equivalent alternative 
target elements (by making any individual element accessible only if the “spotlight” happens to 
be pointing in its direction) — though this would seem to be a particularly cumbersome way of 
achieving such a straightforward objective.  Nor is there anything very convincing about the 
mood/mode suggestions unless we can envisage some reasonably accurate way of directing these 
auxiliary signals to specific<303> target-areas: either using the call-sign principle (which simply 
takes us back to the use of “case (2)” above — time distribution), or else as an agent of locality-
based “extensive definition” of elements.   
If simple extensive areas are all we are concerned with, then this device would seem to be 
rather superfluous since we could arguably just make do by having a limited range to our signals 
and concentrating our target elements within this range.  However it may well be that complex 
and variable extensive-regions will be required — for hologram storage perhaps (Pribram, 
Nuwer, and Baron, 1974; Pribram, 1971) — so there may well be important uses for such 
phenomena.  Nevertheless we must remain in some doubt as to whether they are even feasible; 
and anyhow the “case (2)” paradigm seems to be the most promising explanation of how 
“intensive definition” naming would operate, so we may provisionally accept it as the norm — 
while bearing in mind the possibility of these other additional mechanisms. 
Fixed-range signals 
There are also some implications arising from “case (2)” which are worth considering, and 
which might even be testable in an orthodox experimental way!  If the original signal 
disturbance-shape is continually being modified by dispersion as it progresses away from its 
source — becoming ever more spread out in its spectrum of Fourier-components, then we might 
obviously expect that the ability of a receiving mechanism to recognize it will probably depend 
on its being at the correct range away from the source: neither too far away nor too close (see 
New Fig. C6.7/2a).  This phenomenon could do much to ensure an adequate spread of signals, so 
that they will not generally be intercepted prematurely by nearby receptors — with which the 
emitter might well have an internal link anyhow.  Or to put it another way, it suggests a rather 
special communicational topology which might profitably be investigated from a mathematical 
point of<304> view; and at a more everyday level we might well contemplate the implications of 
the Knight’s move in chess!71  (Also see Figure C8.1/7, below).  (Of course, on a larger scale, 
nerve tracts also achieve a similar non-Euclidean topology). 
A further implication arising from this is that a change in range might mean that a given 
signal will now be interpreted differently:  the meaning may thus be locality-dependent — like 
the word “pavement” considered separately on each side of the Atlantic.  It would follow from 
this that effective “mutations” of elements could occur if-and-when there were a substantial 
movement in the location of receiving-elements, or of the emitting-elements — or indeed if there 
                                                          
71 At one extreme the chessboard King can move only to adjacent squares, and at the opposite extreme 
the Queen can move right across the board if there are no obstacles.  Between these we have the Knight 
which can move only to certain intermediate-distance squares, all at the same restricted radius. 
304
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were a significant change in the optical path between them, reversibly or irreversibly, 
spontaneous or “deliberate”.  There would thus be some scope here for pathogenic or therapeutic 
pharmacological intervention, though on the whole such effects seem more likely to operate on 
the acoustic paths which we have been supposing to operate along the molecular structures them-
selves.  It is to these acoustic paths and their likely control mechanisms that we will now return. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Molecules as waveguides and logic units 
Figures C6.7/1 and C6.7/2 drew attention to the nature of wave-guides in general, and served 
to introduce the idea that linear molecules might also be viewed as wave-guides — though 
subject to manifest quantum constraints which would not be apparent in more macro systems, 
where individual quanta would be hidden amongst a statistical population of fellow quanta.  From 
there we went on to examine a variety of technical difficulties related to systems of this sort.  
Having done that, we should now go back to the main theme of molecules-as-waveguides and 
consider how reflections and storage might be expected to influence the progress of excitons 
along the molecule; and also<305> look at how such potentially logic-gating mechanisms might 
be influenced from outside the molecule. 
Following on from the work of McCulloch and Pitts (1947; McCulloch, 1950) and elaborat-
ions by Hebb (1949), there was considerable discussion until the 1960’s of the supposed role 
played by neurones as logic elements or “formal neurones”; (Blum, 1962).  Clearly there is still 
much to support the idea that interaction effects such as summation do occur at neural cell-bodies 
and other sub-synaptic sites (Eccles, 1964; Katz, 1967 ) and perhaps there is no need to enquire 
any further in the case of “simple” behaviour, such as in invertebrates, though this is highly 
debatable (Miller, 1970).  But such formulations do not, by themselves, explain how transmitted 
messages interact with chemical “transmitter-substances”.  Moreover the more recent ultra-micro 
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added 
2006
Signal when released, showing two components  
(which we might prefer to see as combined by addition) 
The same signal shortly afterwards, when it has 
experienced some dispersion and hence a change 
in the time-code pattern — and this new pattern 
might now be meaningful to receptors at this range 
After further dispersion, its 
altered code might now be …  
…meaningful instead at 
this more remote site 
Eventually the signal probably becomes 
unusable due to yet further dispersion, 
though maybe it dies away anyhow by then 
New Fig. C6.7/2a     Simplified series of diagrams to illustrate how “the same” 
shaped-signal can pass through a continuous “translation” process which at 
some stage might make sense to local receptors at that particular range.   [2006]  
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studies have shown that neurones are generally much too complex to be adequately modelled by 
simple binary logic elements — even as a rough approximation — nor by ternary logic elements 
(Traill, 1970); or even logic elements with any number of straightforward on/off inputs.  On the 
other hand though, it will now be argued that mechanisms roughly approximating to such binary 
elements could well be found at the molecular level — in keeping with the ‘linear micro-element’ 
theory of mentation.  It might therefore be possible to update some of the earlier “formal neuron” 
theory on these lines, though no attempt will be made to do so here.  Moreover it is rather 
difficult to see how the “plastic properties” of neurones (Bureš and Burešová, 1970; Lippold, 
1970; Spencer and April, 1970) and the consolidation of Short Term Memory into Long Term 
Memory (Griffith, 1970) could be properly explained without going into detail of this sort. 
There are 16 mathematical operators for binary logic, (Blum, 1962).  Each determines 
whether the “result” will be on or off<306> (“true or false”) — given its own particular pattern 
for the on/off-ness of two independent inputs A and B.  Thus   “X = A or B”   will mean that X 
will be “on” for the three cases:- 
  (i) Both inputs on; 
  (ii) A = on, B = off; 
  (iii) A = off, B = on;  
but that X will be “off” for the fourth case:- 
  (iv) with both inputs off.  
Of the sixteen patterns, only ten are truly two dimensional in the sense that the result really 
depends on both A and B.  Four of them will be entirely determined by the state either of A or of 
B, (one-dimensional); while the other two are entirely independent of both!  (zero dimensional).  
These latter six cases are thus “degenerate” or trivial from the two-dimensional point of view, and 
so cause less difficulty in explanation.  Other cases are of somewhat improbable utility at 
molecular level, and can anyhow be manufactured from multiple use of the others if all else fails.  
For example:-  
  (A and not B)  or  (B and not A)  
It will therefore suffice here if we look mainly at the following four:  
and,     or,     (A and not B),     (B and not A)     —  
with some brief mentions of the trivial cases. 
To set the stage, we shall take it that we are considering a linear molecule with side-chains, 
each potentially capable of picking up a photon from outside the molecule, or emitting such a 
photon, or storing quanta of energy as a local excitation state — presumably entailing some sort 
of structural change relating to itself, and this might or might not affect the energy-handling 
properties of the system.  Let us define A to be an exciton travelling down the main chain from 
the molecule, in the “correct” direction; and B as the exciton arising from a newly captured 
photon (or from<307> storage) — where the new photon approaches the main chain via a side-
chain.  These may then interact directly, or affect each other indirectly by changing the 
configuration of the system. 
307
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Molecular “and”-gate 
Consider now the properties of a non-uniform molecular waveguide in this context.  What 
would be merely partially-reflecting obstacles in any macro-system, are here likely to be totally 
reflecting due to quantum considerations (probably entailing group-like configurations involving 
the molecule itself) — thus effectively trapping the first exciton-signal, be it A, or B.  This 
trapped<308> state could then be relieved by the arrival of the other exciton of the pair — raising 
the local system to a higher energy state which could thereby pass the threshold of the quantum-
barrier and so generate a further exciton-signal moving down the next section of the molecule, 
and/or emitting a photon capable of influencing other such molecules.  This mechanism would 
thus constitute an “and-gate”;  see Figure C6.7/3. 
Fig C6.7/3.       One possible 
molecular embodiment of an 
and-gate, with the following 
logical properties:-  …<308>…… 
side-chains 
main molecular 
chain travelling 
exciton “A” 
Step 1:   A arrives 
non-uniformities 
causing reflection 
Step 2:   B arrives 
incident 
photon “B” 
 A not-A 
B act  
not-B   
emitted
photon new travelling 
exciton 
Step 3:   The result 
309
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Molecular “inclusive-or”-gate 
The construction of an or-gate would be somewhat simpler as we can now dispense with the 
reflection-trapping mechanism — accepting the “new travelling exciton” as a direct consequence 
of either the old one (A), or of a newly received photon-signal (B).  In the improbable event of 
both arriving simultaneously, several different things could happen.  The incident photon could 
be re-emitted, giving an inclusive-or as shown in Figure C6.7/4 — though<309> this re-emission 
might be delayed, leaving a possibly changed configuration in the meantime.  Perhaps there 
would be interference such that there would be no resultant travelling exciton — giving a case of 
“exclusive-or” from the molecule’s point of view — though there would presumably be other 
alternative outputs such as photon emission or a backward-flowing exciton.  Alternatively we 
might obtain a qualitatively different resultant exciton which is otherwise orthodox — a sort of 
super-positive response (from the molecule’s viewpoint), of which arithmetical addition of 
energy-values would be a special case. 
Fig C6.7/4.        One possible 
molecular embodiment of an 
inclusive-or  gate, with the   
following logical properties:- 
 A not-A 
B act 
not-B act  
sub-threshold 
semi-obstacle 
<309>
case 1:   A arrives 
    (with or without B). 
photon “B” 
re-emitted if “A” 
is already present 
(subsequent exciton) 
case 2:   B arrives alone 
incident 
photon “B” 
(309)
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Two different Molecular “not”-gates 
Systems involving the concept of “not” may be explained in terms of configurational changes 
which are caused by the “negating<310> signal”, and which have the effect of blocking or 
sidetracking the other signal.  Thus Figure C6.7/5 represents the “A and not B” case, and the 
situation for “B and not A” can be depicted as in Figure C6.7/6. <figC6.7/6: 311> 
The latter case, whether or not this arrangement actually occurs in nature, at least serves to 
highlight the possibility that the system might respond unexpectedly selectively when faced with 
quanta having differing energy-values.  In the example shown, it was the lower-energy signal 
which was diverted by a “high-pass filter” (so that it ended up doing switch-throwing work, rather 
than continuing as a signal in its own right); but it is also conceivable that a “low-pass filter” in 
the same position could<311> similarly divert a higher energy quantum into the role of switch-
thrower for a lower energy signal.  And this would be a rather more surprising phenomenon, 
though the idea that the uniformity-or-otherwise of the waveguide will depend on the signal-
frequency, is a commonplace of electronics.  Thus the degree of reflection at the discontinuities in 
the wave-guides of Figure C6.7/2, will depend very much on the frequency or transient-properties 
of the disturbance being propagated; so that, for certain conditions, some of the discontinuities 
will “pass unnoticed” as far as that particular signal is concerned.  Whether such selective 
treatment occurs much, or at all, at the postulated molecular-pathway level, is rather a moot point; 
but there must presumably be some provision for signal-sorting somewhere in the system, be it in 
molecular activity, or nerve-fibre optical dispersion (Chapter B4, above), or both, or whatever.  
At cell-level, at least, there is evidence of a comparatively macro type of signal separation; 
Fig C6.7/5.        One possible 
molecular embodiment of “A and 
not B”,   i.e.  the logical condition 
<310>depicted by:- 
 A not-A 
B   
not-B act  
unhindered exciton “A” 
case 1:   A arrives 
             (without B). 
case 2:       A is blocked by 
configurational change 
— and so trapped, or 
reflected back, or 
expended by photon 
emission. 
path of 
photon “B” 
exciton “A” 
is blocked 
configuration has 
been changed by 
photon “B”, making 
obstacle into an 
effective barrier. 
312
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(Hughes, 1965; Chung et al., 1970; Waxman, 1972; Grossman, Spira, and Parnas, 1973; 
Goldstein and Rall, 1974). 
Trivial logic-cases 
Of the trivial or “degenerate” logical functions, we might just note the following examples.   
(1) A regardless of B is obviously just normal transmission along a wave-guide, without 
obstruction or qualification.  (2) B regardless of A is reception of a photon without any influence 
from any incumbent exciton — at the start of a “label” for instance.  (3) “Contradiction” is a 
dead-stop with no (within-molecule) output — though presumably we may allow it to be a 
photon-emitter to dispose of its acquired energy — or perhaps it will do so by back-reflection or 
other such complicating action? 
The implication here in “(3)”, and in Figures C6.7/3 and C6.7/5, that there might be important 
outputs expressed as photons emitted<312> into the exterior, or reflections sent backwards along 
the molecule, once more calls into question the value of categorizing such phenomena in terms of 
the sixteen binary operators — even though they have now apparently been rescued from their 
embarrassing inapplicability for normal neurons.  If such a mathematically-oriented formulation 
is called for at all, then we would seemingly need a system which contemplated: two or more 
different types of output;  storage and its likely configurational changes with varying stability; 
Fig C6.7/6.        One possible 
molecular embodiment of “B and 
not A”, with the logical properties:- 
…… 
(subsequent exciton) 
Situation 1:  <311> 
   B arrives (without A). 
higher-energy
photon “B” 
“higher-pass  
 filter” 
lower-energy
exciton “A” 
Situation 2: 
A, obstructed by 
specific filter, is 
diverted into B’s 
receptor. 
This changes the 
configuration as 
long as it stays stored 
there — thus blocking 
B. 
“B” is 
not received because 
configuration is no 
longer sensitive to it 
“higher-pass  
 filter” 
 A not-A 
B  act 
not-B   
313
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and also the constraints imposed by the conservation of energy.  Such a calculus might eventually 
be forthcoming, but meanwhile we would do well to keep to first principles or else cautiously use 
a hybrid pluralistic formulation. 
Implications for Freud’s vague theory on “Mental Energy”, etc. 
We are now in a position to offer some new comments about how pharmacological chemicals 
might operate.  There has long been considerable evidence that many of them are site-specific; 
thus it does not take much imagination to see such additions as new components in the “wiring” 
of Figures C6.7/3 to C6.7/6 — either as configurational changes comparable to those supposed to 
arise from the storage of excitons, or as entirely new “electronic components” which create, 
modify, or abolish reflecting-discontinuities and any frequency-selectivity which they might 
have.  Of course many such chemical agents occur naturally, as neurochemical transmitters or 
whatever; and it is well known that the effectiveness of some exotic agents lies in their ability to 
compete for site-occupation with the “normal” occupants of those sites.  There is no obvious 
reason why these sites should not be the linear-molecule sites postulated here; though of course it 
is not suggested that there is any direct current evidence to support this notion. 
The psychoanalytic theoretical literature is replete with concepts involving the blocking of 
mental “discharge”, though it<313> has never been entirely clear just what, in material terms, is 
being blocked or discharged.  Thus Fenichel (1946, page 11) writes:- 
“The basic pattern which is useful for the understanding of mental phenomena is the reflex arc.  
Stimuli from the outside world ...  initiate a state of tension that seeks for motor or secretory 
discharge, bringing about relaxation.  However, between stimulus and discharge, forces are at 
work opposing the discharge tendency.  The study of these inhibiting forces, their origin and 
their effect on the discharge tendency, is the immediate subject of psychology.  Without these 
counterforces there would be no psyche, only reflexes [Ferenczi (1926)].” — Emphasis added. 
In the absence of any precise idea as to what is meant by such terms as “forces at work”, or 
“discharge tendency”, or even “reflex arc”, it is something of an effort to take seriously the notion 
that our mental propensities should be considered as channelled-energy or forces within our 
brains (except as a metaphorical analogy).  Nor, given the accepted view of (fuzzy) logic at cell or 
synapse level-of-resolution, can we really very credibly explain how a specific blockage could be 
set up and maintained.  However the above exposition in terms of quantized molecular 
phenomena does seem to offer the basis for just this sort of precision and specificity.  In 
particular, the problem of how to cope with blocked “A” excitons and their energy, has arisen as 
an explicit issue in connection with Figure C6.7/5.  Accordingly, it may now be within our grasp 
to define Freudian “mental energy” in reasonably precise physical terms — presumably involving 
quantum energy, or its entropy given the collective state of synchrony between molecules, or 
both. 
By the same token, it should now be possible to be more explicit about “mental economics” 
and the closely related notion of mental exhaustion (Fenichel, 1946, pages 13-14).  Qualitatively 
this has always been a plausible idea once the “energy” concept<314> has been accepted, because 
energy or negentropy must ultimately be supplied from limited resources and be directed along 
routes with limited channel-capacity.  The latter would now seem likely to be quantifiable in 
terms of molecular acoustics, and nerve-fibre wave-guide properties (Part B, above); while 
quantitative approaches to questions of energy-source have been suggested by Cope (1973) — 
involving the storage of infra-red quanta in mitochondria, after their generation via redox 
potentials.  <315> 
314
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Chapter C7 
MECHANISMS FOR NEUROSES 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
Here structural bases are proposed for various Freudian “defense mechanisms” in 
terms of the details postulated in Chapter C6.  This leads to a provisional formulation 
of the distinction between neurosis and psychosis in terms of their structure, rather than 
the usual behavioural approach. 
C7.1  What are the “normal” adaptive responses to frustration ?   
Coping with frustration — good homespun advice, and beyond 
Is there any general advice one could give about how to cope with frustrating situations and 
dilemmas?   Alcoholics Anonymous has, if memory serves me correctly, offered several items of 
advice in the form of a prayer for the following virtues:   (i) the strength to change what I can,   
[presumably toward the solution of “dissonance“];   (ii) the serenity to accept what I must;    and 
(iii) the grace to know the difference.   As far as it goes, this is probably sound enough.    
However if we want to go more deeply into this matter, we might well inquire whether we 
can choose an optimal-though-imperfect solution to the dissonance.  This then raises questions 
about time-horizons and chances of “success”, and to what extent our “solution” is fundamental 
rather than merely papering over the cracks by treating the symptoms. 
Mechanics of changing one’s frustration-reduction strategy 
Faced with genuinely insurmountable frustration, it is obviously an adaptive procedure to 
“give in” and “accept the situation”; but what is this likely to entail in mechanistic-physiological 
terms?   Such a change may be likened to the election of a new government, thereby discarding 
the old policies which had proved to be a failure in practice despite any dreams of Utopia which 
they might have conjured up.  Where basic hereditary instincts<316> are involved, this creates a 
special obstacle to “policy-change” because further scheme-elements of the original pattern are 
likely to continue to appear on the scene as fast as their genetic sources happen to reproduce 
them, (Section A3.2, above).  Assuming that the genetic (M–1L) sources are immutable within the 
individual, it would nevertheless be feasible for the brain systems to evolve a more-or-less 
standardized procedure for supporting particular types of mutation in these elements, and 
discouraging the use of the unmodified varieties.  Thus such primitive reflexes as the palmar 
reflex quite soon become “swamped” in amongst later complexities, and it may even be that the 
later developments will have “switched off” the genetic sources, to a greater or lesser extent.  
Anyhow, these alterations to the effective expression of basic instincts may be identified with the 
Freudian concept of sublimation, (Fenichel, 1946, page 141). 
Although these fundamental changes in aim will be away from hereditary instincts, they 
should nevertheless be regarded as “natural” in the sense that the genetic code has evolved in 
such a way as to take account of developments of this kind — which is simply to say that they are 
orthomaturational.  This is, in fact, another example of the fact that the genetic code could not 
possibly foresee all eventualities, nor could it reasonably encode all the relevant “legislation” 
even if it could foresee the needs.  Anyhow, the resulting mutated elements will be capable of 
operating in an orderly and adequately efficient manner, without any undue build-up of 
undischarged excitons which might break through in uncontrolled ways.  Moreover the resulting 
aims are often likely to be vitally important to the individual himself, and even more so to any 
complex society in which he lives.  The fact that different individuals will evolve different 
316
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solutions will also be valuable in producing<317> that pluralism which makes for a particular 
aspect of social stability. 
Other types of mental change will also be called for when one’s non-hereditary learned 
mental constructs turn out to be at variance with reality in important ways.  Ability to accomodate 
to such situations — to allow competitive structures to evolve at the expense of the old ones — 
will depend partly on how pluralistic or “broad-minded” one’s mental organization happens to be 
(and this may well depend on uncommitted mental energy), and partly on the clarity of insight at 
higher MnL levels. 
But not all frustrations are necessarily insurmountable.  The adaptive approach in such cases 
is obviously to try to mould the reluctant environment so that it more fully accords with one’s 
own will; where we may take “will” to include unsublimated instinct (including the important 
case of seeking-for-closure), and also the aims which will so-far have arisen from any sublimat-
ion.  It is, of course, this striving after one’s grand-or-trivial objectives which is the driving force 
behind mammalian endeavour; and arguably it also drives all endeavour of all animals.  When 
such attempts are chronically frustrated without sufficiently-redeeming sublimation, then less 
satisfactory methods involving such things as signal-blocking will come to be used extensively, 
instead of just as short-term expedients.  These are the “pathogenic defenses” (Fenichel, 1946, 
page 143 ff.), resulting in neurotic symptoms such as depression and loss of morale.  For the 
remainder of this chapter, we will devote ourselves to considering various types of such 
“defense”, and sketching the sort of mechanism which might plausibly be involved.<318> 
C7.2  Denial as “hallucinatory wish-fulfilment” for some part of the situation 
Denial, fiction, and ego-protection 
As adults, we usually have fairly definite ideas about what is fact and what is fiction.  We 
may choose to mislead others about the truth, but it is often supposed that “mentally healthy” 
adults will not really be taken in by their own fabulated propaganda — at least not much!   In so 
far as we are able to keep control over such matters, we are probably making use of M2L 
constructs — possibly including accumulated extensive-sets of “facts” and of “fictions” relating 
to various topics.  But any such established sets must have been created in the first place, and this 
almost certainly will have occurred on the basis of experience and closure-forming processes.  
Thus in childhood, before such developments have taken place adequately, any sense of reality 
will quite likely depend on ad hoc assessments of closure — subconsciously weighing the 
closure-implications of various concepts, with particular attention to any bearing they might have 
on the self-consistency of one’s own ego-supporting schemata.  It would thus scarcely be 
surprising to find young children really believing that they “didn’t break the dish” (or whatever).  
And, to the extent that adults will suffer from lapses in rational M2L control, we may expect 
similar self-deception in them too. 
Denial versus evidence 
Almost inevitably however, there will be inconvenient self-incriminating evidence left around 
to disturb the equanimity of those prepared to assimilate it properly.  (In the child, this might 
perhaps cause no great problem if he is unable to attend adequately to enough of the evidence 
simultaneously for him to detect the overall lack of closure, even if he were prepared to do so).  
But if the child or adult is subconsciously aware72 of the<319> cognitive dissonance choice, and 
if it amounts to a stark choice between • maintaining the integrity of his own ego by blocking the 
unwelcome evidence, or • badly eroding his ego-complex by accepting the closure-destroying 
                                                          
72 At the M1L level, perhaps?  <319> 
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information,  then it will not be surprising if he chooses the former (ego-preserving) course.  
Usually however, there will actually be other alternatives open to him (if he is both aware of them 
and able to cope with their internal manipulation):  He may, for instance, invoke the proposition 
that “This was just a mistake, and everybody makes some mistakes”, or he may incorporate the 
evidence into his ego-schema and thus take on the new role of “a bad guy”! 
“Freudian energy” needed to maintain the denial 
However, if the choice is made (subconsciously) to block the evidence as being “against self-
security”, then presumably some sort of “jamming” signal will have to be found which will block 
the excitons in the pathways in question.  This is likely to operate as depicted in Figure C6.7/5, 
with the consequent damming up of unwanted excitons which will not just conveniently fade 
away and are always likely to break out in one form or another as long as they are stored in this 
manner; so there will need to be a continual expenditure of energy to maintain the damming, as 
long as the threat persists or seems to persist. 
There remains the problem of how the appropriate method for jamming could have been 
produced as soon as it seemed to be needed.  The answer is likely to be that this could not be done 
intentionally without prior experience, and that this earlier investigation would have happened 
quite spontaneously and arbitrarily like other initial learning, with at least some of the relevant 
references stored away for potential future use.<320> 
C7.3  Projection and introjection as by-products of the self-organization of the ego 
Ego — the formation of a very specialized schema 
Fenichel (1946, page 40) writes enigmatically that “Introjection is an attempt to make parts of 
the external world flow into the ego.” Similarly projection is seen as an attempt to attribute ego 
qualities to entities other than the ego.  Moreover it is suggested by him that there is a stage of 
development …  “in which anything unpleasant is considered nonego, [and] anything pleasant is 
considered ego”.  How then are we to formulate these ideas in terms of the current theory?   
Back in Section C2.3 and the latter part of Section C5.2, we considered some of the likely 
features for the formation of extensively-defined sets within the material substrate of the brain; 
and it should be noted that an important aspect of this supposed procedure was that the initial 
criterion for the membership of such sets was envisaged as being arbitrary.  This concept of set-
representation was developed, via “groups”, into an explanation for object-representation — of 
which the “self-concept” or “ego” was held to be a very special case (Section C6.3, paragraph 6).  
At the same place, it was suggested that the most crucial criterion for a set of “self“-concepts 
would be whether the candidate-features responded readily to one’s own will (hands, tongue, etc.) 
or whether they were comparatively dilatory in this respect (Mummy, chair-leg, etc.).  But such 
response to one’s whim is likely to be regarded as “good” if only because it will probably aid 
closure-formation, a process which we are taking to be inherently rewarding,(Paragraph 5 of the 
same section).  So, even if this reasoning is only partly valid, there is some reasonable 
justification for adopting the implicit slogan:  “Whatever is pleasurable, is something which 
belongs to this whim-serving set/group which represents an object called ‘me’.”<321>  That is to 
say, as a first approximation, the criterion of pleasure-serving is not so very different from the 
criterion:  “this autonomous integrated system, subservient to my will, and possessing privileged 
information-gathering properties”. 
Loose mind-metaphor teminology — versus clear (more testable) statements 
As for Fenichel’s words about attempting “to make parts of the external world flow into the 
ego”, this is obviously meant metaphorically or “mentalistically” (Hyland, 1977a, 1977b) since a 
321
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literal “physiological” interpretation seems to signify a craving for brain-surgery!  The intended 
meaning (in terms of the current theory) would seem to be something like this:-    
“Introjection is an attempt to incorporate the schemata for various parts of the external world 
into the schema which constitutes the ego”; (presumably without unduly disturbing the grouplike 
properties of the latter). 
Such confusions between the “real” outside phenomenon and its “mental” counterpart are 
common enough, but now that we are getting down to more precise (if speculative) statements, it 
is time to be more careful over such wording — and to avoid unexplained metaphor in our main 
pronouncements. 
Seeking to explain projection etc. via set-dynamics — hence via molecular dynamics 
Anyhow introjection and projection, like denial, may readily be seen as arising naturally from 
primitive set-manipulations which involve the ego.  Given unsuitable experiences and/or inadequ-
ate “decentring” to take in a comprehensive sample of the features of such experiences (due 
presumably to deficient MnL organization at the next higher level), such merely-approximate 
strategies may become adopted as being (apparently) the optimal solution.  They may then 
acquire their own system of self-stabilizing closure (based on the spurious evidence) and it will 
then be quite difficult or impossible to unpick the structure  — or at least to do so without also 
breaking up the ego-structure, especially if this now depends on inappropriately introjected 
schemata to maintain its own closure.<322> 
C7.4 Repression as an internally-directed equivalent of denial 
It was suggested, in the closing two paragraphs of Section C7.2, that denial might operate by 
the use of “jamming” signals that had previously been found capable of disrupting incoming 
information which, by now, had become unpalatable.  But not all unpalatable information will 
appear as current external communications; much of it will already be securely stored in past 
memories — having seemed innocuous at the time, or having been too intrusive to be ignored.  
(Indeed, mere denial or ignoring will arguably never suffice to fully exclude such material from 
subconscious memory, once attention of some sort has fallen on it).  Anyhow, given the existence 
of such material in memory, then it will tend to persist as a potential disrupter of existing group-
like structures which are important to the general self-image structure.  So, in the interest of 
maintaining the comparatively pleasurable closure, it will make homeostatic sense for the brain-
system to emit similar “jamming” signals to exclude such internally stored information from the 
system’s own “Consciousness Centre”, and/or from other, perhaps higher, MnL levels. 
If mental energy must be expended on the denial of unpleasant external evidence whenever it 
happens to appear in a noxious form, then the logistic problem for blocking resident internal 
disrupters will be much more of a serious problem — presumably an unremitting full-time job, in 
fact.  The problem will be particularly vexing wherever the unpalatable material is of a hereditary 
(“instinctual” or M–1L) nature; and this will usually mean “sexual” in the wider Freudian sense.  
Indeed it would seem fair to claim that all cases of repression would have such a hereditary 
component as a major ingredient, though this in itself would hardly have any situational<323> 
significance — so some sort of learned structure must also be involved, and it is this potentially 
changeable part which the therapist will perhaps regard as unadaptively constructed and possibly 
worth remoulding. 
The inefficiency of such a system might be compared to that of an authoritarian business 
organization or political regime.  On the one hand, there will be a considerable demand for 
resources to police the activities of the production-force (comparable to the expenditure of mental 
energy, considered above); and these measures will not necessarily even produce the immediate 
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effects desired if, as Townsend (1970) has suggested, the pilferers and deceivers “merely get 
more inventive”!  On the other hand, there will be the loss of production from the interference of 
the policelike activities — especially when they happen to encroach on the “law-abiding” 
citizens; and in the present context this could be interpreted as blocking quite innocent schemata, 
either because their significance is misconstrued at the relevant subconscious level, or simply as a 
side-effect arising from inadequate specificity.  Moreover, an unwelcome by-product of such 
blocking will be the gaps — the failures in internal closure — which will follow from the effect-
ive elimination of “group-members”.  Such flaws may even rebound on the ego itself, arguably 
constituting the cause of depression. 
Another important analogy which should certainly be mentioned here (though this is not the 
place to investigate its implications) is the immunological use of antibodies to block the develop-
ment of proteins in the body, when these have been identified as foreign.  This analogy is partic-
ularly apposite because there is a plausible chance that some of the actual mechanisms could be 
very similar to those postulated for mental repression.  Perhaps the most important<324> 
difference is that whereas immunology contemplates the more-or-less direct contact between 
chemical entities, the current mental model is prepared to encompass such influence at a distance 
via the intermediary of patterned infra-red phonon-signals. 
As for the role of psychotherapy; it was early recognized by Freud (1900/1953, page 106), 
that it was not sufficient merely to confront the patient with the facts concerning his locked-on 
mental state, and indeed such diagnosis was a comparatively small part of the task.  To confront 
in this indelicate way, is merely to invite denial of this intellectual (M2L) input — and possibly 
broader denials involving the therapist himself or even all non-vital M2L activity as “long-haired 
academic pie-in-the-sky”!  In formal terms then, the art of the therapist might be interpreted as 
inducing new mental constructs which will eventually convert the existing meta-stable structure 
into an unstable structure which will then “roll, on its own accord” into the more valid state which 
will accordingly be more stable in terms of group-like properties.  In other words, given a 
position on a “maximum” which is only optimal in a local sense, the task is to fill in the saddle 
between this peak and the higher, more general maximum.  Without the dividing saddle-contours, 
the system’s own maximizing procedure will then automatically cause a move from the old meta-
stable sub-peak, up continually toward the main peak.  However this must all be done without 
arousing undue denial activity, and this will involve the correct balance between accessing the 
emotions (M0L), the intellect (M2L), and the more intuitive modes of the thought in between. 
C7.5  Other defense mechanisms:  
— Isolation, Reaction-formation, Undoing, and Regression 
Isolation — using higher MnL mental activity? 
In the case of isolation, the painful phenomenon itself is recalled without being repressed, but 
there is a failure of recall<325> concerning its significance and associations. That this should be 
regarded as a specialized form of repression, is suggested by the fact that the patient “shows the 
same resistance to a demonstration of the true connection that a hysteric shows to the reawaken-
ing of his repressed memories” (Fenichel, 1946, page 155).  The text continues:  “Thus here again 
a countercathexis is operative; its operation consists in keeping apart that which actually belongs 
together [Laforgue (1929)]”.  In the context of the present theory, this rather looks as though the 
repressing signals or countercathexes have chanced to disrupt the syndrome of thoughts at the 
M1L level rather than at the more usual M0L level (or perhaps even at the M2L level rather than 
the M1L level!).  Anyhow the result would seem to be a disruption of extensive-set operation, 
rather than a disruption amongst its would-be members.  As we shall see, and as mentioned by 
Fenichel and Laforgue, this is likely to have some relevance to the concept of psychosis. 
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The previous paragraph has taken “countercathexis” as synonymous with “blocking-signals” 
which have been postulated to operate in the manner of Figure C6.7/5.  There is an alternative 
mechanistic interpretation however; and this entails considering the countercathexis as if it were a 
negatively-directed vector (rather than a switch relay), presumably taking the form of a negated 
mutant of the original scheme — and now in competition with it.  One might be forgiven for 
doubting the stability of such a mutated arrangement without further elaborations.  So let us 
suppose that traumatic conditions gave rise, at some stage, to support for some fortuitous group-
like schema which both contained the negated mutant, and managed to be sufficiently group-like 
(without the original scheme) for it to survive under its own stability.  Needless to say, such a 
structure would not mix compatibly<326> with structures closely connected with the original 
scheme; and as the latter is presumably hereditary and infinitely renewable, conflicts seem bound 
to occur from time to time, quite possibly involving attempts at mutual repression via blocking 
signals — thus involving two interpretations of the “countercathexis” concept within the same 
general phenomenon.  After all, there is no obvious reason why both types of countercathexis 
should not co-exist. 
Reaction formation 
Anyhow, it seems plausible to associate the blocking-signal type with “repression” in general, 
as was done above — and to attribute the countervailing-schema-vector to the subtly different 
phenomenon of reaction formation.  Given this postulated distinction, it is of some interest to see 
what Fenichel has to say on the matter, (page 151):-     
“Do reaction formations represent a separate and independent mechanism of defense?   They 
seem rather to be a consequence and reassurance of an established repression.”    
It could well be that a blocking-signal system will always come first and perhaps remain through-
out any development of vector effects.  He continues:- 
“But at least they specify a certain type of repression, which can be distinguished from other 
repressions.  It is a type of repression in which the countercathexis is manifest and which 
therefore succeeds in avoiding oft-repeated acts of secondary repression.  The reaction format-
ions avoid secondary repression by making a ‘once for all’ definitive change of personality.”    
The above-suggested new schema (containing the negated mutant) might reasonably be identified 
with this “definitive change of personality”; and in both cases the structure must be regarded as 
less than ideal — and thus, in some sense, no more than meta-stable. 
Undoing 
If we play wrong notes whilst practicing a musical instrument, then we may be able to make 
full amends by re-playing the same passage; and some types of damage can also be fully 
amended. <327> Often however, no such restitution is physically possible in the “real” world, 
and then there is the temptation (at least at a subconscious level) to try to alleviate the feelings of 
guilt or inadequacy by symbolic correction to the original action or thought.  This constitutes 
“undoing” in the psychoanalytic sense; and leads us on to the important question of just what is 
entailed in such “magic” or “symbolic ritual”. 
In the case of re-enactment, it may well be that a very faithful reproduction of the original 
event will be devised, though with a “happy ending” this time — like the rehearsing musician.  
But unlike the music rehearsal, the original damage was irretrievable in some way, so there will 
remain one very significant flaw in this ritual repeat — a flaw which must somehow be swept 
under the carpet, doubtless by the use of some variety of repression.  We may expect that the 
result will then be some partially satisfying group-like structure, whose dubious stability will 
require ever recurring repression and/or re-enactment to sustain it. 
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Whereas the wishful thinking of re-enactment tries to turn the clock back and start again, the 
alternative approach of restitution will presumably accept the damage of the original faux pas but 
attempt to reverse the original process.  Where this cannot be fully achieved in the real world 
with the original people and objects, then some more amenable substitute domain will have to be 
found.  Such symbolic restitution might even make amends in an overall social sense through 
“good works”, though presumably not fully benefiting the persons originally seen to have been 
injured; or the restitution could be an entirely ritualistic expiation of sins.  In either case there is 
likely to be an intellectual (M2L) rationale to support the procedure, probably taking the form of a 
“repayment of a debt” — either to society, or to God, (respectively). <328> Moreover it is 
arguable that is some cases this ploy will succeed, in that the resulting ensemble of structures 
including the ego and superego will turn out to be self-stabilizing without the need for blocking 
signals.  This would however, presumably entail a change of aim and so fall under the heading of 
sublimation, which is considered to be non-pathological (see Section C7.1, above).  But then, of 
course, there is no guarantee that such a satisfactory outcome will eventuate — and such failure 
may fairly be regarded as a form of neurosis. 
So far we have considered the efforts at both re-enactment and restitution as taking place in 
the real world, even if it did tend to be the “wrong part” of the real world — with substitute 
objects, used symbolically.  These transactions will, of course, have a mental counterpart; and we 
might well expect this mental component to exist on its own sometimes, as straightforward 
fantasy.  Indeed, in the case of worry over trivial mistakes or transgressions, it would not be too 
much to expect that acceptable solutions might be found in this way — quite likely incorporating 
mutant material, and possibly constituting trivial equivalents of sublimation.  And even if we 
cannot accept this as a plausible outcome for wakeful fantasizing, it does look remarkably like the 
“wish-fulfilling” aspects of dreaming which we discussed in Section C6.6. 
Regression 
Regression to an earlier mode of behaviour, may perhaps be best explained in terms of the 
Ashby conceptualization — a switching from one mode of mental organization which does not 
seem to be producing rewarding results, into another mode which might plausibly work better in 
view of its usefulness in the past.  There is thus an element of purposefulness in such a change, 
though as the outside situation will probably no longer be suitable for the older type of response, 
the “purposefulness” will fall somewhat short of that<329> identifying-of-the-suitable-occasion 
which was discussed in Section C4.5.  It will however be an advance on the random change of 
Ashby’s simple homeostat system which we looked at in Section C4.4, so perhaps we should 
regard it as an intermediate case. 
We should notice an important difference in emphasis however.  Whereas Chapter C4 was 
concerned with the M0L level mechanisms operating to select between M–1L alternatives, later 
generalized to viewing Mi+1L levels as choosing between MiL alternatives, it seems here that we 
should be choosing between levels as a whole rather than between alternatives within any one of 
them.  Such choice between levels could be more-or-less self-regulating, or it could be under the 
control of some extra-hierarchical system such as “consciousness” or “attention” (see Section 
C6.4, paragraph 3 ff.), or quite likely both influences will be at work.  (The self-regulation might 
plausibly take the form of competitive closure, with mild mutual inhibition tending to suppress 
the currently less-successful group-like structure).  Nevertheless, we should not overlook the 
possibility that some aspects of “regression” might actually be “epi-gression” in structural terms 
— a return to some other schema within the same MnL, and therefore more closely identifiable 
with Ashby’s paradigm, even if the appropriateness of such behaviour has now been lost for ever. 
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Anyhow there is something different about regression which sets it apart from other defense 
mechanisms.  Indeed Fenichel (1946, page 160) raises the question as to whether it is a defense 
mechanism at all, but argues:- 
“The typical compulsion neurotic, experiencing a conflict between his phallic Oedipus wishes 
and his castration fear, substitutes [earlier] anal-sadistic wishes for his Oedipus demands.  Thus 
actually, regression is a means of defense [Freud (1936)].  What must be admitted, however, is 
that the part played by the ego in<330> regression is different from the part it plays in all other 
defense mechanisms.  Other defense mechanisms are set in motion by an activity of the ego …  ; 
in regression the ego is much more passive.  …  in general, regression seems to be set in motion 
by the instincts which, blocked from direct satisfaction, seek a substitute.” 
(And he goes on to suggest that this is made possible by “a peculiar weakness of the ego 
organization” — which we may interpret as poor closure, including poor agreement with external 
manifest reality). 
C7.6  Toward a structural definition of neurosis — and of psychosis 
The usual approach to defining a phenomenon like neurosis is to seek an “operational definit-
ion” to which feasible measurements can be applied without undue difficulty, and this usually 
means concentrating on behavioural aspects of the phenomenon.  By contrast, the philosophy of 
this present work has been that manifest behaviour is just the tip of the iceberg which tells us 
distressingly little about what is really going on; so its use for definitions of this sort will tend to 
be notably uninformative about structure, and only of limited applicability even for clinical 
purposes.  If we then opt for structural definitions invoking unobservable structures, this will 
clearly also have serious disadvantages as far as direct practical applications are concerned, 
because we are left with no tangible way of measuring the state of the structure.  Probably this is 
ultimately one of those dilemmas which we have to accept and live with, but there are ways of 
making the best of the situation; and one such compromise seems to be to first develop a 
plausible structural set of explanations together with their (structural) definitions — regardless of 
measurability considerations, and then look again at the behaviour to see whether we now have 
new insight which might enable us to make better use of the observational techniques at our 
disposal.  Anyhow, it is in that spirit that the<331> current search for structural definitions will 
take place. 
So, in the light of our present theory, what structural feature seems to characterize neurotic 
states in general?   Posed broadly like this, the immediate answer will be equally broad and 
comparatively mundane; something like the following perhaps:- 
“Neurosis is a state in which, as a consequence of coping with some unpleasant experience, a 
structural arrangement has arisen which (given the prevailing environment) precludes the 
evolution of better adaptive adjustment(s) otherwise available, and also remains stable despite 
any lay attempts to re-mould or dissolve it.” 
But even if we improved on the wording of this definition, there would remain some legitimate 
doubt as to whether it really amounts to a useful structural definition.  Maybe it is impossible to 
dispense with all behavioural connotations like “adaptive”, but whether this is true or not, we can 
perhaps amplify the statement by looking separately at different types of postulated neurosis-
causing structure. 
On the basis of the previously mentioned mechanisms, there seems to be reasonable 
justification for identifying two main sources of neurotic blockage; though we shall then see that 
there is likely to be a supportive interplay between them.  Firstly there is the more-or-less 
permanent commitment to the use of blocking signals to keep disturbing ideas, inputs, or instinct, 
from upsetting the precarious equilibrium of the existing self-concept (ego), or some important 
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aspect of it.  This postulated mechanism and the logistical problems it is likely to entail have 
already been discussed in Sections C7.2 and C7.4, so there is no immediate need to elaborate 
further here.  Suffice it to say that it seems to be the predominant factor in denial, repression, and 
isolation. 
The other main cause of neurotic deadlock takes the form of<332> “over-successful” mental 
structures — fixations onto concept-ensembles which have worked well under past conditions and 
thereby built up a cohesion and stability which is more-or-less impervious to changes in the 
individual’s physical or social environment.  (Social analogies to this fixation are to be found in 
abundance — not least amongst spectacular advances in scientific theory which turn out 
eventually to have been only partly right).  Anyhow fixation is recognized as being intimately 
involved in regression (Fenichel, 1946, page 65 — after Freud, 1920), so we may take it to be the 
predominant factor in this case, and also for cases of projection and introjection — using 
primitive  “good = me,  bad = other”  criteria. 
“Countervailing forces” — How plausible are they in Reaction Formation? 
One might also argue in favour of a third basic factor contributing to neurosis:- the opposition 
of countervailing vectorlike “forces”, as considered in connection with reaction-formation in the 
previous section.  This is a moot point, but here we will tentatively suppose that this phenomenon 
is actually a composite of both these factors together with the otherwise-benign sublimation/ 
mutation phenomenon;  hence it would be more structurally informative (and parsimonious) not 
to accord it separate status as a fundamental basis.  It is not too difficult to imagine that a fairly 
simple and common mutation could insert a “not” into hereditary scheme-elements, so that these 
straight contradictions would then be available for competitive evaluation in Darwinian terms; 
and this supposition finds support in Freudian theory:  
“the anti-instinct forces have an instinctual character because they are derivatives of instincts 
[Freud (1927)].  The instinctual attitudes of the children toward their parents are turned into 
forces hostile to the [same?] instincts by [supported by?] an introjection of the parents.” 
 (Fenichel, 1946, page 103).<333>  
Whether such reactions are to turn out as adaptive sublimations, or as non-adaptive encumbr-
ances would seem to depend partly on the chance eventualities of the mutation process, and partly 
on the scenario of events taking place in the environment and reflected internally by introjection 
and other reality-oriented constructs.  If these negated mutants are totally non-adaptive, then they 
will presumably find no closure and therefore suffer dissolution; but otherwise they might well 
find closure support with introjected superego constructs, thus contributing to adaptivity in a 
partial sense, and quite likely surviving.   
In sublimation (where the mutation is presumed to change the aim, but not actually negate the 
original hereditary instinct) it seems that the mutant can control the instinct without resorting to 
neurotogenic signal-blocking (Section C7.1, paragraph 3not 2 now);  here however, with straight 
negation, it would appear likely that such repressive attempts to “jam” out the hereditary impulses 
will be encouraged whenever they evolve spontaneously.   
The other, more mathematically satisfying, concept of opposed vectors sounds sensible 
initially — but it presents difficulties when we come to think of ways it might actually operate.  
How could signals, as such, negate each other?  Unless they can switch each other off (as propos-
ed above), or destructively interfere optically at all relevant points (!), it seems that the two 
conflicting signals would have to wait until after they had been received by their respective 
antagonistic muscle-fibres, or whatever; though it is conceivable that some forms of neurotic 
muscle tension could be just that!  Anyhow, whichever account we accept, there seems some 
justification for regarding reaction-formation as a composite phenomenon rather than a simple 
basis in its own right. 
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The possibility of such composite phenomena raises the question of whether repression is 
likely to entail pure signal blocking, or<334> whether fixation entails pure over-stability.  On the 
simple logical basis that one can hardly have a stable system in which all the relationships are 
negative, we might reasonably suppose that behind any repression phenomenon there will be an 
over-stable “vicious circle” group-structure — or maybe more than one.  At first sight we might 
expect an overstable system to be • entirely self-contained with no need to try to block other 
signals;  but then, in so far as it is non-adaptive, • conflict with other attempts at closure are 
bound to arise — so we may expect blocking-signals to evolve within the system somewhere, 
even if they do not emanate from the overstable part itself.  Thus we should be prepared to 
consider any real “neurotic” system as comprising a finite quota of both of these components 
(amongst other factors like mutation), though without doubt the “proportions” and “arrange-
ments” of these will vary amongst the various Freudian paradigms as suggested above. 
Psychosis, and how it probably differs structurally from neurosis 
By contrast we may suppose that psychosis does not necessarily entail any such definitive 
self-perpetuating structure, though such structures may well have been the immediate cause of the 
psychotic condition — perhaps even serving to maintain it.  Whereas neurosis was seen as 
consisting structurally of a particular type of organization for the internal information processing, 
psychosis may rather be seen as one or more specific deficiencies in such organization.  Putting it 
rather more formally, we might say:-     
“Psychosis is a state in which there has been a dissolution of one or more of those extensive-set 
organizing structures (in its effective collective form) on which the overall mental organization 
has come to depend, thus resulting in a measure of disorientation.”     
This calls for several comments.  Firstly, it should be distinguished from those cases in which 
(say) the M2L level has not yet developed at all, so that the overall organization cannot be<335> 
said to have become dependent on it.  Secondly, the statement does not preclude the possible 
permanent or intermittent recovery of the damaged organizing agents; for instance, their sublim-
inal remnants might well re-proliferate under suitable circumstances.  Next we might hazard a 
guess that one way in which the dissolution could have arisen is through coming to accept 
essentially incompatible members into extensive-set “lists”; so that, like a social club with too 
mixed a membership, spontaneous disintegration is likely to follow.  Fourthly, we may expect to 
find different types of clinical psychosis depending on which MnL level or levels are effected, or 
indeed which of the (probably existing) subdivisions within such levels are the ones involved. 
Finally, where such MnL organization is anything like persistent in its clinical manifestations, 
then this will not auger well for a cure by psychotherapeutic means because the therapist usually 
depends most on contact via the M2L level (for at least some of the important aspects of the 
therapy), and this level will be most vulnerable to disruptions of the type depicted — even if it is 
primarily some other level which has been “dissolved”, because the M2L level will be somewhat 
purposeless or undeveloped without the continuing full complement of lower levels (on which to 
test and prove its closure ability).  Moreover a similar argument would hold for the main 
alternative route, the M1L level, though here the case would be a little weaker since any M2L 
failure could now presumably be eliminated from the set of contributory causes.  We shall look at 
specific clinical symptoms in Chapter C8, below. 
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C7.7  Paranoia as a neurosis which may be one cause of psychosis, and therefore often 
exhibiting aspects of both 
English and English (1958) offer the following dictionary definitions:-<336> 
“paranoia:  …  a (rare) psychosis characterized by systematized delusions with little or no 
dementia.” - 
to which they add the comment that this system “though extensive, is relatively isolated and thus 
leaves the rest of the personality largely unaffected”.  They then contrast this to:- 
“schizophrenia/paranoid:  a psychosis characterized chiefly by autistic and unrealistic thinking, 
hallucinations, and many often highly elaborate and systematized delusions, particularly of 
persecution and grandeur.  The whole personality is affected and there is apt to be deterioration; 
hence the delusions tend to be, and especially to become with the passage of time, less system-
atized.  …“ 
To Fenichel (1946, page 147), the salient feature of paranoia is its abundant use of projection 
so that the outside world is used, sometimes unfairly, as a scapegoat for the paranoid person’s 
own shortcomings.  Or to put it another way, he “prefers to feel dangers as threats from without” 
because this appears to give him more control via those “mechanisms of protection” which are 
actually “against external stimuli only”; (ibid., after Freud, 1922).  In fact:  “The paranoid is 
sensitized …  to perceive the unconscious of others” such that this assists him to rationalize his 
own projection tendencies, presumably giving them the respectability of a pseudo-closure at the 
M2L level as supposedly rational thought; and this “enables him to become oblivious of his own 
unconscious”.  He will, perhaps, assume a god-like transcendent role in which he sees himself as 
exempt from requiring anything so mortal, mechanical, and dubiously-controllable as an 
unconscious. 
Of these two accounts, the first emphasizes the psychotic features, while the second stresses 
the neurotic elements.  Could they both be right?   The view promoted here is that paranoia is 
structurally a neurosis, at least initially, but that it happens to be a type of neurosis which places 
the patient in a perceived<337> world which has psychotogenetic properties.  Thus the structural 
neurosis is likely to first come to the attention of others via the secondary psychotic behaviour 
arising from it; and the process could well, in some cases, continue on further and further into 
psychosis — both structurally and behaviourally — as outlined in the square-bracketed paragraph 
toward the end of Section C6.3, on the basis of Laing (1960/1965, 1961/1971). 
By way of detail, it would seem that the neurosis would consist of a fixation onto that 
primitive schema (myself = good, other = bad) which we discussed in Section C7.3 as a 
contributing factor toward the formation of the ego or self-concept.  In “normal” circumstances, 
childhood experiences “should” ensure that the other = bad concept will dissolve away through 
lack of external closure — given sufficient supporting experience with a friendly external world; 
but a hostile environment will rather serve to preserve this “basic mistrust” (Erikson, 1950).  
(Moreover such preservation may well be adaptive, and it is worth considering when looking at 
the difference between sub-cultures, or between tame and wild animals).  Meanwhile the 
egocentric myself = good aspect will fail to become decentred (in Piaget’s sense), thus leaving 
the individual with an exaggerated feeling of god-like infallibility.  Once such a person has 
reached the stage of attaining an internal closure of his M1L structures to account for these 
phenomena (elaborated later into M2L delusional rationalizations), it will be very difficult to shift 
them from this state — even if their suspicions are unfounded, but even more so if there is some 
substance to them.  Nor is it difficult to see reasons for this impasse:  their own conceptualization 
will supply them with supporting positive feedback whether this is valid or not, and they are not 
likely to accord trust to any would-be helper — even if the helper has no conscious or<338> 
unconscious ulterior motives which an astute patient might detect. 
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In an adequately congenial environment, such a person would probably not progress beyond 
mere neurosis — though of course he might, himself, cause the environment to become 
uncongenial!  We may consider the particular danger that he will find himself placed in a 
situation in which he cannot avoid “contamination of his special position” due to the intrusion of 
the will of others onto himself.  It is to resolve this dissonant situation that he takes the 
psychotogenetic step of trying to adopt a more restricted definition of his “inner self” set, which 
seems to offer a new independence from the “obnoxious” environment — at the price of 
abandoning some of his own mental territory to it, and withdrawing further into the fortifications 
of his own mental “castle”; (Laing, 1960, 1961 — as above).  This then, is the other extreme 
depicted by English and English’s definition of “paranoid schizophrenia” (above); and presum-
ably there is some scope for equilibria in between these two extremes, in particular circum-
stances.<339> 
  R R Traill  (HPS) —    ThChapt7.d  12/10/95  1215 
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Chapter C8 
DEVELOPING A CONSISTENT AND REASONABLY COMPREHENSIVE  
STRUCTURAL THEORY OF PSYCHOSIS 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter goes still further into details of how the brain is likely to have to 
organize its coded elements into various types of ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ sets.  It is 
argued that the best results will be obtained when several such methods are available 
simultaneously — used in parallel in a pluralistically oriented environment, and that 
this would be likely to cause considerable difficulties for experimental investigations of 
the microstructure (where statistical methods are envisaged).  These concepts are 
evaluated in the light of existing clinical and experimental evidence relating to 
schizophrenia, considering the likely effects of diminished pluralism in producing this 
sort of impaired mental performance.  
 
C8.1  A closer look at the likely mechanisms whereby implicit “intensive” sets might 
become organized into the two-or-more types of extensive set 
 “Intensive” for description, “Extensive” for boxes and leashes — a reminder 
To organize thought about the world, one must have workable ways of arranging items into 
“mathematical” sets.  There are several different approaches to this task and, at the risk of 
repetition, it may help to remind ourselves of the main possibilities, and the “Intensive/Extensive” 
terminology used by Piaget.  One obvious way is to specify some property which all members 
must have:  Red objects, or  Items which have been ticked or fitted with a certain electronic label.  
These are intensive definitions, and they have the advantage of flexibility and universality;  but 
they may be difficult to apply in practical activity, especially if we need to act rapidly.  For better 
control, we may need items to be captive in some sense — in a box,  or a file, or fenced enclos-
ure, or each tethered to a central bouy by ropes, or in a loop of neighbours each linked bilaterally 
by some physical-or-virtual attraction, etc.  These are extensive definitions, with the items being 
set-members by virtue of their location within an extended region (however that may be defined). 
If there happen to be further viable strategies, so much the better;  and hybrid techniques 
should also be useful.  The main point is that facility with a variety of these set-manipulating 
methods offers mental versatility — and we probably spend much of our time translating one type 
into another in our daily life-tasks. [RRT, 2006] 
Practical set-defining Systems? 
In the latter half of Section C5.2 we looked at some of the problems of how the brain might 
develop physical representations of mathematical sets of entities, but without coming to any 
clearcut opinions as to detailed mechanism.  It seems likely though, that any thoroughgoing 
explanation of psychosis will be closely bound up with details of this type, so it will be prudent to 
come to rather more definite ideas on such matters of set-organization before proceeding. 
Rather than building directly on the proposals put forward previously, let us look at an 
apparently new alternative suggestion for the basic mechanism — with a view to doing a 
comparison later on.  Looking back then at the pure base sensorimotor level m0l:  Is there any 
likely scope for set-like organization using only the intensive definition for set-membership?   
In order to explore some of the implications of<340> such intensive definition, let us suppose 
provisionally that the ordinary basic linear-elements of this level (as depicted in Figures C5.2/1 
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and C5.2/2) 73 have an additional ability to keep one74 
name-association reference each — a reference by 
“name”  to some other scheme-element of the same level, 
without normally activating it.  (We may refer to such 
nodes in the linear string as “βi” — anticipating their 
formal equivalence to similar symbolic calls postulated 
for m½l elements).  But as each scheme is considered to 
be made up physically of a whole population of linear 
scheme-elements, and as each element (specified by “i”) 
would presumably be free to form its one association 
(“βi”) according to its own idiosyncratic history-of-
experience, it therefore seems that the scheme, as a 
whole, will have an effective “network” of associations 
to other schemes — roughly in proportion to the associat-
ions actually experienced as significant in the past. 
As an illustration of the system proposed here, 
consider a population of people each of which can like 
only one other person in the population.  If each person 
does actually like one person, then a diagrammatic 
representation of the situation would look like Figure 
C8.1/1,  with a complete complement of closed loops; but 
more plausibly there would be some who would not like 
anyone at all, and these would result in a number of 
“unclosed loops” or linear topologies as in Figure C8.1/2. 
Suppose further that the people can be categorized strictly and unambiguously into an 
exhaustive list of mutually-exclusive sets such as age-group or surname.  In this case we may 
suppose that each different letter in the adjoining diagrams denotes a different surname, and in 
calling the surname “f” (say) we will inevitably call forth<341> a reference to “s”; but a call to 
                                                          
73 Figs.C5.2/1 and C5.2/2  are on “original pages 192-193”.   Likewise for Fig.C5.2/3, see o.p.199-200 
— and for Fig.C5.2/4, see o.p.201-203. 
74 This is a simplifying assumption.  In practice the number could well be more, or simply variable. <341> 
f  f  f  f 
s  s  s  s 
p  p  p  p 
c  c  c  c 
 
Fig.C8.1/2.   Another possible 
association-pattern amongst an 
ensemble of the same basic 
elements, but one in which each 
element is permitted to have either 
one affiliation to another element 
— or none;  (a different simplifying 
assumption). <342:topR> 
f  f  f  f 
s  s  s  s 
p  p  p  p 
c  c  c  c 
 
Fig C8.1/1.      A possible 
association-pattern amongst an 
ensemble of elements, in which 
each element is required to have 
one affiliation to another element, 
(a simplifying assumption). 
<342:topL> 
Food
Sucking
Pain
Crying0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (1) 2 (2)
4 
(4
) 
4 
(4
) 
2(
1)
 
2(
1)
 
Fig C8.1/3.   Strengths of concept 
associations as depicted in Fig C8.1/1, 
(and Fig C8.1/2); see text. <342:bott> 
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“c” might lead to “f” or to “p” — or to nothing at all perhaps, in one random alternative of Figure 
C8.1/2.  If we now leave our analogy of the population of people and return to our postulated 
population of mental scheme-elements, then we may use the different letters to denote four 
different schemes (each with a token population of four elements); e.g.  f=food-sensation,  
s=sucking,  p=pain,  and c=crying.   Thus the situation depicted will be roughly as shown in 
Figure C8.1/3, in which the strengths of the association linkages will be as given by the numbers 
beside the arrows:  plain for the Figure C8.1/1 situation, and in parentheses for the Figure C8.1/2 
case.<342> 
Some biological considerations, and multi-choice possibilities 
Unfortunately this still leaves quite a number of questions unresolved, even assuming that the 
new basic assumption of only-one-reference-per-element is correct.  What exactly is the nature of 
such references likely to be?   Are they to be thought of as a sort of (normally inactivated) “radio 
call” to the other elements, or should we think of the other elements as having become physically 
attached?   Or should we allow for both, with the first perhaps leading to the second?   (Moens, 
1973; also Chapters B1 and B2 above).  Associated with this problem is the question of whether 
any “call” of this sort will be addressed to some particular individual element (such as the “p” on 
the left of the diagrams) or simply to all “p”s within reach which are not already captives of some 
prior or stronger influence. 
When faced with this sort of dilemma in a biological context, it seems to me to be best to 
assume provisionally that all such mechanisms occur to some extent — within a pluralistic 
environment, and having some sort of statistical mix between the alternative possibilities.  We 
may later find that some or most of these supposed alternatives are untenable after all, but then all 
we need to do, in a formal sense, is to allocate a statistical-probability coefficient of zero for such 
cases.  In taking such a view, we may find some considerable encouragement in the example of 
chemical resonance in which one considers a number of likely chemical structures based on 
formal traditional notions of bonding, and then considers that the “actual” structure is a kind of 
hybrid or random-alternation between these traditional<343> structures.  Moreover we should not 
forget that we are dealing with mental elements which are presumed to function at the molecular 
level, so we should not be too surprised if we find ourselves invoking principles which are in 
commonplace usage in chemistry. 
However the immediate task in this section is to try to be definite and specific, even at the 
risk of being somewhat inaccurate on points of subsidiary detail.  Perhaps the best compromise is 
to lay down what seem likely to be the predominant trends of structural development, then try to 
apply them collectively to clinical and experimental observations, and meanwhile make amend-
ments of emphasis wherever these seem to be necessary.  (After all, this is probably the strategy 
which the brain itself adopts, especially at the sensori-motor level).  Moreover it might well be 
that different alternative methods will predominate at different stages or for performing different 
types of task. 
If the non-tactile “radio-call” association contact between elements were to be the 
predominant method of linkage, this would probably be highly flexible but also it would 
presumably be rather cumbersome and unreliable.  As such, it would seem to be a good candidate 
for the initial primitive-and-impressionable organization for the new-born individual; and it is not 
too difficult to envisage other arrangements evolving out of it.  In such circumstances, an 
excitation of an “s” element will elicit a call for some other type of element — let us say that it 
specifies a “p” — and this will operate in<344> a crude way to signify that “p” is also to be 
considered as being a fellow-member of the same set (and not, in this case, as something to be put 
into effect — a distinction which we will come back to shortly).  For this purpose, we may 
reasonably assume that the call is addressed indiscriminately to any “p” which happens to be 
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within range, rather than to any particular one, thus introducing a random component into the 
operation whenever there is any actual difference between elements which pass as “p”s. 
For a more reliable arrangement we might consider the alternative of an actual tactile linkup 
between such elements.  (Note that as long as we are only admitting the possibility of one-or-
none symbolic references from any one element, then such a physical linkage system does seem 
feasible — without the likelihood of unmanageable branched tangles which might be expected 
from other super-linear linkage systems.  Of course this tangle-problem would disappear in 
proportion to the looseness of the physical linkages — presumably vanishing altogether when the 
linkages no longer deserve the description “tactile” but have reverted to the “radio-call” linkages 
which we have just considered).  In fact though, in the final analysis, the distinction between 
“tactile” and “radio-call” linkages is probably less clearcut than we tend to assume in our every-
day lives:-  Infra-red “radio-call” signals would certainly be of an electromagnetic nature, but 
then it might be plausible maintained that the relevant types of chemical bonding involved in a 
“tactile” link would<345> also be electromagnetic in character — though probably with a differ-
ent type of phase relationship between the electric and magnetic components, as in the distinction 
between near-field and far-field properties of radio antennae (Walter, 1970; Skilling, 1962). 
Molecule-like list-codes 
However, be that as it may, we are now considering the closely connected “tactile” type of 
linkup:  so our task now should be to contemplate the likely consequences of such an arrange-
ment, and the mechanisms whereby it might feasibly develop.  If the system is to be manageable, 
it seems likely that the individual elements which are to make up such a chain should retain their 
individual properties largely unchanged, and if the chain is subject to physical stress we might 
expect that breakages should occur between these elements rather than within them.  In these 
circumstances, a feasible geometrical configuration would be a comb-shaped structure with the 
individual elements comprising non-rigid “teeth” of the “comb” — on the lines of the arrange-
ment as drawn in C5.2/3 though now, of course, with a physical connection of some sort to 
replace the more tenuous linkage implied by the dotted lines in that earlier diagram.  To make this 
idea clearer, we may now conveniently look at a modified diagram [Fig C8.1/4] — re-drawn to 
show the new features which we are now considering.  It will be seen that the shape is, in fact, 
more that of a double-toothed dog-comb than one of the conventional type; and the broken lines 
are now drawn between the constituent elements to emphasize the postulated looser connection 
between them:-<346>   <347:Fig8.1/4> 
The main thing to notice about this new diagram is that it lacks any “α” label to act as a clear-
cut reference-point to the set-as-a-whole, so that its only means of reference must presumably be 
via the labels of its individual members (ai) but especially that of the head-member for that 
particular geometrical  arrangement — a1 in this case.  Such an extra role for “a1” would 
evidently lend itself to ambiguity, but then a little thought will suggest that ambiguities of this 
type may be uncomfortably common during the early stages of the development of a generic 
concept.  It is not unreasonable to suppose, for instance, that our early concept of “dogs in 
general” consists of a list of particular dogs, of which one particular dog serves as the paradigm 
and label for the whole diffuse concept.  (This might next be augmented by similar parallel lists 
for which a different paradigm serves as the lead-in; the two separate lists later coalescing 
statistically due to frequent parallel usage).  As another example, we might note that Piaget 
himself violates logic in this way and uses the term “Concrete Operations” ambiguously — 
sometimes including and sometimes excluding the “Pre-operational” sub-period; (Furth, 1969).  
(Here the inclusive case seemingly amounts to a list-like organization, whereas the exclusive case 
can be considered as if it were an isolated “member”, independent of any list-structure).<348> 
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There are other differences too, of course.  Closely associated with the absence of an “α” 
label is the fact that this ensemble has neither a specialized master element (as in Fig C5.2/3)73 — 
nor a specialized name-code (as in Fig C5.2/4) to represent the set, as such.  Clearly there is also, 
by design, a difference in the locations of the weaker linkages.  In addition, in the version which 
happens to have been shown here, there is less of an “intensive” uniformity among the member 
elements as compared with the elements as detailed in Figs C5.2/3 and C5.2/4; so one is more 
inclined to wonder about the mechanism which would have brought such elements together into 
the same extensive set in the first place — and kept them there.  This is the all-important question 
on which it is now vital to get as much clarification as we can muster. 
What could hold the mental list-elements together? 
In Section C5.2 it was suggested that there might be a credential-monitoring segment, γ, in 
the unifying master element Fig C5.2/3 or elements Fig C5.2/4;  but there was no detailed 
suggestion as to how this might operate, and anyhow it is even less convincing here where we are 
considering a confederation which lacks any master element as such. 
349
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 d1
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Fig C8.1/4. 
Another conceivable 
arrangement of linear 
elements formed up to 
represent a set or “list” of 
elements. 
This may be seen as an 
alternative to the structures 
depicted in Figures C5.2/3 and 
C5.2/4 — though this present 
structure is less organized 
(more syncretic), and as such 
might represent a more primit-
ive method which might, or 
might not, be a developmental 
precursor to the other types. 
(The broken lines are here seen 
as a comparatively loose 
physical bonding, though we 
have also been considering 
cases in which such linkages 
are simply communication 
channels using “radio-like” free 
signals such as would be 
shown dotted in Figures C5.2/3 
and C5.2/4). <347> 
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Elsewhere in this work it has proved conceptually useful, when faced with apparently-
teleological phenomena, to invert the naive concept of causal direction — thus assuming an 
arbitrary undirected “mutation” which will, on average, be unhelpful to the organism, but will in 
the long run produce an enduring new adaptive structure by a Darwinian process of selection.    
Similarly here we may<349> suppose that if an ensemble of the Fig C8.1/4 variety does not 
prove to have a reasonable norm of (competitive) usefulness, then it will be quietly pushed back 
into the melting pot.  So far so good, but we still need to offer an explanation of the mechanisms 
involved. 
There is no great problem in visualizing how the βi nodes might invade existing elements in 
an arbitrary manner, thus producing the necessary mutations.  The difficulty, as before, is in 
showing how efficacy could be monitored.  In fact though, there would seem to be a solution to 
this difficulty on the basis of the synchronizing cross-feed principle of Fig C5.2/273, used in 
conjunction with a trial-and-error procedure:-  
In the earlier account of this Monod-and-Jacob system (in Section C5.2), we were thinking in 
terms of ready-made genetic elements — and moreover these were massed replicates of the same 
basic structure, arising from a common chromosomal source.  But consider the possibility that 
such cross-feed support systems might arise occasionally between arbitrarily mutating elements 
which just happened to be within effective communicating distance of each other.  As it will 
presumably be an important property of any meaningful set that its members will tend to be of 
simultaneous relevance, such a synchronizing mechanism would appear to be well suited as a first 
step mechanism for defining the set-membership extensively; but it now remains for us to explain 
how such membership will relate to the intrinsic intensive properties of the individual elem-
ents.<350> 
Evolution sequence:  Association → Salient member → Label-for-whole 
Darwinian survival of the fittest does not apply only to individuals, but also to ensembles of 
individuals; similarly an individual element representing a particular mutant coding will be more 
likely to survive (other things being equal) if it has happened to achieve an affiliation to a useful 
ensemble of elements.  So as long as there is a plentiful supply of mutants from which to choose 
and replicate (and after all, the total population of elements could be vast), then there is a 
reasonable basis for Darwinian selection amongst the postulated ensembles — simply on the 
basis of the resulting survival probabilities for their members.  Such a process could feasibly 
account for loose types of concept-association and synchronization of the Monod-Jacob crossfeed 
variety Fig C5.2/2,73  or indeed for the sequence of single “calls” depicted in Fig C8.1/4 if this is 
a viable proposition — or any tenable combination of such cross-references between simple 
member elements.  However it is difficult to see how this, on its own, could explain the more 
organized type of set representation of Figs C5.2/3 and C5.2/473 in which the set has come to be 
both well defined, and also callable and/or nameable in its own corporate right — like a legally 
formed public company, largely independent of the status of its constituent members. 
Probability and Stepwise Evolution 
In Section C5.2 and elsewhere, I suggested that some specialized and newly mutated “master 
elements” might have the power to set themselves up as arbitrary lists of other elements and also 
then erase their own references<351> to those listed members which did not conform to that list’s 
arbitrarily preset criterion for membership — thus eliminating from extensively-defined 
membership all those elements which did not have the “right” intensive definition.  Unfortunately 
however, satisfying these various different conditions simultaneously by trial-and-error must be 
regarded as tending towards the highly improbable, even given that there are likely to be a very 
great number of elements capable of mutating in potentially useful ways and assuming also that a 
single successful ensemble could be rapidly replicated by “reinforcement”.  Although ultimately, 
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as in genetic evolution, we must apparently accept a progression by trial-and-error as the only 
possible alternative to a teleological or divinely-guided biology, there are nevertheless limits to 
what we can reasonably expect trial-and-error to accomplish in a single step.  Thus we might 
reasonably credit the occasional spontaneous generation of a virus, but not that of a fully 
functional amoeba; and it is similarly rather too much to expect the right fully-organized sort of 
framework for a useful extensive set to appear spontaneously, except perhaps on rare occasions. 
But we have just seen that there is at least one plausible trial-and-error process for a part of 
the job of developing an extensive-definition of sets, so it is now open to us to see whether there 
might be other mutational steps which could result in the same<352> sort of sophisticated system 
as those considered in Section C5.2 though in a more credible stage-by-stage manner.  Let us 
therefore suppose that our cross-referenced syncretic type of thought-association cluster has 
evolved within the brain, as postulated in the above paragraphs, and try to explain how this could 
     Fig C8.1/5.  
One simple representation of a 
syncretic extensively-defined 
set.   In this case the 
association-linkages happen to 
centre on the “a3” string, giving it 
a privileged access to the other 
members.   It is thus well 
situated to capitalize on any 
chance mutations which would 
tend to produce versions of it 
which happen to have properties 
conducive to its being a “master 
element” in its new form. <354>  
(The cross-feed significance of 
“f” and “p” nodes is the same as 
in Figure C5.2/2).  
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evolve further into the well-controlled 
extensive sets envisaged in connection with 
Figures C5.2/3 and C5.2/4. 
It can be seen from Figures C8.1/5 and 
C8.1/6 that one type of evolutionary change, 
potentially capable of working successfully, 
would entail a mutation to the label of one 
exemplar75 of one salient member of the set.  
In favourable circumstances, the new form 
of the label would fortuitously tally with 
separately evolved “call” codings on other 
elements which would then be likely to take 
on a role of set-manipulation from within 
the next higher level of the MnL hierarchy 
— in a way similar to that envisaged for the 
fortuitous growth of control over reflex 
schemoids during the sensori-motor stage. 
<353> 
Thus we now have a rather more cred-
ible postulate on how a well-controlled set 
might evolve — in two steps instead of the 
single step proposed in Section C5.2, and 
which for the moment we may simply refer 
to as “step l” and “step 2”.  In view of the 
supposed potential for occasional further 
development of group-like properties, we 
should also bear in mind the likelihood of 
there being potential for another — “step 3” 
— as well; but as this seems likely to have 
only secondary relevance to our present 
concern with causes of psychosis, we need 
not develop this further idea in any great 
depth here.  Suffice it to say that it might 
well involve a selection in favour of mutat-
ions which enhance the symmetry and order-
liness of syncretic ensembles like the (over-
simplified) one depicted in C8.1/4; but it is 
reasonable to suppose that “step 2” could be 
a prerequisite for this type of development, 
or at least be of some considerable assist-
ance. 
                                                          
75 Here we should bear in mind that, according to the current theory, there would normally be many such 
exemplars existing redundantly in parallel;  so any single one of them could readily be released for 
other purposes.<353> 
     Fig C8.1/6.       <355> 
This depicts the sort of change which might occur to 
the “a3” string of Figure C8.1/5, resulting in a “master 
string” similar in function to that depicted in Figure 
C5.2/3, but arising from rather different circum-
stances.   The main change would probably be some 
alteration to the label part such that the a3 label-
coding would become differentiated from other a3 
exemplars, resulting in a new label “α” which could 
now serve as a reference for the set as a whole rather 
than for its “most prominent” member.   In its new 
role, other codings on the element, such as m3, would 
probably not be maintained by usage and would 
therefore tend to disappear from the new master-
elements — though not from those “a3” elements 
which still retained their old function as representat-
ives of the particular member of the set.  
 f3 
 m3  (?) 
 F3 
 α 
 P3 
 p3 
   etc ? 
= βI 
= βII 
(355) 
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Rival “α-masters” as a possible factor in psychosis 
However, returning to the discussion of step 2 itself, it rather looks as though such an 
evolutionary process might occasionally run into trouble when there are rival claimants among 
the set’s membership for the role of “the most salient”, or at any rate when these or other 
circumstances lead to there being rival “master-string”  α-structures whose properties are in some 
way incompatible.  Such rivalry for the “empty throne” may well be quite common in the early 
stages of step 2, and perhaps even the later stages as well, without necessarily causing any great 
disruption.  Moreover as long as rival formulations can be kept<356> communicationally separate 
by compartmentalization, then there may be no harm in such an arrangement even in the long 
term.  However if some important conceptual structure of a higher MnL level has been built on 
the basis of one set of α-schemata, and if these become eclipsed by, or confounded with, a new 
set of α-schemata before the system has had sufficient time to adjust, then this higher MnL 
system is likely to be thrown into major confusion whenever the second type of α-schemata is in 
the ascendancy.  To what extent this could be avoided by gradual transition, or by psychotherapy 
or whatever, would presumably depend very much on the particular system and the prevailing 
circumstances. 
Anyhow we shall here take it as a postulate that confusions of this type are a decisive factor 
in the production of clinical psychosis, and it seems to follow from this that we should expect a 
given “simple” psychosis to be specific to a particular organization at a particular MnL level.  — 
But then there can be no guarantee that such “simple” conditions will not spread their effect in a 
chain-reaction which would similarly unbalance other systems, and perhaps provide exacerbating 
positive feedback into the original system as well.  Nevertheless if this postulate is true to any 
significant extent, then we might expect that experimental and clinical studies which rely on 
correlation-seeking procedures will produce more mystification than enlightenment on the nature 
of psychosis because any observable behavioural syndromes are more likely to reflect the<357> 
secondary chain-reaction processes than the nature of the original “simple” psychosis, or its 
connection with step 2 difficulties. 
Other Set-Definition Methods — (beyond Intensive and Tethered-extensive) 
So far the discussion in this section has been concerned only with the “tethered” type of 
extensive definition for the sets.  Members have been considered as being either physically bound 
together, or more likely it is their representative “names” which are physically bound, and these 
are presumed to be in potential contact with the member elements by means of intensively defined 
calling mechanisms.  We have not yet brought the present discussion back to the “bounded” type 
of extensive definition, but already it is beginning to become clear that any straightforward 
trichotomy of set-definition types may be an oversimplification.  For one thing, we have just been 
reminded that tethered extension is likely to operate in close cooperation with intensive set-
definition;  but there are also reasons for believing that intensive definitions themselves are 
possibly specific to particular distances-from-source, or even from sources (plural).  Such 
possible effects have already been discussed above in Section C6.7;  but it will assist the present 
discussion if we recall the essential points here, and consider their likely implications for the 
methods of defining set-membership.<358> 
For one thing it was argued that, thanks to optical dispersion of the calling-signals, the actual 
electromagnetic “key” pattern which such signals would present to reception sites would vary 
according to the distance which the signal had passed through the dispersive medium.  This has 
obvious implications for an extensive definition of the sets involved (over and above the intensive 
“callsign” properties) because the effective target region for any particular coding-and-distortion-
tolerance would seem to be a spherical shell, of specific dimensions, centred on the emitting 
source.  [As a matter of detail however, we should bear in mind that unless the dispersive medium 
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happened to be homogeneous and isotropic, the actual shape of the reception-region would not be 
such a neat geometrical shape.  And in view of the likelihood that the bulk of any dispersion 
would be caused by such inhomogeneities as myelinated fibres, this caveat is hardly to be 
ignored.  On the other hand though, we may happily interpret this concept topologically;  and in 
some circumstances we might even get away with statistical approximations — though this 
should certainly be regarded as dubious pending an in-depth mathematical treatment of the whole 
dispersion issue].  Anyhow, the essential point here is that there is not only a bounded extension 
criterion superimposed upon the supposed intensive definition of sets, but it seems that the two 
processes may actually interact, and that the boundaries of effective areas may have much more 
intricate shapes than one might at first suppose.<359> . 
But Section C6.7 went further and considered the possibility that, in some circumstances, the 
effective signal would be an interation-effect or interference-pattern from two or more separate 
sources, whose in-phase operation is likely to have a special significance worthy of detection.   
Anyhow the geometrical implication for such a process is shown in Figure C8.1/7, assuming a 
homogeneous isotropic medium and two relevant emitting sources.  Here the effective receiving-
region has been narrowed down to the ring-shaped overlap of two spherical shells, and of course 
any case which required the interaction of any further sources would entail an even more 
selective target area.  (As before, this neat picture is likely to be severely disrupted by 
inhomogeneities in the dispersive media, but the general principles should still apply). 
It will be convenient to apply the term Range-Bounded Extension to this potential method for 
defining a set, whatever the number of emitting-sources involved:   one, two, or fifty. 
Fig C8.1/7. 
An illustration of the sort 
of region which is likely 
to be implicitly specified 
when two range-specific 
signals are required 
simultaneously for 
effective reception.   
In practice, the shape is 
likely to be much more 
irregular because the 
diagram shown here 
assumes unjustifiably 
that the medium will be 
homogeneous and 
isotropic throughout. 
<360> 
source
A 
source
B 
Range for A 
Range for B 
361 
(360)
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As it would now seem that a signal may be guided to its “intended”76 destination by two 
largely-independent mechanisms (a code-specific receptive-site, and a range-specific “broadcast 
beam”), we would appear to be dealing with mutually cooperative redundant systems, both 
fulfilling roughly the same function.  This means that the system might well be able to continue 
functioning<361> even if one of the mechanisms is disrupted — though we might well expect 
there to be some loss of efficiency as a result of the reduction in redundancy, and that this will 
show specific features depending on which of the mechanisms has been disrupted.  Such 
phenomena seem likely to have some bearing on the attempt to explain psychotic symptoms, as 
we shall see. 
Sets Defined by Barriers such as Cell Membranes 
But when we were discussing bounded extensive definitions earlier, we were more inclined to 
envisage the physical set boundaries as being actual physical barriers such as cell membranes.  
Such a view is clearly still tenable, though it will be expedient to make a clear distinction between 
it and the above Range-Bounded type;  so let us refer to it as Envelope-Bounded Extension, or 
Barrier-Bounded Extension, depending on whether the boundary is seen as being complete (such 
as a cell-or-vesicle membrane) or merely a non-enclosing “wall” (such as the endoplasmic 
reticulum).  It remains then to explain how such set definitions might become established, and 
postulate the particular purposes they might serve. 
One process whereby such categorization-by-location would probably be set up is that of 
embryological cell-differentiation.   Thus it would seem from the work on brain-mapping  
(see Section C5.4 above;  especially concerning Hubel and Wiesel)  that for the more permanent  
(M–1L) parts of the brain organization, there is a ready-made orderly array of “pigeon-holes” into 
which incoming processed signal patterns are sorted.  So no-matter whether such cells operate as 
a single integrated unit, or whether their essential activity is at the molecular level, in either case 
the cell’s overall function will be specialized and its effective processing will evidently be limited 
to a single restricted “topic”.  It is rather less clear to what extent these orderly arrays of cells 
really are “ready-made”<362> by “purely” genetic means.  As with other embryological develop-
ments, we should be on the lookout for shaping effects arising from early attempted usage; — 
orthomaturation again.  (We shall come back to this point again in the fourth paragraph below, in 
connection with the supposedly less primitive origin of such categorization of elements in later 
development). 
Spontanteous Clumping and its Interaction with Boundaries 
In addition to any such genetically inspired specialization within cells, we should not be 
entirely surprised to find a comparable type of specialization occurring spontaneously, very much 
in the same way as land use will tend to become locally-specialized even in the absence of legal 
constraints and natural geographical features (which might perhaps be compared to genetic 
factors).  Moreover the reasons for such clumping would appear to be similar in that there are 
certain advantages in having particular types of entity in close proximity to each other — be they 
communicational entities, or economic, or cultural/emotional — so aggregates will tend to 
continue to build up, within limits, once they have actually begun.77  Such beginnings may have 
                                                          
76 It will, I hope, be clear now from previous discussion that this channelling of information is not to be 
attributed to teleological or vitalistic forces.   We should rather think of such channels as evolving 
arbitrarily (with a large percentage of failures) and then (sometimes) being adopted by an existing 
system because of an apparent usefulness which the system discovers in them.   Of course, once the 
channel has become established, then it does make some sense to talk loosely about “intended” 
destinations.<361> 
77 For theoretical considerations of the consequences, to the homogeneity of the system, of various 
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been inspired by genetic factors or whatever, or they might simply have occurred in any arbitrary 
location wherever several potentially-cooperating elements happened to occur simultaneously.  
If micro-pipette electrodes detect some sort of functional specialization at different sites, notably 
cell-bodies or nodes of Ranvier, then this would hardly be surprising even within the so-called 
“association cortex”, but such findings need not necessarily imply that the electrode has detected 
all the<363> available information at these locations, nor that the specialization is total and 
exclusive.  Nevertheless such phenomena are clear evidence of some degree of “Envelope-
Bounded Extension”, or something very like it. 
In fact, the existence of “natural” boundaries in the form of cell-membranes and similar 
barriers, will presumably greatly influence the way in which the local aggregations develop — 
just as natural geographical boundaries profoundly influence the way in which man or beast will 
develop a specialization in land-use.  The isolation of any given area from its neighbouring areas 
will increase the likelihood of homogeneity within that area, and its difference from its 
neighbours.  The boundary will also act as some sort of a brake on any tendency for the aggregate 
to grow uncontrollably at the expense of the system as a whole; (and it may well be that this 
formal similarity to the problem of cancerous growths is no mere coincidence).  Such restriction 
on potential communication also brings us back to Ashby’s important point that “connections” 
within the brain should be severely limited, and not superabundant as one might suppose. 
Just what sort of local homogeneity should develop will presumably depend on various 
factors including the ratio of locality size to the effective range of signals within the locality.  
Thus we might expect the operation of large localities, such as the Purkinje cells, would<364> be 
significantly different from the operation of small localities.  The degree of isolation will 
presumably also be of considerable importance (and subject to manipulation):   excessive 
isolation would effectively exclude the locality from the general system, while vanishing 
boundary-effects would of course remove the special feature we are considering. 
Coming back then, to the question of cells which are supposedly already pre-organized by 
genetic means, it may well be that there is no strong influence brought to bear to determine what 
specialization the cell should adopt — but that this would not usually be necessary, since only 
slight “hints” from genetic, potential-usage, or near-neighbour sources would generally suffice to 
steer development in the “right” orthomaturational direction.  For regions of the brain where there 
is no predictable pattern to such “hints”, then we will presumably find no detectable regularity of 
function between individuals; hence the so-called “association areas”. 
Consolidation into LTM, and its Breakdown in Psychosis 
[NB]We have by now distinguished at least four different basic methods which the brain might 
plausibly use to establish which elements belong together in “sets”.  Post-learning “consolidat-
ion” into more suitably organized forms of memory would seem to entail the ability to reorganize 
such sets from one type of physical embodiment into one-or-more alternative form.  It seems 
likely, for instance, that this is the sort of activity which results<365> in the conversion of Short 
Term Memory into Long(er) Term Memory — a process which can be sabotaged by bilateral 
hippocampal lesions, as in the case of a particular patient “HM”, (Scoville and Milner, 1957; 
Milner, 1966; Kimble, 1969; Milner, 1970), alias “Mr Henry” (Iversen, 1974) — though one 
should be cautious about assigning a detailed role to the hippocampus on this evidence, or in 
attributing this effect to all concept-consolidation phenomena. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
simple assumptions about inter-element affiliation:  see Goel (1970), Goel and Leith (1970), Leith and 
Goel (1971).  Similar considerations also apply, of course, to phase theory in physical 
chemistry.<363> 
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So far then, broadly speaking, we have considered four different types of set-definition:  three 
varieties of extensive definition plus the intensive definition — though we should recall the 
argument that intensive definitions are likely to be complicated by range-effects arising from 
optical dispersion and hence probably confounded with the Range-Bounded Extension type of 
definition.  Anyhow, bearing in mind that such mechanisms are likely to be operating 
pluralistically in parallel, we now have some basis for postulating the type of malfunction which 
could result in psychotic behaviour:-  any breakdown in extensively-defined set-organization 
would be rather like emptying one’s filing-cabinet onto the floor and tearing the pages out of the 
diary!  Assuming, that things were properly labelled (i.e. intensively defined) then one could, in 
principle, carry on with considerably reduced efficiency — on the “Seek and ye shall find” 
basis.<366> 
This example emphasized pre-existing “files”.  Alternatively or additionally we might consid-
er what our plight would be if no new files or lists were to be allowed in any sort of reliable 
extensive form (even though we night be allowed access to existing files).  Here again, some sort 
of coping behaviour might be possible, but our performance would clearly be seriously impaired.  
Moreover we may presumably envisage various degrees of such breakdown in both cases, so that 
we should expect different gradations in the symptoms — or even major qualitative differences as 
critical thresholds are reached.  (Incidentally we might perhaps also expect some impairment of 
performance from the opposite extreme of too rigid a file-structure).   
Another noteworthy point is that such breakdowns need not be universal, applying to all 
realms of the patient’s thought, (though in some circumstances they might be — e.g.  in response 
to some generally active toxic agent).  Thus a disruption effecting language and logic perform-
ance in the left hemisphere, need not necessarily have any direct bearing on musical ability in the 
right hemisphere; or different subject-material might be differentially effected even if, from the 
macro-anatomical point of view, they were stored at the same site.  In particular, a disruption at 
one MnL level might well occur in isolation from the performance at other MnL levels; and this is 
a point which entails some important consequences:-<367> 
Symptoms varying greatly according to which “MnL”-level fails 
Let us refer back to Table C5.4/I and work down the MnL scale considering the types of 
symptom which are likely to result from a deficient extensive-definition capability at each level.  
Such a failure at the M3L level would be commonplace, and indeed we might doubt whether the 
M3L level exists at all; but anyhow most people seem to manage perfectly well despite this.  
Failure of M2L “formal operations” brings us to one type of symptom often associated with 
psychosis, though it occurs in other circumstances as well:  this entails a failure of logical or 
mathematical coherence — in a degree considered undesirable within the culture concerned (after 
all, no man can match a computer in some features of this skill).  Such lapses from “secondary 
process thinking” (to use Freudian terminology) are commonplace of course; even for “normal” 
people they occur during dreaming, under intoxication, fatigue, and pressure of events.  Those 
people having a chronic deficiency here but not at any lower level, would quite likely pass as 
“normal” in fact; though presumably they would be classified as “having a low IQ” or as being 
innumerate, or perhaps even credited with socio-economic class attributes such as “semi-skilled” 
or “unskilled”.  Indeed this is a feature which we might do well to investigate in some detail, 
though it lies outside the scope of this present work.<368> 
Failure at M1L would be more serious, producing behaviour which most people would regard 
as bizarre — such as devising ad hoc sets of objects with scant regard for the culture’s view of 
which objects “should” belong together.  (Here, as has often been remarked, there is a tenuous 
distinction between “madness” and “creativity”.  After all, sometimes the culture could benefit 
from a re-drawing of its conceptual boundaries).  However there is nothing very creative in the 
368
369
367
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f 
Ps
yc
ho
si
s 
——
 C
8.
1 
 I
nt
en
si
ve
 s
et
s 
→ 
Ex
te
ns
iv
e 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 170  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  170  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
more syncretic thought of the more severe cases.  Such scant following through of mere shreds of 
association suggests a serious lack of the ability to manage sets — i.e.  to manage lists of more 
than one object at a time; and this tends to confirm the suspicion that such patients are just 
making do with unsupported intensive definitions, whereas the normal person would make 
considerable use of one-or-more type of extensive definition to support the process — both 
regarding grouping entities found useful as a set in the past, and also on an immediate Short Term 
Memory basis. 
Even more serious conditions are likely to arise from defects at the M0L and M–1L levels.  
The M–1L case scarcely belongs in our present discussion because its organization is probably 
different, with perhaps no bearing on the intensive/extensive issue in its present form; and any 
developmentally-important defect will probably be of a non-psychological nature — 
acknowledged as “organic” by the medical profession.  M0L failure would constitute an inability 
to comprehend objects as<369> such — a non-acquisition (or loss) of the subconscious 
realization of the mathematical group-like properties of those significant ensembles in our 
environment which we call “objects”.  Because objects are, on the whole, remarkably consistent 
in displaying their properties in a comparatively simple form, it will be most unlikely that such 
learning will not occur (or be lost) unless physical M0L handicaps render such lessons virtually 
inaccessible.  Such a blockage at the senses or their nerve-tracts, or indeed in the would-be set-
handling mechanisms of the brain, will presumably leave the unfortunate individual in a 
vegetative state, as depicted in the film “A Day in the Death of Jo Egg”; and borderline cases 
such as deaf-and-blind babies need most carefully organized experiences of touch, texture and 
olfaction if they are to have anything like a normal development (Tyrrell, 1977).  Once basic 
concepts of this type have been achieved, it seems hard to believe that they could be lost again in 
view of their presumed stability — unless perhaps under extreme trauma and sensory-deprivation, 
or an elaborately rigged environment of ephemeral dissolving pseudo-objects!  Regression back 
down through M0L therefore seems unlikely. 
Here we have been discussing objects (as semi-rigid geometrical entities) as if this were the 
only type of development which depended directly on the M0L sensori-motor stage.  This may be 
a somewhat simplistic view, considering that interpersonal relationships are<370> also 
developing at the same time.  Of course these relationships may well be interpretable in terms of 
objects — after all, as we have seen earlier, one’s self is a key prototypal object against which to 
assess other objects, and parents constitute other key objects.  But it is not difficult to see that 
there will be a qualitative difference, at some stage, between objects of the more geometrical type 
and those of the more human type; and this will presumably mean that there is a possibility that 
one type might come to malfunction even though the other might develop properly.  There is 
some possibility then, that we may have here a vulnerable developmental point at which an 
inadequate or inappropriate set-organization could lead to autistic or psychopathic tendencies.  
This however is a side-issue, and I shall not pursue the matter further here. 
Addressing the correct MnL in Daily Life — an important skill 
Another logically possible type of malfunction within the brain’s set-organization is what we 
might call “meta-linguistic confusion” — the incongruous lumping-together of elements which 
properly belong to different MnL levels.  Thus sharpness, a quality of primary perception 
properly belonging to the interface between M–1L and M0L might become reified and be treated 
mentally as if its internal coding were that of an actual object (belonging at the M0L/M1L 
interface) — and all this without any (M2L?) awareness which could render the activity into an 
acceptable metaphorical usage.  Similarly the confusion could occur one step further up the MnL 
scale, between an object and a set (perhaps the set to which it<371> properly belongs — “this 
slug” versus “slugs in general”). 
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During development, such meta-linguistic confusion is probably natural, inevitable, and 
commonplace (as implied by the mechanisms postulated earlier in the present section, in relation 
to Figure C8.1/4; but normal development presumably brings a fair measure of mastery of such 
mysteries, through closure-seeking processes and the establishment of a specialized 
“administrative” set-organization whereby elements are generally attributed to their proper MnL 
levels.  In principle this could be effected by the establishment of extensive definitions for the 
respective levels; but in view of the apparently small number of such sets, and their very large 
membership, it would seem to be a more economical plan to use some form of ad hoc intensive 
definition for this purpose — and in the circumstances this could well take the form of a “tag” 
system such as those discussed previously in connection with punishment/reward, affect, and 
feelings of familiarity.  Alternatively perhaps there is no such explicit administrative set-structure 
at all, and its function is adequately implied by the massed membership-patterns of the ordinary 
sets, evolving in a “proper” MnL way, in the light of experience. 
It is of some importance to pay special attention to possible differences in set-organization for 
different aspects of mental activity.  In assessing clinical<372> evidence with a view to finding 
meaningful categorisations amongst symptoms, it will be potentially very useful to have in mind 
likely differences in the underlying mechanisms, because any separate anomalies in these 
mechanisms might reasonably be expected to be the cause of separable behavioural abnormalities 
— or at least different emphases in the behavioural patterns.  One such possible difference in 
mechanism is that between “administrative” and “ordinary” sets, which we have just been 
considering.  Another is the distinction according to subject-matter; and another is the important 
distinction between MnL levels, which also raises the question (discussed in Section C3.2 and 
depicted in Table C5.4/I) of whether the same material substrate is used for all MnL levels, or 
whether for instance the lower levels operate wholly or partly within the more ancient and 
primitive parts of the brain, such as the tectum.  It is not necessary here for us to arbitrate 
decisively between such alternatives, but the existence of a conceptual framework which poses 
such choices might well make it easier to devise more plausible interpretations of clinical 
observations than those currently offered. 
Summarizing Section C8.1 
To summarize the discussion of this section:-  In general we have been exploring the 
implications of the supposed existence of alternative physical embodiments of mental set-
structure — the more fundamental intensively-defined type, and at least three types of<373> the 
more instantly-accessible extensively-defined variety.  Some consideration was given to the 
question of how one type could be “translated” into another, though it will be clear that the 
treatment of the subject was not exhaustive (such as to offer a formal internal closure on the 
issue), and indeed such an attempt would seem to be premature pending a detailed quantitative 
investigation of the biochemical and physical issues thought to be involved.  In particular, the 
point raised about the likely observational confounding of Range-Bounded Extension effects with 
those of Intension (because of optical dispersion, especially if this is a variable) is likely to create 
great difficulties for any detailed systematization of the theory; though of course it might be 
possible to demonstrate that this is a non-problem in practice.  Anyhow the essential point here, 
for present purposes, was to give a feel for the sort of processing which might be taking place, 
and how this might manifest its malfunctions at the clinical level — a matter which we turned to 
in the concluding part of the discussion. 
[A further remark, on the specific issue of the suspected range-related nature of intensive 
definitions, might usefully be made here.   We have seen that even though a molecular “label” 
may be receptive to a given signal-pattern after it has traversed optical path x, this will be no 
guarantee that it will be receptive to “the same” signal when it has travelled a different<374> dist-
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ance y.78  This leaves us with a further question:-  Does the “x-distance” version of label have a 
better chance of evolving into the “y-distance” version than any other random label which 
happens to be present?   And if it does, is it likely to evolve via a gradual Lamarckian progression 
— perhaps as it gradually shifts position; or will the change take the form of a sudden mutation?   
The trouble with the Lamarckian gradualistic conceptualization is that it is difficult to devise a 
mechanistic non-teleological explanation of how the process might occur — except perhaps in 
exceptional “freak” circumstances when the natural course of chemical progression just happened 
to coincide with rather involved biological needs, without requiring any guidance from feedback 
mechanisms. 
As for the primary question which implicitly asks whether there is any point in evolving an 
“x-distance” version when it is really a “y-distance” version which we will ultimately need, the 
answer seems to be twofold:-   Firstly there probably is some advantage — some “transferability 
of training” — but no absolute advantage from the molecule’s own private point of view.  
Secondly, and more importantly, the advantage which might be<375> gained from such 
approximation to the optimal should be seen from the viewpoint of the system as a whole, rather 
than as a “promotion-system” for individual elements.  In this light, we should see the advent of 
roughly-appropriate mechanisms and procedures as creating a suitable environment for further 
progress, by focussing the developmentally-influential ongoing activity onto more relevant 
transactions.  But once the interim structures have served this purpose, aiding the evolution of still 
better structures, it is more than likely that they themselves will be bypassed as obsolete, C’est la 
vie! 
Even if the structures discussed here turn out to be purely fictional, it will perhaps still be 
worth posing similar questions for any other structural evolution which seems likely to be occurr-
ing; — and considering whether the same suggested answers are pertinent in the new context.] 
To conclude this sectional summary, we should recall several general principles of operation 
which have been considered as likely to apply.  Firstly parallelistic pluralism:  there are likely to 
be a number of alternative methods and structures for many tasks within a biological system, 
especially within the mental activities of the higher vertebrates; and these alternative systems 
should be considered as potentially operating in parallel — and perhaps in cooperation.  
Sabotaging one will therefore not<376> necessarily stop normal functioning, though it might 
impede its efficiency; so traditional notions of “the controlled-and-designed experiment” should 
be evaluated with some caution. 
Secondly, although there may be such alternatives, some types are likely to be much more 
common or more readily implemented by the system; so we may often be justified in ignoring 
some-or-all of the theoretical alternative varieties.  Thirdly, as we have just discussed 
parenthetically a couple of paragraphs ago, some alternatives may serve as evolutionary staging-
posts — a practical necessity for the proper development of the system, but expendable in 
themselves.  It may be that they themselves undergo the change “required” for the system, or the 
changing function may pass to other physical subsystems.  Fourthly, and finally, such changes are 
seen as having a basically random fortuitous inception — on essentially Darwinian lines — and 
the apparently teleological nature of such “guided” developments is seen as stemming from a 
selection process, which is indeed guided, but on a post-hoc basis — judged on performance. 
                                                          
78 There may well be more to this matter of optical distance than we would expect at first sight.  Thus 
electromagnetic distinctions between “near field” and “far field” may well be involved —  and/or the 
question of whether there is chemical-bond contact of any sort.<375> 
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C8.2  Interpretations of Clinical Schizophrenias and Other Conditions,  
on the Basis of this Theory 
In any attempt to devise a generalized theory to account for a wide and poorly integrated area 
of clinical phenomena, it is likely to be a useful policy to seek out some single work which offers 
a reasonably<377> balanced and comprehensive yet condensed coverage of the whole field.  As 
well as essential description, this should include a balanced outline of existing partially-
successful theories.  For our present purposes, an eminently suitable survey of this type is 
available in the form of Chapman and Chapman’s book:  Disordered Thought in Schizophrenia, 
(1973); and page or chapter references during this section will refer to their work unless 
otherwise stated.  Accordingly we shall now look at various distinguishable themes which arise 
within their book — often from the differing viewpoints of individual workers in the field — and 
try to reconcile them with the reductionist approach which has been discussed above.  We may 
consider the themes in their approximate order of apparent importance, as judged by their 
salience in Chapman and Chapman’s survey:- 
(1) Faulty clusterings of concepts.  
This includes the formulation, traceable through Stransky and Kraepelin of a “loss of inner 
unity of thinking, feeling, and actions” (Chapman & Chapman, page 8), such as not sticking to 
the point; or (page 9) citing Bleuler, the patients “lose … logical ordering of their trains of 
thought.  … familiar associations … are absent”, while “the most unnatural combinations … are 
formed, because their incongruity is not perceived …”.  Subsequently, in Chapter 5, Bleuler’s 
(1911/1950) theorizing is discussed in<378> some detail as the concept of “Broken Associative 
Threads”; though the authors complain (page 110) that “Bleuler never explicitly defined 
‘associative thread’..[but] implies that [it] ..  is not an observable event, but a construct …”. 
In the light of our foregoing discussions, these observations and comments make interesting 
reading.  Taking the authors’ criticisms about observability first:  If the theories developed in the 
present work are anywhere near the truth, then it is small wonder that Bleuler was unable to 
hazard any very credible guess as to what the “threads” might be in material terms, nor any 
details concerning how they might operate.  And even if he had, then he would have been in an 
even worse position than we are now when it came to suggest ways in which such a mechanism 
might be directly observed.  Clearly then, these threads would have had to be constructs in this 
sense.79  But it is one of the arguments of the present work that this need not mean that the 
construct is necessarily limited to being a mere convenient fiction (Section C1.1), though this 
could be so.  After all, as it is argued there, there is a case for suggesting that even our most 
respectable “observations” are fundamentally still constructs in the strict qualitative sense — 
though well separated from acknowledged “constructs” on some scale of corroboration and hence 
of indubitability.<379> 
Not that we need accept Bleuler’s “threads” at face-value, but it should now be apparent that 
a comparatively trivial translation can be made into the conceptual framework of the present 
theory of “call-signs” (intensive definitions of one type) and physically constrained sets (extens-
ive definitions), both of which may be construed as having some functional and topological 
affinity with the “thread” concept.  Clearly the present account does attempt a more detailed 
development, but this is not to belittle the pioneering conceptualizations of Stransky, Kraepelin, 
Bleuler, and others. 
If we accept the plausibility of the conceptualizations of the previous section, then we will 
not find it difficult to attribute the patient’s faulty thought-associations to a break-down in one-or-
                                                          
79  like the formal status of the “tape” concept (Chapters A1 and A3, above), before any structural 
interpretation was attempted.<379> 
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more of the postulated mechanisms by which the brain is supposed to represent sets.  To be more 
specific, it is probably a failure of Tethered or Range-Bounded Extension — leaving the patient 
to make his way, as best he can, with the more primitive and ubiquitous Intensive-type of 
definition for his sets.  This would seem to account for his “default solutions” in the form of 
syncretic thought (supposedly based on intensive definition), and arguably also for any 
“overinclusion” which he might exhibit (Chapter 9).  Similarly any “Excessive yielding to 
Normal Biases” (Chapter 6 ) might also be seen as essentially the same mechanism; and the same 
again with the overusage of (Tag-using Intensive?) emotional<380> associations, as expressed in 
the passage from Jung (1906) quoted on page 226:  “The pure laws of association play quite an 
insignificant role when confronted with the unlimited power of the emotional constellation.” All 
these manifestations may be seen as tendencies inherent pluralistically in the normal individual 
adult, but which come to the fore when the controlling and order-enhancing influence of 
extensive set-definition fails to operate properly. 
Some interesting points are raised by the view that the schizophrenic might, in various ways, 
be showing signs of regressing back to an earlier stage of development, (Chapter 10).  Here the 
emphasis seems to be on the loss of the ability to think abstractly — a matter which we will 
return to below under item “(4)” — but presumably any type of regression, anywhere on the MnL 
scale, would come under the same heading.  In general, when the individual loses some of his 
repertoire of set-handling ability at one of these levels (which we will call the “MiL” level), then 
as an additional-or-alternative strategy to making-do with syncretic thought at that level, he may 
happen to try reverting to some well-tried mode of thought belonging to the Mi-1L level; and this 
is clearly just a new form of words to describe “regression”.  (In fact any reversion to syncretic 
thought should also be regarded as regression — indeed it might be argued that it is itself an 
Mi-1L phenomenon;<381> though such fine distinctions do not materially alter our present 
argument). 
It is worth noticing that schizophrenic and regressive conditions cannot really be identified 
with normal childhood stages, nor with the mental orientations arising normally in more primitive 
cultures.  Chapman and Chapman (page 215), in discussing the study by Bolles (1937), re-state 
one difference as:  “The children, unlike schizophrenics, were able to shift from one approach to 
another in solving a problem and were able to disregard differences and grasp similarities.” 
Assuming that the assessment of “comparable mental age” (page 214) is above serious reproach 
in the light of the present theory, this is likely to indicate that the schizophrenics have an 
additional deficit — in the sets which organize the sets-under-consideration, a matter which we 
will discuss below under “(2)”.  In any case we cannot ignore the fact that schizophrenics have 
bouts of comparative normalcy in which, presumably, the set-structure makes a partial recovery 
for long enough to operate on still-existing higher-level elements, such as schemata for abstract 
thoughts, which would simply not be accessible to children.  Similarly, different background 
histories of experience are likely to produce different numerical weightings amongst the codings 
for different categories of element, and hence influence the “strengths” of mental-association 
differentially.  Thus:  “The younger children probably learned the stronger<382> meanings of 
words earlier, since they are the more common meanings” (page 220, discussing Chapman et al 
(1961)). 
We have seen that a large number of the symptoms of schizophrenia may plausibly be 
attributed to this syndrome of a “faulty clustering of concepts”, which means apparently that 
some aspect of the individual’s ability to handle sets has somehow broken down.  In fact we have 
so far concentrated on the simpler variations on this theme, leaving others to be discussed below 
as special cases.  The type which we have looked at here seems to centre on one MnL level at a 
time, though it is by no means clear whether actual patients customarily show this same simplistic 
bias; and it is more than likely that such an impression is merely an artefact arising from the way 
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we organize our collection and analysis of data — using collective populations of subjects, and 
expecting our data to produce isolated orthogonal dimensions at arbitrary levels of resolution 
chosen by us.  Nevertheless, if we take this impression at face value, we are left to consider which 
single MnL level or levels suffer from this failure, and produce their respective symptoms — 
some of which will be classed as “schizophrenic”, while perhaps others will not.  In fact this issue 
has already been dealt with in Section C8.1 where it was suggested that it was the M1L level 
which produced behaviour sufficiently bizarre to be regarded socially<383> as schizophrenic, 
while not yet so debilitating as to be regarded as physical or vegetative.  In Piagetian terms then, 
this places the more essentially “schizophrenic” phenomena within the orbit of Concrete 
Operational failures:  an inability to manipulate objects, symbols, and social-objects in a coherent 
“group-like” fashion involving set-manipulation, though rote performances and pre-set schemata 
might seem to work adequately in isolation. 
Of course it might be pondered that such a state at one MnL level could precipitate a similar 
deficiency at one-or-more other levels — resulting in a confounding of symptoms within the one 
patient.  (And this might occur even if just one MnL level were a sufficient initial cause for 
schizophrenia).  In such circumstances, it would be somewhat misleading to state baldly that 
single simple MnL phenomena were the cause of the whole syndrome of symptoms, even if this 
were strictly true in an indirect way. 
(2) Shakow’s Major and Minor Set,  
and his anomalous “Preparatory Interval” experiments.  
Shakow’s formulation of schizophrenia, (Chapter 12, Chapman and Chapman), attributes the 
symptoms to a “loss of major set” — where the word “set” is here used in the psychologist’s 
sense of “mental set” toward a particular subject-matter, and not the mathematical sense of a 
collection of entities which we have been using above.  (This is perhaps just one of those 
unfortunate clashes of<384> terminology which is bound to arise from time to time when once-
separate disciplines start to overlap.  One might well argue that there is some common element of 
meaning between the two usages, but that does not help us much when we are trying to delineate 
precise meanings, especially at the exploratory stage as at present.  Nevertheless, both usages are 
so well ingrained in their respective fields, that it seems prudent just to make the best of the 
situation — differentiating the ambiguous word “set” by adjectives such as “mental” or 
“mathematical” wherever the distinction is not clear from the context). 
In Chapman and Chapman’s words:  “Shakow defines ‘set’ as a state of readiness to respond 
to a particular stimulus and ‘major set’ as a state of readiness to respond appropriately, that is, in 
a way that facilitates adaptive behaviour” (bottom of page 244).  These definitions are couched in 
an operationalist-oriented terminology which is of rather limited value for our present objective 
of postulating structure, but they do serve as a useful benchmark.  ‘Minor’ or ‘Segmental’ set 
appears to be left simply as meaning “Non-major set”; thus (bottom of page 248):  “Examples are 
[1] apparently aimless response, [2] response to isolated aspects of the task, [3] repetition of 
previous responses, and [4] response to irrelevant and internal stimuli” — thereby accounting “for 
the positive symptoms” of schizophrenia.<385> 
It will be instructive to look at each of these items in turn, and attempt to give interpretations, 
in structural terms, in the light of the present theory.   
Taking [M] ‘major set’ first, we may reasonably suppose that a “readiness to respond approp-
riately” will depend crucially on the adequate availability both of task-relevant schemata at the 
Concrete-Operations (M1L) level and also of situational-and-social schemata at the same or 
higher levels.  Moreover, for efficient execution of anything but the most trivial of tasks, such 
schemata would seemingly have to base their organization on some sort of extensively-defined 
(mathematical)-set structure — and mere intensive-definition would not really be adequate.  So if 
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this is what ‘Major Set’ entails, or largely entails, then its loss could be confidently expected to 
produce schizophrenic symptoms, and indeed we could then reasonably identify the situation with 
the failures discussed above under “(1)”. 
Looking next at [2] “response to isolated aspects of the task”; this could be seen as a failure to 
integrate the various aspects of the task into one whole extensionally-defined set, and maintain it 
in functional form for long enough to make proper use of it.  This could take the form of  ▪ failing 
to form an integrated inner mental perception of the task or the objects involved in it, or it could 
be  ▪ a failure to marshal the<386> relevant action-orientated schemes appropriately, but it is 
perhaps more probable that the failure would be  ▪ general and encompass all such mathematical-
set transactions, to a greater-or-lesser average extent.  Accordingly, wherever there is a non-
materialization of an effective mathematical-set, its role is likely to be taken by some arbitrary 
would-be member of it80.  But a member is not the same thing as any set it might belong to, and if 
the individual proceeds on the misleading assumption that it is the same, then we might well 
expect his behaviour will reflect this by his only taking cognizance of detached parts of what we 
would regard as the total situation.  (Incidentally, this could also be taken as one explanation for 
the phenomenon of “narrowed attention”). 
Two paragraphs back, the distinction was made between task-relevant schemata (at the M1L 
level), and situational-and-social schemata (which were seen as either M1L or M2L phenomena, 
and quite possibly both).   
Anyhow, the essential point here is that the very existence of a “task”-or-aim is often simply 
a particular aspect of the ongoing social situation — which normal people will usually take for 
granted and categorize correctly without conscious thought; whereas the faulty mechanisms 
within a schizophrenic’s mind are likely to<387> make the same mess of such socially “obvious” 
things, as they would for detail of the task itself.  This would seem to account for two more of the 
symptoms attributed to ‘Minor Set’:-  [1] “apparently aimless response” and [4] “response to 
irrelevant and internal stimuli”.  After all, when one comes to think of it, it requires a consider-
able amount of developmental sophistication to divine what (if anything) one’s “proper aim” 
should be within a social context, or which stimuli are to be considered “relevant” given a 
particular complex context in which it is often social convention which defines what should be 
regarded as salient.  If the patient’s mathematical-set-structure is unable to build up an adequate 
model of the ongoing social situation, in the terms which the culture expects, then he will 
assuredly wander into gross irrelevancies.  Even if (like a computer) he were able to handle the 
task material itself with perfect proficiency, he would still need an absurd amount of guidance 
(like a computer!) if he is to avoid perpetrating “idiotic howlers”; but of course such proficiency 
might always desert him too, and in any case there is no guarantee that the guidance could be 
implemented. 
This leaves [3] “repetition of previous responses” (now encoded internally).  This may be 
regarded as similar to divining the social situation, as discussed in the previous paragraph, in that 
both entail some sort of monitoring and control of more basic action-oriented schemata.  The 
emphasis is<388> now perhaps rather more introspective, on the lines of:  “What are my own 
aims?   And am I making any progress towards them?   So, what is the next step?”   However if 
we choose to claim that these aims and self-monitoring skills derive ultimately from the culture81 
— then the distinction, if any, becomes rather tenuous.   
                                                          
80 — some of whose molecular elements might (in happier times) be capable of mutating into the nucleus 
of just such a set, on the lines discussed in connection with Figure C8.1/4, above 
81 — or perhaps even if they are merely due to experience based on the physical inevitabilities of the 
environment 
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[1+4+3]  In any case, it seems plausible to attribute such self-monitoring activities to the work-
ings of the postulated mathematical-set structures, and thus essentially just another example of the 
same basic phenomenon — though the actual sites of the relevant ultra-micro structures might 
differ for the different aspects of the patient’s overall repertoire, so the severity of malfunction 
need not be the same for the various symptoms, nor for the various MnL levels which could be 
involved. 
We should not pass by this phenomenon of “repetition” without remarking on its apparent 
formal similarity to Piaget’s “Circular Reactions” in infants (Chapter A3, above).  Not that we 
need read much into such a similarity, but some such schizophrenics may well not be properly 
aware that “I have already just done that!” — and this is probably true initially for infants as well.  
Or if the patient or infant is aware of the repetition as such, then they presumably feel that the 
action is rewarding in itself, without questioning whether it makes sense (within some wider 
logical-or-social context) to<389> just do it again. 
390
(390)
SCHIZOPHRENICS 
NORMALS 
TASK-
EFFICIENCY: 
(Speed of 
reaction) 
0.7 sec
0.3 sec
Time 
taken 
to react 
regular warning interval 
irregular warning interval
0 5 10 15 20 25 
PREPARATORY INTERVALS (seconds) 
7 
The likely contribution from a STM strategy 
(least affected by psychosis).  See last part of §(2). 
Fig C8.2/1.       At this point, the original 1978 version of this work replicated 
Rodnick and Shakow’s (1940) diagram of  “Mean reaction times of twenty-five 
schizophrenic and ten normal subjects at the various preparatory intervals of the 
regular and irregular warning procedures”. 
Partly for copyright reasons, those experimental findings have here been reorg-
anized and somewhat simplified such as to illustrate the present discussion a bit 
more clearly. 
The dark-blue dotted line at the bottom is a recent  addition.       — RRT, 2006. 
<390>
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Reaction speed, apparently depending on facility in handling mathematical sets 
We may turn now to Shakow’s findings of an anomalous pattern of reaction-times for 
schizophrenic patients (pages 244-246, Chapman and Chapman), see Figure C8.2/1.<390>  In 
these experiments there were two stimuli:  a preliminary bell, and then (1 to 25 seconds later) a 
light to which the subject was expected to respond as quickly as possible.  If the subject had any 
way of knowing how soon to expect the light after he had heard the warning-bell, then one might 
expect him to be able to use this knowledge somehow such as to give him a quicker reaction 
when the light-signal duly arrived.  Thus if a given trial occurred within a block of trials in which 
this “preparatory interval” was (say) 10 seconds for each case, then the subject might be able to 
make some use of the realization that this was the case; whereas if there were no such regularity 
in the length of the preparatory interval within a block of trials, there would seem to be no such 
helpful knowledge available for utilization. 
If, for the moment, we look only at the result in Figure C8.2/1 for preparatory intervals of 
more than 6 seconds, then we notice that the normal subjects do indeed perform better for the 
“regular” presentations (except when the difference vanishes for the very long 25 sec. delay);  but 
the schizophrenics actually performed better for the irregular presentations!  Meanwhile the 
performance for these same schizophrenics was slowed down as expected, but only for those 
cases in which the preparatory interval was less than 6 seconds — and moreover a plausible 
explanation for this “crossed-graph” inconsistency was offered by Zahn, Rosenthal, and Shakow 
(1963).  This explanation (page 247, Chapman and Chapman) traced some of the mental-set (as to 
expected-delay)<391> back to the delay encountered in each immediately preceding trial,82 rather 
than to any constant value which the block-as-a-whole might have; and furthermore it seems that 
schizophrenics are more inclined to use this strategy.  In the context of our present discussion, the 
important questions to ask are now:   “What do we suppose is actually happening in micro-
structural terms?   And why should the structural configuration of a schizophrenic’s brain favour 
one strategy, while that of a normal brain will favour another?”. 
In fact it would seem that we need not look very far because this phenomenon can be seen in 
terms entirely consistent with those used a few paragraphs ago.  The normal subject’s thinking 
will be ordered by set-structures which entail (i) the logico-social concept of the experimental 
trial-block as a meaningful entity existing over an extended time interval, and (ii) the logico-
social concept of a random mix in which it is futile (or even counterproductive) to expect 
consecutive elements to be alike.  On reflection, we can see that these concepts are by no means 
so trivial that we can merely take them for granted; and indeed their proper use is probably 
beyond the powers of a schizophrenic precisely because he will have troubles with mathematical-
set structures, especially if he has<392> to hold them over the time taken for a trial-block to be 
completed. 
The type of set-failure which we have been considering here will presumably relate to 
“monitoring-or-controlling” sets; but we should recall that we were earlier concerned also with 
the supposed “action-oriented” sets and their embodiment in action/perception schemata.  If, in 
general, we expect the schizophrenic to be having difficulties with these sets as well, then we 
might expect to find evidence for this too somewhere in the graphs.  In fact it is easy to see from 
the graphs in Figure C8.2/1 that the average performance-rate of the schizophrenic is about half 
that of normal subjects (as mentioned in passing on page 244, Chapman and Chapman), and it 
seems reasonable to attribute this to an inefficient action/perception set structure. 
But there are some grounds for suspecting that we can infer still more from Figure C8.2/1.  
The Zahn et al (1963) explanation accounts for the increasing efficiency-with-delay in the 
                                                          
82  a strategy which just happens to pay off for the longer delays, given the particular experimental design. <392> 
392
393 
391
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f 
Ps
yc
ho
si
s 
——
 C
8.
2 
 I
nt
er
pr
et
 S
ch
iz
. 
vi
a 
"L
in
ea
r"
 t
he
or
y 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 179  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  179  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
“irregular-presentation” curve for schizophrenics, and with about the same sort of changes in 
gradient and curvature as shown on the figure — provided we are to trust the consistency of the 
ordinate speed-scale as we move left-or-right along the abscissa83.  It rather looks then, as though 
the absolute values of the speed-ordinates might be reliable guides to underlying<393> 
phenomena.  If we accept this argument, at least provisionally, then we might well ask what 
significance should be attached to the large “peaking” of performance at about 4 seconds delay 
for the regular/schizophrenic curve, and its much smaller counterpart at 2 seconds delay for the 
regular normal curve. 
Two types of time estimate, with crossover at about 7 sec — implications in set-manipulation 
This raises a number of diverse thoughts of a rather anecdotal nature, which I have no 
intention of developing very far here.  However they may suggest some interesting lines of 
investigation, so I shall at least place them on record.  To start with, there is the undocumented 
observation that computer-users operating an interactive tele-type terminal will normally be quite 
happy to wait for up to 10 seconds for the machine to respond, but any further delay is likely to 
cause irritation and impatience, or at least a conscious awareness of the delay.  Next we might 
compare this to the supposed time-span for Short Term Memory which, judging from 
Wickelgren’s (1970) graphs, would seem to have a half-life of about 12 seconds, though perhaps 
a more generally acceptable figure would be around 7 seconds.  One also gets the (perhaps 
misleading) impression that it is more difficult to make reasonably accurate estimates of time 
intervals greater than about 10 seconds, without resorting to such conscious and artificial devices 
as counting the estimated seconds.  Accordingly, one might be forgiven<394> for suspecting that 
there is something qualitatively different available for processes which do not last much longer 
than about 10 seconds, and that this something may be intimately bound up with the recognized 
phenomenon of Short Term Memory (Wickelgren, 1968; Peterson and Peterson, 1959; Posner 
and Rossman, 1965). 
This of course raises some questions about the role and nature of “biological clocks”.  
Concerning this I would suggest (i) that there may be “purpose-built” slow transmission-lines:  
non-TEM nerve-fibre modes (see Part B, above), or else linear molecules (reminiscent of those 
depicted in Figures C6.7/3 to C6.7/6, but without the encumbrance of logical gates along their 
length, so that a signal will traverse the path unconditionally, though subject to a more-or-less 
predictable delay);  and (ii) that there is likely to be a definite upper limit to the delays which 
could be modelled in these ways without the use of a more elaborate mathematical-set structures 
such as various types of “rehearsal”, and (M2L?) counting procedures — each of which would 
probably have a practical upper limit also. 
Anyhow, we might at least reasonably expect that the one-to-seven second delay intervals 
might be easier to embody into a useful schemoid somehow, thus accounting for the “peaking” of 
performance;   and that<395> this might well be of extra benefit to schizophrenics, if only 
because it leaves them with a technique which is less adversely affected than others which they 
might otherwise have had to use. 
Concerning the question of explaining why the same does not apply in the case of “irregular 
presentations”, it rather begins to look as though for these short delays there is a whole mechan-
ism left more-or-less intact despite the schizophrenic condition, and that under these circumscrib-
ed circumstances the schizophrenic is able to benefit from the regularity of presentation in the 
same way as the normal subject — (though still subject to the overall slowness of reaction which 
we discussed earlier).  In other words, this could be taken to support a view that there is a 
                                                          
83 and not just trust it to have the right comparative relationship with other values at each different 
“preparatory interval” value 
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pluralistic choice of mechanisms capable of taking advantage of the block-regularity when this 
exists, but that one of these mechanisms can only work for the shorter-delay conditions.  And if 
we accept that there are likely to be two or more moderately-autonomous mechanisms, then we 
might reasonably expect that in the normal individual each such mechanism will tend to 
specialize in some particular function.  One (or more) is bound to be involved in the more-or-less 
permanently established schemata which presumably constitute “Long Term Memory”, while 
other likely roles for other such mechanisms will involve Short Term Memory-and/orAttention, 
or Consciousness (Popper’s “World 2”:  Chapter A1, above).<396> 
Given such postulated alternatives with moderate autonomy, then it would not be altogether 
surprising to find cases in which malfunctions had affected them selectively — leaving one (or 
more) intact despite disruption elsewhere.  In the Shakow studies it seems likely that it is the 
more STM-oriented which has escaped serious disruption; but this need not be taken as 
representative because it is easy to imagine that if any of his would-be subjects had been suffering 
from such a disability, then he might well have found it impossible to get any sensible laboratory-
oriented responses from them at all.  So it may well be that any patients suffering from this 
debility, alone or in combination, tend to be overlooked in systematic studies of schizophrenics.  
Indeed such patients could conceivably be classified as suffering from some other clinical 
condition, and not be regarded as “schizophrenics” at all.  Anyhow this may serve as a further 
pointer to the possibilities of subcategories within and across apparently-adequate clinical 
classifications. 
(3) Loss of Abstract Thought and Logic.  
During Section C8.1 above (original-pages 368-369, subhead: “Symptoms varying…”), we 
considered what symptoms were likely to arise from defects at the various MnL levels; and it was 
suggested that the symptoms most characteristic of schizophrenia were likely to have their origin 
from M1L malfunctions.  However it was also noted that loss of the ability to think abstractly and 
logically was<397> taken as a significant extra symptom suggesting a schizophrenic state, and 
that this defect was to be considered as a malfunction at the M2L or “Formal Operations” level.  
If both types of symptom are both indicative of schizophrenia in some measure, and if they are 
traceable to inadequate mathematical-set-organizations within different structures, then this raises 
questions about what relationship, if any, there is between these structures. 
Broadly speaking, we might expect the relationship between M1L and M2L defects to be 
either:   (A) one in which some structural influence outside the two respective structures 
themselves comes to adversely affect them both in comparable degrees.  (For instance, if we 
accept that the M2L and M1L structures both use the same material substrate — on some sort of 
recursive-like basis, as suggested in Section C5.4 and its Table — then the common cause could 
well be some defect within this common substrate).  Or alternatively (B), a defect at one of these 
levels might be instrumental in precipitating, maintaining, or exacerbating a similar defect in the 
other.  In fact there is no obvious reason to rule out the possibility of both types of causality 
occurring — either in different patients for each type, or even both within the same patient.  [So 
the controversy over “organic” versus “psychogenic” aetiologies (Chapman and Chapman, pages 
147-148) could perhaps be a contest over a non-issue — some schizophrenics suffering from 
(say)<398> generally-acting toxic effects within the substrate, some from the direct-or-indirect 
effects of misleading experience acting psychologically (see below), and some suffering from 
both.] 
In the case of the psychogenetic causes, it has already been hinted here and in Section C8.1 
that if the M2L level has become defective to a socially-obvious extent, then it is probably some 
defect at the M1L which is to blame — and not the reverse.  After all, if the M2L structures take 
as basic elements the schemata established by M1L closure (as is supposed by the current theory), 
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then any breakdown at the M1L level will tend to erode the schemata on which the M2L level 
depends — either by directly disrupting these schemata, or more probably by simply failing to 
maintain and develop them properly.  So if these various suggestions are correct, then such 
serious loss of abstract thought should either be thought of as a secondary consequence of more 
fundamental M1L difficulties, or else as indicating some malfunction of the substrate common to 
both levels — or as a sign that the two different pathologies are occurring together. 
There is also the likelihood of (C) a more involved interactive relationship between M1L and 
M2L.  Consider, for instance, the orthodox view of abstraction (Chapman and Chapman, page 
144) as the ability to single out “a common property from a range of stimuli” on each of a number 
of objects.  What mechanisms is this skill likely<399> to entail?   It rather looks as though the 
individual needs to be able to manipulate sets of various types of schemata, to represent objects, 
their properties (here reified as if they were objects ) and also actions connecting object-like 
things with object-like topologies.  If such a task is to be feasible, one might reasonably suppose 
it essential to be able to organize these disparate entities in set-structures which stood higher in 
the MnL hierarchy, than any of the entities directly involved.  As the highest of the entities listed 
was what we would class as belonging at about the M1L level, it would therefore seem to follow 
that any organizing set-structure would need to be at the M2L level or higher.  If this should 
happen to be true, it would go some way to reconciling the above “orthodox” view of the nature 
of abstraction, with the formal entailment of the M2L level proposed here.  But it also gives some 
indication of the possible interactive relationships which might exist between MnL levels. 
The possible choice of two or more different aetiologies for M2L defects (perhaps also 
augmented by a volition-defect, which we will discuss next below, and maybe yet other causes) 
might shed some light on the diverse assortment of deviant behaviour which Goldstein 84 
considered to exemplify his concept of “concreteness”,<400> and hence indicative of 
schizophrenia.  Thus Chapman and Chapman (page 148) write:  “Goldstein’s attempt to unite 
these diverse behaviours under a single principle tantalizes the reader with the hope that, if only 
he can penetrate Goldstein’s true meaning, he will obtain insight into the essence of 
schizophrenic thinking.”  Whether the present account gets anywhere near this “true meaning”, or 
an acceptable substitute for it, is a matter for current debate.  Anyhow, the comment continues:  
“…Despite his emphasis on loss of conscious volition [see below] as the [unifying] core 
phenomenon of the concrete attitude, Goldstein described concreteness in such diverse ways that 
clinicians with widely differing views can all find it congenial.  Almost any conceivable error can 
be interpreted as concrete.” 
The comment then goes on to point out that Goldstein denied the appropriateness of 
“intercorrelations between measures of the various kinds of concreteness”.  Insofar as the 
different types of symptom do have independent causes, on the lines suggested above, then this 
criticism of intercorrelational studies would seem to be well-founded; and as it is suggested at the 
finish of this work, there is often a tendency to expect too much in the blind use of such 
techniques.  However it is probably overstating the case to claim that such tests could tell us 
nothing useful:  the above arguments imply possibilities of some inter-correlation; and even a 
null<401> result would be quite informative, implying a need for independent therapeutic 
treatments. 
(4) Loss of Volition or Conscious Control.  
It will be recalled that, in Sections C6.3 and C6.4, a previous attempt was made to postulate 
what the formal structural organization of “consciousness” might be.  Unfortunately, though not 
                                                          
84 Goldstein (1939, 1944/1964, 1959);   Goldstein and Scheerer (1941, 1953);  Goldstein and Salzman 
(1967).<400> 
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altogether surprisingly, the resulting suggestions were not particularly convincing in view of the 
sparseness of detail proposed,85 so that it is difficult to test or corroborate the ideas with any 
precision, even if we are content just using internal closure criteria (see Chapter C1) — never 
mind any external experimental criteria of the more conventional type!  However, for whatever 
value it might have in the present discussion, we may recall that it was supposed that two 
necessary conditions for consciousness were attention and self-concept, and that concepts such as 
sentience might conceivably be explicable in these terms. 
Attention is discussed at the beginning of Section C6.3 (and in the third paragraph of Section 
C5.5) 86  in terms of a metaphorical fitting of a limited number of privileged schemata into 
“a room” or “control centre”.  The implication is clearly that some sort of extensively-defined set 
is crucially involved, that this set and its<402> members have a temporary privileged access to 
the individual’s ongoing activity, and that there is some comparatively rigid limit to the number 
of direct members that can be admitted within the “attention span”87 at any one time (G A Miller, 
1956a, 1956b; Pascual-Leone, 1970).   So, whatever the details of the physical mechanism which 
presumably underlies attention, it seems likely that it may be subject to broadly the same sort of 
defect as the M1L and M2L mathematical-sets which we have been considering above — though 
not necessarily at the same time, nor necessarily at the same physical sites, nor necessarily for the 
same aetiological reasons. 
Self-Concept is considered above in paragraphs 6 to 8 of Section C6.3,88 where it is suggested 
that the most central aspects of it are probably at the M1L level, though there is also a case for 
placing them within the M0L level — or perhaps some unique amalgam of both.  Whatever the 
details, one’s self-concept or ego or personal identity is likely to be a much more involved 
construct than the schemata for ordinary external objects; but it still seems plausible, as far as we 
can see at this stage, that this complicated self-concept will nevertheless consist ultimately of a 
basic extensive-set schematic structure of physical molecular elements —<403> essentially 
similar to that postulated for other extensive sets. 
Putting these two supposed components of consciousness back together, we might reasonably 
expect that the total phenomenon will still be describable, at least in principle, in terms of the 
various mathematical-set structures which we have been discussing.  Of course there is also the 
further complication that an exhaustive model would have to account, not only for consciousness 
itself, but also for the way in which it controls ongoing activity:  more-or-less correctly in normal 
individuals, or inadequately in individuals behaving according to the Goldstein formulation of 
Schizophrenia as a loss of conscious volitional control.  However there is no obvious reason why 
the additional feature of a control-link should make the basic postulate of molecular set-structure 
untenable, though the complications implicit in this problem are formidable:- 
Thus we may recall the topological dilemma concerning where consciousness should belong 
in the MnL hierarchy; (Sec C3.2/paragr 7, and Sec C6.4/paragr 4).89  Although no fully detailed 
account of likely mechanisms emerged from these deliberations, they did at least produce a 
logical solution to the immediate dilemma by placing consciousness, as such, in a category of its 
own — standing aside from the linear hierarchy of the MnL scale.  It thus seemed to occupy a 
potentially privileged position<404> of relatively easy control-access to schemata of all levels, on 
                                                          
85 It is hoped that future theoretical investigation will remedy this deficiency.<402> 
86 Original pp.224-225 (see margin):  “[…]”, which also invokes Section A1.4. 
87 One might profitably enquire whether each MnL level might have its own private attention-span, and 
explore complications raised by this.<403> 
88 Orig.pp.246-247: “The second point … Piagetian description.” 
89 Respectively:    Orig.p.172 “As for consciousness…” —— and    O.p.265 “Section…” 
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average; though to the extent that there exists a body of subconscious and unconscious thoughts, 
it will be obvious that this privilege is certainly not total.  Anyhow, to mark this supposedly 
exceptional status, it was suggested that consciousness be considered as being in an 
exceptionally-named level:  the MtopL  level. 
So what then should we make of Goldstein’s notion that “loss of conscious volition” is, or 
should be, the defining principle for identifying schizophrenia.  From a strictly practical point of 
view, this is most unhelpful “because its presence or absence is almost impossible to judge” 
(Chapman and Chapman, page 149).  And even as a theoretical basis there is precious little, at 
this stage, that one could do in the way of structural development if one were committed to this 
definitional dependence on “consciousness” as the fundamental construct.  Not that the existence 
of such potential inconveniences necessarily means that Goldstein is wrong; though we might 
well pray that he is, because if he is right then there will be a great deal of theory for us to clarify 
in considerable detail before we are likely to have a reasonably accurate insight into the nature of 
schizophrenia.   Nevertheless it is hoped that we do not reject his ideas merely because of wishful 
thinking in this direction! 
But even if he is right, it still seems likely that any deeper, more-micro, level of explanation 
will involve<405> disturbance of one or more of the brain’s postulated extensive-definition set 
structures; and it remains possible that whichever of these structures happen to be faulty in any 
given type of schizophrenia the faults will all fall within a reasonably circumscribed range of 
types of structural error afflicting essentially similar mechanisms, (at the molecular level, or 
whatever). 
Finally it is perhaps worth considering that if Goldstein does happen to be wrong on this 
point, and loss of volitional control is merely a secondary symptom, then its logical status is 
likely to be much the same as that postulated for logical and abstract thinking in the immediately 
preceding discussion:  item “(3)”.  In this case, the comments made there concerning causal 
chains from M1L deficiencies to M2L symptoms, are likely to apply comparably to causal chains 
from M1L to “MtopL” — or wherever we finally decide that consciousness should properly be 
located in the functional topology. 
(5) A Negativistic Attitude, or Paranoid Tendencies.  
It has already been argued in Section C7.7, that paranoia is primarily a neurosis rather than a 
psychosis, but that its nature is such as to encourage a certain amount of disorganization within 
some of the mathematical-set structure acquired by the brain, thus tending to produce some 
psychotic symptoms.  (This question of causes of set-deterioration will be discussed below in its 
own right).  But, as with many syndromes of this general type, it is quite on the cards that there 
was actually a small<406> amount of unwarranted and socially disadvantageous set-
disorganization in the first place — along with a small amount of neurosis — and that the two 
tended to exacerbate each other in a positive feedback situation, so that the collective behavioural 
syndrome eventually escalated until it became socially evident.  In such a situation, it is not a 
clearcut issue to attribute causality; in fact it constitutes an example of the “chicken and egg” 
dilemma.  And even if the neurosis was indeed the root cause initially, it is likely that it would 
have passed unnoticed in many cases if there were no supporting feedback loop operating 
subsequently via psychotic disruption.  In other words, it may not always be possible or desirable 
to make a complete logical distinction between the two types of disorder. 
Accordingly it is perhaps sensible to include this negativistic syndrome under both headings:  
neurosis and psychosis.  At any rate, it does often appear in the psychosis-category; and its 
symptoms are offered as correlating with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  Indeed this seems to be 
the main characteristic of the patients discussed by Laing (1960/1965, 1961/1971), as pointed out 
earlier in Sections C6.3 and C7.7.  Thus if social “objects” such as public institutions come to be 
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seen as malevolent, then the individual will tend to reject such “objects” in the apparent-cause of 
bolstering his own self-identity schema.  Such withdrawal of cathexis will sometimes take on an 
aggressive form such as diminished-cooperation, like<407> Kraepelin’s (1919) patient who 
persistently answered numerical questions with answers which all seemed to be deliberately 
wrong — a phenomenon described by Bleuler as “intellectual negativism”, (Chapman and 
Chapman, “evasion” page 9).  Work propounding this viewpoint of the basic nature of 
schizophrenia includes Sullivan (1924, 1925, 1944/1964) where the patients are seen as having 
lost the motivation to communicate, and Haley (1959) where the concept of “motivated retreat” is 
used — as in Laing (1960, 1961); Chapman and Chapman, pages 228-230)  
C8.3  Some Comments on the Accepted Dimensions for Classifying schizophrenias and 
Related Conditions 
Elsasser has suggested that the crucial difference between physics and biology lies in the fact 
that physics deals with mainly-homogeneous systems, while in biology it is inevitable that the 
systems be very markedly “inhomogeneous”.  This inhomogeneity has been traced down to 
molecular level by experimental procedures for some aspects of biological function, such as 
genetic inheritance, though not in others such as memory — at least not in adequate experimental 
detail.  Nevertheless it has been a principal objective of the present work to offer credible 
suggestions as to how memory could be accounted for at the molecular level, in terms of a very 
considerable degree of inhomogeneity — though not to the extent of leaving it in complete 
chaos.<408> 
But as all too often occurs in practice, there is a price to be paid for progress.  To the extent 
that our model of the brain becomes more inhomogeneous in its basic micro-structure, the more 
we should come to suspect the validity of those modelling techniques which we have come to 
value for homogeneous systems such as “the perfect gas”, or the civil engineer’s “three-
dimensional space”.  After all, even the real gases encountered by the physicist are not really 
“perfect” and under some conditions they produce “behaviour” which is not at all in accordance 
with Boyle’s law — thus leading to seemingly arbitrary artefactual models such as the cubic 
equations of van der Waals.  In fact it is not until we enquire deeply into the basic structural 
nature of gases that we can make reasonable progress towards removing the appearance of 
arbitrariness which the (modified) cubic equation presents.  In a similar spirit, we might well be 
wary therefore, of blindly transferring the mathematical assumptions of simple-paradigm 
behavioural psychology down into the realm of the molecular elements which are, according to 
the present theory, the basis of inhomogeneity underlying psychological phenomena. 
In particular it may be doubted whether psychological systems can really be adequately and 
meaningfully expressed by “dimensions” in a Cartesian-coordinate system.  It would appear that 
this assumption is commonly made, and moreover made quite unconsciously (as if the successful 
use of this conceptualization in applied physics were sufficient guarantee of its universal 
applicability!)  This belief<409> in the applicability of Cartesian coordinates underlies many of 
the experimenter’s statistical tools, such as multiple-factor analysis, so the question is of some 
general relevance.  Indeed the results of such procedures are unquestionably often technologically 
useful — just as Boyle’s law is often technologically useful.  There may even be some discover-
able structural basis for the constructs inferred and named on the basis of such analyses (Cattell, 
1965), though the technique itself will not be much help in elucidating what that structural basis 
might be.  However, one might perhaps feel that the method assumes away many of the 
interesting problems, so that any findings which do eventuate will merely have scratched the 
surface — leaving the “real workings of government” well hidden. 
The sort of structural effects which are likely to conspire against this approach include:  
internal feedback and delay, internal interaction between elements or parts of the system, and 
408 
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effects arising from the fact that the system is actually made up of heterogeneous discrete 
elements rather than a continuum.  Now the interesting thing is that there is a good chance that, in 
principle, one could by-pass these difficulties by using a finer “level of resolution” into a large 
number of subsystems, to such an extent that none of the complications just listed are internal any 
more.  In other words, one can hope for a reductionistic Utopia in which each individual 
subsystem is free from complications like<410> internal feedback, and whatever feedback there 
is will be between such subsystems.  Experimentally though, this will probably not be much help 
if these subunits are too small, too delicate, and too numerous to be measured sufficiently; and 
even if we can infer the basic structure by other means, we may then still have huge problems in 
turning such information into a usable model — though we might, if we are lucky, find a special 
trick of the trade such as “Statistical Mechanics”. 
Having said all that, let us re-examine some of the “dimensions” offered in the literature as 
being indicative of schizophrenia.  And, more to the point, let us try to see past the orthodox 
behaviouristically-oriented formulation and comment on the likely structural basis for the 
dimensions in question. 
Process/Reactive  
The Process-Reactive Distinction is discussed in Chapman and Chapman as probably 
constituting more than “merely two end-points on a continuum of premorbid adjustment” (page 
334).  The Reactive type is likened to Kraepelin’s manic depressive (page 28) and is seen as 
having a good chance of recovery, while the Process type of patient is likened to Kraepelin’s 
dementia praecox as a “typical” schizophrenic with:  “inadequate prepsychotic adjustment, with 
little interest in other people or the activities of life …  develops gradually …  with no 
identifiable precipitating stress.  …  usually …  affective flattening, …  prognosis is poor, …  
deteriorating course”.<411> 
Without attempting any very detailed analysis of these distinctions, some preliminary 
observations on the basis of the current theory might assist us to orient ourselves to the issues 
likely to be involved.  One impression about these latter symptoms is that they seem more likely 
to have their origins deep within the personality structure of the individual, with significant 
components from experiences in early life, or in inherited biases within the mathematical-sets’ 
substrate, or both.  Another impression is the likely importance of experiences involving affective 
relationships, or the genetically-determined nature of whatever structures serve to “encode” 
affective relationships (whether these be “tag”-involving procedures as has been suggested here, 
or some different arrangement). 
As a tentative working hypothesis therefore, it might be useful to think of Process Schizo-
phrenia as stemming from the individual’s failure to acquire stable object-like socially-oriented 
structures, at-or-about the Sensori-motor stage (M0L); — or as having acquired them without the 
“appropriate” affective affiliations (which might also have a direct or indirect bearing on their 
ultimate stability).  We might then wish to distinguish between ▪ those cases which arose 
genetically,  ▪ those generated through damaging experiences (of different sorts, perhaps), and  
▪ those with various admixtures of these two influences.  Behaviourally speaking though, there 
might be little difference between such categories.   
By contrast, we might suppose that Reactive Schizophrenics suffer from<412> comparable 
disruptions at some higher MnL level, probably the Concrete Operations (M1L) level, which 
would have presumably developed later and be more amenable to readjustment — as well as 
being less far-reaching in their consequences.  whether or not genetic components are likely to 
make much contribution toward Reactive Schizophrenia would seem to depend on whether the 
relevant parts of the two respective MnL levels operate within substrates which are both subject 
to the same genetic influences.  Thus if both levels are likely to suffer the same genetic 
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disruption, then presumably the Process-symptoms will pre-empt any would-be development of 
Reactive symptoms; so anyone diagnosed as simply Reactive would presumably be free from any 
such generally-acting genetic defects — except perhaps in an auxiliary role.  But of course, if 
each MnL level operated within a substrate which was genetically independent in origin (with 
respect to mechanisms relevant to our present discussion), then we might well expect to find 
occasional genetic components in any pre-disposition to Reactive Schizophrenia or manic-
depressive personality, (and without them also promoting Process Schizophrenia at the same 
time). 
Hebephrenic/Paranoid  
The Hebephrenic-Paranoid Distinction is implicit in the comparative properties discussed 
above in Section C8.2, in the two items “(1) and (5)” respectively, or indeed in the special 
supposedly neurotic affiliations of the<413> latter “paranoid” item vis a vis any of the other four; 
— and this developed a theme introduced earlier in Section C7.7. 
Chapman and Chapman make some interesting comments concerning this supposed-dimension: 
“Although the distinction between paranoid and nonparanoid patients accounts for some of the 
heterogeneity of performance among schizophrenics, the distinction is not clearly one of 
different disorders.  As Kraepelin himself pointed out, few patients fit unambiguously into one 
subtype, and even those who do may shift from one symptom picture to another  …  A patient 
may, for example, initially show predominantly paranoid symptoms, and later show 
predominantly hebephrenic or catatonic symptoms.  Such changes indicate that these symptoms 
represent different stages of the same disorder rather than distinct disorders.  Not all patients, 
however, shift symptom patterns”.     (Page 30, emphasis added). 
Such a dynamic evolution is clearly within the spirit of the above-mentioned danger of 
progression from a neurotic beginning into more-psychotic states.    Whether these successive 
stages are to be regarded as representing “the same” disorder or not is perhaps a little beside the 
point and a matter of mere semantics;  the crucial issue is to decide what the essential cybernetic 
dynamics are likely to be, and not to try to clothe such phenomena in a terminology which 
implies static configurations.<414> 
“Progress on this problem is hindered both by the dearth of theory to guide the research and 
by the failure of research workers to use objective and reliable criteria for diagnosis of the 
paranoid subtype.” (Chapman and Chapman, pages 333-4).  The current theory might perhaps 
help to fill this breach, or to inspire other theories which do; but of course that remains to be seen. 
Acute/Chronic  
The Acute-Chronic Distinction is discussed by Chapman and Chapman (pages 321-331).  
Changes in symptom patterns over time are hardly surprising if the brain is viewed as a dynamic 
and more-or-less self-organizing system, as we have just seen in the preceding comments about 
paranoia.  In such a system it is likely that an abnormal operation of set-structures at one MnL 
level, or even just an isolated part of such a level, will sometimes disturb the consolidation or 
maintenance of set-structures elsewhere — bringing the possibility that there will be eventual 
profound changes in the overall system.  (A useful rough analogy is offered by consideration of 
the long-term economic consequences of a substantial increase in the price of oil!)  In some cases 
the progression may be propagated through largely internal processes, such as those postulated 
for the paranoid’s decline into hebephrenia; in others the change may be largely brought about by 
external influences such as hospitalization or other institutionalization influences.  But from a 
strictly cybernetic viewpoint, it is not necessarily important to distinguish between such internal 
and external mediators of<415> the exacerbating feedback loops; rather we should ask which 
loops can be broken through our “autonomous” intervention.  Thus we might, because of socio-
political reasons, be powerless to change the “external” influences of hospitalization, and yet we 
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might conceivably be able to stop the progression by medication — though whether this should 
be called “internal” or not is a moot point, and it constitutes another semantic issue. 
Such chronicity should, of course, be taken into account; and it has considerable practical 
implications.  But it looks as though it should properly be regarded as merely secondary as far as 
symptom-analysis is concerned, and not a particularly informative basis from which to try to 
derive a useful fundamental “dimension”.  Of course if we were to get beyond a mere 
consideration of “time served” and look more deeply into the apparent changes of state in the 
various subsystems within the total system, then this would be real progress (and probably 
Utopian progress at that!);  but it is questionable whether such information could be conveniently 
fitted onto one linear dimension, or perhaps even onto any Cartesian coordinate space. 
Two other separate criteria, arising out of Goldstein’s overly inclusive category of “concrete-
ness”, have been proposed as dimension-like dichotomies90 by McGaughran (1954),<416> and 
McGaughran and Moran (1956, 1957) — as outlined by Chapman and Chapman (pages 156-8). 
  Public/Private  
Of these, the Public-Private Distinction might plausibly be attributed to the acceptance of the 
conceptual categories used conventionally within their culture, in the case of non-paranoid 
subjects, or rejection of such conceptualizations in the case of paranoids — either as an 
aggressive gesture against society in retaliation for its supposed malevolence, or for some 
arbitrary reason which has resulted in the past in a “malevolent” response from society, thus 
engendering the feeling of persecution lead to the paranoid state.  Anyhow the findings of 
McGaughran and Moran (1957) and of Silverman and Silverman (1962) found a correlation of 
“privateness” of response with “paranoid-schizophrenia” diagnosis which tends to support this 
view of their common origin. 
Open/Closed  
The other dimension-or-dichotomy arising from these studies is the Open-Closed distinction 
which refers to the use of open-ended categorizations versus closed unique “categories” which 
tend to constitute trivial one-member sets.  The latter one-member tendency turns out to be 
associated with brain-damaged patients rather than schizophrenics — those whose sortings under 
a test were of the type that Goldstein described as ‘stimulus-bound’, or as an excessive response 
to the ‘immediate experience of the given thing or situation in its particular uniqueness’.”  From 
this, and from the typical responses given, there is some basis for believing that these effects in 
brain-<417>damaged patients are symptoms of an underlying defect in which some of the ability 
to place objects into conceptual mathematical-sets has been erased completely; so that the 
individual makes do with individual items instead of the sets which might have contained them, 
and even for these single items he is dependent on the support of perceptual input due to the 
presumed shortage of adequate set-structures to constitute the normal attention-span. 
By contrast, those particular types of schizophrenic which were used in these studies did 
seem to be able to apply concepts like “redness” to the objects which were presented to them, and 
therefore presumably they were able to form.  mentally the mathematical-sets entailed in this type 
of classification.  It is less clear whether or not these subjects had other well-defined set-forming 
aberrations, such as difficulty with M2L control of such activities or whether their performance 
with solid objects is matched by a similar competence with “social objects”.  It might perhaps be 
worth investigating the possibility that in the brain-damaged patients, there is a more uniform 
                                                          
90 Despite McGaughran’s suggestion that these should be seen as continua, it is arguable that this view is 
only applicable to experimental measures, and not to underlying phenomena; or even if they do 
represent some statistical reality, there is nevertheless a discrete basis to them at the micro level.<416> 
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disruption across all types of mathematical-set activity at all levels, while those with experience-
based schizophrenias have defects centring on that particular aspect of set-organization which is 
most related to the schizogenic experience.  Or else, looking at the question more generally, 
perhaps all we should postulate is that there will be a different distribution of set-handling 
deficiencies, without attempting to specify<418> in advance just what the respective distributions 
should be; though from our present structure-oriented point of view this rather amounts to 
admitting temporary defeat!  But of course our “intelligent guesses” at structure depend on there 
being some important and coherent rationale as a historical background to existing mechanisms 
— and arbitrary brain damage is unlikely to have much relevant rationale behind it! 
Attention focus  
The Narrowed-versus-Broadened Attention Distinction — and related effects such as over-
inclusion and distractability.  The literature on this type of symptom is reviewed in Chapman and 
Chapman (Chapter 13, pp 253-285 ), and some of the theoretical issues have already been 
touched on in the present work (Section C5.5, para 3; Section C8.2, paras 13 and 34).91  However our present aim is not so 
much to encompass the whole field as to test the potential explanatory power of the current 
structural theory in isolated typical cases, and in particular in those situations where existing 
explanations have the most difficulty in accounting for the facts (even if, in the end, their 
explanations do seem to be correct).  Accordingly we shall confine our attention here to the 
comparative studies and interpretations offered by Broen (1966) which are discussed in Chapman 
and Chapman (pages 278-280).   ; 
Let us look first at Broen’s concept of “response disorganization” and re-interpret it in terms 
of the<419> current structural theory.  Consider that the individual will generally need to 
discriminate between “dominant” responses (which are, in some sense, to be considered as 
appropriate) and “competing” responses — represented presumably by schemes or schemata 
which are physically available, but are not appropriate in the above sense.  When stated in this 
way, it becomes easy to identify Broen’ s dominant responses with member-schemoids listed in 
an appropriate set-structure and thus having “extensive definition”.  This then would seem to be 
the relevant organization, and its absence would then be the “response disorganization” envisaged 
by Broen.  The practical result of this deficiency would indeed be expected to be “that the 
frequency of the various response alternatives become more nearly equal for schizophrenics than 
for normal subjects”. 
In the present work, we have often come across the idea that there are likely to be many 
categories of set-structure:  notably between MnL levels, but also probably for various different 
areas of activity (presumably also corresponding to different physical areas within the brain, 
though not necessarily distinguishable in macroscopic anatomical terms).  Anyhow it would 
appear that Broen makes at least some distinction of this sort by singling out “focusing 
responses” for special consideration as what amounts to the operation of a particular set-structure 
designated for attention-holding purposes. <420> By way of contrast, the interpretation which 
follows below will envisage at least two relevant organizations for attention — corresponding to 
M1L and M2L thought processes respectively. 
Given certain circumstances which we will come back to shortly, the patient’s attention is 
said to become “narrowed” — thus “reducing the range of stimuli they observe” down to those 
with the strongest “pull” or saliency.  A promising structural interpretation of this progression is 
as follows:-  The patient’s ability to comprehend objects in extensive sets is diminishing, due to 
some breakdown in set-organization in the relevant part of the M0L-M1L interface, leaving the 
                                                          
91 Section C5.5, para 3: o.p.223- “[…”  —   Section C8.2(2) para 4: o.p.386-387 “Looking next…”  — 
and   Section C8.2(4) para 2: o.p.402-403 “Attention is…” 
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patient to do the best he can with the primitive techniques of intensive-definition calling of 
schemata.  Consequently we might well expect that the actual object-schemata which actually 
reach attention will be those “shouting the loudest”, so to speak — which probably means either 
that their elemental molecular representatives are in a majority in some sense, or that sense-
impressions from them have some sort of monopoly over the sensory-input channels.  
Accordingly the patient will tend to fixate on these “salient” items, having lost the ability to give 
a balanced consideration to the full range available to him in the real external world;  or to put it 
in Piagetian terminology, his attention will no longer be “decentré”.  moreover, when the patient 
does shift his attention to some other item such a move is likely to<421> follow syncretic 
associations rather than “logical categories” . 
In other sets of circumstances, also outlined below, there is a loss of the patient’s apparent 
ability to guide himself to the use of “appropriate” criteria when sorting objects.  Instead he will 
seemingly be content to make indiscriminate use of any attribute which he happens to light upon 
as being common to some of the objects, including such features as “shadows or scratches” which 
normal subjects automatically assume to be irrelevant.  (This assumption of irrelevance could 
have a social-norm or formal-logic component; but it is perhaps more likely that it reflects a basic 
M0L awareness of the mathematical-group properties of objects as such, and therefore a feel for 
what is not-real-object but mere sensual artefact like shadows and perspective — accessory 
details which the M1L-stage artist will sensibly ignore until perhaps he acquires the M2L 
sophistication which enables him to rationalize their inclusion again for particular purposes). 
Anyhow it would seem that, although the patient is apparently able to form mental extensive-
sets of objects (as long as other pathologies are absent), he is not keeping proper extensive sets 
for some other feature of the task.  This other feature could be the properties of objects including 
their mathematical-group-like nature, suggesting that the patient’s mental encoding of objects 
must be<422> tending to become mere empty ciphers devoid of genuine object-like 
characterization; — the name or form only, without the substance.  Alternatively the phenomenon 
could be due to the loss of some set-structure which would normally provide guide-lines as to 
which would-be characteristics of objects are worthy of attention.  On the face of it, this seems 
less likely — except insofar as social conventions may be a component in the choice of 
“appropriate” features. 
We may now try to apply these formulations to the first of the two dilemmas which Broen 
considered, but concentrating on the non-paranoid patients for whom the relevant effect was 
greatest (as we might expect on the theoretical grounds outlined earlier).  The dilemma lay in the 
apparently contradictory findings of Payne (1962) and Chapman (1961), because while Payne 
found more “overinclusion” amongst his acute patients, Chapman found more of his version of 
“overinclusion” in his chronic patients.  (Broen himself suggests a solution to this dilemma using 
a somewhat different conceptual approach.  It can plausibly be argued that his explanation is 
formally compatible in its essentials with the one given below; but that is an issue which we will 
not pursue here in any depth). 
Payne’s concept of “overinclusion” amounted to his subjects using the very “shadows or 
scratches” which we have just been discussing.  Such a “response disorganization”, arguably in 
the form of a loss of appreciation of<423> the “objectness” of objects, is in keeping with the sort 
of defect that one might expect from a non-paranoid schizophrenic — if the current theory is on 
the right track.  There is, however, no obvious reason why such symptoms (and their underlying 
mechanisms) should diminish over time as originally-“acute” patients turn into “chronic” 
patients”.  On the other hand though, it is quite plausible that this condition’s underlying 
mechanisms might remain more-or-less constant and yet the manifest effects arising from them 
might disappear somewhat with chronicity due to the masking action of some other development.  
422 
423 
424
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f 
Ps
yc
ho
si
s 
——
 C
8.
3 
 C
ri
ti
qu
e 
of
 A
cc
ep
te
d 
Cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
on
s 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 190  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  190  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
That, in fact, is the essential point made in Broen’s explanation, and he identities the new 
development as the “narrowed observation” with which we began about four paragraphs ago. 
By contrast, Chapman’s (1961) version of “overinclusion” involved the gratuitous addition of 
items which were approximately correct by virtue of some sort of association.  Such errors can 
reasonably be identified as syncretic thought, lacking the set-structure guidance of reliable 
extensive-definition of object sets, and so indicative of one form of mental decline.  Not only that, 
but it is not difficult to imagine that such a deficiency could pre-empt the manifestation of 
Paynes’s type of overinclusion — though the argument is scarcely clearcut enough to actually 
make reliable predictions of this sort.  (That, of course, is unfortunate; and it is to be hoped that 
future developments will remedy this situation).<424> 
The second dilemma investigated by Broen (1966) was the apparent disparity between the 
findings of Venables (1964) and Chapman (1956).  According to Venables, chronic schizophren-
ics attend to a range of stimuli which is narrower than normal; and of course that is very much 
what we might expect from the theory of schizophrenia adopted in the present work, and the 
discussion of six paragraphs back in particular.  However Chapman (1956) had found that the 
same general category of patient (chronic schizophrenics) were more distractable than normal 
subjects, and this seemed to imply that they therefore had a wider span of attention than the 
normal.  In retrospect this might perhaps be seen as a semantic dispute over the term “wideness of 
span”:-  Does it mean the wideness of a narrowly-focussed but highly-rotatable searchlight beam?   
Or does it mean the wideness of a parachute-flare?   Anyhow Broen offered what seems to be a 
very credible explanation along these lines, attributing the different experimental implications to 
the centripetal and centrifugal effects of the more salient items in the two respective cases; and 
such an explanation would appear to be entirely compatible with structural accounts of syncretic 
thought (in default of extensive set-structure) as expounded here. 
In closing  
Some closing comments about the strengths and weaknesses of such explanatory exercises 
are, perhaps, called for at this stage.  Attention is (apparently) a phenomenon of some consider-
able complexity;  and the<425> current theory, with its emphasis on potentially-detailed 
substructure, is likely to have a lot to say about complex phenomena.  Indeed the trouble is that it 
is likely to have too many possible explanations to offer, and the difficulty will then be in 
deciding which ones, if any, are likely to be correct — and in what combinations, and under what 
circumstances.  In other words, we have a situation in which the stock criticism “It explains 
everything but predicts nothing” might be partly justified.  Nevertheless we should perhaps be 
content for the moment to have a theory which does tend to “explain everything” — that is, one 
which offers too many plausible structurally-based solutions rather than none at all.  However, to 
the extent that it is true that such explanations “predict nothing”, this would be a clear indication 
that further work and elaboration is called for to fill in structural, qualitative and quantitative 
details of the theory and its implications. 
C8.4  Aetiological Issues:   By what mechanisms are Psychoses likely to Originate?   
It is clear that there are at least two different categories of cause for schizophrenia:  
“Anybody who at this stage of our knowledge takes a wholly genetic or wholly environmental 
view of aetiology is clearly in error” (Venables, 1975);  so obviously any theoretical approach to 
the problem must be compatible with both.  Moreover it seems likely that there are also different 
sub-categories within each of these two areas:  different<426> parts of the presumed structural 
organization which are affected differently by different genetic factors, and also various 
qualitative types of initial disruption to set-organization which are likely to arise from different 
experiential anomalies.  Any truly detailed explication of these causal chains will probably have 
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to await a detailed exposition of the underlying mechanisms, be they molecular or whatever.  But 
meanwhile, we have now developed the present theory sufficiently for us to be able to indicate 
the likely broad outline of the processes leading to psychoses in general, and those relatively 
enduring psychotic states which we include under the term “schizophrenia” in particular.  The 
experience-based aetiologies seem to be the most difficult of these to conceptualize, so we shall 
leave them till last; but the others can now be outlined quite briefly, given the conceptual frame-
work which has been elaborated in the present work so far.  Let us start with the schizomimetic 
effects as discussed in Chapman and Chapman (Chapter 15):- 
Drugs.  
For any theory which postulates that crucial activities are being carried on at the molecular 
level, it is patently obvious that drugs are likely to produce specific disruptions to particular parts 
of the proposed mechanism Offhand, for instance LSD and Mescaline might both stop the 
efficient activity of at least some of the extensive-set mechanisms — though arguably there 
would be a differential impact on different categories of such mechanism.  Then maybe Sernyl 
somehow interferes with the<427> proper operation of the supposed “tag” effects, leading to 
feelings of unreality or depersonalization.  Likewise perhaps Amphetamine has an impeding 
effect on the schemata related to the ego, thus promoting a predisposition toward paranoid 
feelings.  (These illustrations are offered merely as impressionistic examples, and should not be 
taken too seriously as they stand).  Anyhow, given the present conceptual framework and a 
measure of good fortune, systematic investigations along these lines could conceivably be highly 
rewarding. 
Brain Damage.  
The present work has been primarily concerned with an ultra-micro view of the brain’s 
supposed activities, but clearly there are also meaningful things to be said about the same system 
when viewed in grosser terms (just as there is value in viewing aspects of economic phenomena 
both at the level of the individual and at the level of the firm — or industry, or nation).  However 
our more macro pronouncements are likely to make better sense if we have a proper understand-
ing, of the micro-phenomena, which are the basis of the macro-phenomena; — and having made 
better sense of the macro data we will then be in a better position to use it to shed further light on 
the micro-phenomena.  In other words, there is room for profitable mutual cooperation between 
these two viewpoints.<428> 
Thus the concepts involving intensive and extensive set-defining mechanisms postulated 
here, offer some new dimensions to the interpretation of the significance of brain lesions and any 
tendency there may be for the patient to recover from them; while of course brain-lesion data is 
very useful in clarifying some of the “geographical” mathematical-set-tendencies within the 
brain, and also its behavioural consequences provide useful benchmarks against which 
schizophrenic behaviour patterns can be usefully compared.  If, for instance, we can identify the 
behaviour patterns of brain-damaged patients in terms of set-structure failure (and this seems 
likely), then it is likely to be an informative exercise to account for different distributions of the 
types of such failure in the two cases — with a reasonable chance of thereby shedding some light 
on the way the brain system is organized, and what aspects are most vulnerable to the different 
types of disruption. 
Sleep Deprivation.  
Section C6.6 of the present work suggests that sleep may constitute special consolidation-
periods in which set-structures are vetted for their “internal closure”, and that the coherence or 
“sanity” of surviving mental configurations is therefore likely to depend on this sleep activity.  
Accordingly we should not be surprised if sleep deprivation produces symptoms which resemble 
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the more permanent ones of schizophrenia.  Moreover we can reasonably go further and suggest 
that a<429> selective deprivation of orthodox sleep (if that were possible) would selectively 
impoverish the M0L level initially, while selective deprivation of REM sleep will preferentially 
upset the M1L coherence.  As an interesting further speculation we might consider whether 
meditation or “time to collect one’s thoughts” might serve the same sort of function for the M2L 
level of logical thought; so perhaps such “high pressure” treatment as Speeded Performance 
could be expected to produce psychomimetic symptoms in the form of a trend toward non-logical 
Primary Process thinking.  Flavell et al.’s (1958) findings might conceivably be interpreted in 
these terms, though of course it is unwise to make too much of such an analysis post hoc — and 
one should rather design new experiments specifically based on the new conceptualizations.  
(Chapman and Chapman, page 317). 
Sensory Deprivation.  
It has been part of the general philosophy of the present work that the development and 
maintenance of useful set-structures within the brain (like useful concepts in science) depend on 
two complementary processes.  These are the testing of internal consistency (as just discussed in 
connection with sleep), and secondly the testing of the external consistency of one’s mental 
structures vis a vis reality, by means of a more-or-less continual interaction between these 
domains.  Clearly any prolonged sensory deprivation will interfere with this latter process and 
therefore, according to our<430> theory, some progressive deterioration of some aspects of 
mental organization are likely.  (This indeed may be taken as a special case of a more general 
biological principle that organization tends to depend on the relevant structure actually being 
used.  For example, an unused limb will tend to atrophy or develop inappropriately — apparently 
because its development and maintenance actually depend on the cues given by the stresses of life 
interacting with the system).  Anyhow, suffice it here to say that such schizomimetic symptoms 
arising as a consequence of sensory deprivation would seem to be very much compatible with the 
current theory. 
Incidental Minor  
Other schizomimetic-inducers could be interpreted as acting through some aspect of the 
brain’s overall set-structural organization other than the actual set-structure in question.  In other 
words, it looks as though the self-stabilizing activities of this focal schema are specifically 
disrupted by the interfering “exogenous” action of some other schema within the total system.  It 
will suffice for our present purposes if we merely identify the conditions which might plausibly 
be operating in this way, and also suggest the likely route of their presumed intervention.    
● Relaxed Attention is produced by conscious intent, so we may presume that it is the complex 
ego-schema which deliberately lets certain set-supporting activities lapse, temporarily.    
● In Distraction there is a (voluntary or involuntary) overload on the attention, thus 
disrupting<431> its proper function; and the source will presumably be the intrusion of irrelevant 
stimuli and their internal coding — unless perhaps we choose to blame the ego-schema again, for 
the “voluntary” situations.    
● Hypnosis, insofar as we understand it at all, does seem to be exactly such an intervention — 
instigated and controlled by that other special schema representing supposedly-social demands:  
the superego.    
● Operant Training may be devised by the experimenter to produce deviant responses; and this 
presumably operates through normal “ordinary” set-structures — and probably via essentially 
commonplace mutations to the focal set-structure itself, or to some other such structure normally 
instrumental in maintaining it. 
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Perception manipulation  
Disruption of Perception such as Aaronson’s (1967) use of posthypnotic suggestion to induce 
the subject to believe that the normal “unquestionable” laws of nature had ceased to operate.  
Such a situation (which did in fact produce psychotic symptoms) would presumably have been 
seen by the subject as unwelcome evidence that he was losing his control over happenings in the 
external world.  It thus turns out to be (subjectively and temporarily) a case of a general 
experiential arrangement which does lead to schizophrenia, and which rather looks like being the 
main-or-only experiential cause of schizophrenia.  We shall come to this issue almost 
immediately, and conclude this section on that note;  but first let us<432> deal with the question 
of inheritable pre-dispositions toward schizophrenia:- 
Genetic Factors promoting Schizophrenia.  
When an engineer sets out to design an aircraft or a bridge, he will have to assume the 
competing demands of maximal strength versus minimal weight-or-cost — and probably other 
troublesome variables as well, like pollution-rate, resonance-frequency range and specificity, 
wind-resistance characteristics, and so on.  If the final project is to be viable, taking the total 
existing conditions into account, then the “dimensional space” into which the design must fit will 
be comparatively small — and probably very much more restricted than the naive commentator 
might expect.  Similarly, if the body is to avoid undue risk of infection and yet not have such an 
active immunological system that it destroys its own useful structures, then there will be a 
definite limitation to the range of acceptable “designs” for such a system; (though in practice 
here, the “design” will be by the rather uncomfortable process of natural selection). 
It is not necessary to know all the details (about how molecular-based set-structures might 
operate) for us to realize that such a system is bound to have many aspects where the details of 
adjustment have to be “pre-designed” in much the same way.  Thus it will be no good to the 
individual if his set structures are so stable that no new evidence can make any impression on 
these structures (nor find an appropriate mutant version);  but on the<433> other hand the 
individual will also come to grief if his set-structures are so adaptable that no encoding of 
experience-based discoveries can be relied on to retain its information unchanged.  The 
compromise required here is presumably between over-creativity and ultra-conservatism, but the 
basic principle of finding the proper balance between conflicting demands appears to be the same.  
Moreover, in the absence of “genetic engineering”, the acceptable range will have to be found 
and maintained by the same unfair survival-of-the-fittest principle as that applying to 
immunological systems — though perhaps we are now talking about the survival of “mental 
health” rather than life itself.  However the settings of these values will only “set the stage”; and 
actual “mental survival” will also depend on experiential factors:- 
Schizogenic Environmental Conditions.  
It will be helpful to start by comparing some of the likely properties of ordinary mental 
schemata with those of the special ego schema.  For one thing, the ramifications of the ego will 
almost certainly be much more far-reaching than those of any other schema; and this presumably 
amounts to saying that the ego-structure will be very much “bigger”, in terms of membership and 
internal-closure-loops, than any other mental schema.  Thus, if the individual has managed to 
assemble any recognizable ego-set at all, then the mutual corroboration amongst the closure loops 
of this complex set-structure will probably make it substantially more stable than any other 
mental schema.  So on primarily structural grounds we have some reason to<434> believe that 
the ego-schema has a privileged stability status, and that is likely to mean that responses to its 
attempted disruption will appear to be qualitatively different from similar attempts on the 
integrity of other existing schemata. 
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If we look at the same issue from a functional viewpoint, it seems reasonable to regard the 
ego-structure as the sine qua non of a humanoid being’s mental organization.  In other words, like 
the King in chess, its integrity is equated with that of the system as a whole and cannot be 
regarded as negotiable, whatever the price.  (Not that the brain would have been assembled 
according to any consciously argued “design”, but presumably nature has had to keep trying until 
the appropriate arbitrary mutants present themselves for selection).  So, on these grounds too, we 
might expect the ego to be especially protected from any serious threat to its essential integrity, 
even though other ordinary set-structures might come to be radically altered or superseded. 
In this context, it is interesting to consider Masserman’s (1971) view that psychoses (and 
other mental dysfunctions) arise from particular types of uncertainty concerning the environment 
— and the individual’s own ability to cope with it:-  “Doubts and trepidations about our capacit-
ies to predict and cope with impending and important events induce the internal physiological 
signals we interpret as ‘anxiety’, and variably actuate<435> the symbolically evasive (phobic), 
hopefully repetitive (compulsive ritualistic), regressive-dependent (depressive), reactively 
overassertive (paranoid), dysaffective and dereistic (schizoid), and other individualized attempts 
at mastery or denial which, depending on the extent and duration of their deviation from current 
cultural norms, are then labelled ‘ideosyncratic’, ‘neurotic’, ‘sociopathic’, or ‘psychotic’”. 
Moreover we can get a clearer insight into the type of uncertainty which is involved here.  
The account given by Kimmel (1971a) traces the laboratory evidence on this effect to Yerofeeva 
(1916), and especially to Shenger-Krestovnikova (1921) whose experiment, with dogs, entailed a 
learned discrimination between circles and ellipses.  Uncertainty was introduced in the latter case, 
by progressively using ellipses which were more-and-more circle-like — thus presumably 
eroding the dogs’ confidence that they could really cope with a discrimination which they thought 
they had mastered.  Anyhow the result was:  “a neurotic-like breakdown without the use of any 
aversive stimulation whatever”.  One might perhaps quibble as to whether this might actually be 
classed as an aversive stimulus, though obviously it is not what one normally understands the 
term to mean; but we may recall that the current theory takes it that the accomplishment of 
internal closure should be regarded as rewarding-in-itself and accompanied by subjective feelings 
of satisfaction, so presumably a loss<436> of internal-closure will be unpleasant.  Anyhow we 
can see that the two conceptualizations seem to be compatible, and the merely semantic difficulty 
should cause us no real problem. 
If we can agree that the dog does feel this situation as casting uncertainty into its felt-ability 
to cope — as an attack on its ego-schema in other words — then according to the principles of 
privileged-protection for the ego put forward above, the dog will go to almost any extreme to try 
to redeem the situation.  One interesting point is that the resulting breakdown was described as 
“neurotic-like” rather than psychotic.  Perhaps we should not read too much into the distinction, 
but suppose we do take it at face-value;  Why is it a neurotic response rather than a psychotic one?   
And what has happened to our explanation for schizophrenia?   
One clue to the latter question is the course supposedly taken by some cases of paranoia (see 
Section C8.3 paragraph 10, and other references mentioned there)[1st para on o.p.415!!  Next perhaps?].  There we had a condition 
with an arguable status as an initial neurosis, but with inbuilt tendencies to progress into 
psychosis.  One interesting possibility is that whereas “paranoia”, as usually categorized, entails a 
more-or-less conscious mistrust of social objects and processes;  perhaps some other types of 
neurosis could be described as a less conscious, lower MnL level, mistrust of rather more-basic 
aspects of the environment.  Such neuroses might<437> perhaps then run a similar risk of 
progressing into psychosis, though, if they were low MnL types, they might tend toward more 
hebephrenic or “Process” categories of schizophrenia. 
437
438
436
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
 o
f 
Ps
yc
ho
si
s 
——
 C
8.
4 
 C
au
se
s 
of
 S
ch
iz
om
im
et
ic
 s
ym
pt
om
s 
 MO L E C U L A R   E X P L A N A T I O N  F O R  I N T E L L I G E N C E 195  of  207  
 
Thesis (Part C) —  © R.R.Traill, 1978, 2006 , 2007  195  of  207 Brunel University Research Archive   /   Ondwelle   
 
original
page-Nos
↓ 
As for “why …  neurotic?”, there is no obvious clearcut answer (if indeed the claim is well 
founded).  Suppose however we were to postulate a wider category of paranoid-like neuroses on 
the lines just suggested, and envisaged them as all resulting from various different sorts of 
dangerously-close attacks on the ego; then from a structural point of view we might expect to find 
some rather desperate attempts to save the closure of the ego-structure by “amputating” that part 
of it which seemed to have become contaminated, and re-closing the remainder of the ego-
elements into a somewhat diminished ego-structure.  (This, of course is substantially what Laing 
suggests (1960); but the main difference is that we are here considering a basically similar 
process for a wider range of basic structures associated with the ego-structure, and not just the 
more social-object phenomena of traditional paranoids). 
There is though, something appealing about the supposed origin in an attack on the ego-
structure.  That, after all, is what neurotic defense-mechanisms are supposed to be intimately 
involved in.  Moreover, it could be this very feature which makes for the greater stability and 
duration in schizophrenia proper — as opposed to mere schizomimetic psychoses which perhaps 
always result from<438> attacks on schemata other than the ego itself. 
C8.5  Which Direction For Future Research?   
We started in Section C1.1 by contemplating Chapman and Chapman’s (1973) ideas concern-
ing future research into schizophrenia; and it was suggested that a mere tightening up of statistical 
design (on operationalist/behaviourist lines) as proposed by them, was not likely to produce 
greatly improved insight.  Since then, some quite complex structures have been postulated here, 
on theoretical grounds, to account for schizophrenia and associated phenomena; so it is now 
pertinent to ask whether Chapman and Chapman’s proposed conventional and objective approach 
could ever have led to such complex conceptualizations, unaided by the “less respectable” 
techniques such as those used here. 
Note that even if the theory offered here should turn out to be totally wrong, it would 
nevertheless have served to show that the underlying mechanism could plausibly be very much 
more complex (though orderly) than most psychological or computer-models would have us 
believe; so that doubt must remain concerning the practical usefulness of Chapman and 
Chapman’s proposal for future research. 
It should be recognized that there are important uses for theories which spell out structural 
details of the supposed micro-structure, and that one of these uses is to guide the experimenter to 
those correlations-or-whatever which it might be most profitable to investigate.  If the<439> lead 
should turn out to have been a false one, then at worst one has simply just done yet another 
experiment which has not done much to further our insight; but in practice it is likely that we can 
achieve some worthwhile modification of the structural theory which will enable us to try again. 
In fact, in general, we may expect a useful interplay between the two approaches at many 
stages of an investigation:  from initial considerations to concluding interpretations.  Indeed, 
according to the epistemological arguments outlined in Section C1.1, there is little basis for 
adopting either experimental-investigation, nor internal-closure-seeking as the superior approach; 
rather we should consider the two as complementary.  So let us, by all means, press on with 
suitable experimental studies; but we would do well to press on with structural theoretical 
developments also — and use these two approaches in a mutually guiding and supporting 
collaboration.<440> 
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